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Comparisons play an essential role in our lives.1 When considering what 
patients should get treated first in the emergency room, we compare 
health conditions. We compare how promising different TV shows are 
when we decide how to entertain ourselves. We compare the menus of 
lunch restaurants to decide where to eat. We compare destinations before 
planning weekend trips. We compare career prospects before choosing 
what to study – and so on. Many comparisons like these are made with-
out hesitation. To many, but, of course, not all, it is obvious that patients 
with gunshot wounds should be treated before those with sprained 
ankles, that The Sopranos is better than Days of Our Lives, that the local 
Italian restaurant is better than McDonald’s, that a weekend in Paris is 
better than a weekend in Slough, and that the career prospects of a law-
yer are better than those of a race car driver. However, some comparisons 
are not easy. Feelings of being at a loss and struggling when trying to 
determine what option is best are familiar to most of us. This book is 
about those hard comparisons when no option is at least as good as all 
the alternatives. It is about the situations in which it seems impossible to 
rank options in conventional ways and it seems as though conventional 
comparisons themselves are impossible—the book is about what can be 
broadly called “incommensurability.”
Examples of incommensurability abound. When Sartre’s student, dur-
ing World War II, faced the choice of joining the French resistance in 
England to fight the occupying Germans or staying in France and take 
care of his elderly mother, the alternatives seemed incommensurable 
(Sartre 1975). When asked if Mozart or Michelangelo is the better art-
ist, many think that they are incommensurable (Chang 2002), and when 
contemplating whether deafness reduces one’s health more or less than 
muteness, the health conditions seem incommensurable (Hausman 2015). 
Even though the stakes and values involved may differ significantly, these 
comparisons have one thing in common: they are comparisons in which 
we cannot determinately judge which alternative is best nor do the alter-
natives seem equally as good. Furthermore, the phenomenon does not 
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seem to be merely an epistemic problem. The problem is not lack of 
knowledge. Studying the alternatives and asking friends or experts will 
not help determine whether patriotic duties are more important than fil-
ial duties, whether music is a higher art than sculpting, or whether hear-
ing is more important than speaking. This book addresses how to make 
sense of examples such as these, incommensurability in general, its role in 
ethical theory, and its implications for decision-making.
There is ongoing debate about how to best account for examples 
such as the aforementioned. Some believe some items simply cannot 
be compared at all: they are incomparable (Raz 1986). Some believe 
they are examples of comparisons in which the items relate to each 
other in non-conventional ways (Chang 2002; Rabinowicz 2008). 
Some believe they are comparisons in which it is indeterminate which 
of the conventional rankings hold between the two items (Broome 
1997). In this introduction, we do not side with any camp in this 
debate and therefore use the familiar term “incommensurability” to 
cover all these possibilities.
The theoretical interest in incommensurability is due to the fact that 
it indicates that not everything needs to be related by a “better than,” 
“worse than,” or “equally as good” relation. This is puzzling since often-
used comparative predicates allow us to rank all things they apply to 
using the analogues of these relations. All things that have some length, 
weight, or age can, for instance, be pairwise compared in terms of longer/
heavier/older than or shorter/lighter/younger than, and the comparison, 
at least theoretically, allows for the possibility of the things being equally 
as long/heavy/old. These three types of comparatives exhaust all possible 
relations between things that have length, weight, or age. The possibility 
of incommensurability indicates that some predicates are different: when 
two things are incommensurable, neither is determinately better than the 
other nor are they equally as good as each other. Hence, they are related 
in some other manner.
The possibility that the three standard value relations might not fully 
exhaust all possibilities actualizes some very general problems for axiology 
and normative theory. In axiology, the possibility of incommensurability 
would entail that conventional, one-dimensional value representations 
(e.g., real numbers) cannot accurately represent values and that conven-
tional one-dimensional operators in betterness orderings must be com-
plemented with additional ones. In normative theory, it is often assumed 
that the correct (or most plausible) normative view can always fully deter-
mine a course of action that is at least as good as (or at least as choice-
worthy as) all alternatives. If courses of action can be incommensurable, 
that assumption seems misguided. The possibility of incommensurability 
might be most obviously worrying for consequentialists who believe that 
one ought to always act such that the act maximizes total goodness, but 
it is equally troublesome for non-consequentialists who espouse the idea 
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that one ought to do that which one has most reason to do. If two differ-
ent acts, X and Y, lead to outcomes that are incommensurable in value, 
conventional consequentialism fails to provide guidance. If the reasons 
to do X are neither stronger than, weaker than, nor equally as strong as 
the reasons to do Y, non-consequentialist views that one should do what 
one has most reason to do fail to provide guidance. An early example 
of such potential incommensurability can be found in The Methods of 
Ethics, in which the author Henry Sidgwick (Sidgwick, 1981) discusses 
the dualism of practical reason. According to Sidgwick, what is morally 
right can sometimes conflict with what is prudentially right. Since our 
duty and self-interest are derived from different basic principles, it will be 
impossible to find a common scale on which the two kinds of right can 
be weighed. This gives rise to a dualism of practical reason that on some 
occasions can lead to conflicting requirements and incommensurability.
However, the possibility of incommensurability can also provide oppor-
tunities. The dilemma of Sartre’s student can illustrate the importance of 
creating an identity and meaning in life. The fact that neither option was 
at least as good as the other means that the student could make the choice 
in another way: he could invent a solution. Thus, recognizing that moral 
codes sometimes fail to determine what one ought to do (and thus by 
recognizing incommensurability) creates a space for agency, individual 
freedom, and creativity. At a more general level, by accepting that options 
are sometimes incommensurable with respect to some criteria (e.g., what 
is morally and prudentially right), theoretical space for other criteria is 
created (e.g., what is most in line with one’s previous choices).
In the rest of this introduction, we will provide some historical back-
ground to the philosophical work on incommensurability, as well as an 
overview of contemporary research on the subject. At the end of the 
introduction, we will provide summaries of the chapters in this volume.
1  The History of Incommensurability
Philosophical interest in comparability problems dates back at least to 
the Pythagoreans, a philosophical-mystical movement that was thriving 
in the sixth century BC. According to Western tradition, based largely 
on some remarks of Aristotle in his Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1984: 986a, 
987b, 1080b), the Pythagoreans believed that intrinsic properties of num-
bers and their ratios (arithmos) could explain all there is in the world: 
“They assumed the elements of numbers to be the elements of everything, 
and the whole universe to be a proportion or number” (Aristotle, 1984: 
986a). As a historian of mathematics put it, “the essence of all things, 
in geometry as well as in the practical and theoretical affairs of man, is 
explained in terms of arithmos, or intrinsic properties of whole numbers 
or their ratios” (Boyer and Merzbach 2011: 65). Emboldened by this gen-
eral belief in the explanatory powers of mathematics, the Pythagoreans 
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took an interest in studying both relations between mathematical objects 
and more worldly phenomena. To their great chagrin, however, while 
studying geometry, they discovered that sometimes whole numbers and 
their ratios cannot describe all relations, the paradigmatic example being 
the ratio of the lengths of the side and the diagonal of a unit square, 
although it has been argued that they first discovered that all whole num-
bers and their ratios cannot describe all relations by studying pentagons 
(Von Fritz, 1970).2
In modern times, the term “incommensurability” has been used with 
two very different meanings. On one hand, it has come to play a promi-
nent role in the philosophy of science and philosophy of language ever 
since Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend used the term to describe the 
possibility that certain propositions cannot be translated from one scien-
tific framework (or conceptual schema) to another (Feyerabend, 1978; 
Kuhn 1962). If Kuhn and Feyerabend are right about the possibility 
of such incommensurability, there could, for instance, be propositions 
within the Pythagorean scientific framework that cannot be translated 
or even understood within our modern scientific framework. We would 
have reason to doubt that we could ever, even in principle, understand 
what the Pythagoreans meant when they described the world.3
The term “incommensurability” has also stood in the center of discus-
sions of potential problems when comparing the value or choiceworthi-
ness of different things in ethics, value theory, and political philosophy. 
This use of the term can in modern times be traced to Isaiah Berlin, who, 
in his 1958 lecture “Two Concepts of Liberty,” suggested that the incom-
patibility between different types of liberties might be an instantiation 
of a clash between absolute and incommensurable values (Berlin 1969). 
Following Berlin, in the second half of the twentieth century, there is rich 
literature that outlines different suggestions as to what one might mean 
by claiming that values are incommensurable. For instance, Bernard 
Williams suggested that the claim could mean (i) denial of the idea that 
there is a unique currency that can be used to compare all values; (ii) 
denial of the idea that, for each value conflict, there is some indepen-
dent value that can resolve the conflict; (iii) denial of the idea that, for 
each value conflict, there is some value an appeal to which can rationally 
resolve the conflict; or (iv) that there is no rational solution to any value 
conflict (Williams 1981: 77). Meanwhile, James Griffin suggested that 
there are five kinds of incommensurability: (a) incomparability—neither 
of two values is more valuable than the other, but they are not equally 
valuable either, (b) trumping—any amount of one value is more valuable 
than any amount of another value, (c) weighting—differently weighted 
values cannot be reduced to an unweighted common scale, (d) disconti-
nuity—a certain amount of some value is more valuable than any amount 
of another value, and (e) pluralism—there are irreducibly many values 
(Griffin 1986: 77–92).
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The contemporary notion of incommensurability, which is the focus 
of this book, can be said to originate in the work of Joseph Raz and his 
focus on the failure of transitivity and the identification of the “mark of 
incommensurability” (Raz 1986: 325–326). According to Raz, incom-
mensurability (which he equates with incomparability) obtains when 
“neither of [two options] is better than the other nor are they of equal 
value” (Raz 1986: 326). He proposes that one can identify incommensu-
rability with the following test:
Two valuable options are incommensurable if (1) neither is better 
than the other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option which is 
better than one but is not better than the other.
(Raz 1986: 325)
This passage is important for the development of research on incom-
mensurability in two ways. On one hand, it expresses a focus on valuable 
options (as opposed to previous writings that oscillate between talking 
about options, values, and the general state of affairs). On the other hand, 
Raz identifies the “mark of incommensurability” by providing a test 
that makes salient the general conditions on which most contemporary 
research on incommensurability focuses. (However, much contemporary 
incommensurability research disagrees with Raz about whether this indi-
cates incomparability or some other phenomenon such as indeterminacy 
or parity):
We have here a simple way of determining whether two options are 
commensurate given that neither is better than the other. If it is possi-
ble for one of them to be improved without thereby becoming better 
than the other, or if there can be another option which is better than 
the one but not better than the other, then the two original options 
are incommensurate.
(Raz 1986: 325–326)
Contemporary with Griffin’s and Raz’s discussions in the 1980s and 
inspired also by work in social choice theory (e.g., Sen 1970; Fishburn 
1973), Derek Parfit discussed the possibility that the not worse than 
relation was not transitive. For Parfit, puzzling results in population eth-
ics indicated the possibility that two things need not always be related 
with a precise better than, worse than, or equally as good relation (Parfit 
1984: 431). Each of these three value relations could be “roughed up,” 
according to Parfit. Much contemporary discussion of incommensurabil-
ity continues in the tradition started by these three philosophers, and it 
is against this backdrop the contemporary discussions of incommensu-
rability are placed.
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2  Terminology
An important controversy in the background of philosophical discus-
sions of the nature, importance, and implications of incommensurability 
has concerned what to actually call the phenomena one is interested in. 
As seen earlier, the term “incommensurability” has been used with many 
different meanings. This has led to different authors using different terms 
to refer to the same phenomenon, but it has also led authors to use the 
same term to refer to different phenomena. To readers not familiar with 
the literature, this can be very confusing.
The two most common terms in the discourse are “incommensurable” 
and “incomparable.” Some, such as Joseph Raz, use these terms inter-
changeably (Raz 1986; Anderson 1993). Others, such as Ruth Chang, 
argue that “incommensurability” ought to be given its etymologically 
correct meaning: two things that cannot be placed on the same cardi-
nal scale are incommensurable (Chang 1997, 2015). If two things are 
incommensurable, we cannot say how much better one is in comparison 
with the other in terms of some cardinal scale of units of value. It might, 
however, be possible to say that one of them is better than the other. In 
situations in which no positive characterization can be given of the com-
parative relation that holds between two objects, Chang uses the term 
“incomparable.” She thinks that it is important to distinguish incommen-
surability from incomparability because she thinks that each notion cap-
tures a distinctly important phenomenon.
If a value bearer is neither better than, worse than, nor equally as good 
as the other, they have commonly been believed to be incomparable. 
However, as some argue, value bearers can be positively related in more 
ways than previously believed. For this reason, “incomparable” ought 
not to be defined in terms of “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally as 
good,” but rather in terms of a lack of any positive, binary, generic com-
parative relation. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to claim that incom-
parability is a ternary relation. A is incomparable with B with respect to 
C if and only if no positive, binary, generic comparative relation holds 
between A and B with respect to C. The third item, C, is what Chang 
(1997) refers to as the “covering consideration.” It does not make much 
sense to say that “Paris is better than Slough” simpliciter.4 Such claims 
only make sense when we clarify what covering consideration we have in 
mind; for example, “Paris is better than Slough with respect to a romantic 
and cultural weekend destination.” The same is true for incomparability 
claims: we need to specify in respect to what covering consideration the 
things are supposed to be incomparable.
Introducing the idea of covering consideration also allows us to dis-
tinguish noncomparability from incomparability. Some covering con-
siderations do not apply to some value bearers, and this allows for 
noncomparability. For instance, the claim that the color blue is better 
than the number four with respect to taste seems like an absurdity; what 
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we have here is an example of noncomparability (Chang 1997). This 
somewhat absurd comparison problem seems, however, less worrying 
from the perspective of practical reasoning. Why would we ever need to 
compare a color and a number with respect to their tastiness?
Some follow Chang’s use of the term “incomparable” but interpret 
“incommensurable” somewhat differently. They use the term to refer to a 
relation such that if it holds between two items, then neither is determi-
nately better than the other nor are they determinately equally as good 
(Rabinowicz 2008). “Incommensurability” used as a catch-all term is thus 
compatible with, among other possibilities, incomparability and parity, 
and all non-conventional value relations fall under its umbrella. Other 
terms used to refer to this plethora of possible value relations are “non-
determinacy” (Herlitz 2019, 2020) and “triply not true” (Boot 2017).
While we agree that Chang’s use of the term “incommensurable” seems 
etymologically correct and that there is good reason to keep the ideas of 
not being cardinally measurable and not being comparable apart, since 
there is no standard umbrella term to denote the range of possible ways 
to understand hard comparisons, we will co-opt the term “incommensu-
rability” for practical reasons to encompass all non-conventional com-
parative relations. We will thus use the term “incommensurable” in this 
introduction but encourage the reader to be aware of the different uses of 
the term by different authors throughout the book.
3  Reasons to Accept Incommensurability
People are attracted by the possibility of incommensurability for many 
different reasons. A straightforward reason to accept the prevalence of 
incommensurability is that some of the things we value (and have rea-
son to value) are very different from one another. For instance, most 
people value pleasure, social relations, and achieving goals that they set 
for themselves. For those who accept that there is a plethora of practi-
cal reasons and values and adhere to some pluralistic account of rea-
sons and value, it seems highly plausible that these can come into conflict 
in the sense that we cannot determinately judge how they relate to one 
another. At the very least, one needs an argument for the opposite view, 
the assumption that it is always, in principle, possible to determine which 
of two options is better than the other or that they are equally good. The 
burden of proof seems to lie with those who reject incommensurability.
In what follows, we will present what seem like the most convincing 
arguments for the possibility of incommensurability being instantiated.
3.1  Dilemmas
The possibility of incommensurability can be argued for by referring to 
the existence of moral dilemmas. Consider the situation Sophie faces 
in the novel Sophie’s Choice (Styron 1979). When Sophie and her two 
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children arrive at a concentration camp in Nazi Germany, a guard forces 
her to choose which child gets to live and which child gets to die. If she 
does not choose, both children will be killed. In such a horrific situation 
the alternatives seem incomparable. It is, however, not clear whether this 
constitutes an example of incommensurability. Perhaps the alternatives 
are equally as bad and the dilemma instead ought to be understood in 
terms of conflicting obligations (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988). Or perhaps 
moral dilemmas only show that some values are irreplaceable. This could 
mean that even if one alternative is better than another, the value of the 
outcome cannot fully replace the loss that comes with not choosing the 
other alternative (Griffin 1997).
3.2  The Wrongness of Comparisons
Joseph Raz (1986) introduced the notion of constitutive incomparability. 
He argued that certain things ought not to be compared. For example, 
money ought not to be compared with spending time with one’s spouse. 
Exchanging money for time with one’s loved ones has symbolic signifi-
cance. According to Raz (1986: 348), “Significant social forms, which 
delineate the basic shape of the projects and relationships which consti-
tute human well-being, depend on a combination of incommensurability 
with a total refusal even to consider exchanging one incommensurate 
option for another.” To have certain relationships one must thereby con-
clude that certain values are incommensurable: the relationship itself is 
partly constituted by the belief that it is not exchangeable for money.
Elizabeth Anderson (1993) has developed a similar argument in favor 
of incommensurability. Sometimes when we make a comparison, it makes 
no sense to compare the two goods, all things considered. If the value of 
an object is understood in terms of its being rational to value the object, 
then, since it is not rational to make an all-things-considered comparison, 
the objects must be incommensurable. Anderson outlines the following 
conditions under which she believes incommensurability (which she, fol-
lowing Raz, thinks of as incomparability) is present:
 (1) The goods in question meet the standards measured by the scale 
in very different ways.
 (2) There are no gross differences in the degree to which each good 
exemplifies its own way of meeting the standards.
 (3) Meeting the standard in one way is not categorically superior to 
meeting it the other way.
(Anderson 1993: 55)
3.3  The Small Improvement Argument
The currently most influential argument in favor of incommensurability 
is the so-called small improvement argument. In the context of axiology 
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and normativity more generally, it has, among others, been advanced 
by Joseph Raz (1986), Derek Parfit (1984), Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
(1985), and Ruth Chang (2002). However, a similar argument has been 
discussed in the context of preference relations since the 1950s (Savage 
1954; Luce 1958; de Sousa 1974).
The argument, which is meant to establish that the “at least as good 
as” relation does not exhaust the domain of value relations, takes the 
following form:
Premise 1: It is false that A is better than B and it is false that B is bet-
ter than A.
Premise 2: A+ is better than A.
Premise 3: A+ is not better than B.
Conclusion: It is false that A is better than B, it is false that B is better 
than A, and it is false that they are equally as good.
Premises 2 and 3 establish that A and B are not equally as good. Betterness 
is transitive across equal goodness, so if A and B are equally as good, 
then, if A+ is better than A, A+ must also be better than B. From this and 
Premise 1, the conclusion follows.
This is, however, only the structure of the argument. Examples that 
satisfy the structure described in the small improvement argument must 
be given in order to conclude that things can be incommensurable. The 
choice between two different holiday destinations could be such an 
example. If we compare a week in Iceland with a week in Seoul, it is likely 
that we will find neither to be better than the other, and if we slightly 
improve one of the alternatives, it will still not be judged to be better than 
the other. A small improvement of the meal during the flight to Reykjavik 
would not make the trip to Iceland clearly better than the week in Seoul. 
In the literature, many similar examples are given.
3.4  Solving Difficult Problems in Ethical Theory
Another powerful, but indirect, argument that some options are incom-
mensurable can be derived from contemporary research on paradoxes 
in ethical theory. Accepting incommensurability seems to provide a way 
of avoiding or explaining certain paradoxes. Many paradoxes in ethical 
theory rely on the background assumption that all options are related by 
an “at least as good” relation and that this relation is transitive. That is, 
if A is at least as good as B, and B is at least as good as C, then A must be 
at least as good as C. If that assumption is valid, then it seems that para-
doxes can be established. The prime example of such a paradox is the fact 
that there are compelling arguments in favor of the so-called repugnant 
conclusion, although this seems deeply counterintuitive. That is, consider 
two possible populations, X and Y, with perfect equality and in which 
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everyone has lives worth living. Everyone in population Y has slightly 
lower well-being than the people in population X, but the population in 
Y is much bigger so that with respect to the total sum of well-being, Y is 
better than X. It seems that for all such pairs of populations, the Y popu-
lation is better than the X population. By transitivity, this means that the 
following deeply counterintuitive proposition is true:
For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with 
very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable 
population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be bet-
ter, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.
(Parfit 1984: 388)
Similarly structured arguments have been developed to support other 
deeply counterintuitive ideas – for instance, that there is a number of 
headaches that is so large so that it would be better to cure them than to 
save a life (Norcross 1997; Voorhoeve 2014; Herlitz 2018).5
One reason to accept the possibility of incommensurability is that it 
potentially provides a way of avoiding these paradoxes (Griffin 1986; 
Blackorby et al. 1996, 1997; Broome 2004; Qizilbash 2007; Chang 2016; 
Rabinowicz 2021). To establish the repugnant conclusion, all popula-
tions of X- and Y-type must relate to each other via a chain of “at least 
as good” relations. It is this fact that enables the series of inferences that 
leads one from saying that a population of 20 billion people with fan-
tastic lives is better than a population of 10 billion people with slightly 
better lives to the conclusion that a population of people with lives barely 
worth living is better than the population of 10 billion people with amaz-
ing lives, as long as the population of people with lives barely worth liv-
ing is large enough. If populations could be incommensurable, that series 
of inferences would be blocked. If some X- and Y-type populations were 
incommensurable, the repugnant conclusion would be avoided.
4  Places of Incommensurability
Incommensurability can be possible in many fields, in both ethics and 
other areas. Whenever one can make a small improvement argument, 
one can make a case for incommensurability, and this seems possible 
any time one makes multidimensional comparisons. Multidimensional 
comparisons are ubiquitous. In ethical theory, they are almost always 
present since plausible conceptions of well-being are multidimensional 
(Griffin 1986). At the very least, they typically ascribe value to both life 
extensions and improvements in the quality of life within time periods. 
All ethical theories that ascribe importance to individual well-being and 
its distribution thereby either must explain what is wrong with the small 
improvement argument or accept that alternatives that differ with respect 
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to how well they extend lives and how well they improve the quality of 
life within time periods can be incommensurable (Herlitz 2017).
As often is the case, discussions in ethics have close cousins in aesthet-
ics. Examples meant to establish that there is incommensurability in the 
domain of morality are often examples that belong to aesthetics (this 
is probably because they are less likely to be offensive or dependent on 
substantive moral theories). It does not seem absurd to claim that the 
aesthetic values of two pieces of art—an archetypical type of multidimen-
sionality—are incommensurable.
Multidimensional comparisons are also common outside of ethics 
and aesthetics. Anyone who accepts that both observations in support 
of the theory and simplicity count in favor of a scientific theory will face 
the possibility that one theory is supported by more observations while 
a competing theory is simpler, such that neither theory has more that 
counts in its favor. Will one additional minor observation necessarily tilt 
the scale and provide sufficient evidence to abandon one of the theories? 
Similar arguments can be presented in epistemology, where reasons to 
believe can be of different types.
Moreover, incommensurability should be relevant to all fields of 
research that somehow consider trade-offs. Roughly, trade-offs involve 
compensation – i.e., the loss of one good is compensated for by the gain 
of another. Justifications of trade-offs thus seem to presuppose that the 
goods can be compared and adequately ranked such that the trade-offs 
constitute a satisfactory compensation.
The relevance for decision theory is also obvious. This is a natural con-
nection considering the close ties between axiology and decision theory, 
but there are also other reasons that speak in favor of the possibility 
of incommensurable options. A prime example of this is the possibility 
of incommensurable probabilities that was discussed by Keynes (1921). 
More recently, Wlodek Rabinowicz (2017, 2020) has considered this 
possibility and connected the discussion even more firmly to incommen-
surability within axiology.
5  Accounts of Incommensurability
A significant part of contemporary research on incommensurability has 
focused on how to explain the phenomenon. What explains the presence 
of the mark of incommensurability?
5.1  Parity
While the small improvement argument seems to suggest that value bear-
ers can be incomparable, it has been questioned whether this must be 
the case. It has been argued that value bearers that stand in the relation 
described by the argument may nevertheless be comparable. Intuitively, 
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there is something to this suggestion. Parfit, for example, argues that 
things that are related as described by the small improvement argument 
can be roughly comparable (1984: 431). In his example, a certain novelist 
may be neither better than, worse than, nor equally as good as a certain 
poet, but they can be roughly comparable.6
Chang has presented a formal argument that is meant to establish that 
those value bearers that are related as described by the small improve-
ment argument can nevertheless be comparable. Her so-called chaining 
argument can roughly be described as follows:
Imagine that we make a small unidimensional change to the novelist. 
After a series of such changes, we could end up with a very bad novelist. 
This very bad novelist is clearly worse than the poet. Yet it also seems to 
be the case that “between two evaluatively very different items, a small 
unidimensional difference cannot trigger incomparability where before 
there was comparability” (Chang 2002: 674). This means that if the 
very bad novelist is comparable to the poet, then so must the original 
novelist be.
Chang argues that value bearers related in the manner described by the 
small improvement argument are neither better than each other, equally 
as good as, nor incommensurable but “on a par.” According to Chang, 
this is a fourth sui generis and previously overlooked value relation. The 
soundness of her chaining argument has, however, been questioned (Boot 
2009; Elson 2014a; Andersson 2016b).
5.2  Vagueness
The claim that there is a fourth positive comparative relation has been 
challenged by those who hold a more conservative view of comparative 
relations. It has been argued that there is no need to assume that value 
bearers can be on a par or even incomparable. Epistemic explanations 
may suffice to account for some of the alleged cases of parity and incom-
parability (Regan 1997), whereas other cases could possibly be accounted 
for in terms of vagueness. This view has been defended by John Broome 
(1997). He presented his collapsing argument to show that vagueness 
crowds out non-conventional comparative relations. The argument is 
meant to establish that if we assume that there is vagueness, then there is 
no room left for comparative relations such as incomparability and par-
ity. His argument, however, depends on the collapsing principle, which 
many find hard to accept (Carlson 2004, 2013; Elson 2014b; Gustafsson 
2018; Andersson and Herlitz 2018).
This vagueness approach is, however, not dependent on the collapsing 
argument. Others have argued that the possibility of vagueness allows us 
to be skeptical of claims about parity and incomparability (Andersson 
2017; Elson 2017). A consequence of vagueness is that we cannot be 
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determinately certain that the result of the small improvement argument 
holds, and for that reason, we should be conservative and not embrace the 
possibility of further comparative relations (Wasserman 2004; Klocksiem 
2010; Gustafsson 2013).
5.3  Formal Accounts of Incommensurability
Presenting examples of purported non-conventional comparative rela-
tions raises the question of how they should be analyzed. Some have 
argued that parity can be understood in terms of the three standard com-
parative relations (Gert 2004; Carlson 2010). Similarly, Nien-hê Hsieh 
(2005) has argued that non-conventional relations are to be understood 
in terms of “clumpy values”: values do not provide fine-grained orderings 
but rather place items in clumps, so equally as good items can appear to 
be, for example, on a par.
Chang (1997) has suggested that the evaluative difference between two 
things that are on a par can be understood as a nonzero unbiased differ-
ence. It is nonzero because it has a magnitude—just as when one thing 
is better than another there is a nonzero difference—and it is unbiased 
because the difference does not have a valence—in the same way as the 
difference between two things that are equally as good is unbiased.
Inspired by Joshua Gert’s account, Wlodek Rabinowicz (2008, 2012) 
has provided a fitting attitudes account (henceforth FA) of non-conven-
tional value relations. The FA accounts for value in terms of a normative 
component (e.g., fittingness) and an attitudinal component (e.g., favor). 
Goodness could consequently be analyzed in terms of fittingness to favor. 
If we acknowledge that there can be two levels of normativity – i.e., 
requirement and permissibility – this account can also encompass conven-
tional and non-conventional value relations. For example, X is better than 
Y if and only if it is rationally required to prefer X to Y, and X and Y are 
on a par if and only if it is rationally permissible to prefer X to Y and also 
rationally permissible to prefer Y to X. The two levels of normativity and 
preferences, including preference gaps, can be combined in 15 different 
ways, which entails that the FA have the conceptual space for as many as 
15 possible value relations.
6  Problems for Normative Theory
Incommensurability poses problems for normative theory. If incommen-
surability is possible, it is possible that there is no available option that 
is at least as good or choiceworthy as all the alternatives. It might be the 
case, for instance, that two options are better than all other alternatives, 
but they are not equally good. Some have suggested that this means that 
it is impossible to act rationally.
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6.1  No Optimal Option, Seemingly Solved by Changing to Maximal
According to standard rational choice theory, choosing an option is ratio-
nal if and only if that option is at least as good as every alternative (i.e., 
it is an option that is optimal). If incommensurability is possible, it will 
be possible that no option is optimal, which would mean that it is impos-
sible to make a rational choice. For instance, if an agent faces the choice 
between an apple, a pear, and an orange, and if the apple is incommensu-
rable with both the pear and the orange while the pear is better than the 
orange, there is no optimal option. Neither the apple nor the pear is at 
least as good as all the alternatives since they are incommensurable with 
each other, and for an option to be at least as good as another option it 
must be either better than or equally as good.
This appears to be a significant problem. However, there are some pro-
posed solutions to it. Somewhat depending on how one explains incom-
mensurability, one can revise the criterion for what makes a choice rational 
(Herlitz 2019). For instance, one can follow Amartya Sen (1997) and say 
that choosing an option is rational if and only if that option is not worse than 
any alternative – i.e., it is an option that is maximal. With this definition of 
what it is to choose rationally, it follows that it is rational to choose either 
the apple or the pear. The orange is worse than the pear and is thereby not a 
rational choice, but neither the apple nor the pear is worse than any alterna-
tive (they are both incommensurable with one available alternative—each 
other—but being incommensurable with is not the same as being worse 
than). This works well if incommensurability is some non-conventional 
comparative relation and similar moves can be made by those who believe 
that incommensurability is vagueness. If the incommensurability is due to 
vagueness (i.e., on one permissible sharpening of the covering concept, the 
apple is better than both the pear and the orange and on another the pear 
and the orange are better than the apple while the pear remains better than 
the orange), one can revise the rational choice criterion and say that choos-
ing an option is rational if and only if that option is at least as good as all 
alternatives on at least one permissible sharpening (Broome 2009). Similar 
moves are available to proponents of the FA approach (Rabinowicz 2008; 
Herlitz 2019). Since the apple is optimal on one permissible sharpening and 
the pear optimal on another, choosing either is rational.
This raises an interesting question. Although revising the conception of 
rational choice so that all options that are maximal are rational solves some 
initial problems, it is possible that something has gotten lost on the way. 
Chang has argued that this is the case, that maximality is not a sufficient 
criterion for a choice being rational (Chang 2013). But if it is not sufficient, 
one might wonder if it is never sufficient. It could be the case that maxi-
mality sometimes is enough, but that there are situations in which it is not 
(Andersson and Herlitz 2021). This is a topic that deserves more attention.
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6.2  Dynamic Inconsistency
Although the most obvious decision-theoretical problem has some 
rather simple technical solutions, there are other such problems that 
pose more serious technical difficulties. One of the biggest problems is 
that acceptance of incommensurability in combination with revisions of 
the rational choice criterion leads to dynamic inconsistency (McClennen 
1990; Andreou 2016). When an agent faces a sequence of choices, it is 
possible for her to form a series of maximal choices but end up with 
an option that is worse than some alternative that she could have had 
if she had chosen differently. To see this, consider an agent that faces a 
sequence of choices such that she at t1 chooses between the pear and the 
apple, and regardless of what she chooses, she is offered the opportunity 
to change to the orange at t2. If choosing a maximal option is all that 
rationality requires, in this situation, it would be rational to choose the 
apple at t1 and then change to the orange at t2. At t1, both the apple and 
the pear are rational choices, so it is rational to choose the apple. At 
t2, both the apple and the orange are rational choices, so it is rational 
to choose the orange. However, the orange is worse than the pear, and 
she could have had the pear if she had chosen differently at each choice 
node. By making choices that in isolation appear rational (in virtue of 
being maximal), the agent has ended up with an option that appears 
irrational (in terms of not being maximal) when the sequence of choices 
is considered.
The dynamic inconsistency also enables a weak kind of money-pump 
argument. To see this, consider a case in which at t1, the agent has a 
choice between the apple and the pear, and then, if she chooses the 
apple, she is at t2 offered the chance to change the apple to the orange. 
If she accepts this exchange, she is at t3 offered the chance to change the 
orange to the pear if she pays a small amount (which she is willing to 
do since the pear is better than the orange). These three exchanges get 
the agent to the pear, but she could have had the pear without cost if 
she chose it at t1.
There are various suggestions for how to avoid this problem in the 
literature, but no solution seems unproblematic. For instance, it has been 
proposed that it is rational to be “resolute,” to make a plan and stick to 
it (McClennen 1990). But why would it be irrational to revise plans and 
act on how the alternatives relate to each other? It has also been sug-
gested that rational decision-makers are “sophisticated” and use back-
ward induction to foresee the problems that await them when they face 
a sequence of choices (e.g., Rabinowicz 1995). But that solution can rule 
out as irrational options that are maximal. How to avoid dynamic incon-
sistency while accepting incommensurability remains a debated topic in 
contemporary research.
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6.3  Basic Contraction Consistency and Cycles
According to some views of how to act rationally when some maximal 
options are incommensurable with respect to a primary decision cri-
terion, one ought to invoke a second decision criterion and choose in 
accordance with how the options relate to this. For instance, if the apple 
and the pear are incommensurable with respect to how good they taste, 
one compares them with respect to how much they weigh, the lighter 
the better. These approaches risk violating rationality requirements. To 
see this, consider the possibility that the orange is lighter than the apple 
and the apple lighter than the pear. If one faces all three options at 
once, this kind of two-step approach suggests that one should choose 
the apple. The orange is discarded since it is worse than the pear, and 
of the pear and the apple, the apple is lighter. However, if one faced 
a choice between only the apple and the orange, the approach says 
that one should choose the orange since the apple and the orange are 
incommensurable with respect to taste, and the orange is lighter than 
the apple. This means that the approach tells one to choose one option 
in one set but choose a different option in a subset of that set in which 
the first option is available. So-called “basic contraction consistency” is 
violated (Herlitz 2019). If one instead uses the approach to make pair-
wise comparisons of the options, one ends up with a cyclical ranking 
of them: the orange is better than the apple, the apple is better than the 
pear, and the pear is better than the orange (Herlitz 2020).
This illustrates how different approaches to forming choices when 
maximal options are incommensurable risk violating rationality require-
ments. There are possible ways to avoid this, but they require imposing 
additional formal constraints on what kind of decision-making is accept-
able when some options are incommensurable (Herlitz 2019).
6.4  Risk
Another set of complications arises once one considers what to do in 
situations that involve uncertainties (Hare 2010). Consider again the 
choice between an apple and a pear, but instead of choosing fruit, one 
can only choose one of two lotteries, the outcome of which depends on 
a coin toss. In the first lottery, one wins an apple on heads and a pear on 
tails. In the second lottery, one wins a pear plus ten cents on heads and 
an apple plus ten cents on tails. Now, in light of the small improvement 
argument, assume that ten cents is a small enough improvement that it 
does not change the comparative relation between the apple and the pear. 
An apple plus ten cents is incommensurable with a pear, and a pear plus 
ten cents is incommensurable with an apple. This gives us the puzzling 
situation in which the possible outcomes in each state are incommensu-
rable yet the acts do not seem incommensurable since the latter lottery is 
certain to lead to the additional ten cents.
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It is not obvious what one ought to do in this situation. Whereas some 
have argued that it is only rational to choose the latter lottery (Hare 
2010; Bader, 2018), others have said that it can be rational to choose 
either (Schoenfield 2014; Bales et al. 2014; Doody 2019).
7  Opportunities
Although incommensurability has primarily received attention due to 
the problems it causes, there are also opportunities that arise once one 
accepts incommensurability. If one assumes that all items can always be 
compared in conventional ways so that it will always be the case that 
one item is at least as good as the other with respect to the criterion 
one applies, the criteria in question may seem to be ascribed too much 
importance. Accepting incommensurability is one way in which one can 
reduce the importance of different criteria, something which may seem 
very desirable in certain contexts.
7.1  Chang and Going Hybrid
Chang has argued that we ought to accept that some items are sometimes 
incommensurable (in her terminology, “on a par”) with respect to given 
reasons and that, in these situations, we must resort to reasons grounded 
in the will (i.e., voluntarist reasons) to determine what to do (Chang 
2013). For Chang, given reasons are important because she believes they 
are reasons that, independently of the will of the agent, determine that 
things such as sadistic torture are wrong. However, by accepting that these 
given reasons admit of incommensurability, her theory does not ascribe to 
given reasons the importance of always fully determining what one ought 
to do, something which might seem exigent since it seems to reduce agents 
to automatons whose task is mainly to respond to reason. By accepting 
incommensurability, Chang can propose that reasons grounded in the will 
of the agent must sometimes complement given reasons, thereby reducing 
the importance of given reasons and providing a role for human agency in 
her metaethical theory. This illustrates how incommensurability provides 
a theoretical opportunity to avoid certain problems.
7.2  Law
In the study of law, accepting incommensurability has been suggested 
to be one way of providing space for different valuations in society and 
for making progress in legal theory (Sunstein, 1994). By rejecting the 
idea that there is a single one-dimensional (or monistic) correct valuation 
of goods such as those provided by utilitarians and instead embracing 
pluralism and the idea that there are many different and equally valid 
valuations, what is at stake in legal disputes can be elucidated. Rather 
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than seeing legal disputes as disagreements about facts about which there 
is, fundamentally, a correct answer, legal disputes can be conceived of as 
disagreements about options that are fundamentally incommensurable. 
This, in turn, allows one to think differently about the role of the law 
and about how to make progress in hard cases: it shows that one needs a 
substantive theory of law (Sunstein, 1994).
7.3  Prerogatives
Accepting incommensurability is also a way of providing space for 
prerogatives, both individual and collective. Sometimes, it seems clear 
that it is up to the agent, be it an individual or a collective such as a 
state, to settle normative questions. One way of explaining this in a 
normative-theoretical framework is to accept incommensurability with 
respect to normative principles. In clinical ethics, a plausible normative 
principle says that clinicians should promote health, seeking to improve 
the health of their patients to the greatest extent possible. However, it 
also seems plausible that patients ought to have some influence over 
what treatments they receive. It has been suggested that patient pre-
rogatives can be given a role in clinical decision-making if one accepts 
that treatment options can be incommensurable with respect to health 
(Herlitz 2017). If treatments A and B are incommensurable with respect 
to health (perhaps because one adds more years to the patient’s life 
and the other improves the health-related quality of life more), it seems 
plausible to say that the patient ought to choose between them, and if 
one accepts incommensurability, one does not have to accept that there 
is a conflict between patients’ wills and universal normative principles 
such as health promotion. Similarly, religious freedom is a plausible 
political–philosophical principle. Meanwhile, it seems desirable to say 
that it should be up to the society in question to determine whether this 
principle requires that one grant permission for the building of a mina-
ret in a neighborhood where many of the residents are refugees who 
have experienced traumas due to violence in the name of Islam (Herlitz 
and Sadek 2021). If one accepts that different policies (e.g., grant or do 
not grant permission to build a minaret) can be incommensurable with 
respect to principles such as religious freedom, it is easy to explain col-
lective prerogatives.
8  Summaries of the Chapters
The book covers four aspects relating to incommensurability:
In the first part of the book, new research on how to best explain 
incommensurability is presented. In contemporary debate, two competing 
explanations stand out. According to some, such as Ruth Chang (2002) 
and Wlodek Rabinowicz (2008, 2012), the fact that no conventional 
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comparative relation holds between some options can sometimes be 
explained by the fact that there are non-conventional comparative rela-
tions. The most widely discussed non-conventional comparative relation 
is “parity.” On this view, things need not be related by a “better than,” 
“worse than,” or “equally as good as” relation but may also be on a par. 
On the competing view, espoused by, for example, John Broome (1997), 
Luke Elson (2017), and Henrik Andersson (2017), there is no need to 
introduce a fourth comparative relation to account for incommensurabil-
ity. Instead, it is argued that incommensurability is in fact indeterminacy 
due to vagueness. According to this view, one of the three conventional 
relations does in fact hold but it is indeterminate which one.
In Chapter 1, John Broome argues that incommensurability is vague-
ness. While he has previously argued for this possibility by referring to 
the so-called collapsing principle, he now provides a new argument. 
Central to his novel argument is the claim that competing views can-
not adequately account for our intuitions about hard cases. Broome con-
cludes that it is only vagueness that can give a satisfactory account of the 
phenomenon.
This can be contrasted with Ruth Chang’s contribution in Chapter 2. 
Chang is well-known for her seminal argument that incommensurability 
ought to be understood in terms of a fourth sui generis value relation 
that she calls “parity.” In Chapter 2, she explains why the phenomenon of 
interest—what we have here called “incommensurability”—is not vague-
ness but is instead the holding of a fourth sui generis value relation that 
she calls “parity.”
In Chapter 3, Chrisoula Andreou argues that there might be even more 
value relations beyond “equally as good,” “better than,” “worse than,” 
and “on a par.” According to her, the two terms “roughly equal as” and 
“on a par,” which are often used to refer to the same value relation, actu-
ally denote two different phenomena. With this contribution, she expands 
the space for value relations and provides an explanation as to how the 
value relations differ.
In the second part of the book, the role of incommensurability in 
dismissals of so-called spectrum arguments and in population ethics is 
discussed. Population ethicists such as Derek Parfit (2016), Mozaffar 
Qizilbash (2007), and Wlodek Rabinowicz (2021) have recognized that 
accepting incommensurability can help one avoid perennial problems in 
population ethics. It has been argued that incommensurability can be 
invoked to avoid the repugnant conclusion and the mere addition para-
dox and to block so-called spectrum arguments.
In Chapter 4, Mozaffar Qizilbash contrasts Derek Parfit’s sugges-
tion as to how to avoid the repugnant conclusion with James Griffin’s. 
Central to both of their suggestions are phenomena that can be called 
“incommensurability.” Parfit invokes the concept of imprecision, which 
seems to share many characteristics with parity, and Griffin invokes the 
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concept of discontinuity. While the latter concept is sometimes called 
a form of incommensurability, it can nevertheless be accounted for in 
terms of the three conventional value relations. The details of their 
insightful views are expounded and the merits of their views are thor-
oughly discussed.
In Chapter 5, Henrik Andersson discusses a specific spectrum argu-
ment that has been advanced by Larry Temkin (2012). Temkin’s con-
clusion is that the betterness relation is not transitive. Andersson rejects 
this conclusion by arguing that certain assumptions made by Temkin can 
be questioned and that the possibility of indeterminacy and so-called 
Millian inferiority can show why we need not accept Temkin’s conclu-
sion. The unwanted conclusion of the spectrum argument can thus be 
avoided without referring to incommensurability.
In Chapter 6, Gustaf Arrhenius explores the idea that one can avoid 
impossibility results in population axiology by accepting incommensura-
bility. Arrhenius illustrates that although some problems in population 
axiology can be avoided by accepting incommensurability, other prob-
lems remain.
In the third part of the book, the role of incommensurability in deci-
sion theory is addressed. It is well-known that allowing for incommensu-
rability causes dynamic choice problems. Relatedly, it has recently been 
shown that certain decision strategies that seem appealing when deal-
ing with situations characterized by incommensurability violate basic 
requirements of rationality. The decision strategies might violate basic 
contraction consistency, and they might lead to cyclical evaluations of 
alternatives.
The potential problems for rational decision-making are thoroughly 
discussed in Chapter 7, in which Anders Herlitz illustrates how differ-
ent plausible decision strategies for choice situations characterized by 
incommensurability risk violating rationality requirements. He argues 
that unless one introduces formal constraints on how to choose between 
incommensurable options, one risks forming cyclical evaluations or vio-
lating basic contraction consistency. The question then arises as to what 
grounds these formal constraints. Herlitz does not settle this issue but 
presents some alternative ideas: they might be grounded in the compara-
tive relation (in incommensurability), in the domain of reasons, or in 
rationality itself.
In Chapter 8, Krister Bykvist presents a novel contribution on the 
topic of rational decision-making, developing an account of so-called 
cross-categorical comparisons. The comparison “this table is a bet-
ter table than Trump is a president” would constitute an example of 
such a comparison. An account of these comparisons is important since 
they can, for example, allow us to compare well-being across people 
and make cross-theory comparisons of value when we face evaluative 
uncertainty.
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In Chapter 9, Luke Elson contrasts two influential views of the conse-
quences of incommensurability for agency. More precisely, he provides 
a detailed account of the consequences of Chang’s hybrid view of ratio-
nal choice and of Joseph Raz’s classical view. Elson concludes that by 
adopting a vagueness account of incommensurability we are not forced 
to accept such radical views of agency.
In the fourth and final part of the book, incommensurability and risk 
is investigated.
In Chapter 10, Wlodek Rabinowicz addresses a puzzling problem pre-
sented by Caspar Hare (2010) concerning rational choice. Rabinowicz, 
however, considers it in the domain of formal axiology: how can one 
action be better than another despite the fact that their outcomes are 
bound to be incommensurable? By invoking a fitting attitudes analysis 
of value, he argues that even if the outcomes are on a par, it is possible 
for one action to be better than another. Whether this also is possible if 
the outcomes are bound to be incomparable (which is a radical form of 
incommensurability) is left as an open problem.
In Chapter 11, Katie Steele considers the possibility of ignoring cri-
teria under which options are incommensurable. Steele focuses on a 
non- dominance relation that is often appealed to in discussions of incom-
mensurability and uncertainty. She concludes that such a principle is not 
plausible in the multi-criteria setting that she considers and that we ought 
not to ignore criteria under which options are incommensurable.
In Chapter 12, Ryan Doody presents an impossibility result for deci-
sion theories under risk. More specifically, he argues that no plausible 
decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences can both satisfy a 
dominance principle and accept a transitivity requirement.
Notes
 1 We are grateful to Ruth Chang, Mozaffar Qizilbash, Wlodek Rabinowicz, 
and Joseph Raz for the valuable feedback they have given us on this introduc-
tion. We also wish to thank the participants at the Philosophy, politics and 
economics seminar at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm at which 
a draft of this introduction was presented.
 2 The Pythagoreans, of course, admitted that a comparison could be made, 
as the diagonal of a square is clearly longer than its side. It should also be 
stressed that the Pythagorean view of commensurability is a narrow concep-
tion, as the relation between the diagonal and the side can be expressed by an 
irrational number.
 3 For a rather devastating criticism of this idea, see Davidson (1973).
 4 This is similar to the claims made by, for example, Peter Geach (1956) and 
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997). Geach famously argued that there is no such 
thing as goodness simpliciter, and Thomson expressed a similar view, explic-
itly discussing betterness simpliciter. For the connection between these discus-
sions and value incommensurability, see Andersson (2016a).
 5 For an in-depth discussion of arguments of this kind, see Temkin (2012).
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 6 Similarly, Griffin (1986: 80–1) argued that they may be “roughly equal,” but 
he probably had a view similar to the vagueness view in mind, according to 
which it could be indeterminate how value bearers relate.
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When we have to make a decision, it often seems indeterminate what 
would be the best thing to do.1 The alternatives seem “incommensu-
rate” with each other, to use the term I favor. (“Incommensurable,” 
“incomparable,” “on a par,” and other terms are often used instead.) 
The classic example is the choice faced by a student of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s in wartime France (Sartre, 2007). The student could choose 
to stay at home to look after his mother, who badly needed him, or he 
could try to escape to Britain and join the Free French Forces. Sartre 
took these alternatives to be incommensurate with each other. The aim 
of this chapter is to try to persuade you that incommensurateness like 
this is nothing more than vagueness.
We are interested in what is the best thing for the student to do, which 
is a matter of comparative value. In other words, it is a matter of bet-
terness: what is better than what? Betterness is a comparative relation. 
When a monadic property F comes in degrees, it has a comparative more 
F than or Fer than, which is a dyadic relation. Betterness is the compara-
tive of the monadic property of goodness.
Among comparative relations, betterness is especially important 
because of its connection with normativity – with what we ought to 
do. This chapter concentrates on it for this reason. However, betterness 
shares the common features of comparatives in general. Many other 
comparatives exhibit incommensurateness, for example. The analysis of 
incommensurateness is therefore not in itself particularly a topic within 
the philosophy of value; it is a topic concerned with the structure of com-
paratives in general. We can ask in general whether incommensurateness 
is vagueness.
That is where this chapter starts. The next three sections examine 
incommensurateness in general. Section 2 explains that there are two 
alternative sorts of it, which I call soft and hard incommensurateness, 
respectively. Soft incommensurateness is simply vagueness; hard incom-
mensurateness is something else.
1 Incommensurateness Is Vagueness
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In Sections 3 and 4, I shall describe two formal considerations that 
argue in favor of soft incommensurateness, though not conclusively.
Then in Section 5, I turn to incommensurateness of betterness specifi-
cally. This is a particular bone of contention because of the connection 
between betterness and normativity. I describe a well-known normative 
puzzle that arises from the incommensurateness of betterness.
The rest of the chapter examines solutions to this puzzle. Sections 6, 
7, and 8 describe solutions that can be provided on the basis of hard 
incommensurateness. Section 1.9 describes a solution that can be pro-
vided on the basis of soft incommensurateness. It argues that this solu-
tion is the best.
2  Hard and Soft Incommensurateness
I say two things are incommensurate in respect of a comparative Fer 
than when neither is definitely Fer than the other and also they are not 
definitely equally F.
As an example, I shall use the comparative relation redder than, which 
I call “redderness.” Redderness is the comparative of the monadic prop-
erty of redness. Figure 1.1 illustrates a part of the redderness relation as 
it holds among colors. Sadly, I have not been offered color printing in this 
volume, so I have to ask you to use your imagination. To keep things sim-
ple, I hold one color constant and examine how other colors are related 
to this one. My constant is the color A in the diagram, which is a reddish 
orange. I compare this with the range of colors B, which extend from 
pure red at the top to bluish purple at the bottom. Figure 1.1 indicates 
which colors in this range are redder than A.
The colors toward the top are definitely redder than A, and the colors 
toward the bottom are definitely not redder than A. In the middle are 
Figure 1.1 Colors redder than A.
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colors that lie on the borderline between being redder than A and not 
being redder than A. The property of being redder than A is a monadic 
property and it is plainly vague. Some colors definitely possess it, and 
others definitely do not. In between are borderline colors, as the figure 
shows.
The vagueness of redderness is a sort of incommensurateness. Borderline 
colors are not definitely redder than A, nor definitely not redder than A, 
nor definitely equally as red as A. I call this “soft incommensurateness.”
In this chapter, when I need an analysis of vagueness, I shall assume 
supervaluation (Fine, 1975). According to supervaluation, a vague prop-
erty is a package of sharp properties called its “sharpenings.” A proposi-
tion involving a vague property can be sharpened by replacing the vague 
property with one of its sharpenings. The original proposition is defi-
nitely true if and only if every one of its sharpenings is true.
In Figure 1.1, each color within the range B, if it is in the borderline 
between colors that are definitely redder than A and those that are defi-
nitely not redder than A, can represent a particular sharpening of the red-
derness relation. According to this sharpening, any higher color is redder 
than A and any lower color is not redder than A. By the same token, a 
color in the borderline also represents a sharpening of the monadic prop-
erty redder than A. Any color that lies above the borderline is, therefore, 
redder than A according to every sharpening, so it is definitely redder 
than A. Correspondingly, any color that lies below the borderline is defi-
nitely not redder than A.
Figure 1.1 illustrates a part of the redderness relation, and Figure 1.2 
illustrates a different part of it. The same constant color A is compared 
with the same range B, but the comparison is reversed. This diagram 
identifies which colors A is redder than. A is definitely redder than colors 
toward the bottom of the range. It is definitely not redder than colors 
toward the top of the range. In between are borderline colors.
Figure 1.2 Colors A is redder than.
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Any color within this borderline represents a sharpening of the red-
derness relation, but this time a different sharpening. It also represents 
a sharpening of the monadic property less red than A. (“B is less red 
than A” means the same as “A is redder than B”, and I shall swap freely 
between the two expressions.) According to this sharpening, A is redder 
than any lower color, and A is not redder than any higher color. Or – to 
put it another way – any lower color is less red than A and any higher 
color is not less red than A. A is therefore definitely redder than any color 
that lies below the borderline and definitely not redder than any color 
that lies above it.
So comparing A with the range B in terms of their redderness reveals 
two borderlines. How do the two align with each other? One possibil-
ity is that they are the same: the colors on the borderline between being 
redder than A and not being redder than A are also on the borderline 
between being less red than A and not being less red than A. Figure 1.3 
shows this possibility. I call it “matching vagueness.”
A second possibility is that the borderlines overlap but are not the 
same. Figure 1.4 shows this possibility. I call it “overlapping vagueness.”
A third is that the borderlines do not overlap at all. Figure 1.5 shows 
this possibility. The lack of overlap introduces a new feature. Some of the 
colors around the middle of the range B are definitely not redder than 
A, and also A is definitely not redder than them. An example is B1. A is 
definitely not redder than B1, B1 is definitely not redder than A, and A and 
B1 are definitely not equally red.
I say there is “hard incommensurateness” between two things with 
respect to a comparative Fer than when definitely neither is Fer than the 
other and definitely they are not equally F. So there is hard incommensu-
rateness between A and B1 with respect to redderness.
Hard incommensurateness is not vagueness. The topic of this chapter is 
in effect whether the betterness relation has hard incommensurateness. I 
Figure 1.3 Matching vagueness.
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shall argue that it does not. This implies that all the incommensurateness 
in betterness is vagueness.
How can the question be settled? It may be that some comparatives 
have hard incommensurateness and others do not. There are some formal 
considerations to take into account that apply to all comparatives. I shall 
mention two. Neither of them is conclusive, but they constitute a prima 
facie case against hard incommensurateness in general.
3  The Collapsing Principle
The first consideration is this. If you look at the color B2 in Figure 1.4 
or Figure 1.5, you will see something puzzling about it. A is definitely 
not redder than B2. On the other hand, it is borderline whether or not B2 
Figure 1.4 Overlapping vagueness.
Figure 1.5 Non-overlapping vagueness.
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is redder than A. So the status of B2’s redness in comparison to A is not 
symmetrical: B2 is better off than A with regard to redness. It is therefore 
puzzling why it is not definitely redder than A. You would think that pos-
sessing a higher status with regard to redness would be enough to make 
B2 definitely redder. Yet according to those diagrams, this is not so.
This casts suspicion on the configurations shown in those two dia-
grams. This suspicion attaches to the formal configuration and has noth-
ing to do with the particular example of redderness. It suggests that hard 
incommensurateness may not exist at all.
I once formulated this suspicion as something I called “the collapsing 
principle” (Broome, 1998). It may be expressed this way:
If X is definitely not Fer than Y but Y is not definitely not Fer than X, 
then Y is definitely Fer than X.
I have now been convinced that the collapsing principle is not true in 
every case. Luke Elson has developed some convincing counterexamples 
to it.2
Here is one of them. Elson tells us that, when he plans a holiday, he pre-
fers to visit a large country. It is not that he prefers one country to another 
if and only if it is larger. Among large countries, he has no preference on 
grounds of largeness, nor does he among countries that are not large. But 
he prefers any large country to any country that is not large. The relation 
that constitutes the counterexample is better than as a holiday destination 
for Elson, which I shall write as just better than. It is the comparative of 
the monadic property good as a holiday destination for Elson or good. A 
country is definitely good if and only if it is definitely large.
Elson tells us that China is definitely large, Ireland is definitely not large, 
and France is borderline large. Consequently, Ireland is definitely not bet-
ter than France, but France is not definitely not better than Ireland. By 
the collapsing principle, therefore, France is definitely better than Ireland. 
On grounds I shall explain next, Elson argues that this can be so only if 
France is definitely good, which is to say definitely large.
By parallel reasoning, comparing France with China, we may also con-
clude that France is definitely not large, which implies it is not definitely 
large. The collapsing principle therefore implies a contradiction, so it is 
false. That is Elson’s conclusion.
How does Elson derive “France is definitely good” from “France is 
definitely better than Ireland”?3 We cannot, in general, derive “X is defi-
nitely F” from “X is definitely Fer than Y.” For example, we cannot derive 
“Andorra is definitely large” from “Andorra is definitely larger than 
Monaco”. So we need an argument.
The derivation is valid for sharp monadic properties. We can validly 
derive “5 is prime” from “5 is more prime than 4.” But Elson is not inter-
ested in sharp properties because the collapsing principle is trivially true 
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of them. A sharp monadic property F has a sharp comparative Fer than. 
This means that when X is not definitely not Fer than Y it is automati-
cally definitely Fer than Y.
Elson needs his monadic property to be vague, and indeed good is 
vague. France is borderline good because it is borderline large. But the 
collapsing principle implies France is definitely better than Ireland, and 
Elson claims this is inconsistent with France’s being only borderline good. 
It has to be definitely good.
This can be demonstrated by supervaluation applied to the monadic 
property goodness. Every sharpening of goodness identifies a particular 
size as the boundary between countries that are good and those that are 
not good. According to any sharpening, all the good countries are equally 
as good as each other, and all the not good countries are also equally as 
good as each other. That is the way goodness as a holiday destination for 
Elson works.
Now suppose France was only borderline good. Then there would be 
at least one sharpening of goodness in which France is not good. But in 
this sharpening, France would be equally as good as Ireland, which is 
also not good. Consequently, in this sharpening, France would not be 
better than Ireland. Since there would be at least one sharpening in which 
France is not better than Ireland, France would not be definitely better 
than Ireland as the collapsing principle implies. So the collapsing prin-
ciple implies that France is definitely good.
I think Elson’s is a sound counterexample to the collapsing principle. 
However, it works only because of an exceptional feature of the property 
in question. Both the monadic property of goodness and its compara-
tive betterness are vague. Each has a number of sharpenings. The special 
feature is that in every sharpening of both, no country that is not good is 
better than any other country that is not good. Elson’s highly contrived 
property is designed to have this feature. I know of no more natural 
properties that do.
Moreover, although Elson’s is a counterexample to the collapsing 
principle, it is not an example of hard incommensurateness. True, the 
borderlines of the two vague properties better than France and worse 
than France do not overlap. But between them lie only countries that 
are the same size as France, and these are all definitely equally as good 
as France. Any countries that are definitely not better than France 
and definitely not worse than France are definitely equally as good as 
France.
Erik Carlson (2013) and subsequently Andersson and Herlitz (2018) 
have pointed out that this weaker version of the collapsing principle is 
immune to Elson’s example:
If X is definitely not Fer than Y but Y is not definitely not Fer than X, 
then Y is definitely either Fer than X or equally as good as X.
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Furthermore, these authors show that this weak principle, like the stron-
ger version, implies there is no hard incommensurateness. But I see no 
independent attraction in it. If the collapsing principle itself is refuted, 
there are no grounds for clinging on to this weak version of it.4
I conclude that Elson has shown that the collapsing principle is not 
universally true. Moreover, other counterexamples have been described 
in the literature (e. g. Carlson, 2004 and Gustafsson, 2018). They are 
not as watertight as Elson’s but are nevertheless effective. The collapsing 
principle is subject to severe doubt, therefore. But it remains intuitively 
attractive and may well be true for common cases. Where it is true, it 
implies that matching vagueness is the correct account of incommensu-
rateness. So it provides some evidence in favor of matching vagueness. 
A fortiori, it provides some evidence against hard incommensurateness.
4  Gradation
I shall say no more about the collapsing principle. This chapter con-
centrates on the second formal consideration that opposes hard incom-
mensurateness. It is this. Intuitively, incommensurateness has a graded 
structure. As we move through the range B from bottom to top, we move 
from colors that are definitely less red than A to ones that are definitely 
redder than A. In between is a zone of colors that are neither. In moving 
up through this incommensurate zone, we of course come to colors that 
are progressively redder. Intuitively, it is also true that their comparative 
redderness in comparison to A progressively increases. It is easy to make 
sense of this intuition of gradation in terms of vagueness. But if there is 
hard incommensurateness, it is not so easy.
Vagueness supplies gradation through this principle:
Greatervaluation. X is Fer than Y if X is F according to every sharp-
ening of F in which Y is F, and X is F according to some sharpening 
of F in which Y is not F.
In Broome (1998: 83), I offered greatervaluation as a general truth. 
However, Henrik Andersson and Ruth Chang have shown me it is not 
one. Whereas vagueness can induce gradation on a property through 
greatervaluation, many properties have a prior gradation on some differ-
ent basis. For instance, there are degrees of redness even among colors that 
are definitely red, and this gradation cannot derive from the vagueness of 
red. For some properties, this prior grading on a different basis can over-
ride grading on the basis of vagueness. But I am now using greatervalu-
ation only in order to explain how grading can be based on vagueness.
Let F be the property redder than A. Take two colors B2 and B3 in the 
borderline of this property, where B2 is above B3. Each sharpening of red-
der than A is represented by a color within the borderline. According to 
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all sharpenings represented by colors below B3, both B2 and B3 are redder 
than A. According to all sharpenings represented by colors between B3 
and B2, B2 is redder than A, but B3 is not. So by greatervaluation, B2 is 
redder than A more than B3 is redder than A. This supports the intuition 
of gradation within this borderline.
Next, let F be the property less red than A. Take two colors B4 and B5 in 
the borderline of this property, where B4 is above B5. Each sharpening of 
less red than A is represented by a color within the borderline. According 
to all sharpenings represented by a color above B4, both B4 and B5 are less 
red than A. According to all sharpenings represented by colors between 
B4 and B5, B5 is less red than A, but B4 is not. So by greatervaluation, B5 is 
less red than A more than B4 is less red than A. This supports the intuition 
of gradation within this borderline.
So there is increasing redderness in the borderlines. But in the zone of 
hard incommensurateness in Figure 1.5, which lies between the two bor-
derlines, redderness apparently does not increase as we move up through 
the zone. Any color in this zone is definitely not redder than A and defi-
nitely not less red than A, and this is equally so for any color in the zone. 
Hard incommensurateness seems to create a hiatus in the gradation of 
redderness, between the zones of vagueness in which redderness is graded.
At least, in the zone of hard incommensurateness, no gradation results 
from greatervaluation. A gradation could be supplied by other means 
but demonstrating gradation would require more assumptions and more 
theoretical apparatus. This is further inconclusive evidence against hard 
incommensurateness.
5  A Puzzle about Betterness
I turn now from redderness to the more important topic of betterness. 
The example of Sartre’s student is illustrated in Figure 1.6. The student 
has a choice between A, staying in France with his mother or B, leav-
ing for Britain to join the Free French Forces. Is either better than the 
other? This depends on the details of each. For example, it depends on 
how likely it is that he will get to Britain if he tries and on how much 
his mother needs him. The question is illustrated in Figure 1.6. For the 
sake of analysis, I shall once again hold one of the options constant. For 
this role, I have chosen the option of staying in France, which I assume 
will be in the conditions described by Sartre. B is a range of different ver-
sions of the option of leaving. High up are cases where it is easy to get 
to Britain, and the student’s contribution to liberating France is likely to 
be great. For these, I assume that leaving is definitely better than staying. 
Low down in the range are cases where travel is very dangerous, and he 
is likely not to succeed. Staying is definitely better than leaving in one 
of these cases. Since the considerations that favor either option are very 
different from each other, it is plausible that there is a range of cases in 
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between where staying is not definitely better than leaving, and leaving is 
not definitely better than staying. These are incommensurate cases.
Betterness, like redderness, is undoubtedly vague. One possibility is 
that all the incommensurateness is soft, which is to say that it consists 
entirely of vagueness. In that case, the whole incommensurate zone con-
sists of the borderlines of the properties better than A and worse than A, 
which overlap to some extent. The two borderlines may even coincide 
exactly; this is the case of matching vagueness.
It is also possible that within the range of B, there is a zone where the 
incommensurateness is hard. In a zone of hard incommensurateness, stay-
ing is definitely not better than leaving, and leaving is definitely not better 
than staying, and staying and leaving are definitely not equally good.
Which is the correct account of the situation? Is there hard incommen-
surateness or not? This is the same question for betterness as for any other 
comparative. The same formal considerations arise as the ones I described 
for redderness, stemming from the collapsing principle and from grada-
tion. Both provide some evidence against hard incommensurateness.
The question assumes special importance for betterness because of the 
connection between betterness and normativity. This connection also 
provides a different perspective on the question, besides the formal con-
siderations. We can ask what sort of incommensurateness provides the 
best account of normative phenomena that need explaining. Since, of 
course, betterness is vague, we automatically have soft incommensurate-
ness as a resource for explaining the phenomena. We can ask whether we 
also need hard incommensurateness as a further resource.
I shall argue we do not. It has been recognized for a long time that incom-
mensurateness throws up a particular normative puzzle (see Chang, 1998: 
11). I shall argue that, not only do we not need hard incommensurateness 
Figure 1.6 Sartre’s student.
Incommensurateness Is Vagueness 39
to solve it, but soft incommensurateness provides a better solution to it 
than hard incommensurateness does. It will turn out in Section 9 that this 
is because of one of the formal considerations: a good solution requires 
betterness to be graded.
As a preliminary to describing the puzzle, I need to specify one small 
part of the connection between betterness and normativity. Betterness 
affects what you ought to do. In many cases, it does not fully determine 
what you ought to do, but in some cases it does. Take a case where it does 
and suppose that in such a case a person has a choice between just two 
options. Then she ought to choose one of them if and only if it is better 
than the other. This is a minimal assumption about the connection.
As I am going to use “permissible,” it is permissible for you to choose 
an option if and only if it is not the case that you ought not to choose 
it. Given there are only two options, you ought not to choose one if and 
only if you ought to choose the other. So the minimal assumption implies 
that it is permissible for you to choose an option if and only if the other 
is not better than it.
Let us assume the example of the student is a case where betterness 
fully determines what you ought to do. To justify this assumption, we 
shall have to recognize a wide range of values, perhaps including national 
honor and the performance of filial duties. Let us recognize all the goods 
we need to and incorporate all of them into betterness. So, for instance, 
if the student has a choice between A and B1 in Figure 1.6, he ought to 
choose B1, and if he has a choice between A and B2, he ought to choose A.
Now concentrate on two options B3 and B4 that are both incommensu-
rate with A. If there is a zone of hard incommensurateness, assume they 
are both in that zone. If there is no hard incommensurateness, they are 
both softly incommensurate with A.
These two options can illustrate the normative puzzle I mentioned. 
Suppose the student is offered two choices on successive days. Today, he 
is offered a choice between A, staying in France, and B3, which is travel 
to Britain by a reasonably safe means. He chooses A. The next day he is 
offered a choice between A and B4. By then the safer means of travel has 
shut down, and B4 involves less safe travel. This time the student chooses 
B4. On the face of it, there seems to be nothing wrong with either of his 
two choices since he does not choose a worse option out of those he is 
offered. Yet he ends up with B4 when he could have had B3, and B4 is 
definitely worse than B3. Had he been offered all three options at once, 
he definitely ought not to have chosen B4. This is the puzzle. If the stu-
dent makes the choices I have described, does he do something impermis-
sible, and if so, what? It seems he should have some normative protection 
against this bad outcome. What can it be?
What solution to this puzzle can be offered by different accounts of 
incommensurateness?
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6  Hard Incommensurateness: The First Solution
Let us first assume the incommensurateness is hard and see what follows. 
In that case, definitely, neither A nor B3 is better than the other. Suppose 
the student has a choice between these two options only. My minimal 
assumption about the connection between betterness and normativity 
implies it is definitely permissible for him to choose A and definitely per-
missible for him to choose B3. Similarly, in a choice between A and B4, it 
is definitely permissible for him to choose A and definitely permissible for 
him to choose B4. So both the choices he makes are definitely permissible, 
yet a bad outcome results. That is the puzzle.
Various solutions are available given the assumption of hard incom-
mensurateness. A solution I once offered myself (Broome, 2001) is to say 
that actually, the student does nothing wrong. There is no normative pro-
tection against the bad result. However, causal processes may well protect 
him from it. When he chooses A on the first day, he forms an intention to 
stay with his mother. A person’s intentions typically persist until they are 
fulfilled, and they typically cause the person to take means toward their 
fulfillment. On the second day, the student can be expected still to have 
the intention he formed on the first day. A means toward its fulfillment 
is to reject the option B4. If he does that, he avoids the bad outcome. It is 
prevented just by the causal tendency of intentions to persist. Sadly, this 
protection against the bad outcome is weak because the student might 
easily change his mind on the second day and give up his intention.
More recently (Broome, 2013: Section 10.1) I came to think that the 
causal tendency for an intention to persist has some rational support. It 
is not just that intentions typically do persist; under certain conditions, 
rationality requires them to persist. Among the conditions is that the per-
son does not reconsider the intention. I claim it is not rational just to give 
up an intention you have without at least thinking about it. If the student 
thoughtlessly accepts the offer of B4 on the second day, that would be 
irrational. He would go wrong at that point. Nevertheless, if he does 
think about it, it would not be irrational for him to accept the offer of B4 
since it is a permissible choice for him to make. So, even reinforced with 
this rational support, causal protection against the bad outcome is weak.
The bottom line is that the student may do nothing wrong even though 
he comes to a bad outcome.
7  Hard Incommensurateness: The Second Solution
A second solution can be developed from an idea of Ruth Chang’s (2017, 
2021). I do not believe Chang herself has explicitly offered this idea as a 
solution to this particular puzzle, but it is easily turned to that purpose. 
Chang thinks that a person can create reasons for herself by making com-
mitments. For example, the student might commit himself to his mother, 
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and this commitment gives him a new reason to stay and look after her. 
Chang deals in reasons, but the point can be made for values too. A per-
son can create values for herself by making commitments. For example, 
by committing himself to his mother, the student can make looking after 
her a particular value for him.
Moreover, Chang thinks that a “hard choice,” such as the one the 
student makes, creates a special opportunity for making a commitment 
of this sort. When considering his choice on the first day, wondering 
whether to stay at home or leave for Britain, the student might decide to 
commit himself to his mother. If so, this makes the option of staying at 
home more valuable to him than it previously was. Whereas the option 
A of staying at home was previously not definitely better than B3, leav-
ing for Britain, it may now become so. If it does, A is then also definitely 
better than B4. The value created by the commitment has consequences 
that extend beyond the particular choice where it was made. The student 
ought now to choose A on the second day too. If he chooses B4, he goes 
wrong. That is a solution to the puzzle.
However, it is only a partial solution because, whatever values a per-
son creates by making commitments, she may still face an incommensu-
rate choice. Self-made values have to be weighed against each other and 
against other values, and they may easily be incommensurate with them. 
It would take a total commitment to a single value to make this impos-
sible, and that would at best provide a very rare and extreme solution 
to the puzzle. So now I want you to read the student example as having 
already taken into account all the student’s self-made values, including 
all those he makes when considering his first choice. Assume that these 
commitments leave the student with a choice between incommensurate 
options, as we have been assuming up to now. In this case, we still have a 
puzzle. The commitments do not solve it.
Chang recognizes this possibility. She recognizes that a person faced 
with a “hard choice,” as she calls it, may not settle the choice by mak-
ing a commitment. Instead, she may drift into a decision (Chang, 2017: 
18–19). I take Chang’s word “drifting” to mean making the choice in 
some way that does not involve a commitment that projects a value 
beyond the particular choice. In choosing A over B3 on the first day, the 
student is not necessarily making a commitment. So it does not follow 
that, on the second day, he ought not to choose B4 over A. The student 
may do nothing wrong at all.
We could deny that drifting is possible. We could claim that a per-
son could not make a decision – or perhaps could not rationally make a 
decision – between two incommensurate options without making them 
commensurate by means of a commitment. But that would be entirely 
implausible. In order to make a rational choice between two options, 
you do not have to think one of them is better than the other. If you hap-
pen not to think so, rationality does not paralyze you. Buridan’s ass was 
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paralyzed in such a case and died as a result, but that was a failure of 
its rationality rather than a consequence of it. True, rationality requires 
you to choose to do whatever you believe you ought to do. But it does 
not require you not to choose to do anything that you do not believe you 
ought to do. Chang is right not to make this claim.
Another idea is that the decision between options itself creates a value 
so that any decision between options is itself a commitment of Chang’s 
sort. But that is false, and Chang (2013) rejects it. She thinks that you 
can in effect decide you ought to do a particular act by making a com-
mitment. Nevertheless, she recognizes that deciding to do something and 
deciding you ought to do it are different acts.
The bottom line is that the student may do nothing wrong, even though 
he arrives at a bad outcome.
8  Hard Incommensurateness: The Third Solution
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2012: 145) has a different way of solving the puz-
zle. He deploys a version of the fitting attitude account of value. This 
is a metaphysical theory about the nature of goodness. For something 
to be good is for it to be fitting to have a positive attitude toward it. 
Rabinowicz extends this account to betterness by saying that for one 
thing to be better than another is for it to be fitting to prefer the first to 
the second.
When neither of two things is better than the other and nor are they 
equally good, in typical cases Rabinowicz thinks it permissible to prefer 
one to the other and permissible to prefer the other to the one. He would 
think it permissible for the student to prefer A to B3 and permissible for 
him to have the opposite preference, and also permissible for the student 
to prefer A to B4 and permissible for him to have the opposite preference. 
But he must prefer B3 to B4 since B3 is better. So it is not permissible for 
the student to prefer A to B3 and also prefer B4 to A, even though both 
these preferences are individually permissible. This is because a permis-
sible preference relation must not be cyclic, and these two preferences 
would form a cycle with the student’s preference for B3 over B4.
Let us assume the student should make choices in accordance with his 
preferences. So if he chooses A rather than B3 and also B4 rather than A, 
he does something impermissible. Either he does not choose in accor-
dance with his preferences, or he prefers A to B3 and also prefers B4 to A, 
which is impermissible. Rabinowicz’s solution to the puzzle is to say that 
the student does indeed go wrong, and this is where.
This solution depends on assuming that permissible preferences must 
not be cyclic. Why should that be? Various answers are available, but 
none yields a very satisfactory solution to the solution to the puzzle.
One is to make a normative connection between permissible prefer-
ences and betterness. Since betterness is acyclic, we might be able to derive 
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the conclusion that permissible preferences are acyclic. This answer does 
not suit Rabinowicz because he defines betterness in terms of permissible 
preferences, which he takes to be metaphysically prior to betterness. For 
him, if betterness is acyclic, that would have to be because permissible 
preferences are acyclic, rather than the other way around.
In any case, this answer does not help with the puzzle of the student. 
We might make the connection between permissible preference and bet-
terness in either of two ways but neither succeeds. We might say it is 
permissible to prefer X to Y if and only if X is better than Y. Then indeed 
permissible preferences will be acyclic. But we are assuming that B3 is nei-
ther better nor worse than A, so it will be impermissible for the student 
to prefer B3 to A and impermissible for him to prefer A to B3. Likewise, it 
will be impermissible for the student to prefer B4 to A and impermissible 
for him to prefer A to B4. Since he has to make choices, they cannot be 
constrained by his preferences, so we cannot use preferences to explain 
where he goes wrong.
Alternatively, we might say it is permissible to prefer X to Y unless Y 
is better than X, and then it is impermissible to prefer X to Y. But then 
permissible preferences may be cyclic. It is permissible for the student to 
prefer A to B3, B4 to A, and B3 to B4. So this first explanation of acyclicity 
leaves the puzzle unanswered.
A second explanation is the “money-pump” argument. Rabinowicz 
subscribes to this argument. It has been much debated, and Rabinowicz’s 
own version of it is designed to overcome objections that have been 
raised against it (Gustafsson & Rabinowicz, 2020). But here I shall 
not question the validity of the argument; I am concerned only with its 
broad structure, so I shall describe only a simple version of it. Suppose 
you make choices in accordance with your preferences, and your pref-
erences are cyclic. Suppose you prefer Y to X, Z to Y, and X to Z. 
Imagine you start off with X and are then offered the chance of swap-
ping from X to Y. Because you prefer Y to X, you accept this offer and 
take Y. Next suppose you are offered the chance of swapping from Y 
to Z. You accept this offer too and end up with Z. But you prefer X, 
where you started, to Z, where you ended up. So you have arrived at 
a bad outcome. A course of action that leads to this outcome cannot 
be entirely permissible. It is presumably permissible to make choices in 
accordance with your preferences. So it must be your cyclic preferences 
that are not permissible.
This argument rests on the bad outcome of getting Z when you could 
have had X. This is just the sort of bad outcome that Sartre’s student 
comes to in my version of his story. We are pursuing the question of 
where the student goes wrong. Rabinowicz’s answer is that his choices 
imply he has cyclic preferences, and he goes wrong because cyclic prefer-
ences are impermissible. But now it turns out that cyclic preferences are 
impermissible just because they can lead to a bad outcome of this sort. So 
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we have not found a real explanation of where the student goes wrong. 
True, we have learned that his problem belongs to a recognized set of 
problems. But for a real explanation, we need an independent expla-
nation of why cyclic preferences are impermissible. This money-pump 
explanation is incomplete.
Rabinowicz (2012: 152) does offer an independent explanation. It 
works by treating a person’s preference between two things as a relation 
between the person’s favoring attitudes toward the two individual things. 
For the person to prefer X to Y is for her favoring of X to be greater 
than her favoring of Y. The greater than relation is necessarily acyclic. 
Therefore, preferences understood this way are necessarily acyclic. It fol-
lows that permissible preferences are necessarily acyclic.
However, because it implies that the student’s preferences are neces-
sarily acyclic, this explanation takes us off course in solving his puz-
zle. The student prefers B3 to B4; this is what makes it better. Because 
his preferences are necessarily acyclic, he, therefore, cannot prefer A 
to B3 and also B4 to A. Yet he chooses A over B3 and B4 over A. How 
come? One possibility is that his choices are not in accordance with 
his preferences, which is to say not in accordance with his favorings. 
This is certainly a way to explain how he goes wrong, but it is not the 
sort of explanation we need. If, in making a choice, you choose the 
option you favor less, that must be some sort of accident. We need 
a better explanation of the student’s puzzle than to say he chooses 
wrongly by accident. We can presume the student is careful and delib-
erate in his choices.
The only alternative is to suppose he changes his preference between 
one day and the next.5 That is to say, he changes his favorings. If we 
are to conclude he goes wrong in some way, we shall have to say that 
this change of mind is impermissible. This is a matter of the persistence 
of an attitude. I considered the persistence of an intention in Section 6, 
and I take the same view about the persistence of a preference. Firstly, 
attitudes including preference have a causal tendency to persist, and 
this gives the student some causal protection against the bad outcome. 
Furthermore, it is not generally rational to change a preference with-
out thinking about it, so there is some rational protection against the 
bad result. But both the causal protection and the rational protection 
are very weak: the student might rationally reconsider his preference 
and change it. We therefore cannot conclude that his change of mind 
is impermissible. This alternative, then, takes us back to something 
like my own first solution, which is weak. The student may do nothing 
wrong.
The bottom line is that it seems the student may do nothing wrong even 
though he arrives at a bad outcome. However, there might yet be a differ-
ent explanation of why permissible preferences are acyclic. If so, this third 
solution might show that the student does indeed do something wrong.
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9  Soft Incommensurateness: The Best Solution
We have been assuming that the student faces hard incommensurateness. 
On that assumption, we have not been able to conclude that the stu-
dent necessarily does something wrong, even though he arrives as a bad 
outcome.
The underlying reason for this failure is that hard incommensurate-
ness does not provide any grading of betterness. So far as their betterness 
relative to A is concerned, B3 and B4 have exactly the same standing, even 
though B3 is better than B4. The choice between B3 and A is entirely neu-
tral, there is no normative inclination either way. The same is true of the 
choice between B4 and A. There is no more normative inclination toward 
A in the second choice than in the first. The result is that the two choices 
may go in the way that leads to the bad outcome. But intuitively, there 
ought to be more normative inclination in the second choice because B4 
is worse than B3.
Soft incommensurateness – vagueness – provides this greater inclina-
tion because it grades betterness. So now I turn to soft incommensurate-
ness. Suppose now that there is no hard incommensurateness between A 
and the range of options B. B3 and B4 are in a zone of vagueness rather 
than hard incommensurateness. Then, although neither of them is defi-
nitely better than A or definitely worse than A, B3 is more better than A 
or less worse than A than B4 is.
With vagueness, we have degrees of permissibility. If the student has a 
choice between A and some version of B within the incommensurate zone, 
it is not definitely permissible for the student to choose either. Moreover, 
the better is B within this zone, the more permissible it is for the student 
to choose B, and the less permissible it is for him to choose A. So the stu-
dent should in some way be more inclined to choose A over B4 than he is 
to choose A over B3. This is as it intuitively should be.
For more detail, remember that there are actually two zones of vague-
ness: the vagueness of better than A and the vagueness of worse than 
A. If the vagueness is matching, as I defined it in Section 2, then either 
choice within the incommensurate zone is only borderline permissible. 
Neither is definitely permissible. Where the vagueness is overlapping, 
either choice within the overlap is borderline permissible. Outside the 
overlap, one choice or the other is definitely permissible, but for no 
option in the range B, it is definitely permissible to choose A and defi-
nitely permissible to choose B. So there is subtlety in the permissibility 
of the student’s choices.
Moreover, supervaluation applied to vague betterness provides a clear 
explanation of why the student goes wrong when he makes the choices 
I described. My minimal assumption about the connection between 
betterness and normativity tells us the student ought not to choose an 
option over a better one. According to every sharpening of the betterness 
46 John Broome
relation, either B3 is better than A or else A is better than B4. So according 
to every sharpening, either the student ought not to choose A over B3 or 
else he ought not to choose B4 over A. (This is a disjunction of oughts; 
it is not an ought governing a disjunction.) By supervaluation, therefore, 
definitely, either he ought not to choose A over B3 or else he ought not to 
choose B4 over A. He does both, so one of the choices he makes is imper-
missible. That is why he goes wrong. In this way, we can clearly conclude 
that the student necessarily does something wrong.
You might ask which of his two decisions is the impermissible one, but 
you will normally receive no answer to that question. It is well-known 
(see Fine, 1975) that supervaluation can imply that a disjunction is defi-
nitely true without either of the disjuncts being so. However, because 
permissibility is graded, the impermissibility can be distributed between 
the two choices. Neither is definitely impermissible, but one may be less 
permissible than the other.
You might also ask what is the normative position after the student 
makes his first choice of A over B3. If he then chooses B4 over A, he will 
definitely have done something impermissible. He will have acted imper-
missibly, either in his first choice or in his second. Can we, therefore, 
conclude that he ought not to choose B4 over A since doing so will ensure 
that he does something he ought not to do? No, we cannot.
An argument could be deployed to say we can. Here is one argument 
made by Luke Elson (unpublished). Elson starts from the premise that the 
student ought either not choose A over B3 or not choose B4 over A. This 
is not the premise I have already stated. It is a wide-scope ought govern-
ing a disjunction. It does not follow from my minimal assumption about 
the connection between betterness and normativity. But it nevertheless 
seems plausible, and I shall accept it for the sake of argument. It may be 
reformulated to say that the student ought, if he chooses A over B3, not 
to choose B4 over A, where the clause “if he chooses A over B3” is within 
the scope of “ought.” This formulation is arrived at by substituting logi-
cal equivalents with the scope of “ought” – a rule of deontic logic that is 
hard to reject (see Broome, 2013: 122).
Now suppose the student chooses A over B3 and his choice is irrevoca-
ble. This choice is then necessary in a temporal sense; it cannot be altered. 
Another rule of deontic logic that is hard to reject is “necessary detach-
ment” as I call it (Broome, 2013: 123–125). It says that from “ought if 
X then Y” and “necessarily X,” it follows that “ought Y.” So it seems we 
can detach the conclusion that the student ought not to choose B4 over A. 
That is Elson’s conclusion.
But this argument has a problem. Elson assumes that the premise 
remains true even after the student has made his first choice, but norma-
tive truths can alter with the circumstances. This premise is true so long 
as the student’s first choice is open, but once that choice is made and 
irrevocable, it may no longer be true.
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Think about this case. For a moment, drop the assumption that B3 and 
B4 are in the incommensurate zone. Assume instead that they are both 
definitely better than A, though B3 remains better than B4. Presumably, if 
it is true in the original case that the student ought either not choose A 
over B3 or not choose B4 over A, it is true in this case too. There is no rea-
son why it should not be. Now suppose the student irrevocably chooses A 
over B3, which he ought not to do. Can we conclude by necessary detach-
ment that he ought not to choose B4 over A? Of course not. B4 is definitely 
better than A and it is definitely not the case that he ought not to choose 
it. Indeed he ought to choose it. He went wrong in his first choice, and 
he ought to correct it as well as he can. Necessary detachment is hard 
to reject, so this example shows that the premise is no longer true once 
the student has made a choice. We cannot assume the premise remains 
true once a choice has been made. Because Elson’s argument makes this 
assumption, it is invalid.
Revert now to the case where both B3 and B4 are in the incommensu-
rate zone and let us look at the student’s situation in more detail. Suppose 
for the sake of argument that B3 is near the top of this zone. Then, when 
the student faces his first choice between A and B3, it is not definitely 
permissible for him to choose A. It is borderline impermissible; indeed it 
may be close to being definitely impermissible. We are assuming that, all 
the same, the student chooses A. When he comes the next day to choose 
between A and B4, he may regret his previous choice of staying in France. 
He may think of choosing B4 – leaving for Britain – as a way to reverse 
the choice he now regrets, albeit at a cost. When he makes the second 
choice of B4, he ends up having done something impermissible, but the 
impermissibility may be located largely in his previous choice rather than 
his second one. By the time he comes to his second choice, he can do 
nothing about the previous one.
Intuitively, this way of thinking and choosing seems perfectly permis-
sible. I find it intuitively incorrect to conclude that, once the student has 
chosen A over B3, he ought not to choose B4 over A. When you are facing 
a difficult choice between incommensurate alternatives, the fact that you 
have previously made a particular choice does not necessarily place a 
normative constraint on what you should choose this time.
In sum, I think that the implication of soft incommensurateness for 
the puzzle of the student is exactly right. Here, soft incommensurate-
ness gives a better account of normativity than hard incommensurateness 
does.
10  Conclusion
Soft incommensurateness supplies a better account of the puzzle of the 
student than hard incommensurateness does. I know of no normative 
phenomenon that hard incommensurateness can explain better than 
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soft incommensurateness. For betterness at least, we should give up on 
hard incommensurateness, and recognize that incommensurateness is 
vagueness.
Notes
 1 I am very grateful to Luke Elson for his comments on this chapter, and for 
a conversation on these topics that has continued for several years. In par-
ticular, this chapter has been influenced by his “Unsharpness and forbidden 
compound actions”. I have also received extremely valuable comments from 
Ruth Chang, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Henrik Andersson, and Anders Herlitz, 
which have saved me from significant mistakes. Research for this chapter was 
supported by ARC Discovery Grant DP180100355.
 2 Elson (2014). Although he rejects the collapsing principle, Elson nevertheless 
agrees with my conclusion in this chapter that incommensurateness is vague-
ness. See Elson (2017).
 3 Johan Gustafsson (2018: 289) apparently assumes Elson has no good answer 
to this question. He therefore denies the validity of Elson’s counterexample 
to the collapsing principle. He misses the argument from supervaluation that 
follows.
 4 Here I agree with Carlson (2013: 456–457). Andersson and Herlitz (2018: 
331–332) take the opposite view, but I think their argument is mistaken.
 5 Thanks here to Luke Elson.
References
Andersson, H. and Herlitz, A. (2018), ‘A more plausible collapsing principle’, 
Theoria 84: 325–336.
Broome, J. (2001), ‘Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with 
Incommensurable Values?’, in C. Morris and A. Ripstein (eds), Practical 
Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier (Cambridge University 
Press) 98–120.
Broome, J. (1998), ‘Is Incommensurability Vagueness?’, in R. Chang (ed.), 
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard 
University Press), 67–89. Reprinted in Broome, J. (1999), Ethics Out of 
Economics, (Cambridge University Press).
Broome, J. (2013), Rationality Through Reasoning (Wiley–Blackwell).
Carlson, E. (2004), ‘Broome’s Argument against Value Incomparability’, Utilitas 
16: 220–224.
Carlson, E. (2013), ‘Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle’, 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16: 449–463.
Chang, R, (2013), ‘Commitments, Reasons, and the Will’, Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics 8: 74–113.
Chang, R. (2017), ‘Hard Choices’, Journal of the American Philosophical 
Association 92: 586–620.
Chang, R. (1998), ‘Introduction’, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, 
Incomparability and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press) 1–34.
Chang, R. (2021), ‘What Is It to Be a Rational Agent?’, in R. Chang and K. Sylvan 
(eds), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason (Routledge).
Incommensurateness Is Vagueness 49
Elson, L. (2014), ‘Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle’, Utilitas 26: 
51–60.
Elson, L. (2017), ‘Incommensurability as Vagueness: A Burden-Shifting Argument’, 
Theoria 83: 341–363.
Elson, L. (unpublished), ‘Unsharpness and Forbidden Compound Actions’.
Fine, K. (1975), ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’, Synthese 30: 265–300.
Gustafsson, J. and Rabinowicz, W. (2020), ‘A Simpler, More Compelling Money 
Pump with Foresight’, Journal of Philosophy 117: 578–589.
Gustafsson, J. (2018), ‘Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases?’, 
Utilitas 30: 483–492.
Rabinowicz, W. (2012), ‘Value Relations Revisited’, Economics and Philosophy 
28: 133–164.
Sartre, J.P. (2007), Existentialism is a Humanism (Yale University Press), (origi-
nally 1946).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003148012-4
In a hard case of comparison between two items, it seems that neither is 
better or worse than the other and yet nor are they equally good. If you are 
comparing careers in investment banking and interior design, you might 
judge that the banking career is better in some relevant respects, the design 
career better in other relevant respects, and yet neither is at least as good 
as the other overall. Or if you are comparing the evidence for believing 
that there is a God and the evidence for disbelieving (or withholding judg-
ment), you might judge that the case for belief is better in some respects, 
worse in others, and yet the evidence for each attitude is not at least as 
warrant-providing or justifying as the other. As these cases illustrate, hard 
cases occur in both the practical and theoretical domains. In their simplest 
form, they are normative comparisons of items, A and B, with respect to 
a “covering consideration,” “V,” such as “goodness as a career” or “epis-
temic warrant,” in which it seems that none of the usual trichotomy of 
relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equal to,” hold.
How should we understand such cases? There are four familiar “i” 
explanations: hard cases are hard (i) because we are ignorant of relevant 
normative or nonnormative facts; (ii) because the items are incommen-
surable – i.e., their normative merits are not cardinally measurable; (iii) 
because the items are incomparable; or (iv) because the relevant concepts 
or facts are indeterminate or vague. I have previously argued that these 
four explanations, whether taken jointly or severally, are inadequate 
explanations of hard cases, that is, when taken together or considered 
individually, they fail as an adequate explanation of all hard cases (Chang 
1997, 2002a, 2012, 2017, forthcoming).
Although I have argued against indeterminacy as an explanation of hard 
cases, my arguments have been less directed since it has always seemed to 
me that indeterminacy is the least plausible way of explaining hard cases. 
In holding this view, however, I am in disagreement with a large number 
of philosophers (Griffin (1986); Broome (1997, this volume); Wasserman 
(2004); Qizilbash (2005, 2007, 2014); Sugden (2009); Klocksiem (2010); 
Constantinescu (2012, 2016); Elson (2014), Andersson (2015); Williams 
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(2014, 2016); Dougherty (2016); and Thomas (forthcoming)). Indeed, 
most of those writing in the area suggest that the right way to think 
about hard cases is in terms of indeterminacy, and in terms of vagueness 
in particular.2
In this chapter, I provide further explanation of why I think under-
standing hard cases in terms of vagueness is a mistake. Vagueness both 
under-delivers in that it fails to explain a critical feature of hard cases 
and over-delivers in that it imposes a feature that hard cases do not – and 
should not – have. I then offer my own Goldilocks explanation of hard 
cases, with specific attention to how it solves the two difficulties that 
plague vagueness accounts. I end by offering a nudge to proponents of 
vagueness; given their insights about hard cases, the distance they need to 
travel to accept my explanation of hard cases – and thereby avoid the two 
problems with their account – is not as great as they may think.
Two points of clarification. First, my focus will be on a subclass of 
hard cases, what we might call paradigmatic hard cases – those in which 
the items being compared are qualitatively different with respect to the 
covering consideration, and it seems that neither is better than the other 
or that they are equally good: qualitatively different careers, say, one 
in investment banking and the other in interior design with respect to 
goodness as a career; qualitatively different paintings, say, an abstract 
impressionist painting vs. a photograph with respect to aesthetic merit; 
qualitatively different types of theory, say, evolutionary theory vs. quan-
tum mechanics with respect to explanatory power; qualitatively different 
types of evidence, say, statistical vs. forensic with respect to epistemic 
warrant – where neither seems at least as good. Hard cases involving 
qualitatively different items are rife in human life, are the most difficult 
to explain, and, I believe, hold the greatest philosophical interest.3 Going 
forward, by “hard cases” I mean cases of this paradigmatic variety.
Second, I take “better than,” “worse than”, and “equally good” as 
master normative relations that can, when relativized to an appropriate 
covering consideration, underlie certain other normative relations, such 
as being normatively stronger than, normatively less significant than, and 
equally warrant-providing. So being a stronger normative reason can be 
expressed as being better with respect to normative strength and having 
more epistemic warrant can be expressed as being better with respect to 
epistemic warrant. Sometimes “better than” is understood as confined 
to comparisons within axiology, but master relations, like “better than,” 
“worse than,” “equally good,” are not so confined; when we say that two 
things are “equally good” with respect to V-ness, we are saying that they 
are normatively speaking equally V, where V-ness may be a nonaxiologi-
cal consideration. Stipulating that there are such relations in terms of 
which all comparative relations can be expressed allows us to investigate 
the structure of normativity as a whole, without restriction as to relata or 
covering consideration.
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1  The Problem of Resolutional Remainder
“A is better than B with respect to V” is linguistically vague if there is 
vagueness somewhere in the predicate “better than with respect to V” or 
in the concept it expresses (or strictly in “A” or “B” or their associated 
concepts, but I put that possibility aside here) such that it is indeterminate 
how the predicate or concept applies to A and B. In hard cases of com-
parison, we might say that the indeterminacy is in which of the master 
predicates, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good,” when rela-
tivized to V, applies to A and B.4 Just as it is “hard” to say whether Jason 
Statham is bald, it is “hard” to say whether investment banking is a better 
career than interior design. The hardness in hard cases, so the suggestion 
goes, is a matter of vagueness in our language.
Linguistic vagueness, however, is prima facie pretty implausible as an 
explanation of hard cases. The hardness in comparing a career in invest-
ment banking and one in interior design is substantive and normative, 
not something that disappears through linguistic stipulation. When it 
comes to vagueness in language, the difficulty is whether to apply “bald” 
to Jason Statham or “red” to a colored patch, a problem about whether 
to call Statham bald or the patch red, a linguistic matter that can be set-
tled through linguistic stipulation. Hard cases are not a matter of whether 
to call one career better than another but of figuring out the substantive 
normative matter of how the careers normatively relate (Chang 2002a; 
Schoenfield 2015). That hard cases are not made easy through linguistic 
stipulation seems a compelling reason to reject linguistic vagueness as an 
explanation of such cases. But language and substantive reality may be 
closer than this quick argument supposes. And there is always the possi-
bility, though highly controversial (e.g., Sainsbury 2010), that the vague-
ness is metaphysical – that is, in the world rather than in our language, 
which raises problems that do not necessarily disappear with linguistic 
stipulation. The arguments I propose against vagueness accounts apply to 
vagueness in both their linguistic and metaphysical varieties.
Metaphysical vagueness is vagueness not in language but in the world. 
A relation or property might be thought to hold indeterminately of some 
items; does the property of being part of a particular cloud hold of a par-
ticular water droplet in the sky? It may be thought to be metaphysically 
indeterminate whether it does. Following Akiba (2004), Barnes (2010), 
and Williams (2008), we might think that metaphysical vagueness holds 
when there are multiple fully determinate worlds – some in which, say, a 
given water droplet is part of the cloud and some in which it is not – but 
it is indeterminate which of those worlds is the actual world. In hard 
cases of comparison, we might say that it is metaphysically indetermi-
nate whether A is better than B with respect to V if in some worlds A is 
better than B and in other worlds it is not, and it is indeterminate which 
world is actual. Just as whether a given water droplet is part of a cloud 
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is “hard,” so too is whether investment banking is a better career than 
interior design. The hardness of hard cases, so the suggestion goes, is a 
matter of vagueness in properties or relations in the world.
Now there is an intuitive sense in which it is appropriate to resolve 
vagueness through stipulation. If it is vague whether Jason Statham is 
bald, there is an intuitive sense in which we can “resolve” the question 
of whether he is simply by arbitrarily stipulating that he is (or isn’t). We 
might say that even though there is an answer to the question of whether 
he is bald – namely, that it is indeterminate whether he is, the question 
nevertheless admits of a resolution as to whether he is, and we can always 
resolve the question by arbitrary stipulation.
By “resolution,” I mean the thin, neutral idea of knowable application 
or lack of application of the predicate, where the identity of the predi-
cate remains the same although the associated concept or property may 
change through resolution. My interest is in intrinsic resolution – that is, 
a settling of whether the predicate applies or not solely on the basis of 
facts about how the items relate, and not on extrinsic factors, such as a 
million-dollar reward you will get if you resolve the vagueness one way 
rather than another.5
Consider a supervaluational account of semantic vagueness (Fine 
1975). Here the problem is in our language; we have a word, “bald,” and 
it is indeterminate whether “bald” applies to Statham. The word “bald” 
and the concept of baldness it expresses are not sufficiently precise deter-
minately to answer the question of whether Statham is bald. So we can 
sharpen up the concept of being bald by offering different neighboring 
concepts of being bald, each of which is represented by a different sharp-
ening, and arbitrarily stipulate that one of those concepts is expressed by 
the predicate “is bald.” There is nothing in our language or concepts that 
favor choosing one sharpening over another; we can arbitrarily stipulate 
a predicate and its associated concept as applying to Statham or not.
The same holds for metaphysical vagueness. Here the problem is with 
the world; there are multiple fully determinate worlds and indetermi-
nacy in which of those worlds is actual. So we can sharpen up the target 
actual world by choosing one of the fully determinate worlds as actual. 
There is nothing in the world that favors choosing one determinate world 
over another; we can arbitrarily stipulate a determinate world in which 
Statham is bald (or not) as the actual world. As R. J. Williams, one of the 
leading proponents of metaphysical vagueness, puts it, the resolution of 
metaphysical vagueness is a matter of “randomly and groundlessly” mak-
ing a judgment call (R. J. Williams 2016: 429).
Hard cases are different. In a hard case, arbitrary fiat never intrinsi-
cally resolves the case. If, in attempting to resolve the hard comparison 
between investment banking and interior design, you arbitrarily stipulate 
that the investment career is better, you have not settled the matter but 
are left with “resolutional remainder” – that is, the substantive question 
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of what normative relation holds between the careers has not been closed 
but remains an open question. Or consider a hard case involving statisti-
cal evidence that John committed a tort and individualized evidence that 
he did not. If you arbitrarily stipulate that the statistical evidence is better 
with respect to providing epistemic warrant, you do not thereby settle 
the matter of whether it is – the question of which evidence is weightier 
remains an open question. In cases of vagueness, by contrast, arbitrary 
resolution does close the question. Resolutional remainder is a state in the 
world, not in us, concerning a normative matter. It obtains when that nor-
mative matter remains open after an attempt at resolution, however we 
might think or feel about the case. Vagueness fails to explain why there is 
resolutional remainder after arbitrary stipulation and thereby under-deliv-
ers as an explanation of hard cases (see also Chang 2002a, forthcoming).
It might be thought that “resolutional remainder” in hard cases can 
be explained away in other terms. When you arbitrarily stipulate which 
of two careers in a hard choice is better, the matter of what normative 
relation holds between them remains open perhaps because we can never 
be sure that we followed the correct epistemic procedure in judging that 
neither is better, or because we are uneasy about our stipulated resolu-
tion since we recognize that our peers may stipulate differently (Williams 
2016), or because we are filled with angst, regret or uncertainty in “high 
stakes” cases, like those involving comparisons of careers (Constantinescu 
2012; Williams 2016). These are all extrinsic features of hard cases to 
which indeterminists have helped themselves in attempting to account for 
resolutional remainder.
But these suggestions misunderstand resolutional remainder in two 
ways. First, it is intrinsic to hard cases, not a downstream consequence 
of arbitrary stipulation that is contingent on the circumstances. Arbitrary 
stipulation in a hard case leaves resolutional remainder as an intrinsic 
feature of such cases, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the 
choice. It is not, for instance, a feature of only “high stakes” cases, like 
comparisons between careers, places to live, or people to marry. A pri-
mary school teacher might face a hard case in judging which of two qual-
itatively very different finger paintings is more beautiful. If she arbitrarily 
stipulates that Timmy’s is more beautiful than Tommy’s, her arbitrary 
stipulation does not settle the matter; the question of how the paint-
ings relate with respect to beauty remains open, although answering that 
question may be of little intrinsic or extrinsic importance. Nonarbitrary 
stipulation in a hard case can be always be made on extrinsic grounds. 
The fact that Tommy won a prize for a pencil drawing last week may 
be an extrinsic ground for stipulating this week that Timmy’s is more 
beautiful. Being low stakes, not having adequate time to consider the 
matter, achieving some benefit, and so on, can be extrinsic grounds for 
stipulating one resolution rather than another. But arbitrary stipulation 
on intrinsic grounds will always leave resolutional remainder.
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Second, resolutional remainder is a metaphysical, not a psychologi-
cal phenomenon.6 Arbitrary stipulation in cases of vagueness settles the 
question of whether the predicate applies, while in hard cases, after arbi-
trary stipulation, the metaphysical question of how the items normatively 
relate remains open. Whether we feel angst, uncertainty, or unease about 
the matter is not at issue; after all, you might be a confident stipulator 
who is unfussed about the fact that your epistemic peers could have stip-
ulated differently or that the case is high stakes. The issue concerns the 
metaphysical upshots of arbitrary stipulation in answer to the question of 
what relation holds – does arbitrary stipulation close the matter or not? 
In cases of vagueness, it does; in hard cases, it does not.
Could the fact that hard cases are normative be why arbitrary stipu-
lation yields resolutional remainder? Perhaps it is the feature of being 
a normative hard comparison that makes arbitrary stipulation in such 
cases different from arbitrary stipulation in nonnormative cases of 
vagueness (Constantinescu 2012). The problem with this suggestion is 
twofold. For one thing, if arbitrary stipulation resolves vagueness in 
nonnormative hard cases but not in normative hard cases, an account is 
owed of why this should be. One way such an account could be devel-
oped is by exploring whether all normative hard cases are what Gallie 
(1956) calls “essentially contested,” that is, by their nature always open 
to further substantive debate, while nonnormative ones are not. Perhaps 
the proponent of vagueness could develop an account along these lines. 
But note that in doing so she would be abandoning what we currently 
understand as vagueness and proposing that there is some new phenom-
enon according to which arbitrary resolution leaves resolutional remain-
der. I suggest a way to think about this new phenomenon in the last 
section of this chapter.
But there is a deeper worry. If the hardness of hard cases cannot be 
resolved by arbitrary stipulation according to the vagueness theorist, it 
might be wondered what work vagueness does in explaining such cases. 
After all, if attempts to resolve the putative vagueness in such hard cases 
must fail to provide an intrinsic resolution in such cases, why should 
we think that vagueness is what explains the case in the first place? An 
appeal to vagueness would be otiose in normative hard cases. Sharpening 
the question gets us nowhere; we are left where we began, namely, with a 
substantive, normative question about how two items normatively relate 
in a hard case.
None of this is to deny that vagueness holds in the normative domain 
or even in hard cases.7 Vagueness most plausibly holds when the items at 
stake are quite similar and we need arbitrarily to “draw a line” among 
these similar items to determine what counts as being V. Excrement, for 
example, smells disgusting. If we alter a steaming pile of it ever so slightly 
by adding one drop of Chanel No. 5, it will still smell disgusting. But if 
we add another drop and then another and another, at some point it will 
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no longer smell disgusting. Exactly where we draw the line and call the 
smell no longer disgusting is an arbitrary matter because it is vague 
whether something smells disgusting. The same goes for determining 
whether a life is good. Fixing all the features that go into making a life 
good, it may be an arbitrary matter where we draw the line in calling 
such lives good enough to count as “good lives.” The notion of a good 
life may well be vague. But the problem of comparing two qualita-
tively different lives with respect to “goodness as a life” in hard cases is 
not a matter of drawing a line among similar lives to determine which 
lives are good enough to count as “better as a life” than other lives. 
A property can be vague (e.g., “long”) while its comparative is not (e.g., 
“longer than”).
In sum. Vagueness can be resolved by arbitrary stipulation, but in hard 
cases, attempts to resolve the hardness by arbitrary stipulation leave reso-
lutional remainder. Vagueness cannot accommodate resolutional remain-
der unless it is taken to be a phenomenon that is different from how it 
has so far been understood. If vagueness is understood in this new way, 
there is reason to think that, as an explanation of hard cases, vagueness 
thereby becomes otiose.
2  The Problem of Normative Leakage
Hard cases raise an interesting puzzle for rational choice (Chang 1997). 
Suppose, as many do, myself included, that a comparison between 
alternatives A and B with respect to V determines the rational choice 
between A and B, where V is what matters in the choice between them.8 
Suppose, moreover, that as the vagueness theorist would have it, in a 
hard case of comparison, it is always rational arbitrarily to stipulate 
that one is better than the other. Putting these suppositions together, we 
might accept the following “bridge principles” connecting comparisons 
with rational choice:
Bridge Principles
 (1)  If A is better than B with respect to V, and V is what matters in 
the choice between them, then one should rationally choose A.
 (2)  If A is worse than B with respect to V, and V is what matters in 
the choice between them, then one should rationally choose B.
 (3)  If A and B are equally good with respect to V, and V is what 
matters in the choice between them, then it’s always rationally 
permissible to flip a coin to determine which to choose.
 (4)  If the comparison between A and B with respect to V is hard, and 
V is what matters in the choice between them, then the choice is 
hard, and it’s always rationally permissible to arbitrarily stipu-
late that one is better than the other and choose that option.
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(Although both 3 and 4 involve arbitrariness along the route to choice, 
only the latter involves arbitrary stipulation that one alternative is better 
with respect to V.) Going forward, let us assume that these bridge prin-
ciples hold.
Given these principles, hard cases permit what we might call “nor-
mative leakage”; they can lead to the loss of normativity for a chooser 
through a series of rational choices.9 Suppose you are contemplating 
whether to pursue investment banking or interior design and that the 
comparison of those careers, and thus the choice between them, is hard. 
Following bridge principle 4, you arbitrarily stipulate that interior design 
is better and rationally choose it. I now offer you the opportunity to 
consider a banking career instead, one that is identical to the one you 
forewent except worse in that there will be no year-end bonus. The com-
parison between the two careers is once again hard and so is the choice. 
Employing bridge principle 4, you arbitrarily stipulate that the banking 
career-sans-bonus is better than the design career and choose accordingly. 
But now you have ended up with a career – banking-sans-bonus – that 
is worse than a career you could have had a moment ago – banking – 
through a series of rational choices involving hard cases. If arbitrary stip-
ulation is always permissible in hard cases, then hard cases make us liable 
to normative leakage.
If we understand hard cases as cases of vagueness, can normative 
leakage be blocked? Since the vagueness theorist maintains that arbi-
trary stipulation is always permissible in the face of a hard case, it may 
seem that vagueness permits normative leakage. But the opposite is true. 
Vagueness theorists hold as an integral part of their theory “penumbral 
truths,” such as those given by the ordering properties of the usual tri-
chotomy of relations, like transitivity and consistency. This is precisely 
to block untoward consequences that would otherwise ensue, such as 
normative leakage. (Strictly speaking, some minority views, e.g., degree 
theorists, reject penumbral truths and have been uniformly criticized as 
inadequate accounts of vagueness on that score (e.g. Fine 1975)). Since 
all mainstream accounts of vagueness accept penumbral truths as key 
components of the account, I set minority views aside.10
Put supervaluationally, there can be no sharpening of “better than as 
a career” that permits the three judgments that interior design is bet-
ter than banking, that banking is better than banking-sans-bonus, and 
that banking-sans-bonus is better than interior design. Each alternative 
meaning of “better than as a career,” then, will obey consistency con-
straints and the transitivity of “better than.” Thus there is no sharpening 
on which normative leakage will be permissible. Moreover, “switching” 
between sharpenings in cases of putative normative leakage would involve 
equivocation across choice situations. You might judge that design is bet-
ter1 than banking, that banking-sans-bonus is better2 than design, and 
that banking is better3 than banking-sans-bonus, but it would be odd to 
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make choices across different possible careers on the basis of such equiv-
ocal judgments. Broome sums things up nicely on behalf of vagueness 
theorists: an agent who normatively leaks “necessarily does something 
wrong.” (Broome, this volume: 46).
The fact that vagueness blocks normative leakage might be thought 
to count in its favor as an explanation of hard cases. After all, if hard 
cases should block normative leakage and understanding them in terms 
of vagueness allows them to do so, then vagueness meets that adequacy 
condition of an explanation of hard cases.
But should hard cases block normative leakage? I want to suggest that 
it is an intrinsic feature of hard cases that they make normative leak-
age in the hard choices they determine rationally permissible. If hard 
cases rationally permit normative leakage, then the problem of norma-
tive leakage is not the problem of explaining hard cases and the choices 
they underwrite in a way that blocks such leakage. On the contrary, the 
correct explanation of hard cases would show how such leakage in the 
context of rational choice is rationally permissible. Since vagueness pro-
hibits normative leakage, it over-delivers as an explanation of hard cases, 
imposing on them a feature that is alien to them.
To see why the rational permissibility of normative leakage is an 
intrinsic feature of hard cases, we need to ask what role hard choices 
play in rational life. To tackle this question, we can start by imagining a 
world without hard cases – in particular, a world in which it never seems 
that one of the standard trichotomy of relations fails to hold between 
two items. In Easy World, it is always evident which of the standard 
trichotomy of relations holds, and what’s more, we are always right. We 
can immediately, reliably, and veridically see that banking is better than 
interior design, living in the country is better than living in the city, mar-
rying Adam is better than marrying Brian, and so on. Perhaps we have 
evolved to have unfailing normative instincts that give us direct access to 
normative facts so that all comparative normative truths hit us like basic 
perceptual truths we can discover by just looking. What would such a 
world be missing?
Easy World has two striking features. First, normativity would be a 
dictatorial overlord, always determining in every possible set of circum-
stances whether one thing is at least as good as another and, given our 
first three bridge principles, what you should think, feel, and do in that 
situation. In a world with only easy choices, there would always be a best 
career, place to live, person to marry, number of kids to have, car to buy, 
and so on since between any two options, one would be at least as V as 
the other. Sometimes normativity would determine that two options are 
equal bests, in which case it wouldn’t matter which you choose, and so 
you could rationally flip a coin between them. If all choices were easy, 
normativity would dictate every aspect of rational life, including when 
you should flip a coin between alternatives.
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Second, rational agency would be fundamentally passive. In a world 
with only easy choices, rational agency would be a passive capacity – 
an instinct or a normative perception – to discover orders dictated by 
normativity concerning what to believe, feel, and do in any situation. 
To exercise rational agency, all you would need to do is sit back, relax, 
and let normative truths tell you how you ought rationally to respond. 
There would be no room in Easy World for active rational agency – that 
is, exercises of agency in which the rational agent herself determines for 
herself what she should rationally think, feel, and do.
Of course, there is a version of a world without hard choices in which 
we don’t immediately perceive normative comparative truths but have to 
engage our rational capacities to discover those truths. This “Challenging 
World” may be thought to be our actual world: one thing is always at 
least as good as another, but it often requires exercises of rational agency 
to determine that this is so. Challenging World, however, is like Easy 
World in the respects of interest: although it takes rational effort to dis-
cover what normativity demands of us, normativity is nevertheless a dic-
tatorial overlord, always telling us what is at least as good as what. And 
although discovering normative truths is hard work, involving the exer-
cise of our rational capacities, those exercises are passive in the sense of 
interest: they permit us to discover existing truths, not give us the power 
to determine or create normative truths.
This thought experiment suggests that hard cases play two important 
and distinctive roles in our world. First, they give rise to junctures in 
human life in which normativity “runs out” or is “silent” as to what a 
rational agent should think, feel, or do.11 Second, because normativity 
does not determine a rational response in such cases, they make space for 
the exercise of active rational agency in which a rational agent can deter-
mine for herself what it would be rational for her to think, feel, and do.
This space for the exercise of active rational agency allows agents 
rationally to change their minds about what they should think, feel, and 
do and to do so at a normative cost. Faced with a hard case involv-
ing banking and interior design, you might rationally choose design. In 
the next moment, you might be faced with another hard case involving 
design and banking-sans-bonus. You might rationally choose banking-
sans-bonus. This series of rational choices in hard cases leaks normativ-
ity; you end up choosing a career that is worse than one you could have 
had moments before. But this is what rational human life is like. There is 
nothing rationally to regret; leaking normativity in the course of human 
life is a feature of rational human life. Human rationality makes space 
for rational agents to change direction, switch gears, pursue a new path, 
try out something new, and so on, even though doing so entails leaking 
normativity over the course of their life. Hard choices are the junctures 
at which such leakage is rationally permissible. We might say that the 
freedom to leak normativity is what hard cases are for.
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The rational permissibility of normative leakage in hard cases is what 
allows rational agents to determine the direction of their lives. I believe 
that this self-determination involves the exercise of a robust normative 
power that lies at the heart of an understanding of rational agency as 
active (Chang 2021). Vagueness, which makes normative leakage a mis-
take, misunderstands the role of hard cases in human life.
A proponent of vagueness can of course appeal to extrinsic factors 
to explain how leakage in hard cases is rationally permissible. Those 
extrinsic factors may override the rational mistake inherent in normative 
leakage if hard cases are cases of vagueness. But if hard cases play the 
distinctive role in rationality that I have suggested, the rational permis-
sibility of such leakage is intrinsic to them.12
In sum. Hard cases provide junctures in life in which agents can actively 
determine what they should think, feel, and do, despite the normative 
costs. They are cases in which normative leakage is rationally permis-
sible. Vagueness, which makes normative leakage a rational mistake, is 
therefore inadequate as an explanation of such cases.
3  Parity and Hard Cases
Hard cases offer us a path to a new way of thinking about the structure 
of normativity. They give us reason to reexamine an unreflective assump-
tion we make about normativity: when we make normative comparisons 
with respect to some V, normativity permits only three possibilities: A is 
better than B, worse than it, or they are equally good with respect to V. 
Normativity is assumed to be “trichotomous” in structure. This assump-
tion can be seen to derive from an analogue in the nonnormative domain; 
when making nonnormative comparisons, say, with respect to length, the 
nonnormative domain permits only three possibilities: one item is longer, 
less long, or equally as long as the other. “Trichotomy,” the view that 
between two comparable items with respect to some covering consider-
ation, only one of three relations corresponding to or analogous to the 
trichotomy of relations “more than”, “less than,” and “equal to” could 
hold between them, has been assumed by theorists working in the norma-
tive and nonnormative domains alike. It is foundational to much work in 
the social sciences, especially economics and decision theory but is also 
widely assumed in the humanities and physical sciences.
I have argued elsewhere that Trichotomy does not hold in the nor-
mative domain. This is because the significant qualitative differences in 
normativity between items make Trichotomy too crude a view to cap-
ture the full range of possible normative relations among items (Chang 
2016a). When we compare two careers with respect to goodness as a 
career, two policies with respect to justice, two reasons with respect to 
normative strength or significance, two sets of evidence with respect to 
warrant, or two scientific theories with respect to explanatory power, we 
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cannot assume that these normative covering considerations – goodness 
as a career, justice, normative significance, warrant, explanatory power – 
are like nonnormative covering considerations, such as length, weight, 
and volume, that permit only trichotomous rankings. There is a fourth, 
sui generis, master relation by which things can be normatively related, 
what I call “on a par.” Two careers can be on a par with respect to good-
ness as a career: neither is better than the other but nor are they equally 
good. They are nevertheless comparable; they are qualitatively different 
and yet in the same neighborhood of goodness as a career, they are on a 
par. Similarly, statistical evidence that the defendant committed the tort 
may be neither stronger, less strong, nor equally as strong as forensic, 
individualized evidence arguing the contrary. It isn’t that we can’t com-
pare the epistemic warrant of each kind of evidence; we’re not trying to 
compare epistemic and practical reasons, for instance, or a weight and a 
volume. The statistical evidence is on a par with the individualized evi-
dence. In short, when making normative comparisons, we should reject 
Trichotomy and accept instead Tetrachotomy, the view that between two 
comparable items with respect to some covering consideration, only one 
of four relations – “better than,” “worse than,” “equally good,” and “on 
a par” – could hold between them.
Hard cases are, I suggest, cases in which the items are on a par. 
Normativity is tetrachotomous, not trichotomous, in structure.13 There 
are four, not three master relations in the normative domain.
There are of course many questions that arise in the face of such a 
seemingly radical proposal, many of which I try to tackle elsewhere, and 
I won’t repeat my arguments here. My aim instead is to describe how 
parity solves the two problems we have raised for vagueness theorists.
The first, concerning resolutional remainder can be straightforwardly 
explained. On the assumption of Trichotomy, arbitrarily stipulating that, 
say, investment banking is better than interior design leaves resolutional 
remainder because Trichotomy is false: the careers are on a par. The ques-
tion of what normative relation holds between the careers cannot be set-
tled by arbitrarily stipulating that one is better if the normative truth is 
that they are on a par. Arbitrary stipulation leaves resolutional remainder 
in hard cases because we assume that Trichotomy holds.
The second problem is to explain how hard cases, understood as cases 
of parity, rationally permit normative leakage. To solve this problem, we 
must ask what bridge principle connects the fact that options are on a par 
with how rationally to choose between them. That is, we need a bridge 
principle that replaces principle 4 mooted earlier for hard cases. I have 
suggested that the bridge principle is disjunctive: if options are on a par, it 
is rationally permissible to commit to (a feature) of one, thereby creating 
normativity in its favor and perhaps now having most reason to choose 
it or to drift into one of the options – that is, intentionally choosing it on 
the basis of some consideration that counts in its favor.
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Bridge Principle for Hard Cases
 4* If A and B are on a par with respect to V, and V is what matters in 
the choice between them, then it is always rationally permissible 
to commit to (a feature of) one of them, thereby creating a reason 
to choose it, which may then give one most all-things- considered 
reasons to choose it, or to drift into one option – that is, to inten-
tionally choose it on the basis of already-existing reasons but 
without committing to any of its features.
The difference between committing and drifting is of the greatest 
importance. When you commit to something and thereby create a reason 
to choose it, you are engaging in the volitional activity of putting yourself 
behind that consideration. It is this putting yourself behind something, say, 
the lucre you will earn as an investment banker, that creates normativity 
in favor of the banking career. Since creating reasons is an active exercise 
of rational agency, hard cases, understood in terms of parity, rationally 
permit you to determine for yourself what you have most reason to think, 
feel, and do. Normativity doesn’t dictate what you should think, feel, and 
do in every possible circumstance; it leaves you with “hard choices” – 
that is, cases in which the items are on a par, and you have the freedom to 
create for yourself a reason to pursue one thing over another, a freedom 
that is itself not governed by normativity. Committing to something is 
something rational agents do as an exercise of their rationality that is not 
guided by reasons (Chang 2021). In a hard choice, then, you can create 
a new “will-based” reason for yourself to pursue banking-sans-bonus, 
thereby making it better, we can suppose, than interior design. There is 
no mistake of rationality even though a moment ago you could have had 
banking with a year-end bonus. This is because hard choices allow you 
space to change direction in your life by creating normativity that favors 
new life paths even at the cost of leaking normativity. Moreover, how 
much normatively it is permissible to leak is constrained by the require-
ment that the options are in fact on a par. Rational life allows you to 
change direction at normative cost without making a rational mistake, 
but too much leakage – for example, leakage when options are not on a 
par – will undermine rational agency.
None of this is to say that hard cases, understood in terms of par-
ity, must always permit normative leakage. If today you commit to the 
autonomy afforded by a career in interior design, your doing so confers 
normativity in favor of the design career that wasn’t there before and 
which could now give you most all-things-considered reasons to become 
an interior designer over a banker. Tomorrow, when you are offered the 
chance to reconsider your choice of career, this time being offered the 
same banking career but without a year-end bonus, the design career 
may be better than both the original banking career and the banking 
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career without the bonus because of your commitment. In this way, what 
you chose previously can constrain what you can rationally choose sub-
sequently; commitment in one choice can block what would have been 
normative leakage in a subsequent choice (Chang 2005).
Understanding hard cases in terms of parity also provides us with a 
diagnosis of the hardness in hard cases. Hard cases are hard because we 
assume too crude a view of the structure of normativity – that all nor-
matively significant qualitative differences can be forced to fit within the 
usual three categories of relation corresponding to “more,” “less,” and 
“equal” in the nonnormative domain. Once we allow for the possibility 
of parity, determining which relation holds between two items in a hard 
case will be (relatively) easy: the items are on a par. But there is a hardness 
that remains in hard choices. In hard choices, we are rationally permitted 
to commit or to drift, and which we do is not a choice guided by reasons 
but a volitional activity. The hardness is volitional: can we commit or is 
the will content to drift? Committing to something is hard; it is a matter 
of putting your very self behind something. We commit in our friend-
ships, love relationships, and personal projects. But commitment beyond 
these spheres is not yet recognized as part of what it is to be a rational 
agent. Instead, we are taught that when we face a hard choice one option 
is at least as V as the other and that our job as rational agents is to dis-
cover which it is. We are taught that rationality is a matter of discovery 
of reasons, not their creation through our commitments.
In sum. If we understand hard cases as cases of parity and not vague-
ness, we can explain both why arbitrary resolution of hard cases leaves 
resolutional remainder and why normative leakage is rationally permis-
sible. Hard cases and the hard choices they underwrite are junctures in 
human life in which rational agents can change direction in their lives 
despite the normative costs of doing so.
* * *
I end with a nudge for vagueness theorists – at least of the traditional, 
non-epistemicist variety. Although I believe that indeterminacy under-
stood as vagueness is the least plausible of the “i” explanations of what 
I have called “paradigmatic” hard cases, I also believe that those who 
appeal to vagueness to explain such cases are very close to the truth of 
these cases, i.e., that they are almost partisans of parity. This is because, 
they share with defenders of parity two key insights about hard cases – 
namely, (i) that they are not cases of incomparability and (ii) that it is 
implausible to think that in all hard cases between qualitatively different 
items, one is always at least as good as the other but we just don’t know 
which. Surely, we can compare two careers, places to live, and human 
lives, even if they are qualitatively different. And is it really plausible to 
think that between every pair of qualitatively different careers, such as 
banking and interior design, there is always a precise truth about whether 
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increasing the salary of one by a dollar thereby makes it better, but we are 
too stupid to discover that truth? Maybe such precision holds of baldness 
and being a heap, but it is hard to believe it holds of goodness as a career, 
well-being, justice, epistemic warrant, and the like.
I wonder whether proponents of vagueness have come to vagueness as 
an explanation of hard cases largely by default. Indeed, indeterminacy 
sometimes seems to serve as a dumping ground for unclear or difficult 
normative determinations. Once the vagueness theorist accepts that not 
all hard cases can be explained by incomparability or ignorance, then 
on the assumption of Trichotomy, indeterminacy is the only remain-
ing explanation. As I have argued in this paper, however, indeterminacy 
understood as vagueness is not the right kind of phenomenon to explain 
hard cases.
To get on the path to parity, the vagueness theorist needs only to take 
two steps. First, she needs to recognize that the assumption of Trichotomy 
is unreflectively built into certain, especially economic, approaches to 
hard cases and that this assumption requires examination and defense. 
Second, she needs to investigate the nature of the normative consider-
ations she is attempting to model, without simply assuming that they are 
amenable to the same modeling fit for nonnormative considerations, such 
as length, weight, and volume. I have argued that qualitative differences 
in normativity make space for a fourth, sui generis way in which items 
can be normatively related (Chang 2002a, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a). The 
structure of normativity is not like the structure of nonnormativity. We 
need parity to explain hard cases.
The history of philosophy is filled with attempts to explain difficult 
phenomena in familiar terms. When familiar tools strain to explain very 
real and important phenomena, we make philosophical progress by add-
ing new tools to our explanatory toolbox. Hard cases call on us to reex-
amine deep and unreflective assumptions we make about the structure of 
normativity. By adding parity to our explanatory toolbox, I believe that 
we put ourselves on a path to a deeper understanding of hard cases and 
the nature of normativity.
Notes
 1 Thanks to the editors of this volume and to the audience at the UK ALPP 
conference, especially Matt Kramer, Rae Langton, and Re’em Segev, for com-
ments that led me to make some useful clarifications, and to Kit Fine for dis-
cussion about the varieties of vagueness that saved me from many infelicities 
and helped me to simplify my arguments.
 2 If my arguments are correct, the positive arguments offered by proponents 
of vagueness are not. The most trenchant of these arguments are provided by 
John Broome (1997, this volume). If Broome’s arguments are correct, then 
two ways of understanding value relations that make room for both vague-
ness and the determinate failure of the usual trichotomy of relations offered 
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by Wlodek Rabinowicz (2007, 2012, see also 2009) and myself (2002b, 
2016a) are mistaken.
I believe that Broome’s arguments depend on a controversial assumption. 
They assume that all banking careers (or what not featuring in vagueness) can 
be arrayed on a spectrum such that it makes sense to say of each career on the 
spectrum that it is (trichotomously) “closer” or “further” from being a ver-
sion of the banking career that is definitely better (or worse) than the interior 
design career. I have suggested (Chang 2002a) that there are at least two rea-
sons we cannot expect that an item like a career can always be tweaked with 
small, successive normative changes to generate a spectrum of such careers 
where each career is increasingly good as a career. First, a small normative 
change can trigger a new aspect of goodness of career that wasn’t relevant 
before, thus making the new career not better with respect to goodness as a 
career but only with respect to some additionally smuggled in covering con-
sideration. I call this the Hegelian Proviso. Second, a small normative change 
in a career can make a career not better but worse than it was before because 
of organic unities. I call this the Aristotelian Proviso. These provisos show 
that we cannot assume that a spectrum of the sort on which Broome’s argu-
ments rely is always available. (Although I rely on a similar spectrum in my 
arguments for parity, my burden is to show that there is at least one such 
spectrum involved in a hard case, not that all hard cases are amenable to 
treatment in terms of the kind of spectrum that Broome envisages).
Other proponents of vagueness have offered mostly negative arguments 
against my arguments that hard cases are not cases of vagueness. Some tele-
graphic worries about such arguments that could not be addressed explicitly 
in this chapter are as follows:
Wasserman’s (2004) objections suggest (a) that there is a difference in phe-
nomenology involving vagueness of monadic as opposed to polyadic predi-
cates, but I can see no difference in phenomenology in the relevant cases; 
my point is that in hard cases, it seems determinately that none of the usual 
trichotomy of relations holds (that the one career is not better than the other) 
and we are not inclined to judge that it’s unclear whether ‘better than’ holds, 
as we might in cases of vagueness so the phenomenology is different; (b) 
maintains that the idea of resolutional remainder begs the question against a 
previous argument that ignorance as to which of the usual trichotomy holds 
is not always in play in hard cases since the idea of a resolutional remainder 
presupposes that one of the usual trichotomy of relations holds but we don’t 
know which. This worry itself, it seems to me, begs the question against the 
possibility of parity and misunderstands the idea of resolutional remainder, 
which does not entail the claim that one of the usual trichotomy holds even 
after arbitrary stipulation but that the substantive question of what relation 
holds between items remains open.
Klocksiem (2010) rightly points out that the Small Improvement Argument 
alone does not establish incomparability but is consistent with vagueness, 
which is why there is a need to argue explicitly against the possibility that 
one or both of the Small Improvement Argument and the Chaining Argument 
trade on vagueness, which I try to do in Chang 2002a.
Sugden (2009) rightly argues that if we assume trichotomy and frame the 
question about hard cases as one about modelling them by the relation “at 
least as R as,” then we might as well think about them as cases of vagueness 
since he fiats no space for contemplating a normative reality that defies these 
assumptions. However, the philosophically interesting question is about nor-
mative reality of hard cases, not how we can impose neat decision-theoretic 
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models on them that may not accurately reflect their features (see also 
Qizilbash 2014).
Elson’s (2014) interesting and complex argument that my arguments for 
parity trade on vagueness wholly depends on the thought that “is compa-
rable” (or being comparable) (with respect to V) can be vague without any 
one of “better than,” “worse than,” or “equally good” (with respect to V) 
being vague, assuming trichotomy. I don’t see how this is plausible though it 
is a logical possibility. As a tetrachotomist, I would deny that “is comparable” 
(with respect to V) can be vague without at least one of “better than,” “worse 
than,” “equally good,” or “on a par” (with respect to V) being vague (where 
the vagueness of course could derive wholly or partly from V-ness). If compa-
rability is constituted by a certain range of relations, its vagueness seems to 
be a function of the vagueness of one of its components. Moreover, in Elson’s 
(2017) it is suggested that the fact that there can be a quandary over how to 
trade off multiple different components of the covering value makes for a 
prima facie case in favour of vagueness, thereby shifting the burden to oppo-
nents of vagueness to explain why vagueness does not explain these cases. But 
a quandary over the “rate of trade-off” across components of, say, justice, is 
the bread and butter of substantive normative theorizing; it is this quandary, 
which is substantive, that accounts for many of the competing “conceptions” 
of justice that are each substantive and not simply sharpenings of the vague 
term or property of being just. Simply having the form of there being multiple 
legitimate ways to relate different criteria is not ipso facto grounds, it seems 
to me, for accepting vagueness as the default explanation of hard cases.
Andersson (2015) suggests that my assumption that a small unidimen-
sional difference in an item cannot trigger incomparability where before 
there was comparability already begs the question of whether the items are 
comparable because “all differences [can] be understood to be composed of 
small uni-dimensional differences” (p. 252). However, this principle, which 
I understand normatively, not nonnormatively as Andersson supposes in his 
main text (p. 673 though he claims the arguments apply even to a normative 
version of the principle), does not beg the question since there are norma-
tive differences between incomparable items, too, which presumably can be 
broken down into small unidimensional differences if normative differences 
can. As Andersson himself notes, I say very explicitly that the intuition that 
a small normative change in one dimension of the covering consideration in 
one item is not sufficient to trigger incomparability with some other item if 
before those items were comparable holds in a demarcated set of cases and 
not universally, and I lay out two kinds of cases in which it does not hold. So 
the question is whether my appeal to the principle holds in the cases I have 
in mind. Here, all I can do is urge the reader to think of such cases for her or 
himself – laying out any single case in all the necessary detail would be not 
only too onerous but ultimately controversial for at least some readers. I sug-
gest that the Mozart and Michelangelo case is such an example.
 3 The dialectical point of focusing on paradigmatic hard cases is to exclude 
cases involving two nearly identical items about which the “hardness” in 
comparison, if indeed there is hardness, may not be of the same sort as the 
hardness involved in hard cases involving two qualitatively different items. 
(In other work, I refer to this amorphous class as “superhard.”) Throughout 
this chapter, I assume that ignorance (as opposed to epistemic vagueness) is 
not the problem, though exactly how to distinguish ordinary ignorance from 
the ignorance that is putatively vagueness is a difficult question. (Again, in 
previous work, I explore arguments against the idea that in hard cases “at 
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least as good as” holds between items, but we just don’t know which in the 
above (Chang 2002a).) I also assume that incommensurability, the idea that 
items cannot be measured on the same cardinal scale representing the cov-
ering consideration, is a nonstarter since the hard cases of interest do not 
require commensurability for comparability.
 4 We could hold instead that the vagueness is not in which of the usual trichot-
omy of relations holds but in whether the options are comparable/incompa-
rable. For this indeterminacy to hold, however, there must be indeterminacy 
in what relation holds, or so I will suppose.
 5 Extrinsic factors are, of course, always available to resolve vagueness in non-
arbitrary ways. Tom Dougherty (2016) suggests that social conventions can 
step in to solve indeterminacies in morality. It may be worth noting that views 
of vagueness that appeal to extrinsic features to ground nonarbitrary resolu-
tion of vagueness need special arguments to explain why arbitrary resolution 
would not be permitted if, for example, the sharpenings are split 50-50 or the 
degree of truth of each proposition is the same.
 6 I suspect I am to blame for some of my interlocutors treating resolutional 
remainder as a psychological phenomenon. In Chang 2002a, I try to eluci-
date the metaphysical idea that the question of what relation holds remain-
ing open by talking of the “perplexity” over what relation holds “persisting.” 
Here I meant “perplexity” as a conundrum, difficulty, puzzle, not a psycho-
logical state of being puzzled or perplexed.
 7 Indeed, the presence of vagueness and some of the other “i” phenomena may 
help to obscure what is really explains hard cases. We are, to be sure, igno-
rant in hard cases, but it is a mistake, I have argued, to think that ignorance 
explains why the case is hard.
 8 In Chang 2016b, I argue for a strong and tight connection between com-
parisons and rational choice: that if we (i) work with master comparative 
relations, R (“better than,” “worse than,” “equally good,” and “on a par” (to 
be explained in the text that follows)); (ii) make the relata, A and B, include 
anything that can be said to be an object of choice; and (iii) allow covering 
considerations, V, to be whatever might matter in a choice between items, 
comparative facts of the form “A R B with respect to V” provide the grounds 
of all rational choice: they are that in virtue of which a choice is rational. 
According to “comparativism,” comparisons occupy center stage in under-
standing practical normativity, whether you are a consequentialist, deon-
tologist, virtue theorist, perfectionist, etc., because they are that in virtue of 
which choices, intentions, and actions are rational or normatively justified. 
Moreover, they provide a unified framework within which we can conduct 
debates within both practical and theoretical normativity – comparative facts 
provide the ground not only of rational choice but also rational belief.
 9 The idea of normative leakage is a cousin to the familiar idea in decision 
theory that cyclical preferences are disallowed on the pragmatic grounds that 
they would allow agents to money pump. We might say that cyclical compari-
sons in conjunction with bridge principles lead to the possibility of “norma-
tivity pumping.”
 10 In any case, even degree theorists are subject to the argument from reso-
lutional remainder; insofar as degrees can be equal, arbitrary stipulation 
resolves the case but it does not do so in hard cases without resolutional 
remainder.
 11 As we will suggest in the next section, normativity “runs out” only on the 
assumption that “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good” are the only 
master relations.
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 12 Broome (this volume) cleverly notes that, given certain (controversial) 
assumptions, vagueness theorists can account for regret over a past choice by 
“distributing” the rational error involved in normative leakage. If you change 
your mind in the careers case, the rational mistake can be put mostly on your 
initial choice to go for interior design. But even if the rational error in norma-
tive leakage can be “distributed” in the way that Broome suggests, norma-
tive leakage always involves making a rational mistake somewhere in one’s 
choices. Hard choices allow normative leakage without there being any ratio-
nal error. (The controversial assumptions of Broome’s argument are, first, 
that all banking careers can be arrayed along a spectrum of trichotomously 
increasing goodness as a career so that at some point along the spectrum, 
there is a banking career that is definitely better than the interior design career 
and, second, that there are trichotomous degrees of rational permissibility in 
choosing a career that are isomorphic with this spectrum of trichotomously 
increasing degrees of goodness as a career).
 13 I have implied that trichotomy holds in the nonnormative domain and that 
tetrachotomy holds in the nonnormative domain. But this is not quite right. 
There is some reason to think that both domains are structured tetrachoto-
mously – that is, that within each domain, there are properties or covering 
considerations that permit of tetrachotomous orderings. Within the norma-
tive domain, for instance, some normative covering considerations, such as 
“goodness of number of lives saved,” where the goodness is measured by the 
number of lives saved, have a trichotomous structure – saving five lives must 
be better, worse, or equal to saving one life since their normative relation is 
determined by how many lives are saved and numbers can only be greater, 
lesser, or equal to another. Similarly, some nonnormative covering consider-
ations may admit of tetrachotomous ordering. Which is more bulky, a bicycle 
or a 2 x 4 wall stud? Bulkiness is a multi-component covering consideration 
with qualitative aspects that arguably need not relate items trichotomously. 
Similarly, we might wonder whether an orangey-red patch must be redder, 
less red or equally as red as a purply-red patch. A bicycle and piece of lumber 
may be on a par in bulkiness, and two qualitatively different-looking red 
patches may be on a par in redness. These are controversial claims that I leave 
aside here (but see Chang 2002b).
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In choosing between two options, one might, if time permits, compare 
the options and attempt to determine if one option is better and the other 
worse, or if the options are equally good (overall and relative to what 
matters in the situation at issue, which can include the fit between the 
options and the taste or preferences of the choosing agent). According to 
the trichotomy thesis, “the conceptual space of comparability between 
two [options] is spanned by the trichotomy of relations ‘better than,’ 
‘worse than,’ and ‘equally good’: if none of those relations holds, the 
[options] are incomparable” (in terms of their overall value relative to 
what matters in the situation at issue).1 The trichotomy thesis has been 
challenged based on the idea that two options that are not rankable as 
one better than the other or as exactly equally good might, at least intui-
tively, be positively related to one another as “on a par” (rather than just 
negatively related to one another as not exactly equally good and not one 
better than the other). But what is it for two items to be on a par?
A prominent and seemingly promising approach to elucidating parity 
is to build on the notion of rough equality – understood as involving 
closeness in value (more on this later) – and to cast the dispute between 
proponents and opponents of the trichotomy thesis as follows: accord-
ing to proponents of the trichotomy thesis, all pairs of options that are 
roughly equally good are, if not exactly equally good, then such that one 
option is strictly better than the other, though not by much. According to 
opponents of the trichotomy thesis, this is not so; rather, in some cases, 
two roughly equally good options are imprecisely equally good – though 
close in value, they are not rankable in relation to one another2 – and 
it is the relation between such options that the term “on a par” is best 
reserved for. This suggestion fits quite neatly with the familiar idea, which 
I will take on board, that if two options are on a par, then, even though 
the options are not rankable in relation to one another, they are in the 
same neighborhood in terms of their overall value (i.e., in terms of how 
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valuable they are overall) relative to what matters in the situation.3 Given 
this idea, which captures the key features of the notion of parity that I 
am here concerned with, it is natural to conclude that options that are on 
a par must be close in value, and so roughly equally good.4 But, as I will 
argue, this is not the case.5
Developing a view that I present, in part, elsewhere,6 I will begin by 
focusing on the construal of parity as imprecise equality and on the case 
to be made for the possibility of imprecise equality. I think that the case 
is strong. But, building on the understanding of imprecise equality that I 
develop here and in some examples and ideas in some of my prior work, 
I explore the possibility that there can be cases of comparability beyond 
those acknowledged by the trichotomy thesis that are not cases of impre-
cise equality but are still cases of parity (wherein the options are not 
rankable in relation to one another but are in the same neighborhood). 
I then focus on the question of how two options could be in the same 
neighborhood in terms of their overall value (or, more precisely, in terms 
of how valuable they are overall relative to what matters in the situa-
tion at hand) if the options are not roughly equally good (and so are not 
imprecisely equally good). In responding to the question, I explain that, 
in evaluating a particular group of alternatives, some of which are not 
rankable in relation to others, one may need to use a “grading system” 
with wide-ranging evaluative classes. Significantly, when two options 
fall in the same wide-ranging evaluative class, they need not have the 
closeness in value necessary to qualify them as roughly equally good. 
Nevertheless, for options in the same class that, by hypothesis, cannot 
be ranked in relation to one another and cannot be “graded” using a 
grading system that employs narrower evaluative classes, counting the 
options as in the same neighborhood and, relatedly, as on a par seems 
perfectly appropriate even if the options cannot also be described as 
roughly equally good.
2
Items can be compared in all sorts of ways. Books can be compared based 
on, for example, their innovativeness or, alternatively, on their suitability 
to keep a fire going. The items of interest in this chapter are options that 
agents might have to choose between. Moreover, for two options to be 
comparable in the sense of interest here, it does not suffice that they are 
comparable in any old way.
For example, two submissions for a creative writing contest are not 
necessarily comparable in the relevant sense just because one is better 
relative to one of the factors that matters given the context of choice, 
such as, say, originality. Similarly, the two submissions are not neces-
sarily comparable in the relevant sense just because one is better in 
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terms of a factor that is altogether irrelevant given the choice situa-
tion, such as, say, suitability for use as a door stop.
(Andreou 2020a)
Furthermore, as suggested in section 1, the truth of a negative compara-
tive claim such as, for example, that X and Y are not equally good, does 
not suffice to make the options comparable in the sense of interest here. 
For comparability in the relevant sense to obtain, there must be some 
positive relation between the options that captures how they compare in 
terms of their overall value, relative to what matters in the situation at 
issue, from the point of view of practical reason. Notably, whether there 
is a positive relation that captures how two options compare in the rel-
evant sense does not depend on whether the two options are themselves 
good or bad options. In particular, two bad options can be positively 
related to one another as exactly equally bad.
According to the standard view, all options (in a particular choice situ-
ation, given a particular choosing agent) are comparable (in the relevant 
sense); more specifically, according to the standard view, for every pair 
of options, one option is either better than the other or the options are 
exactly equally good. The standard view can be resisted in two ways. 
First, it might be argued that options are not invariably comparable –
sometimes there is no positive relation between the options that captures 
how they compare in terms of their overall value. This is the incompa-
rability thesis. Second (and additionally or else alternatively), it might 
be argued that comparable options are not always comparable as one 
better than the other or as exactly equally good. This way of resisting the 
standard view rejects the aforementioned trichotomy thesis, according to 
which, if two options are comparable, one option is better than the other, 
worse than the other, or exactly as good as the other.
Before Ruth Chang’s now prominent discussions of the trichotomy 
thesis, arguments that could be developed as either for the incomparabil-
ity thesis or against the trichotomy thesis were sometimes automatically 
cast as arguments for the incomparability thesis. Consider the small-
improvement argument, which originally played the role of the most 
promising argument for the incomparability thesis.7 According to the 
small-improvement argument, there are options X, Y, and X+ – where 
X+ is a slightly improved variation of X – such that:
 (1) X is not better than Y
 (2) Y is not better than X
 (3) X+ is better than X
 (4) X+ is not better than Y
If it is granted (in accordance with the next step in the argument) that if 
two options are exactly equally good, then anything that is better than 
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one of the options will also be better than the other option, it follows 
from 3 and 4 that X and Y are not exactly equally good. But then, given 
1 and 2, it follows that X and Y are neither one better than the other, nor 
exactly equally good.8
Filling in the small-improvement argument requires providing plausi-
ble candidates for X and Y (i.e., candidates for which 1–4 all seem clearly 
true). Prominent proposed cases include cases in which it seems plausible 
to suppose that the agent knows all there is to know about what matters 
in the case at hand, such as, for instance, Chang’s (2002) coffee and tea 
case in which, by hypothesis, all that matters is whether and, if so, which 
drink tastes better to the agent. In Chang’s case, the agent “rationally 
judge[s] that [a particular] cup of Sumatra Gold tastes neither better nor 
worse [to her] than [a particular] cup of Pearl Jasmine and that although 
a slightly more fragrant Jasmine would taste better than the original, 
the more fragrant Jasmine would not taste better than the cup of cof-
fee” (2002: 669). If X = opting for the Pearl Jasmine, Y = opting for the 
Sumatra Gold, and X+ = opting for a slightly more fragrant Jasmine, we 
have, it seems, the sort of case we need.
But, even if this is right, we can, as Chang does, resist the incompa-
rability thesis. For, it may be that cases that fit the small-improvement 
argument are best understood as cases that count against the trichotomy 
thesis, not against the comparability of the options under consideration. 
And, indeed, this seems like the best way of understanding the challenge 
raised by Chang’s coffee and tea case. Even opponents of the standard 
view should, it seems, agree that Chang’s coffee and tea case is not a case 
of incomparable options. The options seem roughly equally good. The 
small-improvement argument suggests that they are not also one better 
than the other or else exactly equally good, which in turn suggests that 
they are imprecisely equally good.
The preceding reasoning assumes, following Chang, that the debate 
between the proponents and opponents of the trichotomy thesis can be 
fruitfully construed as not a mere terminological dispute but as a sub-
stantive dispute about our “ordinary” or “intuitive notions of compara-
bility and incomparability” (Chang 2016: 191–192).
In what follows, I will accept the small-improvement argument as an 
argument against the trichotomy thesis and consider whether all cases of 
parity (wherein the options are not rankable in relation to one another 
but are in the same neighborhood) must be understood as cases of impre-
cise equality. After saying more about imprecise equality, I will, building 
on my construal of imprecise equality and on my prior work on par-
ity, provide considerations in favor of the conclusion that the answer is 
“no.” As part of supporting this conclusion, I will focus on explaining 
how two options can be in the same neighborhood (in terms of how 
valuable they are overall relative to what matters in the situation) with-
out necessarily being close in the sense implied by rough equality. Note 
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that, henceforth, the parenthetical remark in the preceding sentence will 
often be left implicit, as will my previously repeated remark regarding the 
notion of parity at issue in this chapter, according to which options that 
are on a par are not rankable in relation to one another but are in the 
same neighborhood.
3
As suggested previously, to say that two options are imprecisely equally 
good is to say that they are roughly equally good and that they are not 
also one better than the other or else exactly equally good. But what is it 
for two options, say X and Y, to be roughly equally good? One thing that 
seems necessary is that their overall values are close; and for this to hold 
it must be that were another option, W, considerably (i.e., quite a lot as 
opposed to just a little) better than one of the original options, it would 
also be better than the other. Importantly, this necessary condition leaves 
open the question of whether X and Y are precisely comparable to one 
another. Relatedly, it is compatible with there being an option that is a 
little better than one of the options but not better than the other; were 
this ruled out, rough equality would not be compatible with imprecise 
equality.9
Return to Chang’s coffee and tea case. Chang’s cup of Sumatra Gold 
and cup of Pearl Jasmine seem roughly equally good; the small-improve-
ment argument suggests that they are not also one better than the other 
or else exactly equally good; as such, they seem to qualify as imprecisely 
equally good. Insofar as they are imprecisely equally good, there is some 
small improvement, s, such that improving one of the options with s does 
not make the improved option strictly better than the alternative. In par-
ticular, the small improvement of making the Pearl Jasmine slightly more 
fragrant does not make it strictly better than the Sumatra Gold. Still, 
insofar as the Pearl Jasmine and the Sumatra Gold are roughly equally 
good, it seems like an option that is quite a lot better than one of the 
options will be better than the other option too; for, if an option that is 
quite a lot better than one of the options is not better than the other, the 
original options must not have been close in value. If, for example, a glass 
of Dom Pérignon is quite a lot better than the cup of Pearl Jasmine but 
not better than the cup of Sumatra Gold, it seems false to say that the cup 
of Pearl Jasmine and the cup of Sumatra Gold are roughly equally good.
4
Now consider the question of whether all cases of parity must be cases of 
rough equality and, more precisely, cases of imprecise equality. (Note that 
settling this question does not necessarily settle the question of whether 
there are any cases of incomparability, which I here leave aside.) Given 
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the (partial) description of rough equality provided earlier – according to 
which “X is roughly equal to Y” implies that, were another option, W, 
considerably better than one of the options, it would be better than the 
other option too – there could, I contend, be cases of parity that are not 
cases of rough equality and so not cases of imprecise equality. In particu-
lar, there could be cases in which the options are intuitively characteriz-
able as on a par, and yet there is another option that is quite a lot better 
than one of the options but not better than the other.
Consider the following case:
Suppose that one is both compassionately and philosophically 
inclined, and let A [and] B… be defined as follows:
A = dedicating the summer to compassionately engaging with oth-
ers by volunteering at a homeless shelter
B = dedicating the summer to promoting one’s philosophical 
development by completing a book manuscript
…
Taking into account the context of choice, including any relevant 
features of the choosing agent, suppose that (from the point of 
view of practical reason), A is not better than B and B is not better 
than A.10
Now consider an improved version of the compassionate option, call 
it A*, in which one also provides a temporary foster home for a needy 
child. A* does not seem roughly as good as A, but quite a lot better. Still, 
like A and B, A* and B are so different, it seems like they too might be 
such that neither is better than the other (from the point of view of prac-
tical reason). But then we have, in A*, an option that is quite a lot better 
than A but not better than B. This suggests that even though A and B 
seem like they are on a par, they are not imprecisely equally good.
Importantly, this case is not meant to provide decisive support for the 
view that there can be options that are on a par but not imprecisely 
equally good. However, once it is supplemented with the reasoning that I 
will provide for the view that we can make sense of two options being in 
the same neighborhood without being close in the way that options that 
are roughly equally good are, it will, I hope, be clear that we should not 
assume that all cases of parity are cases of imprecise equality.11
Interestingly, Chang provides a characterization of options that are on 
a par that allows for the possibility of options that are on a par but not 
necessarily imprecisely equally good. In working up to this characteriza-
tion, Chang (2016: 194) suggests that
we understand value relations in terms of evaluative differences 
between items [with respect to what matters in the choice situation 
at issue, where] evaluative differences can be individuated along 
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two dimensions: (1) bias or direction, that is, whether the difference 
favours an option or “points to” one of them, and (2) magnitude, 
that is, whether the difference has some extent and is therefore 
nonzero.
We can then understand cases of parity as follows: “If A and B are on 
a par, then their evaluative difference does not favour one alternative 
over the other – it has no direction – but it nevertheless has magnitude” 
(Chang 2016: 195). Cases of parity thus differ from cases in which A 
is better than B and cases in which B is better than A, since, in cases 
of the latter two sorts, the evaluative difference between the options is 
biased toward one of the options. Cases of parity also differ from cases 
in which A and B are equally good since in cases of the latter sort, the 
evaluative difference between the two options is not only not biased, 
but also has zero magnitude. Moreover, there is nothing in the charac-
terization of parity under consideration that requires cases of parity to 
be cases of imprecise equality. In particular, the characterization does 
not require that the evaluative difference between the options not be 
large.
I will not attempt to decisively weigh in on whether Chang’s contro-
versial characterization of parity is revealing or confounding in relation 
to the familiar cases of parity that Chang focuses on and that fit with the 
idea that options that are on a par, though not rankable in relation to 
one another, are in the same neighborhood in terms of their overall value 
relative to what matters in the situation. What must be noted, given my 
purposes, is that the characterization gives no answer to the question that 
I seek to address (regarding the notion of parity that I am concerned with 
in this chapter and that captures the key features of the familiar cases). 
That question is as follows: Allowing, provisionally, that there could be 
options that are on a par but not roughly equally good (and so not impre-
cisely equally good), in what sense would such options be in the same 
neighborhood in terms of their overall value relative to what matters in 
the situation?
To answer this question, it helps to think about grading systems and 
how the extent to which they can be sensibly refined depends on how 
simple and similar the options compared are.12 If, for example, one is 
evaluating the books in one’s office on the basis of their suitability to fig-
ure in some impromptu resistance training, and this is purely a function 
of their weight, one may be able to not only divide them up into broad 
classes that reflect “different grades or levels of quality” relative to what 
matters,13 such as “marginal,” “good,” “very good,” or “excellent,” but 
also to rank them and assign them much more precise scores based on 
their weight. If, however, one is evaluating books from a variety of very 
different disciplines for a dissertation prize, it might be misguided to sup-
pose that, with enough time and insight, one could rank each dissertation 
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in relation to every other dissertation.14 Instead, it might be that properly 
evaluating the dissertations involves sorting them into “grade classes,” 
such as “marginal,” “good,” “very good,” and “excellent,” and allowing 
that, while options that are similar enough might be rankable in relation 
to each other, options that are very different might not be. Options of the 
latter sort might only be comparable as in the same class or as on a par. 
Since the grade classes are, by hypothesis, inevitably quite broad, two 
options in the same class can be such that one of the options is consider-
ably better than the other. It therefore cannot be assumed that options in 
the same grade class qualify as roughly equally good.
Suppose, for instance, that two physics dissertations fall in the class 
of good books. One of the physics dissertations, P*, might be consid-
erably better than the other, P, just as the improved compassionate 
option in the previously described summer plan case is considerably 
better than the original compassionate option, though both options are 
good. Were all the dissertations quite similar to one another, it might be 
possible to subdivide the good dissertations into two distinct sets cor-
responding to two more refined evaluative classes (that do not overlap 
and together contain all and only the good dissertations), with one set 
containing the better of the two good physics dissertations, P*, and the 
other set containing the worse of the two good physics dissertations, 
P, and the dissertations in the former set all being better than the dis-
sertations in the latter set. This need not, however, be possible if some 
of the good dissertations (which might include, in addition to the two 
physics dissertations, a creative writing dissertation) are very different 
from each other and not comparable as one better than the other or as 
exactly equally good. If, for example, the good creative writing disserta-
tion, C, cannot be ranked in relation to either of the two good physics 
dissertations, then there is no way of subdividing the good dissertations 
into two distinct sets with the dissertations in the set containing P* all 
being better than the dissertations in the set containing P. The evaluative 
neighborhoods (or grade classes) that options that are on a par belong 
to are thus sometimes inevitably quite wide-ranging – wide-ranging 
enough to contain options that are not sufficiently close in value to 
qualify as roughly equally good, including (1) some pairs of similar 
options – such as P* and P in the case at hand – that are such that one of 
the two options is considerably better than the other, as well as (2) some 
pairs of options – such as P and C in the case at hand – that are not 
rankable in relation to each other and do not qualify as roughly equal 
in value because there is another option – P* in the case at hand – that is 
considerably better than one of the original options but not better than 
the other. As such, it does not follow from the fact that options that are 
on a par share the same evaluative neighborhood that they are roughly 
equally good, even if the neighborhood cannot be subdivided into two 
narrower evaluative classes.
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Notably, one might consider weakening the idea of rough equality so 
that pairs of options – including pairs of similar options that are such 
that one of the options is considerably better than the other – can qualify 
as roughly equal if the options share a neighborhood that, due to some 
of the options in the neighborhood not being rankable in relation to each 
other, cannot be subdivided into two neighborhoods that figure as dis-
tinct grade classes (wherein all the options in one of the grade classes are 
better than all the options in the other grade class). But this just leaves us 
without a label for the less inclusive subset of cases we normally think of 
as cases of rough equality and papers over the real distinction between 
cases of parity that fit with the strict notion of rough equality and cases of 
parity that fit only with the weaker revisionary notion. Whatever labels 
we settle on, it is important to recognize that cases of parity can fail to 
qualify as cases of rough equality in the more standard, stricter sense of 
“rough equality.”
Significantly, if one is receptive to the possibility of parity but skepti-
cal about Chang’s idea that, if A and B are on a par, then their evaluative 
difference has “magnitude” but no “bias,” one can, in light of the preced-
ing reasoning, refrain from taking Chang’s idea on board and still have 
something illuminating to say about what it is for two options to be on 
a par (whether or not they are imprecisely equally good): if A and B are 
on a par, then, though not rankable in relation to one another, they share 
a class in a grading system that can be used to grade A and B and that 
is, in relation to this task, as refined as can be (assuming distinct, non-
overlapping grade classes). Alternatively, those sympathetic to Chang’s 
idea might attempt to use the distinction between cases of parity that are 
cases of imprecise equality and cases of parity that are not cases of impre-
cise equality to try to illuminate talk of magnitude and (lack of) bias in 
cases of parity, emphasizing that cases of parity can involve options that 
are either more or less close in value, but that either way, reason does not 
favor one option over the other. Of course, strictly speaking, the assump-
tion that X and Y are close in value does not imply that X and Y have a 
difference in value with some zero or nonzero magnitude, but rather that, 
were some third alternative, W, considerably better than one of the origi-
nal options, it would also be better than the other. Still, talk of magnitude 
without bias might seem more promising than when first encountered.
In the end, what I really want to emphasize is that understanding par-
ity in accordance with the preceding discussion captures the key features 
of (the notion of) parity (that I am here concerned with) – namely, that 
options that are on a par are not rankable in relation to each other, but are 
in the same neighborhood in terms of their overall value relative to what 
matters in the situation; moreover, it allows that there are instances of 
parity that are not instances of imprecise equality (in the sense I describe 
early in the chapter). The idea that options that are on a par might not 
be imprecisely equally good has been previously embraced; it has not, 
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however, been previously explained in relation to the central idea that 
options that are on a par are in the same neighborhood (in terms of their 
overall value relative to what matters in the situation at issue). Given that 
options that are on a par are in the same neighborhood, it is natural to 
conclude that they must be close in value, and so roughly equally good. It 
is, I hope, illuminating to see why this need not be so.
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Notes
 1 The quoted description of the trichotomy thesis is from Chang (2002: 661). 
For reasons that will be discussed later, Chang rejects the thesis.
 2 The possibility of options being “imprecisely equally good” is discussed by, 
for example, Parfit (2016). Earlier related discussion on “rough comparabil-
ity” can be found in Parfit (1984: 431). Notably, I am not using “roughly 
equally good” and “imprecisely equally good’ as interchangeable, as is some-
times done. In particular, as I am using “roughly equally good,” two options 
that are roughly equally good can fail to be imprecisely equally good since 
they might be rankable in relation to one another.
 3 Although the (partial) description of options that are on a par as “in the 
same neighborhood” is borrowed from Chang (2016), Chang does not cast 
all cases of parity as cases of imprecise equality. More on this later in the 
chapter. Note that I will put aside, as not the conception of parity at issue 
in this chapter, the “permissible-attitudes” conception of parity. According 
to the permissible-attitudes conception, two options “x and y are on a par 
if and only if it is rationally permissible to prefer x to y and also rationally 
permissible to prefer y to x” (Rabinowicz 2008: 30; see, relatedly, Gert 2004 
and Rabinowicz 2012). Though defensible for certain purposes (at least when 
suitably qualified or refined), the permissible-attitudes conception of parity 
allows that two options can qualify as on a par even if the choosing agent 
rationally permissibly strongly prefers one of them. In particular, if it is ratio-
nally permissible to prefer getting a slice of chocolate cake over getting a slice 
of apple pie, and it is rationally permissible to prefer getting a slice of apple 
pie over getting a slice of chocolate cake, then this conception of parity counts 
“getting a slice of chocolate cake” and “getting a slice of apple pie” as on a 
par, even if I am the one choosing, and I rationally permissibly strongly prefer 
getting a slice of chocolate cake. It thus seems unsuitable with respect to an 
inquiry concerning the evaluation of options relative to all that matters in 
the case at hand, including, in cases involving multiple rationally permissible 
preferences, the fit between the options and the rationally permissible prefer-
ences of the choosing agent. In any case, my interest here is in conceptions 
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of parity that are tied to the familiar idea that if two options are on a par, 
then they are in the same neighborhood (in terms of their overall value rela-
tive to what matters in the situation); the permissible-attitudes conception of 
parity is not tied to this familiar idea, at least not directly enough to clearly 
shed light on the question that, as I will presently explain, I will be seeking 
to address – namely, “Could two options that are not rankable in relation 
to one another be in the same neighborhood (in terms of how valuable they 
are overall relative to what matters in the situation at hand) if they are not 
roughly equally good, and, if so, how could this be realized?” See, relatedly, 
note 5.
 4 This conclusion fits neatly with Erik Carlson’s suggestion that “parity should 
imply a certain degree of similarity, with respect to value,” and “hence, if a is 
on a par with b, and c is much better than a, then c must be better than b, as 
well”; see Carlson (2010: 125) and keep in mind that, as indicated in section 
3, for two options to be close in value, it must be that were another option, 
W, considerably (i.e., quite a lot rather than just a little) better than one of the 
original options, it would also be better than the other.
 5 A version of the contrast between the permissible-attitudes approach to 
understanding parity, discussed in note 3, and the rough-equality approach 
can be found in Qizilbash (2018). I do not mean to suggest that all viable 
views of parity fit one or the other approach (given my description of the 
approaches). To the contrary, my aim is to defend a view that suggests that 
parity can be helpfully understood in a way that does not fit with either of 
these two approaches. Ruth Chang provides a characterization that also argu-
ably occupies a different space, though it is, as will become apparent when I 
discuss the characterization later, one that I do not want to commit to, in part 
because it is not clear to me that it is defensible and in part because it does 
not answer the question at the end of note 3 that I will soon turn to and then 
attempt to answer in the rest of the chapter.
 6 See Andreou, Choosing Well (unpublished manuscript). I thank the editors 
for inviting me to share this more complete presentation of my view.
 7 See Chang (1997: section III.7) for a discussion of the small-improvement argu-
ment in the context of an introduction to philosophical issues associated with 
the idea of incomparability. See also, for example, de Sousa (1974) and Raz 
(1986: chapter 13) for earlier variations of the argument. (A particularly inter-
esting complication related to de Sousa’s variation is flagged in note 8 below.) 
As Johan Gustafsson and Nicolas Espinoza (2010: 754) note, “there are both 
preferential and axiological versions of the argument.” Although  Gustafsson 
and Espinoza put forward what might appear to be a decisive argument against 
the preferential version, a rebuttal to their challenge is provided in  Carlson 
(2011).  Both preferential and axiological versions of the argument continue to 
play a pivotal role in discussions concerning comparability.
 8 Interestingly, in de Sousa’s variation of this argument, wherein the agent is sup-
posed to be torn between “keeping her virtue” and accepting a “tempt[ing]” 
monetary reward for “losing it” (1974: 544–545), the improvement of the 
monetary reward does not seem small ($1,500 versus $1,000). It might be 
suggested that, although the difference seems large, it might qualify as small 
if $1,000 will make a big difference in the agent’s life but an extra $500 on 
top of that will not be very significant. This complication seems like a dis-
pensable distraction relative to de Sousa’s reasoning, which only requires an 
option that is clearly better than $1,000, but I find the complication quite 
suggestive. As will become apparent, considering more than small improve-
ments in small-improvement type arguments is, I think, a good move to make 
82 Chrisoula Andreou
in terms of helpfully complicating debate about parity, rough equality, and 
incomparability. According to the view I will develop, even given moderate-
to-large-improvement scenarios that do not enable a ranking of the options, 
the options may still be comparable as on a par.
 9 See, relatedly, Qizilbash (2018) regarding the “‘mark of parity’ on the rough 
equality view.”
 10 This case, with the addition of an improved option, A*, that I will get to 
shortly, is drawn from my “Incomparability and the Huge Improvement 
Arguments” (2021), in which the case (which I first presented at the Tanner 
Humanities Center in 2016) figures in an assessment of a variation of the 
small-improvement argument for incomparability – namely, the huge-
improvement argument for incomparability. My tentative suggestion there is 
that the case raises problems for the huge-improvement argument for incom-
parability. See, relatedly, Martijn Boot’s discussion of the “large improvement 
phenomenon” (2017), wherein options A and B are such that A is not better 
than B, B is not better than A, and yet A and B cannot qualify as equally good, 
not even roughly equally good, because A*, which is a considerably improved 
version of A, is better than A but not better than B. Boot (2017) counts large-
improvement cases as cases involving incomparable options (though he uses 
the term “incompletely comparable” based, in part, on the idea that, although 
the options are “overall incomparable” – i.e., incomparable with respect to 
all the “relevant values taken together” – they are “usually comparable with 
respect to the [relevant] values [taken] separately” (316)). A notable compli-
cation that I will flag but not delve into here is that, for Boot (2017), all the 
evaluations in play must be “detached from…subjective preference” (317); as 
such, they may fail to capture the overall evaluation of the options relative to 
all that matters in the case at hand from the point of view of practical reason, 
which can include the fit between the options and the taste or preferences of 
the choosing agent (Andreou, 2021).
 11 Notably, my reasoning later in the chapter suggests that, although, in certain 
cases, parity can exhibit a persistence in the face of considerable improve-
ments that speaks against counting the options as imprecisely equally good, 
the persistence need not be so radical that the cases should be understood 
as cases of incomparability rather than cases of parity. For some interesting 
discussion regarding persistent unrankability, see Handfield and Rabinowicz 
(2018) and Herlitz (2020).
 12 In this paragraph and the next, I build on my suggestion, in Andreou (2015), 
that “as we move away from toy cases and introduce more subtleties, the cat-
egories used in the comparison of options may involve thinner concepts with 
broad application. Where the most refined categories in play are extremely 
broad, there is a great deal of room for parity to figure as highly pervasive” 
(21). Notably, and as I explain in Andreou (2015), like Nien-hê Hsieh (2005), 
“I associate parity with the possibility of options ‘clumping’ together…, but 
my view concerning this possibility and its implications differs substantially 
from Hsieh’s…. According to Hsieh’s understanding of parity and clumpiness, 
parity amounts to equality” (Andreou 2015: 15, note 15).
 13 The quoted phrase is borrowed from Andreou (2020b).
 14 A variation of this example and of my discussion of it in the remainder of 
this paragraph and the next two paragraphs appears in my Choosing Well 
(unpublished manuscript).
Parity Without Imprecise Equality 83
References
Andreou, C. (2015), ‘Parity, Comparability, and Choice’, Journal of Philosophy 
CXII: 5–22.
Andreou, C. (2020a), ‘Empowering Rationality: Rethinking the Limits of Rational 
Choice’, American Philosophical Quarterly 57: 105–116.
Andreou, C. (2020b), ‘In a Different League: Intransitivity, Betterness, and League-
Based Satisficing’, in A. Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An 
Introduction and Critical Inquiry (Routledge).
Andreou, C. (2021), ‘Incomparability and the Huge Improvement Arguments’, 
American Philosophical Quarterly 58/4: 307–318.
Boot, M. (2017), ‘Problems of Incommensurability’, Social Theory and Practice 
43: 313–342.
Carlson, E. (2010), ‘Parity Demystified’, Theoria 76: 119–128.
Carlson, E. (2011). ‘The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued’, Philosophical 
Quarterly 61: 171–174.
Chang, R. (1997), ‘Introduction’, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, 
Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press).
Chang, R. (2002), ‘The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics CXII/4: 659–688.
Chang, R. (2016), ‘Parity, Imprecise Comparability, and the Repugnant 
Conclusion’, Theoria 82: 182–214.
de Sousa, R. (1974), ‘The Good and the True’, Mind 84: 534–551.
Gert, J. (2004), ‘Value and Parity’, Ethics 114: 492–510.
Gustafsson, J., and Espinoza, N. (2010), ‘Conflicting Reasons in the Small-
Improvement Argument’, Philosophical Quarterly 60: 754–763.
Handfield, T., and Rabinowicz, N. (2018), ‘Incommensurability and Vagueness in 
Spectrum Arguments’, Philosophical Studies 175: 2373–2387.
Herlitz, A. (2020), ‘Spectrum Arguments, Parity and Persistency’, Theoria 86: 
463–481.
Hsieh, N. (2005), ‘Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability’, Utilitas xvii/2: 
180–204.
Parfit, D. (1984), Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press).
Parfit, D. (2016), ‘Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?’, Theoria 82: 
110–127.
Qizilbash, M. (2018), ‘On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality’, Economics and 
Philosophy 34: 87–108.
Rabinowicz, W. (2008), ‘Value Relations’, Theoria 74: 18–49.
Rabinowicz, W. (2012), ‘Value Relations Revisited’, Economics and Philosophy 
28: 133–164.







1  Preliminaries: Two Kinds of “Incommensurability”1
In his celebrated discussion of “incommensurability” in Well-Being: Its 
Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, James Griffin (1986: 
chapter 5)2 distinguishes a number of distinct senses of “incommensu-
rability.”3 Of these, he suggests that the strongest is “incomparability.” 
Griffin (1986: 83) argues that – at least in the realm of prudential 
value – there is no “incomparability.” “Incomparability” (of the rel-
evant sort) exists if, as between two options (or realizations of pruden-
tial value), one is not better than the other and they are not of equal 
value either. Griffin argues that some candidate cases of “incomparabil-
ity” may instead be cases of “rough equality” and since “rough equality” 
is a form of equality, these are not cases of “incomparability.” Griffin’s 
notion of “rough equality” is a close relation to Derek Parfit’s idea of 
“rough comparability” in Reasons and Persons (Parfit 1984: 431) and his 
subsequent discussion of “imprecise equality” (Parfit 2016). At the same 
time, Griffin discusses “discontinuity,” which he treats as a “weaker” 
form of “incommensurability.” In cases of “discontinuity,” the claim is 
that, as between two prudential values, A and B, either enough of value 
A outranks any amount of value B; or once one has a certain amount of 
B, any amount of A outranks any further amount of B. Griffin (1986: 
85) accepts that there are cases of this sort but he argues that since they 
involve ranking, there is no incomparability in these either. Furthermore, 
in an endnote, where he discusses Parfit’s views, Griffin (1986: 338–340) 
conjectures that “it would seem likely that this incommensurability in 
prudential cases would get transferred to interpersonal calculation” of 
the sort that is relevant to population ethics.
The common feature of the candidate examples of “rough equality” 
and “discontinuity” (in prudential value) is that there is typically a differ-
ence of kind or type (e.g. between poetry and prose, or between different 
categories of prose), or some form of qualitative difference (e.g. in the 
pleasure or pain) involved in the items or options being compared. While 
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there are various definitions of “incommensurability” (see Griffin 1986; 
Raz 1986a, b; and Chang 1997), in this chapter, I take “incommensu-
rability” to cover distinct cases with this common feature. As a result, I 
follow Griffin (1986: 77) and use “incommensurability” in a “way that 
allows different senses” and to cover cases – such as cases of “discontinu-
ity” and “rough equality” – where items are comparable in terms of value 
(see Griffin, 1986: 76 and 97).4
There have been two dominant ways of modeling “rough equality” in 
the subsequent literature. The first focuses on Griffin’s suggestion that 
“rough equality” is a form of vagueness or “indistinctness” and on the 
possibility of a vague ordering (see Griffin 1986: 96). This possibility 
has been most fully explored and developed by John Broome (1997, 
2000, 2004, and 2012; see also Griffin 2000).5 The second reading fol-
lows Parfit and Griffin in supposing that there are two kinds of “rough 
equality” or “rough comparability.” The first sort involves an inability to 
make precise discriminations or ignorance. Both Parfit and Griffin argue 
that there are other cases where the problem of comparability is not of 
this sort, but rather in the nature of the world or, put another way, in the 
nature of the relation between objects of value. It is this second form of 
“rough equality” that links this literature to the discussion of a distinct 
relation aside from the standard “trichotomy” of “better than,” “worse 
than,” and “exactly equal in value.” The relation of “parity” as it has been 
explained by Ruth Chang (1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2016, and forth-
coming) and the relation “in the same league as” that Parfit (1984: 431) 
mentions are also distinct relations and close relatives of “rough equal-
ity” of this sort. In this chapter, I follow earlier work (see Qizilbash 2002, 
2005a, 2007a, b; and 2018) and use “parity” as a term of art to refer 
to “rough equality” as a distinct relation. This use of “parity” within a 
nonstandard set of value relations extended to allow for “rough equality” 
may, in some respects, be inconsistent with Chang’s account of “parity” 
because Chang (2016; and forthcoming) distinguishes her account from 
the views of both Parfit and Griffin.
The form of “incommensurability” that Griffin himself invokes in the 
context of population ethics is “discontinuity” rather than “rough equal-
ity.” Furthermore, for Griffin’s remarks about “discontinuity” to be plau-
sible, they should arguably allow for vagueness (see Qizilbash 2005a). 
By contrast, in his later work, Parfit defends a form of “discontinuity” 
(or “strong lexical view” in his terms6) and invokes “imprecise equality” 
rather than conceptual vagueness in his discussion of the “Repugnant 
Conclusion.” This may be another case where there is a question about 
whether the best way to address these problems involves invoking a 
determinate but nonstandard value relation such as parity or vagueness 
about which value relation holds (see Broome 1997; Rabinowicz 2009a; 
and Qizilbash 2012 inter alia). If we set aside other potential ways of 
avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion, and there is a choice between 
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“parity” – interpreted in terms of rough or imprecise equality – and 
vagueness, which should we favor?
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2, I summarize the 
account of value relations; in Section 3, I discuss examples of “discon-
tinuity” and suggest that vagueness is relevant to these; in Section 4, I 
extend the discussion to population ethics and “discontinuity” combined 
with either parity as “imprecise equality” or vagueness in the context of 
the Repugnant Conclusion; and Section 5 concludes.
2  “Rough Equality,” “Rough Comparability,” and “Parity”
I begin with an account of value relations (set out more fully in Qizilbash 
2005a) which allows for “rough equality” as a distinct relation. I write 
“G” for a primitive relation which means “better than or exactly as good 
as.” This is the “conventional” use of “at least as good as.” “Better than” 
(B) and “exactly as good as” (E) are then defined as follows:
 Definition 1: xBy if and only if xGy and not (yGx)
 Definition 2: xEy if and only if xGy and yGx
I assume that G is a quasi-ordering so that it is transitive and reflexive 
but not necessarily complete. That is, I assume that for all x in the set 
of alternatives X, xGx (reflexivity), and for all x, y, and z in X: if (xGy 
and yGz), then xGz (transitivity of G). Following standard results about 
quasi-orderings (see Sen 1979: 10), transitivity of G implies transitivity 
of B: for all x, y, z in X, if (xBy and yBz), then xBz. It is also easy to 
show that B is irreflexive – so that for all x in X, not (xBx) and asym-
metric – so that for all x, y in X, if xBy then not (yBx) (see Qizilbash 
2005a: theorem 1). Completeness of G requires that for all nonidentical 
x and y in X, xGy or yGx.7 If it holds, we can say that all alternatives 
are commensurate so that either one is better than the other, or they 
are exactly as good. If instead, like Griffin, one believes that (in the pru-
dential realm) all alternatives are comparable – even if they are not all 
commensurate in the sense defined here – one would need to allow for 
an alternative comparative relation between options because they may be 
comparable without being commensurate. In Griffin’s terms, alternatives 
that are comparable but not commensurate are “roughly equal” in value. 
Because “rough equality” of the relevant sort involves a determinate 
(fourth) value relation between alternatives rather than vagueness, and 
because “rough equality” can also be understood as a form of vagueness 
I use “on a par with” (P) as a term of art for this relation. I also write “C” 
for a primitive and nonstandard relation meaning “comparable with.” 
While this relation is primitive, it is important that comparability is, in a 
sense, broader than commensurateness as it is defined here. In particular, 
if all items are commensurate, they are all comparable, but if they are all 
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comparable it does not necessarily follow that they are all commensurate. 
Furthermore, the primitive notion of “comparability” allows for the pos-
sibility that there are distinct cases where we might say that (while one is 
not better than the other), items are in some sense “equal in value.” They 
may be “roughly equal” in value or “in the same league” – even if they 
are not exactly as good. To allow for these cases, we can define “parity” 
as follows:
 Definition 3: xPy if and only if xCy and not (xGy or yGx).
Finally, there is a non-conventional sense of “at least as good as” (A) 
which can be defined as follows:
 Definition 4: xAy if and only if xCy and not (yBx).
This relation is arguably invoked in Derek Parfit’s discussion of “rough 
comparability.” Parfit (1984: 431) discusses three candidates for a literary 
prize: a novelist and two poets. He writes,
We might claim, of the Novelist and the First Poet, that neither is 
worse than the other. This would not be claiming that these two can-
not be compared. It would be asserting rough comparability. There 
are many poets who would be worse candidates than this Novelist, 
and many Novelists who would be worse candidates than the First 
Poet. We are claiming, of these two, that something important can 
be said about their respective merits. Neither is worse than the other. 
They are in the same league.
(Parfit 1984: 431)
It is in this sort of case that Parfit thinks that “rough comparability” is not 
merely a matter of ignorance. As he puts it, “The rough comparability is 
here intrinsic, not the result of ignorance” (Parfit 1984: 431). Because in 
the example he discusses here, neither is worse than the other, but they are 
not exactly as good either, in the system I have outlined, they must be on a 
par. Indeed, to this degree, Parfit’s uses of “in the same league” and “roughly 
comparable with” track the relation “on a par with” as I have defined it.
If we allow for “parity” understood as a distinct relation of “rough 
equality” or “rough comparability” we allow for incompleteness of G 
because in cases of parity neither xGy nor yGx. These cases involve alter-
natives that are not commensurate and are, in this sense, incommensu-
rate8 even though – in terms of the system of value relations outlined 
here – they do not involve any form of incomparability. Furthermore, 
while in this relation system E is transitive, P is not (see Qizilbash 2002: 
144–147). Consider again Parfit’s example of two poets and a novelist. 
On this relation system, this is an example of parity. While both poets 
are on a par with the novelist – since while they are not exactly equal in 
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value and one is not worse than the other, yet they are comparable and – 
the second poet is better than the first. Nonetheless, while the second poet 
is on a par with the novelist and the novelist is on a par with the first poet, it 
is not true that the second poet is on a par with the first. P is non-transitive. 
And because the unconventional “at least as good as” relation can hold 
when alternatives are on a par, A is also non-transitive (see also Qizilbash, 
2005a and 2007a). Here again, this relation system tracks Parfit’s discus-
sion. In the terms he himself uses, Parfit (1984: 431) believes that “[w]hen 
there is only rough comparability, not worse than is not a transitive rela-
tion.” Parfit’s use of “not worse than” here arguably tracks relation A.
This account of value relations treats “comparable with” as a primitive 
relation. How might one distinguish cases of incomparability and parity if 
one accepts this account? If one treats the nonstandard relation of parity as 
a form of “rough” or “imprecise” equality, then to say that items are com-
parable requires that some form of equality must hold if one is not better 
than another. If they are not precisely equal, they must be roughly equal 
in value. If items are roughly but not precisely equal, then while slight 
changes in the value of options may not make one better than the other, 
any significant change in the value of one will tip the balance. While this 
“mark of parity” is not part of, or required by, the formal system of rela-
tions outlined here, it follows from interpreting parity in terms of “rough 
equality” (see Qizilbash, 2002, 2005a; and 2018).9 This mark also dis-
tinguishes parity from incomparability: in cases of incomparability, while 
neither of two items is better than the other, even some significant change 
in the value of one does not make it better or worse than the other. On 
accounts where “on a par with” is interpreted in terms of “in the same 
neighborhood as” or “in the same league as” – this mark may fail to hold 
because there are arguably cases where items that are not close and, to this 
degree, not “roughly equal” in value while being in the same neighborhood 
or league (see Andreou 2015; and 2021a). These accounts might, nonethe-
less, be squared with the mark of parity as it is defined here, if, to qualify as 
a “significant” change in value, it must be large enough to “carry” one item 
from one “neighborhood” of value to another. Yet if “neighborhoods” are 
very large, the intuition that parity is “rough equality” loses force.10
While the “mark of parity” is intuitively compelling if items are roughly 
equal in value, if one adopts the previous definitions but does not accept 
that parity is a form of “rough equality,” one might adopt an alternative 
way of distinguishing “parity” and “incomparability.” On this weaker 
version of the “mark of parity” when options are on a par, while some 
slight change in value may not tilt the balance in favor of one of them, 
either some significant increase in the value of one of the items will make 
it better or some significant reduction in the value of one of the items 
will make it worse. Then cases of “incomparability” can be defined so 
that while two items are incommensurate, no change in the value of 
one makes it better or worse than the other (Qizilbash 2018: 91–92). 
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This alternative way of characterizing the distinction between “parity” 
and “incomparability” might fit better with an account of parity under-
stood as belonging to the same league or neighborhood, which may allow 
for large value neighborhoods or leagues.11
3  “Discontinuity” and Vagueness
Now consider “discontinuity.” Here Griffin’s claim is that, as between 
two (prudential) values, A and B, either (i) enough of value A outranks 
any amount of value B, or (ii) once one has a certain amount of B, any 
amount of A outranks any further amount of B. Griffin (1986: 85) accepts 
that there are cases of this sort, especially if one focuses on specific real-
izations of value – “value-tokens” – rather than values in the abstract – 
“value-types.” For example, he suggests that
it is more plausible that, say, fifty years of life at a very high level 
of well-being – say, the level which makes possible satisfying per-
sonal relations, some understanding of what makes life worth while, 
appreciation of great beauty, the chance to accomplish something 
with one’s life – outranks any number of years at the level just barely 
worth living.
But he adds that “we should not expect to find sharp discontinuities at 
extreme ends of the scale.” He goes on:
Fifty years at a very high level – say, with the very best Rembrandts, 
Vermeers, and de Hoochs – might be outranked by fifty-five years at 
a slightly lower level – no Rembrandts, Vermeers, and de Hoochs, 
but the rest of the Dutch school. And then fifty-five years at that level 
might be outranked by sixty years at a slightly lower level – no Dutch 
School but a lot more of the nineteenth-century revival of the Dutch 
School. And so on, step-by-step, until, it seems, we must eventually 
reach the point where the original fifty years would be outranked by 
a sufficiently large number of years of life just barely worth living.
(Griffin 1986: 86)
This “beauty-kitsch example” is a form of what is now known as “spec-
trum” – or, somewhat misleadingly as “continuum” – examples. In each 
step along the spectrum, there is a small reduction in the quality of enjoy-
ment, which is traded off against some quantity – in this case, some 
number of years of enjoyment of beauty. There is, in Griffin’s view, no 
problem of comparability in this example. He adds,
This step-by-step approach seems irresistible. Yet it presents us with 
two embarrassments: a Sorites Paradox and a slippery slope. If we 
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take enough pebbles away from a heap, it ceases to be a heap. But 
then, since one pebble more or less could never make the difference 
between its being a heap or not, if we remove them singly it can never 
cease being a heap. Similarly, one might argue, with “appreciation of 
beauty” or “deep personal relations”; and slow, step-by-step changes 
we can never lose the appreciation of beauty or deep loving relations.
But we obviously can – I want to set the Sorites problem to the 
side. We can indeed reach a point, with the series of subtractions, that 
we just saw (first Rembrandt, Vermeer, and de Hooch, then the whole 
seventeenth century Dutch School …), at which we lost the apprecia-
tion of beauty. We may have the kicks of kitsch but they are different.
(Griffin 1986: 87)
In this example, at a very high level, a slight reduction of quality does 
not lead to a change in the kind of life lived. Yet if enough is lost in 
terms of quality so that there is a change in the kind of appreciation or 
enjoyment, greater amounts of quantity cannot compensate for the loss 
of quality.
As we reach the bottom of the spectrum, Griffin worries, nonetheless, 
that enough of the kicks of kitsch must compensate for the loss of quan-
tities of the other prudential values. At the bottom, when “we also lose 
deep personal relations, accomplishment, and all the rest of the substan-
tial values in life, then by parity of reasoning, since what is left is, though 
slight, not nothing, enough life with this residue must be more valuable” 
(Griffin 1986: 87). To resist this judgment Griffin invokes the idea of a 
“basic preference” and his informed desire view of welfare – on which 
well-being consists in the fulfillment of fully informed desires (see Griffin 
1986: part 1):
We do seem, when informed, to rank a certain amount of life at 
a very high level above any amount of life at a very low level. 
And if we do, it is likely to be a basic preference; that is, it could 
not be based upon other judgements about the amount of value in 
the objects being ranked. Nor need there be any extreme perfec-
tionism at work in this preference; those who held this preference 
could also be willing to sacrifice the best Rembrandt, Vermeer, or 
de Hooch, for all the various, though lesser, achievements of the 
Dutch school.
(Griffin 1986: 87)
Griffin thinks that informed preference favors some amount of the 
enjoyment of Rembrandt, Vermeer, and so on over the enjoyment of 
any amount of the kicks of kitsch. This is the “discontinuity” claim. And 
because Griffin suggests that in this sort of example there is a Sorites at 
work, one would expect to find an imprecise borderline as one moves 
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down the spectrum – in this case a rough threshold where enough genu-
ine beauty is lost and what remains are the kicks of kitsch.
Griffin does not develop the claim that there is a Sorites in this exam-
ple. And there is ongoing debate about whether cases of this sort involve 
a Sorites (see Temkin 1996 and 2012; Qizilbash 2005b; and Pummer 
2018 and forthcoming). If it can be shown that there is a Sorites or 
Sorites-like structure in such cases that would support the idea that they 
involve vagueness. Yet, there are other “symptoms” of vagueness, nota-
bly whether or not there is a predicate that admits borderline cases or 
an imprecise borderline. To this degree, we need not settle debates about 
whether or how spectrum examples involve a Sorites or Sorites-like struc-
ture to believe that there is some form of vagueness involved. As long 
as there is an imprecise borderline or if there are borderline cases – for 
example, in the “beauty-kitsch” example, borderline cases of “beauty” 
and an imprecise borderline between cases of “beauty” and “kitsch” – 
theories of vagueness come into play (see Qizilbash, 2005b; and Knapp, 
2007). Similarly, in Griffin’s discussion of this example, we start with a 
life at a “very high” level, and it can certainly be argued that, like “tall” 
and “bald,” “high” (or “very high”) is a vague predicate since there are 
borderline cases of “high” (or “very high”) and an imprecise borderline 
between cases that are and are not high (or “very high”).
The beauty-kitsch example is a close relative of what Parfit calls the 
“single-life analogue of the Repugnant Conclusion” (Parfit 1986: 160). 
He offers the following example: “Suppose that I can choose between 
two futures. I could live for another 100 years, all of an extremely high 
quality. Call this the Century of Ecstasy. I could instead live for ever, with 
a life that would always be barely worth living. Though there would be 
nothing bad in this life, the only good things would be muzak and pota-
toes. Call this the Drab Eternity” (Parfit 1986: 160).
Commenting on these futures, Parfit confesses, “I believe that, of these 
two, the Century of Ecstasy would give me a better future. And this is the 
future that I would prefer. Many people would have the same belief, and 
preference” (Parfit 1986: 160). This belief and preference are consistent 
with Griffin’s suggestion that – for someone whose preferences are (fully) 
informed – enough years enjoying the best of the Dutch School are pre-
ferred to any amount of enjoyment of the kicks of kitsch. It is, in Griffin’s 
terms, an example of “discontinuity.” But in the discussion immediately 
preceding this example, Parfit discusses population paradoxes and, in a 
note, he rules out the possibility that in cases of this sort there is a Sorites 
Paradox. He writes,
It may be objected that my argument is like what are called Sorites 
Arguments, which are known to lead to false conclusions. Suppose 
we assume that removing any single grain from a heap cannot turn a 
heap of sand into something that is not a heap. It can then be argued 
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that even if we remove every single grain, we must still have a heap. 
… A Sorites Argument appeals to a series of steps, each of which is 
assumed to make no difference.
(Parfit 1986: 160)
Parfit makes this argument in the context of the “Mere Addition 
Paradox,” but I shall explain it in terms of the beauty-kitsch example. 
Parfit suggests that “[a] Sorites Argument appeals to a series of steps, 
each of which is assumed to make no difference.” By contrast, the step-
by-step sequence, which involves slight reductions in the quality of 
enjoyment with some increase in the time spent in enjoyment, involves 
pairwise comparisons between options where in each step one is better. 
He concludes that “[t]he objections to Sorites Arguments are therefore 
irrelevant” (Parfit 1986: 160).
This line of argument has been made in the context of a variety of spec-
trum examples (see, for example, Temkin 1996; and 2012), and I shall 
not evaluate it here. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in the beauty-
kitsch example, Griffin is also claiming that at the top of the spectrum, 
55 years without the very best of the Dutch School (but with enjoyment 
of slightly lesser works) is better than 50 years of the best of the Dutch 
School. It is somewhat further down the spectrum that, on Griffin’s read-
ing, some loss of quality may no longer result in the same kind of appre-
ciation. And in Parfit’s example of the Drab Eternity and the Century of 
Ecstasy, the equivalent to Griffin’s logic would be some point further in 
the slide down from ecstasy to “muzak and potatoes.” In this context, 
Parfit invokes J. S. Mill’s discussion of “higher” and “lower” pleasures:
I claim that, though each day of the Drab Eternity would be worth 
living, the Century of Ecstasy would give me a better life. This is like 
Mill’s claim about the “difference in quality” between human and 
pig-like pleasures. It is often said that Mill’s “higher pleasures” are 
merely greater pleasures: pleasures with more value. … This would 
be so if the value of the pleasures lay on the same scale. But this is 
what I have just denied. Though each day of the Drab Eternity would 
have some value for me, no amount of this value could be as good for 
me as the Century of Ecstasy.
(Parfit 1986: 161)
In Griffin’s terms, this is a case of “discontinuity.”12 Furthermore, there 
is arguably a vague borderline between the “higher” and “lower” plea-
sures. And some pleasures might classify as “borderline higher.” Indeed, if 
vagueness is relevant in the beauty-kitsch example, it is equally relevant 
in this one. Parfit’s own example thus suggests that – while he and Griffin 
appear to take different views on the Sorites – vagueness is also relevant 
to Parfit’s views to the degree that he invokes “discontinuity.”
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4  Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion: “Discontinuity” 
with “Imprecise Equality” or Vagueness?
I now turn to “discontinuity” in the context of population ethics. I begin 
with a formalization of these examples (following Broome 2004: 55–56; 
and Qizilbash 2005b: 127). In what follows, we are concerned with 
populations of various sizes. We begin with a population of ten billion 
people, living at a very high quality of life. We then reduce the quality of 
life of those alive somewhat and increase the number of people who are 
alive at the new quality of life. If we believe that the new population is 
better than the first, and repeatedly increase the size of the population 
while slightly reducing the quality of life of those who are alive in this 
way we might be led to:
The Repugnant Conclusion: for any possible population of at least 
ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be 
some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other 
things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives 
that are barely worth living.
(Parfit 1984: 388)
Parfit believes that moral theories should avoid this conclusion. In what 
follows, I shall write w for a level of (lifetime) well-being, write w1 as a 
very high quality of life, w2 as a less high quality of life, w3 as a quality 
of life less high than w2, and so on. I assume that there is a finite range of 
levels of well-being between w1 and wk and that wk is a level that is barely 
worth living. I write numbers n1, n2, n3, and so on, where n2 (n3) is smaller 
than n3 (n4) and so on. Finally, I write a world with ni people living at 
welfare level wi as W(ni, wi). The step-by-step or spectrum property that 
can lead to this conclusion is:
Property S: there is a sequence of numbers 10 billion, n2, n3, …., nk 
starting with 10 billion, with the property that a population of ni 
people living at level of well-being wi is better than a population of 
n(i-1) living at w(i-1), for any integer i such that k≥i>10 billion.
We can also define:
Property D: a population of 10 billion people living at well-being level 
w1 is better than any number nk of people living at level of well-
being wk.
Returning to the earlier account of value relations, which followed a 
reading of Griffin’s and Parfit’s works, B is irreflexive, asymmetric, and 
transitive. Then we know (following theorem 2 in Qizilbash 2005b: 127) 
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that if a sequence w1,…, wk has Property S, then it does not have Property 
D.13 In the light of this result to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion we must 
reject Property S, or we must reject asymmetry or transitivity of B. Since 
on my reading Parfit does not reject asymmetry or transitivity of B, he 
must reject Property S.
It is worth noting here that there is another route to rejecting the 
Repugnant Conclusion. If we drop the assumption that the final level 
of well-being (wk) in the range is (i.e., falls to the level of) a life barely 
worth living we can, arguably, accept the intuition in spectrum exam-
ples, without accepting the Repugnant Conclusion. In terms of the for-
malization above, we can then accept Property S and reject Property D 
while not accepting the Repugnant Conclusion. Ken Binmore and Alex 
Voorhoeve (2003) have developed this line of argument in the context of 
some spectrum examples.14 In the current context, this argument appears 
to provide a neat way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion. However, 
the argument typically hinges on an assumption about the formal rep-
resentation of value taking a particular form (involving “asymptotes”; 
see, for example, Binmore and Voorhoeve 2003: 277).15 And the ways of 
avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion that Griffin and Parfit advance do 
not involve making any such assumption.
Suppose then that we do not adopt any assumption about the repre-
sentation of value of the sort that Binmore and Voorhoeve make and that 
there is no sequence of the sort required by Property S, which culminates 
in nk people living at a level of well-being wk, which is a life barely worth 
living. If so, there is some first level of well-being in the sequence such 
that we cannot reduce the level of well-being somewhat and find a larger 
number of people living at the lower level of well-being, which makes 
the resulting world better than the world with the smaller population. It 
seems hard to believe that there is a first and precise level of well-being in 
the spectrum where this is the case.16 This is, arguably, where vagueness 
is relevant if one starts from the supposition that this sort of example 
involves “discontinuity.” Again, I take “high” to be the relevant vague 
predicate. Starting from a very high quality of life, when one reduces the 
quality of life in a step-by-step way, there will be some level of well-being 
that is no longer “high.” We might, following Griffin’s suggestion, then 
define this as a level where enough of what makes life good has been lost 
so that it is no longer true that lowering the quality of life to this level 
and increasing the number of people alive makes the world better (Griffin 
1986: 340).17 There is an imprecise borderline between those levels of 
well-being that are “high” and those that are not. There will be a zone of 
levels of well-being that are definitely “high,” those which are definitely 
“not high” and a vague zone in between where the level of well-being is 
neither definitely high nor definitely not high (for a fuller discussion, see 
Qizilbash 2005b: 118–126). As long as a life barely worth living is defi-
nitely not “high,” in this sense, we can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion.18
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This response to spectrum examples and avoidance of the Repugnant 
Conclusion does not invoke the relation of “parity” or “rough equality.” 
Because Parfit invoked “rough comparability” and “in the same league 
as” in his discussion of the “mere addition paradox,” there is now litera-
ture on “mere addition,” incompleteness, and “parity” defined in various 
ways that attempt to formalize some of Parfit’s discussion of this paradox 
(Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson 1996; 1997; and 2005; Qizilbash, 
2005a, 2007a, 2007b; and 2018; Rabinowicz, 2009a; and 2009b; and 
Gustafsson 2019), and there is also some critical literature relating to the 
relevant proposals (Arrhenius 2000, 2016 and forthcoming; and Nebel 
2015 inter alia). In the more recent literature, notably in Parfit’s final 
paper on this topic, spectrum (or “continuum”) cases, the Repugnant 
Conclusion, and “mere addition” are discussed together. In the context 
of “mere addition,” the suggestion is that the addition of people who 
have lives worth living does not affect existing people, and their addi-
tion does not involve any social injustice (Parfit 1984: 420) at a range 
of levels of well-being roughly comparable with the status quo. Parfit 
invokes “rough comparability” in cases of mere addition because we can-
not plausibly claim that such addition makes the world better or worse 
or that the two worlds are exactly as good either. If, like Parfit (1984: 
430–432), we believe that these worlds are, nonetheless, comparable (and 
accept the account of value relations advanced earlier), we must believe 
that they are roughly comparable in value or on a par.19 Yet if we restrict 
our attention to spectrum examples of the sort which I discuss in this 
chapter, where there is no mere addition, then any potential roughness in 
comparison involved in such addition cannot be invoked without some 
further explanation.
If mere addition is not the source of “incommensurability,” where does 
it enter? In his later work, Parfit tries to “defend a strong form of lexical 
superiority,” which is akin to what Griffin calls “discontinuity.” Parfit 
writes,
When we say that things of kind P are lexically better than things of 
kind Q, we can mean that, though the existence of more Qs would 
always be non-diminishingly better, the existence of some sufficient 
number of Ps would be better than any number of Qs. There is a 
similar sense of lexically worse than.
In defense of this form of lexical superiority, Parfit invokes what he calls 
“evaluative imprecision.” Such imprecision is relevant only if one item is 
not better than the other. If so, Parfit claims that either they are precisely 
or imprecisely equally good. In the first case, the relation is transitive, and 
in the latter case, it is not (Parfit 2016: 114). And as a result of non-tran-
sitivity of imprecise equality, “not worse than” is non-transitive (Parfit 
2016: 115). Parfit leaves no room for incomparability. These remarks 
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about value relations and transitivity map directly onto the relation sys-
tem described in Section 2: E is transitive; P is non-transitive, and A maps 
onto (Parfit’s sense of) “not worse than” and is non-transitive. Parfit thus 
invokes a further form of “incommensurability” – imprecise or rough 
equality which in the system of relations outlined here would be defined 
as “parity” – in defense of the lexical view (or “discontinuity”). Yet, since 
Parfit has already invoked one form of “incommensurability” (“discon-
tinuity”), the further invoking of “imprecise equality” is hard to explain. 
If there is a difference in the kind of lives lived at some point in the spec-
trum, and “discontinuity” (or a “lexical view”) is invoked to account for 
it, it is not obvious why one should also invoke “imprecise equality” or 
parity. Inasmuch as he does so, Parfit appears to double count “incom-
mensurability.” 20
Why does Parfit invoke “imprecise equality” in spectrum examples? 
The imprecise lexical view, for Parfit, addresses one of the chief weak-
nesses of standard lexical views. His line of argument runs as follows:
Some … writers claim that lexical views cannot be applied to actual 
or possible things that are in the same category and could together 
form some continuum, with each thing being only slightly differ-
ent from its neighbours. We cannot defensibly claim that everything 
above some point on such a continuum is lexically better than every-
thing below this point, since there cannot be a great difference in 
value of similar things that are just above or just below this point.
(Parfit 2016: 116)
Parfit believes that this objection fails when there is imprecise compa-
rability. When there is imprecise equality, instead of appealing to some 
single point
in this continuum which separates greater and lesser goods, we can 
appeal to various zones in which things would be imprecisely equally 
good, bounded by zones in which it would be indeterminate whether 
one of two things would be better, or things would be imprecisely 
equally good.
(Parfit 2016: 116)
This view appears to be a close relation of views that invoke “rough 
equality” or “parity” in the context of mere addition since those views 
also allow for a zone where parity holds, which is surrounded by vague 
zones (see Qizilbash 2005a, 2007a and b; and 2018; and Rabinowicz 
2009a and b; and 2012). Indeed, Ruth Chang (2016 and forthcoming) 
defends a similar view that invokes a zone of parity in “continuum” 
cases.21 However, Parfit’s motivation – as with the account that invokes 
vagueness – is to allow for imprecision. While semantic vagueness is ruled 
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out, except at the borderlines of the zone of imprecise equality, in Parfit’s 
view imprecise equality does much the same work that vagueness does on 
the “discontinuity” view that starts from Griffin. Parfit suggests that the 
relevant “continuum arguments” assume that “[c]ompared with the exis-
tence of many people who would all have some quality of life, there are 
some much larger numbers of people whose existence would be better, 
though these people’s quality of life would all be slightly lower” (Parfit 
2016: 120). He claims that we could reject this assumption by claim-
ing that “such larger worlds would not be better, but would at most be 
imprecisely equally good” (Parfit 2016: 121). And he believes that this 
way of rejecting the assumption is less implausible than the Repugnant 
Conclusion and that the balance of plausibility favors imprecise equality.
Parfit’s view does nonetheless run into difficulties. A formal analysis 
of Parfit’s imprecise equality view – presented by Wlodek Rabinowicz 
(forthcoming) – shows that it has implications that are implausible. I 
here briefly explain Rabinowicz’s version of this argument (which itself 
follows the analysis of Toby Handfield and Rabinowicz, 2018) in the 
terminology used here. Consider some point in the finite sequence of 
population levels. Suppose that we start at some level of well-being wi 
and population ni in the sequence, and we find some somewhat lower wj 
and some number, say, 200 billion, which is greater than ni. I will write 
this world as W(wj, 200 billion). Suppose next that W(wj, 200 billion) 
is on a par with (and so not better than) W(wi,ni). Is that enough to 
violate Property S? If we think of parity in terms of “rough” or “impre-
cise” equality, it seems that this will not be enough. If worlds that are 
on a par are roughly equal in value, then we can invoke the “mark of 
parity” to distinguish parity from incomparability. Consider again W(wj, 
200 billion), which is on a par with W(wi,ni). Parfit (2016, 110) holds the 
Simple View according to which “[a]nyone’s existence is in itself good, 
and makes the world in one way better, if this person’s life is good to live, 
or worth living.” Since at well-being level wj life is worth living, we can 
make the world better by increasing the number of people who live at this 
level and find some W(wj,nj), which is much, and thus significantly, bet-
ter than W(wj, 200 billion).
22 If so, then by the mark of parity, W(wj, nj) 
is better than W(wi,ni), and there is no violation of Property S. Indeed, if 
this were not so, then if parity is rough equality, W(wi, ni) and W(wj, 200 
billion) would be incomparable rather than on a par (see also Herlitz, 
2020: 473–478).23 If Parfit has in mind a form of “rough equality” when 
he talks of “imprecise equality,” his view does not violate Property S and 
given the other assumptions I have made based on my reading of Parfit, 
he must reject Property D and cannot avoid the Repugnant Conclusion.
Parfit’s view must be amended in some way to avoid that conclusion. 
One way to do this is to drop the requirement that parity is a form of 
“rough equality” and allow for the weaker version of the “mark of par-
ity” discussed earlier. On this alternative, as we saw, when parity holds 
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between items, while some slight change in value may not tilt the balance 
in favor of one of the items, either some significant increase in value 
will make it better than the other or some significant decrease will make 
it worse. Now suppose once more that two worlds W(wi,ni) and W(wj, 
200 billion) in the sequence are on a par. Then on this weakening of the 
mark of parity, while some significant worsening of W(wj, 200 billion) 
may make it worse, even some significant improvement which involves 
increasing the number of people who are alive at level wj may not make 
the world better than W(wi,ni). If so, at wj, there is no nj such that W(wj,nj) 
is better than W(wi, ni). In this way, the sequence can violate Property S, 
and given the other assumptions adopted in the system of value rela-
tions defined earlier, we can accept Property D and avoid the Repugnant 
Conclusion. But we must drop the view that parity is “rough equality,” 
and that involves departing from Parfit’s view as I have interpreted it 
here.24 As I argued earlier, this way of understanding parity may none-
theless be consistent with interpreting “on a par with” as “in the same 
neighborhood or league as.”25 It may also be consistent with another 
(“fitting-attitudes”) view of parity that does not require that parity is 
“rough equality” (see Rabinowicz, 2009a and forthcoming).
In contrast to Parfit’s view, the view that began from Griffin’s account 
of “discontinuity” only invokes one form of “incommensurability.” To 
this degree, it is arguably more parsimonious and does not double count 
“incommensurability” – and this point may count in its favor. Vagueness 
is invoked for much the same reason that Parfit invokes “evaluative 
imprecision”: to allow for a zone rather than a first and single point in 
the sequence where “discontinuity” sets in. One might speculate about 
why Parfit did not favor a vagueness view. It may be that he favored a 
zone of imprecise equality (with rough borders) over vagueness simplic-
iter because he believed that there was no Sorites or Sorites-like structure 
in the relevant spectrum examples. Yet as I argued earlier, even if we set 
aside the question of whether there is a Sorites or Sorites-like structure 
at work in these examples, in the “single-life analogue of the Repugnant 
Conclusion” when Parfit invokes “discontinuity,” vagueness is arguably 
relevant. Alternatively, Parfit may not have favored the vagueness view 
because of various objections to it. It is thus worth asking: what objec-
tions are there to this view? And, in particular, do these objections lead 
one to favor Parfit’s view over the vagueness view?
One objection is that while introducing vagueness makes the threshold 
less sharp, there is still indeterminacy about a first and unique point in the 
spectrum below which any increase in quantity does not compensate for 
some fall in quality. The objection is that there is such a point, irrespective 
of whether there is indeterminacy about it. As Handfield and Rabinowicz 
(2018: 2385) put it, “This is counter-intuitive, whether or not it is inde-
terminate where this point occurs” (see also Pummer, forthcoming). My 
reading of this objection is that it presses the point that accepting the 
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implications of “discontinuity” conflicts with our intuitions since (given 
the various assumptions made) it implies a first and unique point in the 
sequence where some reduction in welfare cannot be compensated by an 
increase in population. Since both Griffin and Parfit invoke “discontinu-
ity,” this objection does not favor Parfit’s view over the position which 
began from Griffin’s remarks. 26
Another objection to views that invoke vagueness in the context of 
spectrum examples is that while in the case of many vague predicates 
the indeterminacy – say about whether or not someone is “bald,” “tall,” 
or “poor” – can be defused by arbitrary stipulation, it would be odd to 
attempt to defuse controversies in the context of spectrum examples in 
value theory in this way. It is (arguably) odd because these controver-
sies involve substantive value judgments (see Chang, forthcoming; and 
2002a: 137–139). Yet, it is recognized that there are debates in ethics 
and public policy in which substantive value judgments are in play where 
arbitrary stipulations might be invoked to address vagueness or imprecise 
thresholds.27 As John Rawls (2001, 35) notes, “To some degree all our 
concepts, and not only our moral and political concepts, are vague and 
subject to hard cases.” It would be surprising if population ethics did not 
involve vague concepts or imprecise thresholds. Let us suppose, none-
theless, that this response to the objection proves unconvincing. Does 
this objection necessarily favor “discontinuity” views that invoke rough 
equality or parity, where – as in Parfit’s view – the zone of parity or 
rough equality is bordered by vague zones over those that invoke only 
vagueness. To the degree that Parfit’s view invokes vague zones, the same 
objection might be leveled at it. For example, in the zone where it is inde-
terminate whether one world is better than or imprecisely equal in value 
to the other, it might be argued that what is at stake is a substantive value 
judgment rather than a vague borderline, and that arbitrary stipulation 
cannot be used to decide what value relation holds as it might be in cases 
of vagueness.
5  Conclusions
Two distinct approaches to avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion and 
addressing spectrum examples emerge from James Griffin’s Well-Being 
and Derek Parfit’s later work. In one, only one form of “incommensura-
bility” – “discontinuity” – is invoked in the slide from a high quality of 
life to a life barely worth living, while vagueness is invoked to address 
the presence of borderline cases and imprecise borders. In Parfit’s case, 
imprecise equality is invoked to allow for imprecision in valuation, while 
vagueness is invoked only to allow for the absence of sharp borderlines 
of the zone of imprecise equality. In this chapter, an account of value rela-
tions has been presented that is consistent with a reading of Griffin’s and 
Parfit’s views and that allows for a distinct relation of parity understood 
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as rough equality. It is argued on the basis of this reading and account 
that Parfit’s invocation of imprecise equality cannot plausibly address 
some of the implications of allowing for “discontinuity” or a lexical 
view of the sort Parfit defends if it is interpreted in terms of parity 
understood as rough equality. The implied way of distinguishing cases 
of parity and incomparability if parity is rough equality – the “mark of 
parity” – must be weakened to make this view plausible. Parfit’s view 
also appears to double count “incommensurability” by invoking both 
“discontinuity” (i.e. a lexical view) and imprecise equality in the context 
of these examples. When the respective merits of the two views – the 
one invoking only vagueness and the other invoking parity understood 
as “rough equality” in the context of “discontinuity” in avoiding the 
Repugnant Conclusion – are compared, this point arguably favors the 
view that does not invoke imprecise equality.
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Rabinowicz (forthcoming).
 9 This “mark” is distinct from what Joseph Raz (1986b: 325–326) calls the 
“mark of incommensurability.” Raz uses the “mark of incommensurability” 
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better than the other, then the two original options are incommensurate.” 
While Raz’s mark distinguishes cases of exact equality from incommensurate-
ness, it does not distinguish cases of parity or rough equality from incompa-
rability since in both cases items are incommensurate.
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“[p]erhaps every pair of options can be located in a shared league with either 
an upper bound or a lower bound.”
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these remarks, he discusses Parfit’s “mere addition paradox.” His remarks are, 
nonetheless, relevant to spectrum cases in population ethics, with or without 
“mere addition.”
 18 For critical discussions of Griffin’s “discontinuity” view when it is used in 
the context of population ethics, see Arrhenius (2000: 92–100) and Ryberg 
(1996: 210–212).
 19 John Broome has argued that invoking worlds that are incommensurate (as 
they are when they are on a par or roughly equal) in the context of mere addi-
tion is ad hoc. On this, see Broome (2004; and 2007), as well as Qizilbash 
(2007a, 2007b, and 2018) and Rabinowicz (2009a).
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 20 One might argue in his defense that Parfit invokes one form of “incommensu-
rability” – “imprecise equality” – to address an objection that is addressed to 
another – to “discontinuity” setting in at some point in the sequence. On this 
argument, Parfit does not double count “incommensurability.” I am grateful to 
Wlodek Rabinowicz for this point. Yet if evaluative imprecision is invoked to 
rebut the relevant objection, one must inevitably ask, Why invoke “imprecise 
equality” – or incommensurateness more generally – rather than vagueness? 
Invoking “imprecise equality” surely requires more in the way of explanation, 
and, to avoid the concern about “double counting,” the explanation should 
not be about qualitative differences in the of lives lived in the spectrum since 
those differences are invoked to explain the presence of “discontinuity.”
 21 Unlike Parfit, Chang (2016: 210; and forthcoming) drops the lexical view 
while invoking a zone of parity in addressing spectrum cases.
 22 This would be so even if one allows for vagueness at the borderline of the 
zone of parity.
 23 Handfield and Rabinowicz (2018) and Rabinowicz (forthcoming) discuss 
this sort of case in terms of “radical incommensurability” and its persistence. 
Anders Herlitz (2020) provides an illuminating discussion that uses and 
refines these terms and relates them to the literature on parity.
 24 For a formal analysis and critical discussion of Parfit’s imprecise equality 
view, see also Jensen (2020). Because Parfit’s view invokes “discontinuity,” 
some standard criticisms leveled at Griffin’s views also apply to Parfit’s.
 25 These contrasting ways of distinguishing parity and incomparability in the 
context of the Repugnant Conclusion are closely related to the helpful dis-
tinction between “strong” and “weak non-persistency” advanced by Herlitz 
(2020: 475–478).
 26 My reading of this objection may, of course, be contested. In particular, it 
can be argued that while on the vagueness view there is a single point where 
“discontinuity” sets in, this is not so on Parfit’s view. I am grateful to Wlodek 
Rabinowicz for this point. Nonetheless, Handfield and Rabinowicz (2018: 
2385) also suggest that if we want to avoid “discontinuity” (or “radical inferi-
ority” in their terms) setting in at some determinate point in the spectrum, and 
still insist that there is “discontinuity” between the first and last element, then 
to preserve transitivity of “better than” we must posit either an implausible 
(or “radical”) form of incommensurateness or an implausible (or “radical”) 
form of indeterminacy or vagueness. Here again, the implications of accept-
ing “discontinuity” appear to make both accounts – of “imprecise equality” 
in as much as it is a form of incommensurateness and of vagueness – implau-
sible. In the absence of further analysis, the objection does not favor one 
account over the other. Henrik Andersson (2021) provides a more extensive 
and helpful discussion of some of Handfield and Rabinowicz’s objections.
 27 Perhaps the best-known example is abortion (see, for example, Williams 
1995: 214), which has also been discussed in terms of a spectrum example 
(see Temkin 2000).
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1  Introduction1
The assumption that the value comparative “better than” is transitive 
is central to most normative reasoning.2 If it is not a transitive relation 
then there may be alternatives, such as A, B, and C for which A is better 
than B, B is better than C, and yet C is better than A. This possibility 
would make it impossible to pick a best alternative since it allows for a 
cycle. However, in his book Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the 
Nature of Practical Reasoning, Larry Temkin (2012) forcefully questions 
the assumption that “better than” is a transitive relation.3 Roughly, his 
explanation as to why our value relations might not be transitive is that, 
depending on what I compare a specific object with, different consid-
erations will be more or less weighty. Or, as Temkin (2012) puts it, the 
assessment of relative goodness is sometimes “essentially comparative.” 
When comparing A with B, some specific consideration is central, and 
A is better than B with respect to this consideration. The same consider-
ation may be central when comparing B with C, and B is better than C 
with respect to this consideration. However, when comparing C with A, 
some other consideration may be more central, making C better than A. 
This can explain the potential cyclicity.
Temkin’s arguments in favor of this possibility are very detailed and 
sophisticated; it is impossible to do justice to all of them here. However, 
his spectrum arguments are central to his claim. Temkin uses spectrum 
arguments to argue that the belief that the “better than” relation is transi-
tive is incompatible with other more intuitive beliefs, so we should con-
clude that “better than” is not transitive. While there are several possible 
formulations of spectrum arguments, I will focus on the formulation of 
the argument that Temkin deems “the simplest, most powerful coun-
terexample to the transitivity of the betterness relation” (Temkin 2012: 
135).4 If it can be shown that Temkin’s most convincing formulation of 
the argument fails, then this casts doubt on the endeavor in general.
I will argue that Temkin’s argument does not threaten the transitiv-
ity of betterness. First, I will provide an informal account of why his 
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argument fails. Roughly, I will argue that if we acknowledge that there 
can be a zone of vagueness in Temkin’s spectrum argument, then we need 
not accept his conclusion. Second, I will show how the formal features of 
our value relations provide a neat explanation as to why we ought not 
to reject the transitivity of the betterness relation and that we instead 
should reject a belief expressed by Temkin about evaluative trade-offs. 
It is important to note, in the context of this book, that my rebuttal 
of Temkin’s argument is conservative in that it does not refer to non-
conventional value relations such as parity, imprecision, or rough equal-
ity. As such, my objection could be understood to be part of the larger 
effort to provide an account of the normative landscape without referring 
to non-conventional value relations; the “at least as good” relation and 
vagueness suffice.5
2  The Spectrum Argument
Temkin’s preferred formulation of the spectrum argument starts by not-
ing that the following views seem intuitively appealing:
View One: For any unpleasant or “negative” experience, no matter 
what the intensity and duration of that experience, it would be better 
to have the experience than one that was only a “little” less intense 
but twice (or three or five times) as long.
View Two: There is, or could be, a spectrum of unpleasant or “nega-
tive” experiences ranging in intensity, for example, from extreme 
forms of torture to the mild discomfort of a mosquito bite, such that 
one could move from the harsh end of the spectrum to the mild end 
in a finite series of steps, where each step would involve the trans-
formation from one negative experience to another that was only a 
“little” less intense than the previous one.
View Three: The mild discomfort of a mosquito bite would be better 
than two years of excruciating torture, no matter how long one lived 
and no matter how long the discomfort of a mosquito bite persisted.
View Four: “All-things-considered better than” is a transitive relation. 
So, for any three outcomes, A, B, and C, which involve unpleasant 
experiences of varying intensities and durations, if, all things consid-
ered, A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C.
(Temkin 2012: 135)
Now consider a series of lives from P1 to Pn. All these lives are very 
lengthy and all include 15 mosquito bites per month. P1 and P2 are simi-
lar in all relevant respects, except that P1 includes two years of excruciat-
ing torture, while P2 includes four years of almost as intense torture. P3 
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stands in the same relation to P2 as P2 does to P1, i.e., P3 includes eight 
years of almost as intense torture as does P2. We would say, in accordance 
with View One, that P1 is better than P2, and that P2 is better than P3, 
and so on. However, in accordance with View Two, we will eventually 
reach Pn, which is such that it does not include excruciating torture, but 
very minor discomfort for a very long time. It may very well be that 
this minor discomfort is just one extra mosquito bite per month. Given 
View Four, P1 is better than Pn, but according to View Three, Pn is better 
than P1. It has thus been shown that Views One, Two, Three, and Four 
are incompatible. Something has to go, but all four views seem correct. 
Moreover, rejecting any of the four views seems to lead to both practical 
and theoretical problems.6 Temkin argues that it is View Four that must 
be rejected, as rejecting any of the other views would come at too high 
a price.
3  The Spectrum Argument and Indeterminacy
There are, of course, ways in which one can object to spectrum argu-
ments of this type, and Temkin discusses several such objections. There 
is, however, one type of objection I wish to discuss further. This objec-
tion is that there must be a point in the spectrum where View One does 
not apply between two adjacent outcomes, breaking the chain of “better 
than” relations.7 One explanation as to why that might be the case is 
that differences in degree may give rise to a difference in kind, and since 
there clearly is a difference in degree in the spectrum argument, there 
could also be a difference in kind. That is, not only do the pains differ 
in intensity, but the experiences also differ in a more fundamental man-
ner that cannot be fully accounted for in terms of intensity – i.e., they 
have different phenomenological characteristics. This difference in kind 
becomes clear when one considers the difference between excruciating 
torture and a mosquito bite. Such a difference is not merely a difference 
in degree but also a difference in kind; they belong to two different cate-
gories of experiences. If there is a difference in kind between experiences 
at the opposite ends of the spectrum, then we should expect this differ-
ence in kind to arise somewhere in the spectrum. That is, a difference 
in kind can also, albeit less obviously, be found between two adjacent 
experiences in the spectrum. This means that even though two adja-
cent experiences are similar, there could be a difference in kind between 
them such that when we compare them the factors that are relevant and 
significant for comparing other adjacent experiences in the spectrum 
no longer apply (Temkin 2012: 266). The simple trade-off expressed in 
View One does not hold for these experiences since the pains are of a 
sufficiently different kind.
Temkin admits that there are such differences in kind in the spectrum; 
the reason that View Three applies to experiences at the opposite ends 
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of the spectrum is that there is a difference in kind between these experi-
ences, excruciating torture differs in kind from a mosquito bite. Temkin 
even takes this to explain why transitivity does not hold. Due to the dif-
ference in kind between experiences at the opposite ends of the spectrum, 
factors that are relevant and significant when comparing these experi-
ences differ from the factors that are relevant and significant for compari-
sons of experiences that differ merely in degree.
The objection, however, states that this difference in kind not only 
holds between experiences at the opposite ends of the spectrum; rather, 
the difference arises somewhere between adjacent experiences in the spec-
trum. For these experiences, due to their difference in kind, View One is 
not applicable, so the transitivity of “better than” is not threatened. That 
is, somewhere in the spectrum, two adjacent pains are of such different 
characters that the difference in time is not enough to outweigh the dif-
ference in kind and consequently we should reject View One.
I am inclined toward the gist of such an objection. However, Temkin is 
not convinced by it. His reply takes the following form: P1 clearly differs 
in kind from Pn, and the objection states that there is a break somewhere 
in the spectrum from P1 to Pn where this change takes place. Let us call 
the two adjacent experiences for which View One does not hold Pk – 1 and 
Pk. Temkin then asks whether View Three applies to Pk – 1 and Pk:
For our opponent’s argument to work, he needs the difference 
between Pk and Pk – 1’s pain to be akin to the difference between the 
pain of intense torture and the pain of a mosquito bite. If there were 
such a difference, then, indeed, we would agree that View Three 
applied to the two “nearby” pains Pk and Pk – 1; correspondingly, we 
would reject View One, and the threat to the transitivity of “better 
than” would evaporate.
(Temkin 2012: 272)
This response is misdirected, as Temkin focuses on View Three rather 
than View One. We should not assume that these views are mutually 
exclusive. The real issue is whether View One applies or not. The relevant 
question is thus whether the difference in kind is enough for View One 
not to apply. Temkin’s view of this is that the difference is not enough. 
According to him, even though Pk – 1 and Pk may differ in kind, they are 
clearly very similar. For example, Pk – 1 is more similar to Pk than to P1, 
and Pk is more similar to Pk – 1 than to Pn. Given that they are so very 
similar, we should expect View One to hold between them, according to 
Temkin.
Surprisingly, with this response, Temkin acknowledges that the experi-
ences may indeed differ in kind. According to Temkin, however, the focus 
on different kinds is a red herring; instead, we should focus on the simi-
larity of the adjacent experiences. He writes,
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In sum, though it may have helped illuminate how it could be the 
case that different factors could be relevant and significant for com-
paring different alternatives, the issue of different kinds is a red her-
ring, and I ought not to have put some of my earlier discussions in 
those terms. The point is simply that when the difference between 
two pains is “sufficiently” great, View Three is appropriate for com-
paring them, whereas when the difference between two pains is “suf-
ficiently” small, View One is appropriate.
(Temkin 2012: 274)
This, however, does not amount to a rebuttal of the claim that differences 
in kind constitute a counterexample to View One. Rather, Temkin seems 
to dig in his heels and once again claim that since Pk – 1 and Pk are next to 
each other in the spectrum, View One must be applicable, thus disregard-
ing the claim that if Pk – 1 differs in kind from Pk, then View One might 
not be applicable. The fact that Pk – 1 and Pk are adjacent does not rule out 
the possibility that they differ in kind. It is well-known that small changes 
can trigger larger changes, such as the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel’s back. Small nonevaluative changes that trigger big changes in 
value are no less familiar. Adding a pinch of cilantro can, according to 
some, ruin an otherwise tasty dinner.
What one might find implausible in my suggestion, however, is that 
there is an abrupt change in the spectrum. One might find it implausible 
that along a fine-grained pain spectrum there exists an abrupt change 
in kind between two points. It may seem odd that there is such a sharp 
break in the spectrum (see Temkin 2012: 275).
Let us grant that a sharp break of this kind seems implausible. It could, 
however, still be that there is a break but that this break is not sharp. This 
is a familiar idea. A single grain of sand does not constitute a heap, but if 
we keep on adding grains of sand, we will eventually end up with a heap. 
There is, however, no exact lower limit on the number of grains of sand 
that is needed to rightly call the collection of grains “a heap.” For some 
number of grains, it is indeterminate whether it is a heap or not. Similarly, 
there could be a zone in which it is indeterminate whether View One 
applies to the adjacent outcomes.8 It may, for example, be indeterminate 
whether the difference in kind is to be found between Pk and Pk – 1, Pk + 1  
and Pk, or Pk + 2 and Pk + 1. This means that although we cannot deter-
minately judge for which outcomes in the spectrum View One does not 
apply, it will not be true for all adjacent experiences that View One will 
apply, since for Pk – 1 to Pk + 2 it will be indeterminate. This should make 
the claim more plausible.
Temkin (2012: 534–538) discusses a similar idea presented by 
Christopher Knapp (2007). Knapp argues that trade-offs between inten-
sity and time seem to be desirable only when we are dealing with quan-
titative differences and not when it comes to qualitative differences. If 
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we have a spectrum ranging from very intense pain (600) to very mild 
pain (1), there is a difference in quality between the pains at the different 
ends of the spectrum, while two pains at the same end of the spectrum 
will only differ in quantity. For pains in the middle of the spectrum (300 
and 301, for example), it is indeterminate whether they are very intense 
or very mild.9 And since it is indeterminate for two adjacent points in the 
middle of the spectrum whether there is a difference in quality, then it is 
indeterminate whether one of these outcomes that lasts for a certain time 
is better than its adjacent outcome that lasts much longer. Consequently, 
it is neither true nor false that View One holds and thus we have a break 
in the chain.10 However, Temkin is not much impressed by this objection:
We must clearly reject its key premise that a pain’s being a borderline 
case of a qualitative distinction guarantees that it would be inde-
terminate whether or not View One or View Three applied for any 
comparisons involving that pain. This is simply not so. After all, even 
if one grants that pain 301 is both indeterminately very intense and 
indeterminately very mild, and so a borderline case of qualitative 
distinction, it doesn’t follow that a trade-off between one year of 
pain 301 and five years of pain 301 would involve a borderline case 
where a qualitative difference was at stake! Since there is no differ-
ence between the intensity of pain in the two cases, only a difference 
in duration, it cannot be indeterminate whether a qualitative differ-
ence is at stake.
(2012: 536)
Admittedly, I find this reply somewhat unclear. It may be that he has 
shown that Knapp’s “key premise” must be rejected, but this does not 
counter the more general reply that I have presented here.
However, Temkin continues his response to the line of reasoning I have 
presented here and provides a more general answer. According to him, it 
might very well be that it is indeterminate whether pains 300 and 301 are 
very intense or very mild, but it is determinate that the difference between 
them is small, and View One is appropriate to apply when we compare 
pains with a small difference between them in intensity.
Once again, Temkin seems to dig his heels in and claim that the two 
experiences are sufficiently similar, and by doing so he is neglecting the 
possible consequence of the difference in kind that holds between the 
experiences. His reply consequently seems to misconstrue the original 
objection. It was argued that – for the same reason that View One does 
not apply to experiences at the opposite ends of the spectrum – if adja-
cent experiences differ in kind, then View One is not applicable to these 
adjacent experiences. That is, if there is a difference in kind, then different 
criteria may be relevant to the comparison, blocking the chain of better-
ness relations. It may be indeterminate where this difference in kind lies 
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on the spectrum, but it does, however, exist. For this reason, View One 
should be rejected. View One is supposed to be applicable to any two 
pains such that one is slightly less intense than the other. We now know 
that this is false since for some such pains there is a difference in kind, 
and for these pains, View One is not applicable.
By rejecting View One, Temkin’s “most powerful” counterexample to 
the transitivity of “better than” fails, so there is no need to reject the view 
that “better than” is not a transitive relation.
4  The Spectrum Argument and Value Superiority
Let me try to make the same point but in a somewhat different manner. I 
take the issue at stake to be whether we should reject View One or View 
Four. Temkin has shown that if we accept the very reasonable Views Two 
and Three, Views One and Four will be incompatible. If we are to reject 
one of these views, we must have an explanation as to why the view might 
not hold. Temkin has given explanations as to why View Four might not 
always hold by arguing that the assessment of relative goodness is some-
times essentially comparative. However, accepting this as an explanation 
requires a revision of our conception of the nature of value: it would 
require that we “rethink the good.” Moreover, View Four is fundamental 
to our conception of value, so if an explanation can be given as to why 
View One does not hold for all adjacent experiences in the spectrum, then 
this casts doubt upon Temkin’s conclusion. I gave such an explanation 
above, so now we have reasons to doubt Temkin’s conclusion.
Here I will give a somewhat more technical explanation as to why, 
given Views Two, Three, and Four, View One fails to apply. I will show 
that for two adjacent experiences in the spectrum, one will be weakly 
inferior to the other, which supports the claim that they differ in kind, 
and consequently, View One cannot hold for these two experiences. Thus, 
the chain of experiences allegedly connected in the manner described by 
View One is broken. So, by assuming transitivity, an explanation as to 
why View One fails to hold can be given. That is, from the knowledge we 
have of the structure of value, an explanation can be given as to why we 
should reject View One.
Interestingly, the argument I will present is similar to the view that 
Mozaffar Quizilbash, in this volume, attributes to James Griffin. Griffin 
refers to “discontinuity” and vagueness to show how the spectrum argu-
ment can be dismantled. I will not, however, use the term “discontinuity,” but 
prefer the terms “superiority” and “inferiority.” My argument will be based 
on research by Gustaf Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz (2015) regarding 
superiority in value.11 According to them, there are two kinds of superiority:
Strongly superior: An object e is strongly superior to an object e’ if 
and only if e is better than any number of e’-objects.
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Weakly superior: An object e is weakly superior to an object e’ if and 
only if for some number m, m e-objects are better than any number 
of e’-objects.12
(Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2015: 232)
In their writings on the topic, Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2015) have 
made the following interesting discovery:
Observation 5: Suppose that “is at least as good as” is a complete 
and transitive relation on the domain. Then, in any finite sequence of 
objects in which the first element is weakly superior to the last ele-
ment, there exists at least one element that is weakly superior to its 
immediate successor.13
(Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2015: 237)
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’s discussions are framed in terms of superior-
ity; however, for the current discussion, it is more fitting to talk about 
strong and weak inferiority:14
Strongly inferior: An object e is strongly inferior to an object e’ if and 
only if e is worse than any number of e’-objects.
Weakly inferior: An object e is weakly inferior to an object e’ if and 
only if for some number m, m e-objects are worse than any number 
of e’-objects.
We can now see that it is plausible that excruciating torture may be 
weakly inferior to the mild discomfort of a mosquito bite: two years of 
torture would always be worse than the discomfort of a mosquito bite, 
no matter how long the mosquito bite persisted.
I also take it that the results arrived at by Arrhenius and Rabinowicz are 
true for weak inferiority. The mirror image of the proof for Observation 
5 should provide us with the proof for Observation 5’.
Observation 5’: Suppose that “is at least as good as” is a complete 
and transitive relation on the domain. Then, in any finite sequence 
of objects in which the first element is weakly inferior to the last ele-
ment, there exists at least one element that is weakly inferior to its 
immediate successor.
If we accept that experiences at the opposite ends of the spectrum 
are related by weak inferiority, which seems to fit well with Temkin’s 
characterization of their relation, then it follows that somewhere along 
the spectrum, one experience will be weakly inferior to the next. This 
surprising result can be accounted for by the fact that there is a difference 
in kind between two adjacent items in the spectrum.15 Furthermore, it can 
be indeterminate where this change in kind takes place.16
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’s findings on superiority thus strengthen 
the support for the claim I made in the first part, i.e., that there is a 
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difference in kind between two adjacent experiences. It has been shown 
that two adjacent experiences in the spectrum are related by a weak infe-
riority relation but it has not been shown that the chain of “better than” 
relations is broken. Even if ek is weakly inferior to ek + 1, it does not fol-
low that ek is worse than ek + 1. The existence of weak inferiority in the 
spectrum should make us doubt View One, but the view has yet not been 
ruled out on formal grounds.
If Temkin’s argument is to work, View One must apply to all adja-
cent experiences in the spectrum. View One claims that for any pain ei, a 
slightly less intense experience that is twice (or three or five times) as long 
is worse. From this, it follows that for any two items in the spectrum, ek 
and ek + 1, ek is better than ek + 1. According to the definition of weak infe-
riority, for some number m, m ek objects are worse than any number of 
ek + 1 objects; ek may be better than ek + 1, and yet m ek may be worse than 
any number of ek + 1.
However, with one very reasonable assumption, we reach a contradic-
tion. According to Temkin, ek is very similar to ek + 1, and if that is the 
case, it seems reasonable that if we prolong both experiences so that they 
become, for example, twice as long, then clearly ek would still be better 
than ek + 1. If 10 years of intense headache is better than 20 years of a 
slightly less intense headache, then clearly 20 years of intense headache 
must be better than 40 years of slightly less intense headache. Or, more 
generally, if ek is better than ek + 1, then k ek must be better than k ek + 1. 
This proportionality assumption entails that m ek is better than m ek + 1, 
which contradicts the result arrived at through the definition of weak 
inferiority: m ek objects are worse than any number of ek + 1 objects. This 
contradiction can be avoided by rejecting View One.17
The generality of the proportionality assumption can be questioned. It 
is doubtful if it is true for all contexts, and it may have boundaries such 
that it is not true for all values of k. For example, if ek and ek + 1 are two 
pleasurable experiences, it is possible that one has a diminishing marginal 
value while the other does not or that both have a diminishing marginal 
value but to different degrees. If that is the case, it is possible that ek is 
better than ek + 1 yet k ek is worse than k ek + 1.
18 The validity of the propor-
tionality assumption can also be questioned when applied to extremely 
short experiences. One second of extreme pain may be better than a day 
of moderate pain, but 100 seconds of extreme pain may not be better 
than 100 days of moderate pain.19
However, for this context, i.e., for spectra of the kind discussed by 
Temkin, the proportionality assumption is plausible. We prefer the more 
intense experience to the less intense just because the latter is a longer 
experience – it is a trade-off we want to make. In this context, when k 
is larger than 1, the less intense experience becomes even proportionally 
longer than the more intense experience. This seems to be a trade-off 
that is in our favor. In fact, the consideration that speaks in favor of 
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the proportionality assumption seems similar to what speaks in favor of 
View One. According to View One, a negative experience will be better 
than a slightly less intense but much longer experience, so proportionally 
extending the experience should lead to the same result.
In other words, if one sets out to argue that the proportionality 
assumption is mistaken in this specific context, one will also struggle 
to defend View One. The intuitions that support the proportionality 
assumption in the context of Temkin’s spectrum argument are hard to 
rebut since these concern views of trade-offs that seem central to the 
spectrum argument.
5  Why We Should Accept Indeterminacy
I have argued that Temkin’s most convincing formulation of a spectrum 
argument does not lead to the conclusion that we should reject the transi-
tive property of “better than.” First, I argued that it is possible that some-
where in the spectrum there is a difference in kind between two adjacent 
experiences, and thus View One is not applicable between these experi-
ences. Temkin’s reply to this line of reasoning is not convincing, especially 
if one takes into consideration that it can be indeterminate where in the 
spectrum this change takes place.
Second, I explained why we should reject View One. It is not only that 
it is incompatible with the other three views; it was also shown that our 
knowledge of the structure of value relations provides a neat explanation 
as to how spectrum arguments can be blocked. Central to this explana-
tion was the concept of weak inferiority. It could, of course, be objected 
that the possibility that one experience is weakly inferior to its adjacent 
experience is just as counterintuitive as the possibility that “better than” 
is not transitive. The explanation I have given is consequently not to be 
preferred to the explanation proposed by Temkin. Furthermore, the coun-
terintuitive result may serve as another reason to reject View Four, since 
it is only if we accept transitivity that we can arrive at the result that one 
experience is weakly inferior to its adjacent experience. However, one 
must remember that there is no clear-cut boundary between experiences 
that differ in kind. It may be indeterminate where this change takes place 
since the borderline can be vague. Acknowledging the role of indetermi-
nacy should thus make this strategy more appealing. Furthermore, the 
result is only counterintuitive if we believe that weak inferiority implies 
that the two experiences must differ greatly in value. This assumption 
might be premature, however, as Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2015: 536) 
note: “contrary to appearances, e might still be weakly superior to e′, 
even though it is better only by a small margin.” That is, even if they 
do not differ greatly in value, there can be a difference in kind between 
the two adjacent experiences. Given such a difference, one can doubt 
whether View One holds for these two experiences: if one experience can 
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be weakly inferior to its adjacent experience, then it might be that these 
experiences are so different that View One does not apply.
However, an interesting result from Toby Handfield and Wlodek 
Rabinowicz (2018) may make my suggestion seem less plausible. They 
have argued that the indeterminacy needs to be of a certain kind to block 
the result of spectrum arguments, i.e., it needs to be radical. This is how 
they characterize radical indeterminacy that blocks a spectrum argument 
involving harms:
Two harm types admit radical indeterminacy if and only if, for at least 
one of them, H, for all quantities K′ of H at least as large as some 
threshold K, it is indeterminate for every sufficiently large quantity 
of the other type, H′, whether K′H is worse than this quantity of H′.
(Handfield and Rabinowicz 2018: 2384)
While weak inferiority and indeterminacy are sufficient to explain why a 
specific spectrum argument will fail, radical indeterminacy is needed to 
block the possibility of constructing a new spectrum argument. That is, 
even if there is a break in the spectrum and it is indeterminate where this 
takes place, it could be possible to construct a new spectrum by multiply-
ing the number of items in the spectrum so that the indeterminacy disap-
pears. With a sufficient number of items, it should become determinate 
what value relation obtains between the items, so a new spectrum argu-
ment can be made. The indeterminacy must consequently be radical to 
avoid this possibility. What makes their findings relevant here is that they 
argue that radical indeterminacy is hard to accept, making the strategy I 
have proposed less appealing. Handfield and Rabinowicz (2018) present 
two reasons meant to support the claim that it is hard to accept radical 
indeterminacy. It is, however, not clear that these considerations put in 
doubt the existence of radical indeterminacy. First, they discuss whether 
“indeterminacy that arises from a vague threshold in one relevant dimen-
sion must eventually be overwhelmed by a large enough difference in a 
second relevant dimension” (Handfield and Rabinowicz 2018: 2384). If 
that were the case, then appealing to indeterminacy to block spectrum 
arguments would be a dead end. However, they admit that no research 
suggests that indeterminacy must behave in this manner and that they 
lack robust intuitions on this matter. This reason should thus not be 
attributed too much weight. The second reason as to why radical indeter-
minacy is expressed as follows:
[R]adical indeterminacy arguably does not do very much to directly 
address the paradoxical features of spectra that exhibit radical infe-
riority between the first harm type and the last. As we have seen, if 
we assume that the betterness ranking across such a spectrum is com-
plete, then there are adjacent, qualitatively very similar harm types in 
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the spectrum such that one is radically inferior to the other. This is 
still counterintuitive, whether or not it is indeterminate where this 
point occurs. If it indeed is indeterminate, then – as we have seen – 
radical indeterminacy will have to obtain between some adjacent 
types in the spectrum. Alternatively, if there is no radical inferiority 
between any two adjacent types, then we know that the only way 
to avoid violating transitivity is if at some point in the spectrum 
there is radical incommensurability between two adjacent types. 
Again, this remains surprising, even if it is indeterminate where this 
point occurs.
(Handfield and Rabinowicz 2018: 2384)
This is indeed true, but it is not a reason to reject radical indeterminacy; 
rather, it is a statement concerning the difficulties of making sense of 
spectrum arguments. It is true that spectrum arguments force us to accept 
some counterintuitive claims. In this chapter, I have argued that if we 
find intransitivity too hard to accept, we should, in the terminology of 
Handfield and Rabinowicz, accept radical indeterminacy.
Furthermore, Rabinowicz (2021) has recently argued that radicality of 
this kind may not, after all, be too difficult to explain. If we accept his 
fitting-attitudes analysis of value relations it is, for example, possible to 
account for some forms of such radicality.20
6  Spectrum Arguments and Non-conventional Value Relations
Throughout this chapter, I have assumed that the “at least as good” rela-
tion fully exhausts the domain of value relations. As evident in this vol-
ume, this assumption can and has been questioned. Several arguments 
have been presented to show that there might be additional sui generis 
value relations (e.g., Chang 2002; Rabinowicz 2008). Notions such as 
“parity,” “incomparability,” “imprecision,” and “rough comparability” 
have all been invoked to attempt to dismantle the tension in spectrum 
arguments. For example, it has been argued that there is no need to 
assume that two adjacent experiences either are related by an at least as 
good as relation or are incomparable, as they might just as well be on 
a par. This relation between two adjacent experiences would block the 
spectrum argument (see Qizilbash 2007; Chang 2016), though it is not a 
promising strategy. First, much doubt has been expressed as to whether 
such a relation is plausible. Second, as Anders Herlitz (2020b) has shown, 
Handfield and Rabinowicz’s arguments applied explicitly to parity allow 
us to conclude that radical parity must be confused since it is in tension 
with how parity is usually characterized.21
The approach taken here could be understood as part of a larger 
endeavor. My argument could be understood as part of the attempt to 
fully account for all value relations by referring to the concept of “at 
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least as good.” Several arguments put pressure on the assumption that “at 
least as good” fully exhausts the domain of value relations. These argu-
ments, however, face the challenge of explaining why phenomena such 
as “parity,” “incomparability,” “imprecision,” and “rough comparability” 
cannot be accounted for in terms of the vagueness of “at least as good.” 
I and others have argued that this more conservative approach is just as 
successful in correctly depicting the axiological landscape (e.g., Broome 
1997; Andersson 2017; Elson 2017). It has now been shown that this 
more conservative approach can also help explain why “better than” is 
a transitive relation, so there is no need to introduce any further value 
relations to arrive at this result.
To give an example, my objection to Temkin’s argument resembles 
Derek Parfit’s view of a similar matter. When discussing the related topic 
of the Repugnant Conclusion, Parfit (1984: 110) argues that the notion 
of imprecision allows us to avoid the conclusion that
[c]ompared with the existence of many people who would all have 
some very high quality of life, there is some much larger number of 
people whose existence would be better, even though these people 
would all have lives that were barely worth living.
While he refers to something similar to weak inferiority to avoid this 
conclusion, he also needs to introduce the notion of “imprecision.” This 
approach could perhaps successfully show why we need not accept 
Temkin’s conclusion that “better than” is not transitive. However, my 
account has the advantage of only appealing to the familiar notions of 
vagueness and indeterminacy; there is no need to introduce a further 
mysterious notion.
7  Conclusion
This chapter’s result is important because it clarifies how Temkin’s four 
views are incompatible. For those who find it hard to reject Views Two, 
Three, and Four, an explanation has now been given as to why View One 
ought to be rejected: There is a difference in kind between experiences 
at the opposite ends of the spectrum, and this difference arises between 
two adjacent experiences. Since there is such a difference in kind, View 
One is not applicable and the chain of betterness relations does not hold 
throughout the spectrum. The findings regarding the structure of value 
arrived at by Arrhenius and Rabinowicz neatly support the claim that if 
we accept Views Two, Three, and Four, we must reject View One. One 
experience will be weakly inferior to its adjacent experience, so View 
One is not applicable. This weak inferiority can be accounted for by the 
fact that the experiences are of a different kind. Furthermore, it can be 
indeterminate where this change takes place.
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When we face incompatible claims, we need an explanation as to which 
claim we should reject. Temkin has explained why the transitivity of “bet-
ter than” might not always hold. Now we also have an explanation as to 
why View One might not always hold.
Notes
 1 I owe much gratitude to many for helping me develop the ideas presented 
here. A first version of this chapter that included the main argument was 
written in 2017, and several versions have since been circulated and presented 
on various occasions. The feedback I received from Erik Carlson during my 
PhD defense inspired me to write the chapter in the first place. Since then 
I have received helpful comments from Mattias Gunnemyr, Anders Herlitz, 
Jakob Werkmäster, Wlodek Rabinowicz, the audience at the Hard Cases and 
Rational Choice workshop in Bern in November 2017, and the audience at 
the Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy in Lund at which this chapter was 
presented.
 2 Throughout most of this chapter, I will assume that there are only three value 
comparatives: “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally as good as.” If there 
are other value comparatives beyond these three, then it is, of course, pos-
sible that these additional comparatives are not transitive. I will return to the 
importance of this assumption.
 3 He discusses the very specific value relation the “all things considered better 
than in a wide reason-implying sense.” Temkin (2012: 13) describes the rela-
tion in the following way: “Roughly, on this use, outcome A is better than 
outcome B, all things considered, if one would have more reason to prefer A 
to be realized than B, from an impartial perspective.”
 4 An early formulation of this can be found in Temkin (1996); the argument is, 
however, inspired by an argument by Stuart Rachels (1998).
 5 John Broome (1997) makes perhaps the most important contribution to the 
attempt to provide an account of the normative landscape without refer-
ring to non-conventional value relations; see also Constantinescu (2012), 
Andersson (2017), Elson (2017), and Broome (2021).
 6 All four views are grounded in intuitions that are common in axiological 
theorizing. If we are to reject one of them, then this will have consequences 
for theories that encompass them. The practical problems of rejecting any of 
the views is because they are relevant when discussing trade-offs. As Temkin 
(2012: 23) acknowledges, practical decisions often involve trade-offs. Trade-
offs are therefore central for many of our everyday decisions, as well as for 
life-changing decisions. The philosophical literature often connects these 
discussions to population axiology and the distribution of benefits, i.e., dis-
cussions that clearly involve trade-offs, but they are also relevant to more 
mundane situations since these also often involve trade-offs. The cost of 
rejecting View Four can also be accounted for by referring to rational choice 
theory. Value relations are often believed to guide us to rational choice among 
alternatives. However, if the betterness relation can be cyclical, then we will 
not be guided toward the best alternative. For a more nuanced view of the 
practical implications of rejecting View Four, see Herlitz (2020a).
 7 There could be several such breaks along the spectrum but, for the objection 
to hold, one suffices.
 8 In fact, there could be several such zones, but in line with the discussion in 
note 7, one zone is all that is needed for the objection to hold.
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 9 I take this to be a simplified version of Temkin’s description of the spectrum. 
It is more plausible that the spectrum consists of several categories and that 
these categories have indeterminate boundaries. Consequently, the pains in 
the middle are neither very intense nor very mild. However, the important 
point is correct even in the simplified description: it can be indeterminate 
where the difference in kind is found.
 10 Not only is it indeterminate whether View One applies and an experience is 
better than its adjacent much longer experience, but it is also indeterminate 
whether the same experience is worse than the much longer experience.
 11 The idea of superiority in value be traced back to at least John Stuart Mill 
(1863).
 12 James Griffin (1986) had a similar distinction in mind.
 13 Very roughly, the proof of the observation starts by proving the following: 
“Lemma 1: Suppose that ‘is at least as good as’ is a weak order, that is, a 
complete and transitive relation on the domain. For any objects e, e′, and e″, if 
e is weakly superior to e″, e is weakly superior to e′ or e′ is weakly superior to 
e″ ” (Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2015: 241). Observation 5, of course, entails 
Lemma 1 and that Lemma 1 entails Observation 5 can also be shown. Lemma 
1 is then proven by assuming that (i) e is weakly superior to e″, but (ii) e is 
not weakly superior to e′. To establish Lemma 1, we need to show that e′ is 
weakly superior to e″. From (i) we know that there must exist some number 
m for which (1) m e-objects are better than any number of e″-objects. From 
(ii) we can infer that there exists some number m′ for which “(2) m e-objects 
are not better than m′ e′-objects. But then, given that ‘is at least as-good as’ is 
a complete relation, (2) implies that (3) m′ e′-objects are at least as good as m 
e-objects. By the transitivity of ‘is at least as good as’, if one object is at least 
as good as another, which is better than some third object, then the first object 
is better than the third. Consequently, (3) and (1) imply that (4) m′ e′-objects 
are better than any number of e″-objects. (4) implies that e′ is weakly superior 
to e″ ” (Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2015: 242).
 14 While the idea of superiority easily translates to inferiority, it is also pos-
sible to consider similar structures for “equally as good” and non-conven-
tional value relations, such as “parity.” For more on this matter, see Henrik 
Andersson and Andrés Garcia (n.d.).
 15 This view seems to be endorsed by James Griffin (1986: 338–340). For a help-
ful discussion of Griffin’s view, see Mozaffar Qizilbash (2005, 2021). This 
view also shares some features with Derek Parfit’s (1984) attempt to avoid 
the Repugnant Conclusion. For more on the similarities and differences, see 
the following under “Spectrum Arguments and Non-Conventional Value 
Relations” and Qizilbash (2021).
 16 As Qizilbash has argued, if one finds the suggestion of one experience being 
inferior to its adjacent experience to be implausible, one should take into 
account that the boundary between these experiences may be vague. Qizilbash 
(2005) does not use the same terms but has framed his discussion in terms of 
Griffin’s “discontinuity.”
 17 It could, of course, also be avoided by rejecting the claim that the first expe-
rience is weakly inferior to the last. However, Temkin seems to endorse this 
inferiority claim, which, after all, is almost exactly what his View Three states.
 18 This possibility was suggested to me by Wlodek Rabinowicz.
 19 I owe this example to Anders Herlitz.
 20 Rabinowicz (2021) provides an explanation of radical parity and not radical 
indeterminacy. Roughly, radical parity can be accounted for in terms of a class 
of permissible preference orderings that differ from one another as to where 
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the break in the spectrum is located. The fact that Rabinowicz’s account 
shares structural features with the so-called supervaluationistic account of 
vagueness makes the possibility of explaining the occurrence of radical inde-
terminacy within this framework promising. For more on the concept of 
“parity”, see the following.
 21 More specifically, it is in tension with the so-called chaining argument that is 
an essential part of the argument for a fourth possible value relation. See also 
Rabinowicz (2021) for an attempt to explain radical parity.
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1  Introduction
Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in regard to 
their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations “is bet-
ter than” and “is as good as.” The main problem in population axiology 
has been to find an adequate theory about the value of populations where 
the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may 
vary. This field has been riddled with impossibility results, which seem 
to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the 
number of people and their welfare varies.1 There have been many cre-
ative but unfortunately failed suggestions for how to eschew these impos-
sibility results.2 Here I shall consider two suggestions to the effect that 
incommensurability or vagueness could help.3 We shall start, however, 
by discussing incommensurability and Derek Parfit’s famous “Repugnant 
Conclusion.”
2  The Repugnant Conclusion and Incommensurability
The Repugnant Conclusion can be stated as follows:
The Repugnant Conclusion: For any population consisting of people 
with very high positive welfare, there is a better population in which 
everyone has a very low positive welfare, other things being equal.4
Very high positive welfare
Very low positive welfare
Population Z is much larger than A
ZA
Figure 6.1 The Repugnant Conclusion.
6 Incommensurability and 
Vagueness in Population 
Axiology
Gustaf Arrhenius
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In Figure 6.1, the width of each block represents the number of people, 
whereas the height represents their lifetime welfare. Dashes indicate that 
the block in question should be much wider than shown; that is, the 
population size is much larger than shown.
A population could consist of all the past, present, and future lives (in a 
possible world), or all the present and future lives, or all the lives during 
some shorter time span in the future such as the next generation, or all 
the lives that are causally affected by, or consequences of a certain action 
or series of actions, and so forth.5
All the lives in Figure 6.1 have positive welfare, or, as we also could put 
it, all the people have lives worth living. The A-people have very high wel-
fare, whereas the Z-people have very low positive welfare.6 The reason for 
this could be that in the Z-lives there are, to paraphrase Parfit, only enough 
ecstasies to just outweigh the agonies, or that the good things in those 
lives are of uniformly poor quality, e.g., eating potatoes and listening to 
Muzak.7 However, since there are many more people in Z, the total sum of 
welfare in Z is greater than in A. Hence, a theory like Total Utilitarianism, 
according to which we should maximize the welfare in the world, ranks Z 
as better than A – an instance of the Repugnant Conclusion.8
A theory could avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing incom-
mensurability. It could imply that at least one large population enjoying 
very high welfare is incommensurable with all populations with very low 
positive welfare (that is, the former population is neither at least as good as, 
nor worse than, the latter populations) and that no population with very 
high welfare is at least as good as all populations with very low welfare.9
This is quite an unsatisfactory way to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion 
and arguably wasn’t intended by Parfit. Those who find the conclusion 
repugnant are also likely to think, I surmise, that it is counterintuitive 
that a large population enjoying very high welfare is incommensurable 
with all populations with very low positive welfare. Perhaps, although I 
doubt it, it can be reasonably believed that some populations with very 
high welfare are incommensurable with some populations with very low 
positive welfare, but that some populations with very high welfare are 
incommensurable with all larger populations with very low positive wel-
fare seems, given that other things are equal, clearly counterintuitive.
Some incommensurability among populations is pretty plausible, I think, 
if there are other considerations apart from welfarist ones that are relevant 
for the evaluation of populations. If some kind of pluralism is true and 
there are other values than welfare, then it wouldn’t be remarkable if some 
populations turn out to be incommensurable. For example, it might be 
that both liberty (of some kind) and welfare should count but that there is 
no way of weighing gains in welfare against losses in liberty and vice versa. 
If one population is better than another population in respect to welfare 
but the other is better in respect to liberty, then these two populations 
would be incommensurable if the aforementioned pluralism were true.
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It is important to remember, however, that we are discussing cases 
where other things are equal: roughly, the populations that we are com-
paring only differ in respect to the welfare levels of their constituent lives 
and size. In general, for an appeal to incommensurability to have any 
credibility as an argument against the adequacy condition we are discuss-
ing here, one must produce a good welfarist reason for incommensura-
bility. With respect to the Repugnant Conclusion, I don’t see any such 
reason presenting itself (more on this later).
Let’s formulate an adequacy condition that avoids this unsatisfactory 
way of dealing with the Repugnant Conclusion:
Quality: There is a perfectly equal population with very high welfare 
which is at least as good as any population with very low positive 
welfare, other things being equal.
Avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion implies that there is at least one 
population with very high welfare that is at least as good as or incommen-
surable with all larger populations with very low welfare. Quality is in 
one sense logically stronger than avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion 
since it rules out axiologies that imply that at least one population with 
very high welfare is incommensurable with all populations with very low 
positive welfare but none is at least as good as all such populations.10
It is otherwise a very weak condition. A theory that implies that 
most but not all large populations with very high welfare are worse 
than some populations with very low welfare doesn’t violate Quality. 
Likewise, neither a theory that yields that only one perfectly equal popu-
lation with very high welfare is better than all populations with very low 
positive welfare, nor a theory that deems all such pairs of populations 
to be equally good, violates Quality (nor do these theories imply the 
Repugnant Conclusion).
If one holds that the Repugnant Conclusion is unacceptable, then it 
would be odd, one might argue, to accept such theories. Arguably, the 
axiological intuition most people have about the relation between popu-
lations with very high and very low positive welfare is much stronger 
than what is captured by Quality. Perhaps we believe that if the high 
welfare population is sufficiently large, then such a population and any 
larger high welfare population is better than any very low welfare popu-
lation. As true as this might be, one should remember that Quality is only 
a necessary and not a sufficient condition for an acceptable axiology.
3  Critical-Level Utilitarianism
Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson have in a num-
ber of papers developed a theory, or rather a family of theories, called 
Critical-Level Utilitarianism.11 John Broome has also defended a version 
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of this theory.12 We are here interested in a version of this theory that 
incorporates incommensurability, but to get there, we need to first pres-
ent the simplest version of the theory and its properties. As such, Critical-
Level Utilitarianism, or CLU for short, is a modified version of Total 
Utilitarianism. The contributive value of a person’s life is her or his wel-
fare minus a positive critical level. The value of a population is calculated 
by summing these differences for all individuals in the population. CLU 





















In the formula, n is the population size of X, and ui is the numerical 
representation of the welfare of the i:th life in population X, and k is the 
critical level.
The critical level k is supposed to be the level at which it is axiologi-
cally neutral whether a life is created or not, what Broome calls “the 
neutral level for existence.” Blackorby et al. and Broome don’t equate this 
level with the welfare level of a life that is neutral for a person – that is, 
neutral welfare, an option that the classical Total Utilitarian would use. 
As Broome writes, “[T]he neutral level for existence [the critical level] is 
positive, once the zero of lifetime wellbeing is normalized at the level of 
a constantly neutral life.”13 Hence, since the critical level is positive, the 
contributive value of lives with positive welfare below the critical level 
is negative.
Consequently, assuming that the critical level is higher than very low 
positive welfare, the Repugnant Conclusion is avoided and Quality is 
satisfied since the value of a huge population with positive but very low 
welfare will be negative.
CLU violates a number of other intuitively attractive conditions, 
however. Here we will limit the discussion to a few that will be espe-
cially relevant when we proceed to the discussion of the incommen-
surability version of CLU. First, CLU violates the following attractive 
condition:
Non-Sadism: An addition of any number of people with positive wel-
fare is at least as good as an addition of any number of people with 
negative welfare, other things being equal.
It is easy to see that CLU violates Non-Sadism and that its violation of 








Population size A = 1
Population size B = n + 1 
Population size C = m + 1 
Figure 6.2 CLU and Non-Sadism.
Population A in Figure 6.2 consists of one person with welfare well 
above the critical level. In outcome B, we have added n people with posi-
tive welfare x. Their welfare is a units below the critical level k, as indicated 
in the diagram. The negative value of this addition is thus n(x − k) = −na, 
which is represented by the gray area in outcome B. In C, m people with 
negative welfare y have been added, m < n. Their welfare is b units below 
the critical level, b > a, as indicated in the diagram. The negative value of 
this addition is m(−y − k) = −mb, which is represented by the gray area 
in outcome C. For any values of a and b, we can find values of n and m 
such that mb < na, as in our previous case (the gray area in outcome C 
is smaller than the gray area in outcome B). In such cases, it is better to 
add the people with negative welfare rather than the people with positive 
welfare, a clear violation of Non-Sadism.
CLU implies especially troublesome violations of Non-Sadism, such as
The Very Sadistic Conclusion: For any population with negative wel-
fare, there is a population with positive welfare that is worse, other 
things being equal.
There is always a population with sufficiently many people with positive 
welfare slightly below the critical level such that the total negative value 
of these people is greater than that of a given population made up of 
people with negative welfare. This holds irrespective of how much people 
suffer and of how many they are. Thus, CLU implies the Very Sadistic 
Conclusion and violates
Weak Non-Sadism: There is a negative welfare level and a number of 
lives at this level such that an addition of any number of people with 
positive welfare is at least as good as an addition of the lives with 
negative welfare, other things being equal.
Finally, to avoid the worst versions of the Repugnant Conclusion where 
the Z-lives are just barely worth living, the critical level has to be set fairly 
high. If the critical level is set at the level of a fairly good life, however, 
we get the Very Sadistic Conclusion that a population with horribly tor-
mented lives may be better than a population with fairly good lives. In 
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this sense, CLU is caught between the sadistic Scylla and the repugnant 
Charybdis.14
4  Incomplete CLU
Blackorby et al. acknowledge the aforementioned and related problems, 
and they have suggested an interesting solution involving incommensu-
rability.15 Here’s the idea. Instead of using one critical level, they propose 
an interval of critical levels when comparing populations of different size. 
The interval of critical levels is assumed to be between zero and a posi-
tive welfare level α. The idea is that a population A is better than another 
population B if and only if A is better than B for all critical levels in the 
interval. If A is better than B for only some critical levels in the interval, 
and B is better than A for some other critical levels, then A and B are 
incommensurable; that is, A is neither at least as good as B nor worse 
than B. They call this principle Incomplete Critical-Level Utilitarianism 
(Incomplete CLU for short).16 We shall formulate this principle as follows:
Incomplete CLU: Population A is at least as good as B if and only if 
CLU(A) ≥ CLU(B) for all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ α, where α is the upper bound 
of the critical interval.
Given the standard properties of “at least as good as” it follows from the 
above that if A is better than B for only some critical levels, and B is better 
than A for some other critical levels, then A and B are incommensurable 
(since then it is neither true that A is at least as good as B, nor that B is 
at least as good as A).17 As Blackorby et al. point out, Incomplete CLU 
avoids the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion.18
It does this in a questionable manner, however, since it does this by ren-
dering all the populations involved incommensurable. For example, let’s 
say that A is a large population with very high welfare and total welfare x 
and that B, C, D, and so forth, are populations with very low welfare and 
with total welfare greater than x. Assume that very low welfare is below 
the maximal critical level α. If k = 0, then CLU is equivalent to Total 
Utilitarianism and, consequently, CLU(A) < CLU(B), CLU(A) < CLU(C), 
and so forth. If k = α, on the other hand, then the value of populations B, 
C, D, and so forth are going to be negative whereas the value of A is going 
to be positive. Thus, Incomplete CLU renders all populations B, C, D, and 
so forth, with very low welfare and with total welfare greater than x as 
incommensurable with A.
There are at least two problems with this result. First, it is a rather 
extreme result. Along the lines of the discussion of the Repugnant 
Conclusion and the Quality Condition, even if (and that is a big “if”) 
it can be reasonably believed that some populations with very high wel-
fare are incommensurable with some populations with very low positive 
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welfare, it is counterintuitive that all of the high welfare populations are 
incommensurable with all larger populations with very low positive wel-
fare but higher total welfare, given that other things are equal.
Consider for example a low welfare B-population with total welfare 
just slightly higher than A. If one rejects the Repugnant Conclusion, then 
one will of course consider A better than B since one would also think 
so if the total welfare was much higher in B than in A. If one accepts the 
Repugnant Conclusion, one might be a bit unsure about this case (if one 
isn’t a hard-nosed Total Utilitarian who of course will rank B as better 
than A), perhaps even think that there is some kind of incommensurabil-
ity here, but somewhere along a spectrum of low welfare populations 
with successively higher total welfare, one will judge the low welfare pop-
ulation as better than A. Hence, there seems to be no intuitive space for 
a wholesale classification of all the involved populations as incommensu-
rable. It is a kind of “greedy” incommensurability (more on this below).
The second problem concerns the source of the incommensurability. As 
we pointed out previously, for an appeal to incommensurability to have 
any credibility as an argument against the adequacy conditions involved 
in the impossibility theorems, and in particular for welfarists such as 
Blackorby et al., one must produce a good welfarist reason for incom-
mensurability. There are, I think, three plausible sources of incommensu-
rability among populations that are relevant in respect to the adequacy 
conditions involved in the impossibility theorems in population ethics.
The first apparent source of incommensurability from a welfarist perspec-
tive has to do with comparisons of different people’s welfare: one can reject 
interpersonal comparability of welfare. This move certainly yields exten-
sive incommensurability among populations, but it would be, I surmise, 
too extensive to be plausible, and rejecting interpersonal comparability of 
welfare leads to Arrowian impossibility theorems.19 At any rate, Blackorby 
et al. are obviously not denying interpersonal comparisons of welfare since 
their theories presuppose the meaningfulness of such comparisons.
The second welfarist source of incommensurability can be found in 
the orderings of lives. It seems possible that there are pairs of lives such 
that we cannot say whether one is better than the other, nor can we 
say whether they are equally good. In real life, such cases are of course 
numerous because of epistemological problems. But it also seems possible 
that there are lives whose welfare is incommensurable in principle. An 
example might be a life that has somewhat more joy and true friendships 
but somewhat less important achievements than another. This kind of 
incommensurability would carry over to population axiology. Let’s say 
that we have two populations of the same size consisting of lives whose 
welfare is incommensurable; that is, we cannot determine whether the 
lives in one of the populations have at least as high welfare as the lives 
in the other populations, and vice versa. Other things being equal, these 
populations are incommensurable.
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If there are lives whose welfare is incommensurable, then the relation 
“has at least as high welfare” is not complete over the set of all pos-
sible lives and we will only have a quasi-ordering of possible lives. The 
adequacy conditions discussed here only presuppose a quasi-ordering of 
lives, however. Blackorby et al., on the other hand, presuppose complete-
ness, since they assume that welfare can be measured on a ratio-scale 
and measurement on this scale, in turn, presupposes the completeness of 
the relation “has at least as high welfare as” over the set of lives whose 
welfare is measured. In other words, incompleteness in the ordering of 
lives in regard to welfare is not available for Blackorby et al. as a source 
of incommensurability among populations.
More importantly, incompleteness in the ordering of lives would hardly 
yield the kind of incommensurability among populations that Incomplete 
CLU implies. It would be bizarre to claim that lives with very high wel-
fare are incomparable in regard to welfare with lives enjoying very low 
positive welfare, or, for that matter, that hellish lives are incomparable 
with flourishing lives. Hence, the plausible incommensurability among 
lives that may exist cannot support the kind of incommensurability to 
which Blackorby et al. resort and can hardly be wielded as an argument 
against the adequacy conditions in population ethics that we have dis-
cussed here.
The third somewhat plausible source of incommensurability from a 
welfarist point of view is the following: we might find it impossible to 
weigh a greater number of small gains in welfare against a smaller num-
ber of great losses. And one might think that the Repugnant Conclusion 
involves such a weighing since we are weighing lives with very high posi-
tive welfare against lives with very low positive welfare and that a move 
from A to B would involve a great loss for the A-people and just a slight 
gain for the B-people.
There are several problems with this reasoning, however. Let me bring 
up some of the more important ones. First, talk about “gains” and “losses” 
might be quite misleading in the present context – it sounds like we are 
“taking” welfare from some well-off people and “giving” it to some 
worse-off people whom we are considering “moving” from an existing 
population to another population. This need not be the case, however. 
For example, the compared populations might be two future populations 
consisting of different people. So no one is gaining or losing, at least as 
long as we don’t think one can gain from being created and lose from not 
being created. Especially the latter claim is a tall order to defend.20
Second, and more interestingly, this won’t generate the kind of incom-
mensurability generated by Incomplete CLU and points to a general 
problem for an appeal to incommensurability in population ethics. With 
this source, it would be counterintuitive if the zone of incommensurabil-
ity wasn’t limited but “greedy.”21 Even if we could get incommensurabil-
ity when we weigh a greater number of small gains in welfare against a 
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smaller number of great losses, it seems likely that we should get out of 
the zone of incommensurability at some point if we increase the number 
of people that gain. Applied to the Repugnant Conclusion, we would then 
get incommensurability in some zone of the sequence of populations with 
very low positive welfare but increasing total welfare. At some point, 
however, when the number of people gaining is so much greater than 
the number of people losing, one might not find it a hard call anymore 
to judge that the gains outweigh the losses. So this source will generate 
a limited incommensurability among populations and not the wholesale 
incommensurability implied by Incomplete CLU.
We should also consider the incommensurability implied by Incomplete 
CLU in cases involving lives with negative welfare. Here it yields even more 
counterintuitive results, I’m afraid. Consider the Very Sadistic Conclusion. 
For any number n of hellish lives, there is a number m > n of lives with 
positive welfare just below the highest critical level, such that a popula-
tion consisting of the hellish lives is incommensurable with the population 
consisting of the lives with positive welfare. Thus, Incomplete CLU avoids 
the Very Sadistic Conclusion but, again, in a disputable manner since the 
population with hellish lives is not incommensurable with the population 
consisting of the lives with positive welfare but clearly worse.
Lastly, although Incomplete CLU can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion 
and the Very Sadistic Conclusion, it cannot avoid violating Quality and 
Weak Non-Sadism. According to the former condition, there is at least 
one perfectly equal population with very high welfare that is at least as 
good as all populations with very low welfare, other things being equal. 
Incomplete CLU implies that for any population with very high welfare, 
there is a population with very low positive welfare that is incommensu-
rable with or better than the former.
Weak Non-Sadism yields that there is a negative welfare level and a 
number of lives at this level such that an addition of lives with positive 
welfare is at least as good as an addition of the lives with negative wel-
fare, other things being equal. According to Incomplete CLU, for any 
addition of lives with negative welfare, irrespective of how much people 
suffer and of how many they are, there is an addition of lives with posi-
tive welfare that renders the compared populations incommensurable.
5  Vague CLU
Broome suggests a structurally similar solution to Blackorby et al.’s, but 
instead of incommensurability, he introduces vagueness in the ordering of 
populations. The idea is that the critical level is vague.22 Broome adopts 
a supervaluationist account of vagueness. According to this account, we 
can say that a population A is better than B if and only if it is better under 
every sharpening (or interpretation) of the critical level; otherwise, it is 
indeterminate whether it is better.
Incommensurability and Vagueness in Population 135
We can, with Broome, assume that the sharpenings of the critical level 
lie in an interval between zero and a positive welfare level α.23 Hence, 
we can say that population A is better than B if and only if CLU(A) > 
CLU(B) for all sharpenings k, 0 ≤ k ≤ α; otherwise, it is indeterminate 
whether A is better than B. The structural similarity with Blackorby et 
al.’s proposal should now be evident. Let’s call this theory Vague Critical-
Level Utilitarianism or Vague CLU for short.
Does it help substituting vagueness for incommensurability? Well, 
the implications will be similar to those of Incomplete CLU pointed out 
earlier, although instead of the populations being rendered incommen-
surable, it is indeterminate whether they are better or not. For example, 
according to Vague CLU, for any addition of lives with negative welfare, 
irrespective of how much people suffer and of how many they are, there 
is an addition of lives with positive welfare such that it is indeterminate 
whether is better to add the lives with positive welfare rather than the 
hellish lives. Of course, that is exactly what we think we can say with con-
fidence, and the reason why Weak Non-Sadism is so compelling. What we 
believe is that the addition of lives with positive welfare is determinately 
better than the addition of the lives with very negative welfare. All the 
other troublesome implications of Incomplete CLU discussed previously 
can be reproduced for Vague CLU, including the greediness problem. An 
appeal to vagueness doesn’t help here.24
Notes
 1 The informal Mere Addition Paradox in Parfit (1984: 419ff) is the locus clas-
sicus. For an informal proof of a similar result with stronger assumptions, see 
Ng (1989: 240). A formal proof with slightly stronger assumptions than Ng’s 
can be found in Blackorby and Donaldson (1991). For theorems with much 
weaker assumptions, see my (1999), (2000a), and especially (2000b), (2001), 
(2011), (forthcoming).
 2 See Arrhenius (2000b), (forthcoming).
 3 For some other suggestions (most of them presented just as a solutions to a 
specific simple impossibility result) and criticism of these, see e.g., Arrhenius 
(2016), (2021); Hájek and Rabinowicz (2021); Handfield and Rabinowicz 
(2018); Parfit (2014), (2016); Qizilbash (2000), (2021); Rabinowicz (2021).
 4 Here’s how Parfit (1984: 388) formulates the conclusion: “For any possible 
population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, 
there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if 
other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives 
that are barely worth living.” Hence, our formulation is more general than 
his. The ceteris paribus clause in the formulation is meant to imply that the 
compared populations are roughly equal in all other putatively axiologically 
relevant aspects apart from individual welfare levels.
 5 More exactly, a population is a finite set of lives in a possible world. A, B, C,… 
A1, A2,…, An, A∪B, and so on, denote populations of finite size. We shall adopt 
the convention that populations represented by different letters, or the same 
letter but different indexes, are pairwise disjoint. For example, A∩B = A1∩A2 
= ∅. We shall assume that for any natural number n and any welfare level X, 
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there is a possible population of n people with welfare X (for a discussion of 
this No-Limit Assumption, see Arrhenius (2000b: ch. 3), (forthcoming)).
 6 We shall say that a life has neutral welfare if and only if it is equally as good 
for the person living it as a neutral welfare component and that a life has 
positive (negative) welfare if and only if it has higher (lower) welfare than a 
life with neutral welfare. A welfare component is neutral relative to a certain 
life x if and only if x with this component has the same welfare as x without 
this component. There are a number of alternative definitions of a neutral life 
in the literature, many of which would also work fine in the present context. 
For a discussion, see Arrhenius (2000b), (forthcoming: chs. 2 and 9), Broome 
(1999), (2004), Bykvist (2007: 101), and Parfit (1984: 357–358 and appendix 
G). Notice also that we actually don’t need an analysis of a neutral welfare in 
the present context but rather just a criterion, and the criterion can vary with 
different theories of welfare.
 7 See Parfit (1984: 388) and Parfit (1986: 148). For a discussion of different 
interpretations of the Repugnant Conclusion see Arrhenius (2000b), (forth-
coming) and Parfit (1984), (2014), (2016).
 8 Throughout this chapter “better” means “better, all things considered,” if not 
otherwise indicated.
 9 We could extend this definition for the purpose of this chapter to include Ruth 
Chang’s (2002), (2005) (2021) proposal that there is a forth value-relation: 
“on a par” – that is, define incommensurability as “neither at least as good 
as, nor on a par, nor worse than.” Likewise for Parfit’s (2014), (2016) idea of 
imprecise equality. For a discussion of the latter, see Arrhenius (2016), (2021).
 10 Quality doesn’t imply avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion, and vice 
versa, but given full comparability among populations and satisfaction of a 
weak dominance condition, avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion implies 
satisfaction of Quality. For a proof, see Arrhenius (2000b), (forthcoming: 
appendix B).
 11 See Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1995), (1997), (2005) and Blackorby 
and Donaldson (1984). These authors also propose a more refined version 
of CLU where the contributive value of people’s welfare is dampened by a 
strictly concave function. This modification has no relevance for the argu-
ments made here. For a precursor to Blackorby et al.’s theory, see Kavka 
(1982).
 12 Broome (2004). Broome develops his theory from some foundational ideas 
in axiology, drawing on some of the results from his earlier book Weighing 
Goods (1991), and carefully working toward a comprehensive population 
axiology. Unfortunately, space limitations prevent me from doing full justice 
to Broome’s rich book, and I shall here focus on the implications of the popu-
lation axiology that he formulates in the final chapters.
 13 Broome (2004: 259). See also the discussion of Broome’s definition of a life 
with neutral welfare in Arrhenius (forthcoming: section 2.2.3). Blackorby 
et al.’s zero represents the welfare of a life with neutral welfare where neutral 
welfare is the limit that the welfare of all kinds of lives approaches as they 
get shorter and approach zero length (2005: 25). Cf. Arrhenius (forthcoming: 
section 2.2.3, fn. 27).
 14 Broome (2004: 213–214) acknowledges this dilemma: “To ease the discom-
fort of the … repugnant conclusion, I suggested that the neutral level might 
be a reasonably good level of life. If this is so, the … [Sadistic Conclusion] is 
more poignant. A life just below the neutral level will also be reasonably good. 
It may contain no suffering, so the [distribution with such lives] … may con-
tain no suffering. Yet according to the [Sadistic Conclusion], this distribution 
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is supposed to be worse than a distribution that contains a very great deal of 
suffering. – The implausibility arises principally from the interaction between 
the positive [repugnant conclusion] and [the Sadistic Conclusion]. To make 
ourselves comfortable with the positive one, we need a high neutral level, but 
this makes us uncomfortable with the [Sadistic Conclusion]... – The best we 
can hope for is a compromise that reduces the strain on our intuitions to a 
tolerable level. I see no guarantee that this is possible.”
 15 See Blackorby et al. (1997: 216–219), (2005: ch. 7).
 16 See Blackorby et al. (1997: 216–219, 226). That the critical levels consist of 
all numbers between zero and a positive welfare level is not part of Blackorby 
et al.’s definition of Incomplete CLU, but they assume this in their discussion 
of it. See also Blackorby et al. (2005: 219–221, 248–252).
 17 It also follows that if A is at least as good as B but B isn’t at least as good as 
A, then A is better than B; and if they are both at least as good as the other 
one, then they are equally good.
 18 See Blackorby et al. (1997: 218–219, 226) and Blackorby et al. (2005: 221).
 19 For a discussion, see Arrhenius (2000b), (2000a), (forthcoming).
 20 For a discussion of whether it can be better for a person to exist than not to 
exist, see, e.g., Arrhenius (2015); Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2010), (2015).
 21 Broome (2004: ch. 12) uses the term “greedy” to describe incomparability 
that spreads way beyond its intuitive limitations. See also Arrhenius (forth-
coming); Handfield and Rabinowicz (2018); Herlitz (2020).
 22 Broome (2004: 180). Cf. Broome (2021).
 23 Broome (2004: 180, 259).
 24 I would like to thank Anders Herlitz and Henrik Andersson for helpful dis-
cussions. Financial support from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant M17-
0372:1) is gratefully acknowledged.
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Many have argued that some practical reasons admit of what could 
generally be called nondeterminacy: practical reasons sometimes fail to 
fully determine that for two comparable options, one is determinately at 
least as good as the other.1 The by now most common explanations of 
such nondeterminacy are that it is either due to vagueness (e.g., Broome 
1997, 2004, 2021; Elson 2017) or because some non-conventional 
comparative relation such as parity obtains between two alternatives 
(e.g., Chang 2002; Rabinowicz 2008). Although the question of how 
to explain nondeterminacy has received significant attention, little has 
been done to identify which practical reasons admit of nondeterminacy 
and how they do this, i.e., which practical reasons can entail that an 
agent who attempts to follow and act on these reasons will face non-
determinacy problems and how these reasons entail this. This chapter 
hypothesizes that clues as to which practical reasons admit of nondeter-
minacy and how they do this can be found by studying the challenges 
that nondeterminacy poses for choice theory and theories of how to act 
rationally when practical reasons fail to fully determine what one ought 
to do. It argues that when otherwise acceptable decision strategies vio-
late basic requirements of rationality because of nondeterminacy, rea-
sons cannot admit of it, and outlines three possible explanations of how 
to account for this.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents, in 
detail, nondeterminacy and a standard revision of conventional deci-
sion criteria in light of nondeterminacy. The second, third, and fourth 
sections introduce some challenges that nondeterminacy poses for 
choice theory: dynamic choice problems, underdetermination, cyclical 
evaluations, and violations of basic contraction consistency. The fifth 
section discusses some constraints that can be used with decision strate-
gies so that these problems are avoided. In the sixth section, four views 
of how to understand such constraints are discussed. There is a brief 
concluding section.




1  Nondeterminacy and Determinate Maximality
There are good reasons to expect that practical reasons sometimes fail to 
fully determine what one ought to do. Here are three arguments to that 
effect. First, sometimes alternatives are so different from each other that 
it seems implausible to expect practical reasons to guide action. Are the 
reasons to cater to the needs of a sick relative stronger than the reasons to 
defend one’s country against foreign occupiers? Are the reasons to finish 
that last work assignment on time stronger than the reasons to help one’s 
child with their homework? Are the reasons to order the healthy salad 
for lunch stronger than the reasons to order the tacos that one knows will 
bring much more pleasure?
Second, consider the small improvement argument (see de Sousa 
1974; Raz 1986; Sinnott-Armstrong 1988; Chang 2002). Consider a 
situation in which someone, Cleo, must choose between a career in the 
diplomatic corps and a career as a civil rights lawyer. Cleo recognizes 
many good reasons to join the diplomatic corps: it would give her a 
chance to promote human rights globally, serve her country, meet many 
interesting people, and see the world. She also recognizes many good 
reasons to become a civil rights lawyer: it would give her a chance to 
promote the rights of minorities in her community, serve her community, 
keep living in her hometown where she has her friends and family, and 
have her own family and raise children in the same loving environment 
that she grew up in. To Cleo, the reasons that apply to the choice do not 
determine that either option is better than the other. Would anything 
change if one of the options was improved? Would one option be clearly 
better than the other if it was slightly improved? Would Cleo have more 
reason to join the diplomatic corps than to become a civil rights lawyer 
if she learned that the diplomatic salary was slightly higher than she 
previously thought? Cleo values money and thinks that a higher salary 
speaks in favor of a certain career option, but would a relatively small 
amount of money change how the options relate to each other? To many, 
this seems implausible. Small improvements of one option do not tip the 
scale when one compares two very dissimilar options, neither of which is 
superior to the other. Yet, if a small improvement does not tip the scale, 
the initial two options cannot have been equally good. The two options 
must be related to each other in some other way. We can expect to find 
this phenomenon, what Joseph Raz (1986) once called the “mark of 
incommensurability,” in many areas.
Third, consider a more theoretically motivated argument. It is widely 
recognized in population ethics that it is impossible to reconcile widely 
held intuitions regarding which of two populations is better; for example: 
“regardless of its size, a population in which everyone leads lives barely 
worth living is worse than a population of one billion people leading 
blissful lives,” and “compared to a population in which everyone leads 
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lives at positive welfare level W, a population that is twice as big in which 
everyone leads lives that are almost as good, at positive welfare level W–, 
is better” (see, e.g., Parfit 1984; Arrhenius 2000, forthcoming). Similarly, 
when one compares large benefits to few people with small benefits to 
many people, it is strikingly difficult not to end up with deeply coun-
terintuitive conclusions, for example, that it is better to cure billions of 
mild headaches than to save a life (Temkin 1996, 2012; Norcross 1997; 
Rachels 1998). One promising way to solve these problems is by accept-
ing the fact that reasons sometimes fail to fully determine that any option 
is best (Qizilbash 2007; Parfit 2016; Herlitz 2019a; Rabinowicz 2019).
Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is not to establish that situations 
in which practical reasons fail to fully determine what one ought to do 
are possible, relevant, or common. Furthermore, I will not engage with 
the matter of what the best explanation for this is, whether it is some-
times indeterminate which option one has most reason to favor due to 
vagueness (e.g., Broome 1997), whether some alternatives are some-
times incomparable (Raz 1986), whether some alternatives are some-
times “on a par” (e.g., Chang 2002), whether options are sometimes 
imprecisely equally as good (Parfit 2016), or whether there might be 
some other non-conventional comparative relation (Rabinowicz 2008). 
Rather, I wish to explore the following question: if these situations are 
relevant, how are they relevant, and under what conditions can we 
expect them to arise?
While the aforementioned explanations differ in some respects, 
they have one thing in common that is captured by the concept of 
nondeterminacy:
Nondeterminacy: x and y are nondeterminate in their ranking with 
respect to p (i.e., that with respect to which the ranking is made) if it 
is not determinately true that x is more p than y, not determinately 
true that x is less p than y, and not determinately true that x and y 
are equally as p.
Nondeterminacy is irreflexive (i.e., no item is nondeterminate in its rank-
ing with itself), symmetric (i.e., if x is nondeterminate in its ranking with 
y, then y is nondeterminate in its ranking with x), and non-transitive 
(i.e., it is not the case that if x and y are nondeterminate in their ranking 
and y and z are nondeterminate in their ranking, then x and z are neces-
sarily nondeterminate in their ranking; see Carlson 2010). Proponents 
of the vagueness explanation, incomparability, parity, imprecise equality, 
and other non-conventional comparative relations can all agree that it is 
sometimes the case that some options are nondeterminate in their rank-
ing (although they of course disagree as to why).
Nondeterminacy can actualize serious challenges to rational choice. 
However, it is not true, as one might initially believe, that nondeterminacy 
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undermines the very possibility of rational choice assessments in the 
sense that practical reasons that admit of nondeterminacy fail to give 
any action guidance. To see this, consider the possibility that practical 
reasons provide us with the following ranking of x, y, and x+ (let “≈” 
denote “nondeterminate in their ranking” and “<” denote “determinately 
worse than”):
 x y x y x x    ; ;
It is obvious that this ranking, which incorporates nondeterminacy 
between x and y and between x+ and y, does not undermine the possibil-
ity of rational choice assessments, as x is not a rational choice and should 
not be chosen.
It is also easy enough to revise conventional decision criteria so that 
they can say precisely the foregoing. According to Amartya Sen, propo-
nents of incomparability, parity, and other non-conventional comparative 
relations can say that only maximal options are rational, i.e., only options 
that are not worse than any alternative are rational (see, e.g., Sen 1970, 
1997, 2017). x is worse than x+, and thus not maximal. Proponents of 
the vagueness explanation of nondeterminacy can say that only options 
that are optimal (i.e., at least as good as every alternative) on some 
admissible precisification are rational choices (Fine 1975; Broome 2009). 
If p is vague and therefore fails to fully determine a conventional rank-
ing of x, y, and x+, one can precisify (or specify) p in different ways so 
that a conventional ranking results. For instance, one might precisify p 
so that it can be determined that x is less p than y and y less p than x+. 
However, if p, which is vague, manages to fully determine that x is less 
p than x+, it is not admissible to precisify p so that x is at least as p as 
x+. That is an inadmissible precisification. There is no admissible precisi-
fication on which x is optimal with respect to p. Proponents of Wlodek 
Rabinowicz’s version of the fitting-attitudes framework for value, which 
explains value relations in terms of permissible preference orderings, can 
say that options that are dispreferred to some alternative on all permis-
sible preference orderings are irrational (Rabinowicz 2008). Within this 
fitting-attitudes framework for value, it is permissible to prefer y to x and 
to prefer x+ to y, but if it can be determined that x is worse than x+, then 
x is dispreferred to x+ on all permissible preference orderings.
To stick to the concept of nondeterminacy, I will use a more general cri-
terion that reflects the standard ways of revising rational choice criteria 
within the different explanatory frameworks:
Determinate maximality (DM): An option, x, is determinately maxi-
mal with respect to p if and only if (a) x is not worse than any alterna-
tive with respect to p, and (b) it is not the case that on all admissible 
precisifications of p, there is an alternative that is better than x.2
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Regardless of one’s view of how to explain nondeterminacy (e.g., vague-
ness, incomparability, parity, imprecise equality, or other non-conven-
tional comparative relations), DM can be used to make rational choice 
assessments of options in choice sets in which some alternatives are non-
determinate in their ranking.
2  More on Determinate Maximality
One might now think that nondeterminacy problems do not pose a chal-
lenge to practical reasoning at all or that the challenge is a minor one (see, 
e.g., Hsieh 2007). Indeed, conventional rational choice theory cannot be 
used to guide action in choice situations characterized by nondetermi-
nacy because there is no optimal alternative, but in all choice situations 
characterized by nondeterminacy, there is some determinately maximal 
alternative. So, why not just revise the decision criterion conventionally 
used in rational choice theory and hold that it is rational to choose any 
determinately maximal alternative? This section presents three arguments 
that challenge the plausibility of this view: it can lead to the formation 
of sequences of choices that are suboptimal; it neglects the fact that there 
might be resolutional remainder; it fails to recognize that the justificatory 
power grounded in comparative relations differs between situations in 
which some alternative is optimal and in which some alternative is deter-
minately maximal but not optimal.
First, accepting nondeterminacy and revising one’s decision criteria so 
that an option that is determinately maximal is rational leads to dynamic 
choice problems (see, e.g., McClennen 1990; Andreou 2016; Gustafsson 
2016). If one adopts the view that all determinately maximal options are 
rational, one accepts a view that it can be permissible to form sequences 
of choices that are not determinately maximal (and even suboptimal), 
and a decision-maker who follows the strategy is exposed to a weak kind 
of money pump.
Consider an illustration. There are again three options: x, x+, and y: x 
is nondeterminate in its ranking with y; x+ is an improved version of x, 
so x is worse than x+, but x+ is also nondeterminate in its ranking with 
y. In other words, we again have
 x y x y x x    ; ;
Now, it is obvious that in a choice situation in which an agent chooses 
between x, x+, and y, x+ and y are the only determinately maximal alter-
natives. According to the view that it is rational to choose any determi-
nately maximal alternative, one of them ought to be chosen. This seems 
sound.
However, the approach seems less sound when one considers choice 
sequences. Consider the possibility that an agent will make two 
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sequential choices, first (at t1) a choice between x+ and y, and then (at t2) 
a choice between sticking to the first choice or switching to x:
According to the view that it is rational to choose any option that is deter-
minately maximal, it is rational to choose y at t1 and x at t2. However, this 
means that the agent ends up with a choice that is not determinately max-
imal (x is worse than x+, which could be chosen if the agent had chosen 
x+ at both t1 and t2), which, according to the approach that was followed, 
is an irrational choice. Holding all determinately maximal alternatives 
to be rational choices thus seems to lead to (or, more precisely, permit) 
irrational choices in some situations.
This phenomenon also reveals that agents who use DM as the only 
criterion when making choices between options that are nondeterminate 
in their ranking are exposed to a weak kind of money pump (Gustafsson 
2016). To see this, imagine that the aforementioned sequence consisted 
of three sequential choices, that the agent at t3 had the opportunity to 
either stick to their choice at t2 or (if that was not their choice at this 
point) choose x+. An agent who chooses y followed by x would not only 
be rationally obliged to switch to x+ at t3 but also rationally obliged 
to pay some money (amounting to the difference between x and x+) to 
change their choice. If the choice sequence could be iterated, the agent 
would be rationally permitted to financially ruin themselves for no rea-
son or gain whatsoever.
Adopting the view that one can make rational choices when facing 
options that are nondeterminate in their ranking by choosing any deter-
minately maximal alternative means that one accepts that it can be ratio-
nal to form a choice sequence that leads to an irrational choice. This is 
not the place to explore how often this will be a problem or the condi-
tions under which it poses a problem. But it is obvious that it is a possibil-
ity, and this possibility alone gives us reason to question whether DM is a 
necessary and sufficient criterion for rational choice when some options 
are nondeterminate in their ranking. In the literature on dynamic incon-
sistency and money pumps, it has been suggested that these problems can 
be avoided by adopting either the view that rational agents are resolute 
and do not change their minds (McClennen 1990) or the view that ratio-
nal agents are sophisticated choosers who use backward induction to 
foresee problems when they make sequential choices (Rabinowicz 1995). 
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In what follows, I will suggest that dynamic choice problems should 
instead be solved by the introduction of some new decision criteria.
Second, it has been argued that contrary to situations in which two 
alternatives are optimal, when two alternatives are determinately maxi-
mal but not optimal, there is resolutional remainder:
[In choice situations characterized by nondeterminacy], there is reso-
lutional remainder; given a list of admissible ways in which the per-
plexity might be resolved, there is still a further question as to how 
the perplexity is to be resolved, for that resolution is not simply given 
by arbitrarily opting for one admissible resolution over another.
(Chang 2002: 684–685)3
In some choices between options that are nondeterminate in their rank-
ing, it seems as though something is unresolved if one merely picks an 
option that is determinately maximal. To take this intuition seriously, 
this something ought to be addressed by practical reasoning in some way.
Third, there is a difference between what might be called the justificatory 
power of an option being optimal and an option being determinately maxi-
mal but not optimal. When two options are (determinately) equally good, 
this provides a sufficient justification for an agent to choose either one of 
them. When neither of two options is (determinately) at least as good as the 
other, this might provide some justification for an agent to choose either one 
of them, but this justification seems weaker. In other words, it is not obvious 
that the justification of a choice that is grounded in how alternatives relate to 
each other is sufficiently strong to meet the requirements of rationality when 
an option is merely determinately maximal but not optimal, as opposed to 
when an option is optimal (i.e., at least as good as all alternatives).
3  Introducing New Criteria
A different way of responding to nondeterminacy problems is to say that 
when two options are nondeterminate in their ranking with respect to 
some decision criterion or reason, some other criterion or reason should 
be used to rank them so that one can establish a conventional ranking 
of all pairs of options. This approach clearly deals with potential resolu-
tional remainder and, insofar as it can determine an option that is at least 
as good as all alternatives, it leads to a strong justification.
For instance, someone may propose the idea that when some set P of 
practical reasons that apply to the choice admits of nondeterminacy, one 
ought to make pairwise comparisons of the options that are nondetermi-
nate in their ranking by ranking them with respect to some other reason, 
Q, that does not admit of nondeterminacy. In other words:
Imposing conventional pairwise rankings: x is worse than y if and 
only if x is worse than y with respect to the set of primary practical 
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reasons P, or x and y are nondeterminate in their ranking with respect 
to P and x is worse than y with respect to secondary reason Q.
At a general level, and insofar as one does not qualify what Q might be 
and how it might relate to P, this view is problematic. To see this, con-
sider the following possibility. Assume, again, that with respect to P, x, 
x+, and y relate to each other in the following way:
 x y x y x x    ; ;
If one does not qualify Q in any way, it is perfectly possible that with 
respect to Q, x, x+, and y relate to each other in the following way:
 x y y x x x    ; ;
Imposing conventional pairwise rankings then can generate the following 
cyclical ranking of the options:
 x y y x x x    ; ;
Thus, x+ is worse than y because x+ and y are nondeterminate in their 
ranking with respect to P, and x+ is worse than y with respect to Q; y is 
worse than x because y and x are nondeterminate in their ranking with 
respect to P, and y is worse than x with respect to Q, and x is worse 
than x+ because x is worse than x+ with respect to P. According to this 
approach it is then irrelevant how x and x+ relate to each other with 
respect to Q.
This is not just a theoretical possibility. To see this, consider an illustra-
tion. Imagine that x, x+, and y are different wines and that P reflects the 
set of reasons that underlie how much one will enjoy them. Let Q reflect 
the reason to favor more environmentally friendly wines, something an 
agent could plausibly use as a criterion to establish pairwise rankings of 
alternative wines that are nondeterminate in their ranking with respect to 
how much she will enjoy them. There is no obvious and necessary rela-
tion between how much one will enjoy a wine and how environmentally 
friendly the production of the wine is. Therefore, it is perfectly possible 
that insofar as how much one will enjoy a wine admits of nondetermi-
nacy, imposing conventional pairwise rankings of wines by looking at 
how environmentally friendly the production is can lead to cyclical evalu-
ations. Assume that x is a white wine (say a Pinot Grigio) that is nonde-
terminate in its ranking with red wine y (say a Bordeaux) with respect to 
how enjoyable it is to consume and that x+ is a slightly better white wine 
(say a Chablis) that is also nondeterminate in its ranking with red wine y. 
As it happens, the production process of x is the most environmentally 
friendly, followed by the production process of y, with the production 
process of x+ being the least environmentally friendly. An agent who 
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makes pairwise rankings of the wines by determining that a wine is worse 
than another if and only if it is less enjoyable, or if it is nondeterminate in 
its ranking with the other wine but its production process is less environ-
mentally friendly, will generate a cyclical ranking of the wines.
It is sometimes suggested that one can avoid accepting unpalatable 
rankings such as these by individuating alternatives in different ways 
depending on the comparative context (see Broome 1991; Arrhenius 2009; 
Voorhoeve 2014; Herlitz 2019b, 2020a). If one, for instance, individu-
ated y in different ways depending on whether one compares y with x 
(say y*) or with x+ (say y**), the ranking would no longer be cyclical. 
The following is not a cyclical ranking of the options:
 x y y x x x      ; ;
Although in principle a theoretically possible way to refute the argu-
ment, this solution is not appealing. As John Broome (1991) has pointed 
out, individuating alternatives in different ways is always possible, but 
because of this, one must have a good reason to change the individuation. 
In general, alternatives ought to be individuated in such a way that all 
features that are pertinent in light of what matters to the comparison are 
included in the individuation (Broome 1991; Voorhoeve 2014; Herlitz 
2019b, 2020a). If I wish to evaluate two wines in light of how enjoyable 
they are, I ought to individuate them so that their enjoyable properties 
are included. In the previous example, it is obvious that there is a way of 
individuating the alternatives so that both the features pertinent in light 
of P and the features pertinent in light of Q are included and generate 
a cyclical ranking. For instance, one can individuate the three wines in 
a way that includes both their enjoyable features and facts about how 
environmentally friendly their production processes are and end up with 
a cyclical ranking of the wines. This suffices for the argument that impos-
ing conventional pairwise rankings can lead to cyclical rankings.
What started as a nondeterminacy problem – a problem relating to the 
fact that reasons fail to determine an option that is at least as good as 
all alternatives – has now turned into a cyclical ranking of the options, 
with all options being worse than some alternative (see Herlitz 2020b).4 
Although acyclicity is not necessary for rational choice (see, e.g., Schwartz 
1986; Duggan 2013; Herlitz 2020c), cyclical orderings are generally seen 
as a bigger problem than nondeterminacy (see, e.g., Broome 2004).
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the methods that can be used 
to identify rational options when one deals with cyclical rankings generate 
plausible results in this case. Conventional ways of dealing with cycles (e.g., 
referring to Schwartz sets or uncovered options) would say that all options 
are equally rational choices in the previous example. This seems question-
able. If x, x+, and y are three wines, one is primarily interested in how much 
one will enjoy the wines, and x is determinately less enjoyable than x+, it is 
questionable whether it is rational to choose x (see Herlitz 2020b).
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4  Two-step Models
Rather than introducing a new reason in order to determine how options 
relate to each other in pairwise comparisons, one might be attracted by 
the idea of introducing a new reason in order to rank the options that 
remain after DM has been applied. After all, it seems implausible to con-
sider x a viable option at all if it is determinately true that x is worse 
than x+ with respect to what matters to the choice. Also, this approach 
clearly deals with potential resolutional remainder, and since it deter-
mines an option that is at least as good as all alternatives, it leads to as 
strong a justification as the one provided in cases in which there is no 
nondeterminacy.
In other words, one might propose the following idea:
Two-step model: Choose an option that is determinately maximal 
with respect to P. If more than one option is determinately maximal 
with respect to P, choose an option in this set that is at least as good 
as all alternatives in the set with respect to Q.
This has been a somewhat popular move among those who recognize 
nondeterminacy problems and take them seriously. Chang (2013) has 
famously argued that when what she calls “given reasons” fail to fully 
determine what one ought to do, one ought to introduce a created reason – 
grounded in the agent’s volition – and do what is best with respect to 
the created reason. Norman Daniels (2008) has argued that substantive 
principles used to rank different healthcare policies admit of nondetermi-
nacy and fail to fully determine what policymakers ought to do; in those 
situations, he argues that one ought to resort to a deliberative process 
and rank alternatives with respect to the criteria that transpire from such 
a process. Fröding and Peterson (2012) have suggested that a virtuous 
agent might face options that are nondeterminate in their ranking with 
respect to moral reasons and that the virtuous agent will compare these 
options in terms of how good they are with respect to relevant non-moral 
reasons. I myself have advocated such two-step models in the context 
of allocating scarce health-related resources, in social choice situations, 
and in the context of clinical choice situations, person-centered care, and 
shared decision-making (Herlitz 2017, 2018, forthcoming; Herlitz & 
Sadek 2021).
However, this method violates what many (see, e.g., Chernoff 1954; 
Sen 1970; Fleurbaey, Tungodden and Vallentyne 2009) take to be a basic 
requirement of rationality, i.e., the so-called basic contraction consis-
tency, sometimes called property alpha (see Herlitz 2019b):
Basic contraction consistency: If an alternative, x, is permissible in 
a choice set C, then it is also permissible in a choice set C’ that is a 
subset of C and contains x.
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It can be easily seen that basic contraction consistency is violated by the 
two-step model. Consider once again x, x+, and y, which relate to each 
other with respect to P in the following way:
 x y x y x x    ; ;
and which relate to each other with respect to Q in the following way:
 x y y x x x    ; ;
According to the two-step model, y should be chosen (and is the only 
permissible option) if the choice set is {x, x+, y}. This is because only x+ 
and y are determinately maximal with respect to P, and x+ is worse than 
y with respect to Q. Since x is worse than x+ with respect to P, it is not 
determinately maximal and is therefore discarded in the first step; it is 
irrelevant how x and x+ relate to each other with respect to Q.
However, x should be chosen (and is the only permissible option) 
according to the two-step model if the choice set is {x, y}. Both x and 
y are determinately maximal with respect to P when x+ is not in the 
choice set, and y is worse than x with respect to Q. Since x+ is not in 
the choice set, there is no option that is better than x with respect to P 
in the choice set; there are no grounds for ruling out x in the first step, 
so how good x is with respect to Q becomes highly relevant.
Obviously, {x, y} is a subset of {x, x+, y}, and whereas y is permissible in 
{x, x+, y}, it is not permissible in {x, y}, which contains y. In other words, 
basic contraction consistency is violated.
The two-step model would violate basic contraction consistency if x, x+, 
and y are the three wines; P reflects how enjoyable they are; and Q reflects 
how environmentally friendly the production processes of the wines are, as 
described in the previous section. When choosing between all three wines, 
the approach suggests that one first discards the worse white wine, x, and 
then ranks the better white wine, x+, and the red wine, y, with respect 
to how environmentally friendly their production processes are. Since the 
production process of the red wine is more environmentally friendly than 
that of the better white wine, the approach suggests that one will choose 
the red wine. When choosing only between the less enjoyable white wine 
and the red wine, all options are nondeterminate in their ranking with 
respect to how enjoyable they are, so all options are evaluated in terms 
of how environmentally friendly their production processes are. Since the 
production process of the less enjoyable white wine is more environmen-
tally friendly than that of the red wine, the approach suggests that one 
ought to choose the more environmentally friendly red wine.
5  Avoiding Violations of Rationality Requirements
The previous sections reveal that nondeterminacy in principle can cause 
agents who adopt seemingly attractive and plausible decision strategies 
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to violate what appear to be basic requirements of rationality. An agent 
who adopts the strategy “choose any determinately maximal alternative” 
might form choice sequences that lead to choices that are not determi-
nately maximal. An agent who attempts to impose conventional com-
parative relations on pairs of options that are nondeterminate in their 
ranking with respect to the reasons that apply to the situation by invok-
ing some new reason might end up generating cyclical evaluations of her 
options. An agent who discards alternatives that are not determinately 
maximal and compares the remaining options that are determinately 
maximal with respect to some new reason might violate basic contrac-
tion consistency. What can we learn from this?
First, it can be noted that both the argument that illustrated how nonde-
terminacy can spawn cyclical evaluations and the argument that illustrated 
how two-step models violate basic contraction consistency rely on an impor-
tant assumption. For these arguments to work, it must be assumed that the 
reasons that admit of nondeterminacy and the reason that is brought in to 
establish a ranking do not relate to each other in specific ways.
If one, by contrast, puts constraints on what might qualify as a valid rea-
son that plays this role, the arguments can be refuted (see Herlitz 2019b). 
As an illustration, consider again the case in which x, x+, and y are three 
wines, and there is nondeterminacy in their ranking when one ranks them 
with respect to how enjoyable, P, they are (x ≈ y and x+ ≈ y). Assume 
further that the two white wines, x and x+, are enjoyable because they are 
light and refreshing, and the red wine, y, is enjoyable because it has a rich 
taste. Enjoyable, P, admits of nondeterminacy because both wines that 
are light and refreshing and wines with a rich taste are enjoyable, but it 
is not fully determined how these features relate to each other for overall 
assessments of how enjoyable different wines are. Insofar as the reason 
one uses to establish conventional rankings or to choose between options 
in a second step, Q, is entirely unrelated to how enjoyable the wines are, 
for instance, if this reason relates to how environmentally friendly the 
production processes are, imposing conventional comparative relations 
and the two-step model run into problems (as illustrated in the previous 
sections). By contrast, if one holds that the reason used to establish a con-
ventional ranking must be a reason, Q*, that determines how being light 
and refreshing and being rich in taste relate to each other with respect to 
how the features contribute to overall assessments of how enjoyable dif-
ferent wines are, one can avoid these problems. For instance, Q* could 
be “light and refreshing wines are better than wines with a rich taste,” or 
“wines with a rich taste are better than light and refreshing wines.” Such 
a reason, Q*, will generate rankings of the less enjoyable white wine and 
the red wine as well as of the more enjoyable white wine and the red wine 
such that if it determines that the less enjoyable white wine is better than 
the red wine, then also the more enjoyable white wine will be better than 
the red wine, and if the more enjoyable white wine is worse than the red 
wine, then also the less enjoyable white wine will be worse than the red 
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wine. It follows from the constraints on Q* that if y < x with respect to 
Q*, then y < x+ with respect to Q*, and if x+ < y with respect to Q*, then 
x < y with respect to Q*. This means that there will be no cycle in the 
ranking if one imposes conventional comparative rankings with reference 
to Q* and relying on Q* in a two-step model will not lead to violations 
of basic contraction consistency.
The point can be generalized within specific explanatory frameworks 
of nondeterminacy. Consider, for instance, how one can impose con-
straints on Q with reference to the supervaluationist approach to vague-
ness within the framework that holds that nondeterminacy is due to 
vagueness. Assume that x and y are nondeterminate in their ranking with 
respect to P and that x+ and y are nondeterminate in their ranking with 
respect to P because P is vague so that it is indeterminate whether x is 
more P than, less P than, or equally as P as y and indeterminate whether 
x+ is more P than, less P than, or equally as P as y. According to the super-
valuationist approach to vagueness, a sentence that contains a vague term 
is “supertrue” if it is true on all admissible precisifications and “super-
false” if it is false on all admissible precisifications (Fine 1975; Broome 
2009; Andersson 2017). An admissible precisification is one that is in 
accordance with ordinary language and that respects so-called penum-
bral truths (Fine 1975). If one holds that Q must be such that it provides 
an admissible precisification of P, imposing conventional comparative 
rankings will not generate cyclical rankings, and the two-step model will 
not violate basic contraction consistency. This is because introducing and 
relying on a Q that would lead to cyclical rankings or violations of basic 
contraction consistency would mean that one precisifies P in a way that 
contradicts penumbral truths, which is inadmissible.
Insofar as one commits to using the same Q that provides an admis-
sible precisification of P to determine a ranking of the alternatives in all 
situations in which some alternatives are indeterminate in their ranking 
with respect to P (which is vague), one also avoids the risk of forming 
sequences of choices that lead to options that are determinately worse 
(with respect to P) than some available choice sequence that is available. 
If an agent commits to determine what to do when the options are inde-
terminate in their ranking with respect to P by ranking the options with 
respect to Q and if Q provides an admissible precisification of P, then if 
x+ < y at t1 then x < y at t2. An agent who commits to using the same Q 
that provides an admissible precisification of P to determine a ranking of 
the alternatives will, in other words, either choose x+ at t1 and x+ at t2 or 
y at t1 and y at t2, neither of which leads to a choice that is determinately 
worse with respect to P than any available alternative.
It is obvious from the aforementioned that one can avoid the problems 
outlined in the previous sections of this chapter if one accepts that non-
determinacy is due to vagueness and imposes constraints on what quali-
fies as an admissible Q in terms of admissible precisifications. Somewhat 
similarly, proponents of the fitting-attitudes approach to value can within 
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their framework impose constraints on what is an admissible Q in terms 
of permissible preference orderings. For instance:
Yields permissible preference orderings over the choice set: Q is 
admissible if and only if it yields preference orderings over a choice 
set that are permissible given the rankings established by P.
(see Rabinowicz 2008; Herlitz 2019b)
In other words, it is noteworthy that, given certain explanations of non-
determinacy, there are views of how to make rational choices when rea-
sons fail to fully determine a best alternative by introducing new reasons 
to establish conventional rankings that avoid the problems outlined in 
the previous section. These views say that one must impose constraints 
on what the new reasons that establish conventional rankings might be 
like, somewhat similar to how supervaluationist approaches to vague-
ness impose constraints on what constitutes admissible precisifications 
of vague terms.
6  Understanding How Reasons Cannot Admit of 
Violations of Rationality Requirements
Given that one can avoid choice-theoretical challenges by putting con-
straints on reasons that are introduced to create conventional rankings 
of options that are nondeterminate in their ranking, one can perhaps 
learn something about when and how nondeterminacy occurs by study-
ing how decision strategies might violate rationality requirements. It is 
possible that reasons cannot admit of nondeterminacy in such a way 
that doing what is permissible according to these reasons can mean that 
one violates basic requirements of rationality. This section explores this 
possibility.
Consider four views of the problems introduced in the previous sec-
tions. First, it is of course possible to refute the relevance of the arguments:
The accept irrationality view: Reasons can admit of nondeterminacy, 
and this means that acceptable decision strategies sometimes lead to 
violations of basic requirements of rationality. However, this is not 
a problem.
Although this is certainly a possible position, I believe most people would 
favor views that do not entail cyclical rankings or the violation of basic 
contraction consistency.
Here are three views that achieve this:
The properties of nondeterminacy view: Reasons can admit of non-
determinacy, but the phenomenon – nondeterminacy – has certain 
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properties that constrain what it means to respond appropriately to 
these reasons.
On this view, nondeterminacy has certain properties with substantive 
implications for how it is appropriate to respond to the reasons that 
admit of nondeterminacy when some options are nondeterminate in their 
ranking. The relation “x is at least as good as y” has a property that 
implies that it is appropriate to choose x. By contrast, the relation “x is 
nondeterminate in its ranking with y” might have a property that implies 
that it is appropriate to use a certain method to choose between x and y, 
and this method has formal constraints in line with the constraints dis-
cussed in the previous section.
On the properties of the nondeterminacy view, the features of nonde-
terminacy explain that one ought to respond to nondeterminacy in a way 
that avoids violating basic requirements of rationality. The nondetermi-
nacy phenomenon as such constrains rational agents that face it.
The not all reasons view: Reasons can admit of nondeterminacy, but 
the domain of valid reasons cannot be such that responding to the 
reasons means that one violates basic requirements of rationality.
On this view, the domain of valid reasons has certain properties such that if 
the valid first-order reasons admit of nondeterminacy, the only second-order 
reasons that might be used to establish conventional rankings that are valid 
are reasons that do not lead to violations of basic requirements of rational-
ity. On this view, basing one’s choice of wine – in the example used above – 
on how environmentally friendly the production process is amounts to bas-
ing one’s choice of wine on a second-order reason that is invalid.
On the not all reasons view, the domain of valid reasons is such that 
the only second-order reasons that are valid are those that do not lead to 
violations of basic requirements of rationality, which explains how one 
ought to respond to nondeterminacy in a way that avoids violations of 
basic requirements of rationality. The domain of valid reasons ensures 
that rational agents that face nondeterminacy can never act on valid rea-
sons and violate rationality requirements because the domain of valid 
reasons has an architecture that renders this impossible.
The rationality obliges view: Reasons can admit of nondeterminacy, 
but for an agent to be rational, she must adopt a decision strategy 
that does not violate basic requirements of rationality.
On this view, rationality has certain properties that constrain how one 
can rationally respond to nondeterminacy. Accordingly, choosing a wine 
in the recurrent example with reference to the environmental friendli-
ness of the production process is irrational because norms of rationality 
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require that rational agents avoid decision strategies that violate basic 
requirements of rationality. On the rationality obliges view, that this is 
what it means to be rational explains how one ought to respond to non-
determinacy in a way that avoids violating basic requirements of ratio-
nality. Rationality thus constrains agents who face nondeterminacy.
The properties of the nondeterminacy view, the not all reasons view, 
and the rationality obliges view can all explain why a rational agent who 
acts on valid reasons that admit of nondeterminacy will avoid violating 
basic requirements of rationality. As such, each of these views offers a 
solution to the choice-theoretical challenges that arise once one accepts 
the possibility of nondeterminacy. However, the views explain how ratio-
nal agents avoid these problems in different ways, and these different 
ways have very different implications for different areas of interest to 
decision theorists and philosophers. Those who accept the properties of 
the nondeterminacy view will have to accept that comparative relations 
carry far more information than is often thought and that they also can 
have wide-ranging implications for how rational agents are permitted 
to make choices. Those who accept the not all reasons view will have to 
accept that there are formal constraints on the domain of valid reasons 
that are indirectly inferred from constellations in the domain of reason in 
complex ways. Finally, those who accept the rationality obliges view will 
have to accept a view of rationality that is rich enough to have implica-
tions that impose constraints on second-order reasons.
7  Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined some choice-theoretical challenges that 
arise if one accepts the possibility of nondeterminacy, i.e., that action-
guiding reasons may fail to fully determine a best option. I demon-
strated that nondeterminacy can lead agents to form suboptimal choice 
sequences and that if they use seemingly plausible decision strategies, 
they might make cyclical rankings of their options or violate basic con-
traction consistency. I also demonstrated that there are ways to impose 
constraints on decision strategies in order to avoid these problems but 
showed that these constraints can be derived either from the phenom-
enon of nondeterminacy, from the reasons themselves, or from norms of 
rationality. Whichever way one attempts to derive the constraints, there 
will be implications for the phenomenon of nondeterminacy, for what the 
domain of reasons is like, or for norms of rationality.
Notes
 1 For helpful comments and exchanges on an earlier version, I thank 
Henrik Andersson, Chrisoula Andreou, Gustaf Arrhenius, John Broome, 
Krister Bykvist, Ruth Chang, Luke Elson, Mozaffar Qizilbash, Miriam 
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Schoenfield, Wlodek Rabinowicz and other participants at the workshop 
‘Incommensurability: Vagueness, Parity and Other Non-Conventional Value 
Relations’ at the Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm in December 2019. 
I am very grateful for additional feedback on a later draft from Henrik 
Andersson and Wlodek Rabinowicz. Research for this paper was sup-
ported by the Swedish Research Council (2017-01382) and Riksbankens 
Jubileumsfond (M17-0372:1).
 2 Within the fitting-attitudes framework for value, saying that x is not worse 
than any alternative with respect to p amounts to saying that there is no alter-
native, z, such that it is required to disprefer x to z.
 3 When Ruth Chang first introduced this idea, she tied it to parity, her favored 
explanation of nondeterminacy. However, there is no reason to tie the phe-
nomenon of resolutional remainder to a particular explanation of nondeter-
minacy (Wasserman 2004).
 4 Somewhat relatedly, insofar as nondeterminacy is possible, it is in principle 
possible that it occurs when one applies one of several decision criteria.
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1  Introduction
Without blinking an eye, we make comparisons across distinct value cat-
egories. Here are some examples.1
 (1) This table is a better table than Trump is a president.2
 (2) You are more prudent than you are moral.
 (3) I am more kind than I am beautiful.
This is puzzling since “better table,” “more prudent,” and “more kind” 
cannot be read in the usual ways here: “being better as a table,” “show-
ing a higher degree of prudence,” and “showing a higher degree of kind-
ness,” respectively. This has prompted some linguists to think that these 
constructions are anomalous in some sense, ungrammatical or nonsensi-
cal. Others have claimed they are grammatical and meaningful but only 
metaphorical or metalinguistic (e.g., it is more appropriate to say “this is 
a good table” than to say “Trump is a good president”). Some linguists, 
such as Alan Bale (2006, 2008) and Ewan Klein (1980), however, have 
offered what they think is a meaningful non-metaphorical interpreta-
tion. Except for a few brief comments, philosophers have so far been 
silent on this perplexing issue, which is especially odd since philosophers 
thrive on puzzles.3
In this chapter, I shall argue against the idea that the meaningfulness 
of cross-categorical comparisons (sometimes called “indirect” or “inter-
adjectival” comparisons) is an illusion. I shall also argue against the exis-
tent linguistic ideas about how to make these comparisons meaningful. 
My focus throughout will be on cross-categorical value comparisons. I 
shall give the rough contours of a new theory of such comparisons (with 
a hint on how to extend them to their non-evaluative counterparts) and 
show that they are normatively relevant. In particular, I shall suggest how 
they can be usefully invoked when comparing well-being across people, 
when assessing the fittingness of attitudes, and when making cross-theory 
value comparisons in the context of acting under evaluative uncertainty 
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(“What should I do when I am not certain about the values of my alter-
natives?”). If I am right, then there is a need to posit a new nonstandard 
value relation or, more exactly, a family of cross-categorical betterness 
and equality relations.
Before we start, I need to make an important clarification. I am inter-
ested in philosophical analyses of the concept of cross-categorical com-
parisons: a priori, necessarily true biconditionals in which the left-hand 
claim, if true, holds in virtue of the right-hand claim. This is not the 
typical focus in linguistic analysis, which only aims to provide the truth 
conditions of a natural language sentence. To draw on linguistic propos-
als, I will therefore read them as philosophical analyses. This also means 
that I will gloss over issues concerning the surface grammar of English, 
which often plays an important role in linguistics but less so in philo-
sophical analysis.
2  Cross-Categorical Comparisons in General
What are cross-categorical comparisons (let us call them cross-cats for 
short, which also will remind us of their cross-breed nature)?
First, we can say that they have any of the following forms, where F 
and G are different gradable adjectives and A and B are nouns:
x is F-er/more F than y is G.
x is F-er/more F for an A than y is G for a B.
x is an F-er A than y is a G B.
However, not all constructions of these forms are cross-categorical in 
the sense that I am interested in. Take, for instance, this cross-adjectival 
sentence:
 (4) This chair is taller than it is wide.
This is not cross-categorical in the relevant sense, since the tallness and 
the width of the chair can be directly compared in terms of length, in cm, 
for example.
What I am after are constructions in which F and G are distinct adjec-
tives that do not pick out directly comparable properties. Here are some 
non-evaluative examples:
 (5) Einstein is more intelligent than I am beautiful.
 (6) I am more angry than she is happy.
 (7) He is taller for a Swede than he is heavy for a Swede.
For none of the pairs (intelligent, beautiful), (angry, happy), and (tall, 
heavy) are the elements directly compared on one common dimension, 
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and the same seems to hold for the evaluative examples listed at the 
beginning of the chapter: (good as a table, good as a president), (prudent, 
moral), and (kind, beautiful).
One could perhaps object here that appearances are misleading when 
it comes to the evaluative examples. It may seem as though the evaluative 
properties cannot be directly compared, but if we look closer, we can see 
that they can be so compared. For example, why not say that
 (2) you are more prudent than you are moral,
should roughly be understood as
 (8)  the degree to which I am prudent counts more toward my flour-
ishing or overall virtuousness than the degree to which I am 
moral?
The idea is that being kind and being moral fall under the same cover-
ing value, counting toward my flourishing or overall virtuousness.4 This 
does not seem to be plausible, however. It is perfectly fine to say that
 (9)  you are more prudent than you are moral, but I have no idea 
about what makes your life flourish more.
Furthermore, there is nothing strange about saying that
 (9*)  it is unfortunate that you are more prudent than you are 
moral, since the degree to which you are moral counts more 
toward your flourishing than does the degree to which you 
are prudent.
Returning to the matter of delineating cross-categorical comparisons, 
we can see that, as Bale notes, one crucial difference between cross-adjec-
tival statements that are and those that are not reducible to direct com-
parisons concerns their conceptual entailments.
 (10a) I am taller than I am wide.
 (10b) If I am very wide, then I am at least very tall.
 (11a) Einstein is more intelligent than you are beautiful.
 (11b)  If you are very beautiful, then Einstein is at least very 
intelligent.
 (12b) He is taller for a Swede than he is heavy for a Swede.
 (12c)  If he is very heavy for a Swede, he is at least very tall for a 
Swede.
Statement 10a does not entail 10b, for 10a can be true even if I am 
very wide for a man – say, 1 m 30 cm – and short for a man – say, 1 m 32 
cm. All it takes for 10a to be true is that my height exceeds my width. In 
contrast, 11a entails 11b, and 12a entails 12b. That is why these informal 
inferences all seem fine.
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Einstein is more intelligent than you are beautiful.
You are very beautiful.
So
Einstein is at least very intelligent.
He is taller for a Swede than he is heavy for a Swede.
He is very heavy for a Swede.
So
He is at least very tall for a Swede.
The same kind of entailment holds for our evaluative examples:
 (13a) This table is a better table than Trump is a president.
 (13b)  If Trump is a very good president, then this table is at least 
a very good table. (Given Trump’s actual behavior, it is more 
appropriate to use a counterfactual conditional here!)
 (14a) I am more selfish than you are moral.
 (14b) If you are very moral, then I am at least very selfish.
 (15a) You are more kind than you are brave.
 (15b) If you are very brave, then you are at least very kind.
3  Skepticism about Cross-Categorical Comparisons
There is skepticism about whether we should take cross-cats literally. 
They have been accused of being ungrammatical, meaningless, metaphor-
ical, and metalinguistic. So before we go on to discuss literal interpreta-
tions of cross-cats, we need to respond to these skeptical challenges. I 
think we can put the accusations of ungrammaticality and meaningless-
ness to one side since it seems obvious that we can use cross-cats gram-
matically and meaningfully. Furthermore, as we have seen, they also have 
clear and distinctive entailments.
According to the metaphorical interpretation, cross-cats only have 
metaphorical meaning. It is true that we sometimes use cross-cats to con-
vey hyperbole:
 (16) I am older than the universe is big.
 (17) He is taller than the Great Pyramid of Khufu is heavy.
But it is one thing to say cross-cats can be used metaphorically and another 
to say that they can only be used in this way. For example, we do not 
seem to be forced to use the previously listed sentences metaphorically.
 (1) This table is a better table than Trump is a president.
 (2) You are more prudent than you are moral.
 (3) I am more kind than I am beautiful.
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They seem to have a literal meaning as well. I hope that the account of 
cross-cats I will present will validate this point – at least for evaluative 
cross-cats.
According to the metalinguistic idea, a cross-categorical sentence of 
the form
x is F-er/more F than y is G
should be understood as something like
it is more appropriate to say “x is F” than to say “y is G.”
(The other constructions can be given analogous readings.) This 
account does not say much until one says why it is more appropriate to 
do this. One possibility is that it is more appropriate to say it because
x is a clearer example of an F than y is an example of a G.
This approach does not work for all cross-cats, however, since it can 
be true that x is F-er than y is G, even though x is clearly not an F and y 
is clearly not a G
 (18) I am taller than you are heavy
can be true even though I am a very short person, and thus clearly not a 
tall person, and you are a very light person, and thus clearly not a heavy 
person. Perhaps you are very light, and I am short but not very short.
Of course, much more can be said about this and other alternative 
metalinguistic approaches, but I hope that the account of cross-cats I will 
present shows that there is no need to “go metalinguistic” (at least not for 
evaluative cross-cats).
4  Positional Accounts
According to what I shall call positional accounts,
x is F-er than y is G iff x has a higher position in the F-ranking than y 
has in the G-ranking.
x is equally as F as y is G iff x has the same position in the F-ranking 
as y has in the G-ranking.
(The other constructions are given analogous readings.) Applied to our 
evaluative examples, this means that
This table is a better table than Trump is a president iff this table has 
a higher position in the good as a table ranking than Trump has in the 
good as a president ranking.
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You are more prudent than you are moral iff you have a higher posi-
tion in the prudence ranking than you have in the morality ranking.
I am more kind than I am beautiful iff I have a higher position in the 
kindness ranking than I have in the beauty ranking.
This account has a ring of truth, but the crucial question is how to 
understand the talk about “higher position.” Alan Bale (2006, 2008) 
spells it out as follows. Suppose we are considering n items ranked in 
terms of F-ness and also n items ranked in terms of G-ness. For each 
ranking, assign an item the ratio n/n = 1 if it is on top in the ranking, 
the ratio n – 1/n if it is second, n – 2/n if it is third, and so on. In Bale’s 
universal scale account,
x is F-er than y is G iff the ratio assigned to x is greater than the ratio 
assigned to y.
x is equally as F as y is G iff the ratio assigned to x is the same as the 
ratio assigned to y.
As it stands, this account is severely restricted, however.
First, it only works if both the F-ranking and the G-ranking are com-
plete. But we seem to be able to make cross-categorical comparisons 
when at least one of the rankings has gaps. For example, we can say that:
 (19) I am a better teacher than Talentlesso is an artist,
even if we assume that the good as an artist-ranking is incomplete. 
Perhaps Mozart cannot be said to be a better, worse, or equally as good 
artist as Michelangelo, to use a famous example.5
Second, it only works if the F-ranking and the G-ranking have the same 
number of compared items. To see this, suppose there are three Fs and 
five Gs. Then the second-best item in the F-ranking will be assigned two-
third and the second-best in the G-ranking will be assigned two-fifths.
We do not want to say that the second-best item is F-er than another 
is G just because the F-ranked items are less numerous. For example, 
we do not want to say that I am kinder than you are brave just because, 
even though we are both second-best in our respective rankings, there are 
more brave people than kind ones.
Third, it only works if there is a finite number of compared items. 
But we seem to be able to make true cross-cats when at least one of the 
rankings has an infinite number of items, for example, when one of the 
compared properties is unbounded:
 (20)  I am more moral than you (who are suffering immensely) are 
well off,
where being well off is an unbounded property (there is no limit to how 
well off you can be).
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Perhaps these flaws can be fixed in a more sophisticated positional 
account. But there remains one problem that no positional account seems 
to be able to deal with. To see this, note first that any positional account 
must say that
if x is on top in the F-ranking and y is at the bottom in the G-ranking, 
then x is higher up in the F-ranking than y is in the G-ranking.6
Assume the top-ranked x is very bad in the relevant F-sense and the 
bottom-ranked y is very good in the relevant G-sense. Then it does not 
seem to be true to say that x is F-er than y is G despite the fact that x 
is higher up in the F-ranking than y is in the G-ranking. Suppose, for 
example, a, b, and c are compared in terms of both being good as a phi-
losopher and being kind. They are all very bad as philosophers, but a is 
less bad than b, and b is less bad than c. They are all very kind but a is 
kinder than b and b is kinder than c. Then a has a higher position in the 
good as a philosopher ranking than c has in the kindness ranking since a 
is top ranked and c is bottom ranked. But we do not want to say that a is 
a better philosopher than c is kind.
We can make a similar point without focusing on cases in which the 
polarity is different (very bad versus very good). Suppose a, b, c are all 
kind but not very kind, and a is kinder than b, b is kinder than c. Suppose 
also that a, b, c are all very beautiful, and a is more beautiful than b, and 
b is more beautiful than c. Then a has a higher position in the kindness 
ranking than c has in the beauty ranking, but we do not want to say that 
a is kinder than c is beautiful.
In fact, this example shows that Bale’s account is in danger of being 
internally inconsistent. Remember that he wants to validate this inference:
a is kinder than c is beautiful.
c is very beautiful.
So
a is at least very kind.
If Bale wants to insist that a is kinder than c is beautiful because a is 
higher up in the kindness ranking than c is in the beauty ranking, then 
he can no longer accept the entailment he claimed was a characteristic 
feature of cross-cats.
To these objections, Bale could reply that he had in mind cases in 
which we consider and rank all brave people and all kind people. If 
we consider the maximal comparison class of all kind people, the top-
ranked ones must be very kind and the bottom ranked not very kind. 
Similarly, if we consider the comparison class of all beautiful people, 
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the top-ranked ones must be very beautiful and the bottom ranked 
not very beautiful. So it cannot be true that the top ranked in terms of 
kindness is not very kind and the bottom ranked in terms of beautiful 
is very beautiful.
But then we are back to the problem of unboundedness. This move does 
not work for cases in which there are no maximal or minimal elements, 
so the choice is between internal inconsistency or a severely restricted 
account. I hope we can do better and avoid this dilemma.
5  Further Constraints on Evaluative Cross-Cats
The previous examples show that we have further constraints on a 
viable account of evaluative cross-cats. Let us use “X-good,” “X-bad,” 
“X-neutral,” “X-better” as short for “good in the relevant X-sense” 
(examples of instances would be “prudentially good” and “good as a 
table”), “bad in the relevant X-sense” (e.g., “prudentially bad” and “bad 
as a table”), “neutral in the relevant X-sense” (e.g., “finally neutral”), and 
“better in the relevant X-sense” (e.g., “prudentially better” and “better as 
a table”), respectively. We can now state the further constraints succinctly 
(where F and G are distinct senses of value):
Polarity
If x is F-good and y is G-bad, then x is F-better than y is G-valuable.
If x is F-neutral and y is G-bad, then x is F-better than y is G-valuable.
If x is F-good and y is G-neutral, then x is F-better than y is G-valuable.
I use “G-valuable” here rather than “G-good” since it is assumed that y is 
not G-good but G-bad or G-neutral.
“Very” modification
If x is very F-good and y is G-good but not very G-good, then x is 
F-better than y is G-good.
The last constraint can be generalized to other modifiers:
Degree modification
If x is D F-good and y is D' G-good and D is a higher degree modifier 
than D', then x is F-better than y is G-good,
where D is a degree modifier, such as not very, very, extremely, and mod-
erately, and
D is a higher degree modifier than D' = df. for all x, y, and F, if x is D 
F and y is D', then x is F-er than y.
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Here are some illustrations:
 (21)  This table is a better table than Trump is a president, since this 
table is a good table and Trump is a bad president. (Polarity)
 (22)  You are more prudent than you are moral, since you are 
very prudent and you are moral but not very moral. (‘Very’ 
modification)
 (23)  I am more kind than I am beautiful, since I am extremely 
kind and I am beautiful but not extremely beautiful. (Degree 
modification)
There is one important complication here that needs to be addressed. 
When I say that x is F-good but not very F-good and y is very F-bad, I 
take this to imply that x is F-better than y is F-valuable (by the first polarity 
principle listed above). But it also implies a cross-polar comparison: x is less 
F-good than y is F-bad, or, equivalently, y is more F-bad than x is F-good. 
This comparison holds, since y is very F-bad, while x is F-good but not very 
F-good. Suppose, for example, that x is a good but not very good table, and 
y is a very bad philosopher; then x is a better table than y is a philosopher. 
But it is also true that x is less good as a table than y is bad as a philosopher, 
or, equivalently, y is worse as a philosopher than x is good as a table, since 
x is good but not very good as a table, and y is very bad as a philosopher.
Note that cross-polar comparisons can be found in the intra-category 
cases too. Suppose that your trifling pleasure is good but not very good, 
and my suffering is very bad. So, your pleasure is better than my suffer-
ing, but it is also true that your pleasure is less good than my suffering is 
bad, or, equivalently, my suffering is worse than your pleasure is good.7
6  Conjunctive Accounts
Let us now consider the so-called conjunctive accounts of cross-cats. The 
most prominent and elaborated one is Ewan Klein’s (1980). This account, 
adjusted to my terminology, holds that
“x is F-er than y is G” is true iff there is a degree modifier D such that 
“x is D F, and y is not D G” is true (where “D” is read as “at least D”)
Applied to our initial evaluative sentences, (1)–(3), the results would 
be as follows:
 (24)  “This table is a better table than Trump is a president” is true 
iff there is a degree modifier D such that “this table is a D good 
table and Trump is not a D good president” is true.
 (25)  “You are more prudent than you are moral” is true iff there is 
a degree modifier D such that “you are D prudent and you are 
not D moral” is true.
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 (26)  “I am more kind than I am beautiful” is true iff there is a 
degree modifier D such that “I am D kind and I am not D 
beautiful” is true.
As seen, Klein’s account takes Degree modification and turns it into a 
definition of cross-cats. I think this account is on the right track – after 
all, it gives the right verdict about (1) to (3) – but there are still some 
issues. First, the account seems to overgenerate cross-cats. Suppose that I 
am very prudent and my sock, unsurprisingly, is not moral and thus not 
very moral either. Then the account would imply that I am more prudent 
than my sock is moral. But this is false since my sock cannot be moral. An 
easy fix would be to say that “x is D F and y is not D G” in the analysans 
and should be replaced with “x is D F and y is G but not D G.”
But that would lead to other problems, for now the account can no 
longer say that this table is a better table than Trump is a president. Since 
Trump is a bad president, he does not fulfill the condition “is good but 
not D good,” which he has to fulfill according to the revised account.
Second, Klein’s account (including the revised version) has problems 
satisfying Polarity. Suppose, for instance, that this table is neither good 
nor bad as a table but is simply neutral as a table. We still seem to be able 
to say truthfully that this table is better as a table than Trump is good as a 
president. But there is no D such that this table is D good, for it is neutral.
Third, it is not clear how to define cross-categorical equality in Klein’s 
account.
7  My Account
My account builds on Klein’s but avoids its limitation. To see what my 
account amounts to, let us first introduce the notions of a polarity function, 
degree modifier function, and modified polarities. A polarity function takes 
as an input a value kind and spits out a polarity property based on that 
kind. There are three such functions, pos, neg, and neut. The output of pos is 
a positive polarity property, a goodness property based on that input value 
kind, so pos(F-value) = F-goodness. The output of neg is a negative polar-
ity property, a badness property, so neg(F-value) = F-badness. The output 
of neut is a neutral polarity property, so neut(F-value) = F-neutrality. So, 
for instance, pos(final value) = being finally good, neg(final value) = being 
finally bad, and neut(final value) = being finally neutral. I am not assuming 
that all three functions are defined for all kinds of values. Perhaps some 
kinds of values do not have neutral values (are there neutral hammers?), 
and perhaps other kinds do not have negative values (e.g., ‘moral worth’).
A degree modifier function is a function that takes a polarity prop-
erty as input and spits out a degree-modified polarity property. Examples 
of degree modifiers functions are very, moderately, barely, somewhat, 
and not very. So, very(F-good) = being very F-good, moderately(F-bad) 
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= being moderately F-bad, barely(F-good) = being barely F-good, and 
not very (F-good) = being F-good but not very F-good. I shall assume 
that there is also a trivial degree modifier function, td, such that td(F-
good) = being F-good, td(F-bad) = being F-bad, and td(F-neutral) = being 
F-neutral. td is the only degree modifier function that is defined for neu-
tral value properties since neutrality does not come in degrees.8 Finally, 
d is a higher degree function than d' iff, for all x, y, and F-value, if x falls 
under d(F) and y falls under d'(F), then x is F-better than y.
A degree-modified polarity property can be seen as a range property 
since it carves out a set of items that could differ in degrees of the relevant 
value but share the property of being within the range. So, the items that 
are very F-good can differ in F-value, but they all share the property 
of falling within the range defined by being very F-good. For example, 
among the very good presidents, some are better presidents than others. 
A degree-modified polarity property is also non-positional, since whether 
an item is top, bottom, or nth in the relevant ranking is not determined 
by whether it exemplifies under it. That a flute is very good does not say 
anything about whether it is best, worst, or nth in the ranking of flutes.
It is important to note that the way a value adjective, such as “very 
F-good,” picks out a range property can be a highly contextual matter. 
What falls under “very F-good” in one context need not fall under “very 
F-good” in another context. I can count as a very good basketball player 
in a context in which the comparison class is my elderly relatives, but 
not in a context in which the comparison class is the Swedish national 
basketball team. In my statements of the polarity and degree modifier 
functions, I have ignored these contextual issues to avoid unnecessarily 
cluttering the exposition.
Here are some examples of degree-modified polarity properties:
Degree-modified positive polarity properties: being kind, being very 
kind, being finally good, being moderately finally good, being barely 
prudentially good, being good as a president, being extremely good 
as a president
Trivially degree-modified neutral polarity properties: being finally 
neutral, being prudentially neutral
Degree-modified negative polarity properties: being unkind, being 
very unkind, being selfish, being moderately selfish, being finally bad, 
being extremely finally bad, being prudentially bad, being somewhat 
prudentially bad, being very bad as a president, being extremely bad 
as a president
Finally, a modified polarity function, mp, is a function composed of a 
polarity function, p, and a degree function, d: mp(·) = d(p(·)). Examples 
are very(pos(·)), moderately(neg(·)), and barely(pos(·).
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We now define cross-categorical betterness in the following way:
x is F-better than y is G-valuable = df. there are modified polarity func-
tions mp, mp' such that x falls under mp' (F-value), and y falls under 
mp'(G-value), and mp is of a higher rank than mp'.
mp is of a higher rank than mp' = df. for all x, y, F, if x falls under mp(F-
value) and y falls under mp' (F-value), then x is F-better than y.
Note that this definition ensures that higher rank is irreflexive and asym-
metric, given a certain instantiation condition: for any pairs of mp and mp', 
there are F, x, and y such that x falls under mp (F-value), and y falls under 
mp'(F-value). We can then use the irreflexivity and asymmetry of F-betterness 
to show that higher rank must also be irreflexive and asymmetric. To show 
irreflexivity, suppose for reductio that mp is of a higher rank than itself. 
Then, given the instantiation condition, there are F, x such that x falls under 
mp (F-value), and, given the definition of higher rank, x is F-better than itself, 
which is impossible. To show asymmetry, suppose for reductio that mp is of 
a higher rank than mp' and mp' is of a higher rank than mp. Then, given the 
instantiation condition, there are F, x, y such that x falls under mp (F-value), 
and y falls under mp'(F-value), and, given the definition of higher rank, x is 
F-better than y and y is F-better than x, which is impossible.
If we also assume that for any n-tuple of modified polarities, mp1, 
mp2, mp3, …, mpn, there are F, x1, x2, x3, …, xn such that x1 falls 
under mp1(F-value), x2 falls under mp2(F-value), x3 falls under mp3(F-
value),…, and xn falls under mpn(F-value), we can also show that 
higher rank must be acyclical, if we also assume that F-betterness itself 
must be acyclical, which seems plausible for any F.9 Suppose for reduc-
tio that mp1 is of a higher rank than mp2, mp2 is of a higher rank than 
mp3, …, but mpn is of a higher rank than mp1. Suppose also that x1 falls 
under mp1(F), x2 falls under mp2(F), x3 falls under mp3(F), ..., and xn 
falls under mpn. Then, by the definition of higher rank, x1 is F-better x2, 
x2 is F-better than x3, x3 is F-better than x4, …, but xn is F-better than 
x1, which is impossible.
Admittedly, these instantiation conditions assume a certain richness in 
value structure that could be questioned. An alternative way to ensure 
that higher rank is well-behaved is simply to postulate that the relation is 
irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.
Note also that Cross-Cat Betterness ensures the following:
Value Category Harmony
For all F, x, and y, if there are mp and mp' such that x falls under 
mp(F-value), and y falls under mp' (F-value), and mp is of a higher 
rank than mp', then there are no mp'' and mp''' such that x falls 
under mp''(F), and y under mp'''(F), and mp''' is of a higher rank 
than mp''.
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For if this conditional is false, it follows from Cross-Cat Betterness 
that for some F, x, and y, x is F-better than y and y is F-better than 
x, which is impossible since F-betterness is asymmetric.
What about cross-categorical equality? We cannot just say that
x is as F-valuable as y is G-valuable iff there is an mp such that x falls 
under mp (F-value) and y falls under mp (G-value).
This account of equality would entail that
x is as kind as y is beautiful, whenever x is kind and y is beautiful, no 
matter whether x is kind but not very kind and y is very beautiful.
x is as good a table as y is a president, whenever the x is a good table 
and y is a good president, no matter whether x is not a very good table 
and y is a very good president.
This captures a very coarse-grained notion of cross-cat equality. At the 
other extreme, we have exact cross-cat equality:
x is as F-valuable as y is G-valuable iff there are mp and mp' such that 
x falls under mp(F-value), and y falls under mp'(G-value), and mp has 
the same rank as mp'.
mp has the same rank as mp' = df. for all x, y, and F, if x falls under 
mp(F-value) and y falls under mp'(F-value), then x is exactly as 
F-valuable as y.
This is a very restrictive notion of cross-cat equality, however. Indeed, 
it seems as though mp has the same rank as mp' only if mp = mp' = 
dt(neut(·)), since any other modalized polarity function will allow for 
variation in the degree of F-value. If this is correct, x is as F-valuable as y 
is G-valuable only if x is F-neutral and y is G-neutral.
Here is a better account that avoids this problem:
Cross-Cat Equality
x is as F-valuable as y is G-valuable iff, for all mp, x falls under mp(F-
value) iff y falls under mp(G-value) (and both x and y fall under some 
mp).
This definition makes cross-categorical equality transitive, which is an 
attractive feature. Note also that it entails that Mozart is as good a com-
poser as Michelangelo is a sculptor (they are both exceptionally good in 
their own fields), which seems to be a welcome result. Indeed, since this 
holds even though we cannot say that Mozart is a more creative artist than 
Michelangelo, or that Michelangelo is a more creative artist than Mozart, 
or that they are equally creative, one may suggest that this captures a notion 
of parity. (I say a notion rather than the notion since there seem to be many 
different value concepts one can have in mind when one talks about parity.)10
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Let us now turn to inter-polar cross-cats. I suggest the following definitions:
x is more F-good than y is G-bad = df. there are modified polarity 
functions mp, mp', such that mp = d(pos(·)) and mp' = d'(neg(·)), d is a 
higher degree modifier function than d', and x falls under mp(F-value), 
and y falls under mp'(G-value).
x is more F-bad than y is G-good = df. there are modified polarity 
functions mp, mp', such that mp = d(neg(·)) and mp' = d'(pos(·)), d is a 
higher degree modifier function than d', and x falls under mp(F-value) 
and y falls under mp'(G-value).
x is as F-bad as y is G-good = df. for all mp and mp' such that mp = 
d(neg(·)) and mp' = d'(pos(·)), d = d', x falls under mp(F-value) iff y 
falls under mp'(G-value).
Since my aim in this chapter is modest – just to outline an account of 
evaluative cross-cats – I will not say much about how to generalize my 
account to all non-evaluative cross-cats. Suffice it to say that the cen-
tral notions, i.e., polarity functions and degree modifier functions, which 
together define modified polarity functions, can easily be generalized 
to non-evaluative properties. I have already done so for degree modi-
fier functions, but polarity is also a general aspect of gradable adjectives 
(and the expressed properties). For example, length has both a positive 
polarity, being tall, and a negative one, being short. Similarly, weight has 
a positive polarity, being heavy, as well as a negative one, being light. 
Felt temperature seems to have three polarities: warm, cold, and neutral. 
(Of course, in all these cases, polarity is a contextual matter.) The polar-
ity functions pol, neg, neut can thus be extended to have non-evaluative 
kinds as inputs, and the previous definitions can be extended to apply to 
non-evaluative cross-cats, mutatis mutandis.
The advantages of my account are the following:
 (1) It has the right entailment.
 If x is F-better than y is G-good and y is very G-good, then x is 
at least very F-good.
 (2) It applies even when there are gaps in one ordering.
 If x falls under mp(F-value) and y falls under mp'(G-value), and 
mp is of a higher rank than mp', then x is F-better than y is 
G-valuable, even if either the F-value ranking or the G-value 
ranking is gappy.
 (3) It applies even when the number of F-value ranked items is not 
the same as the number of G-value ranked items.
 If x falls under mp(F-value), and y falls under mp'(G-value), and 
mp is of a higher rank than mp', then x is F-better than y is 
G-valuable, even if the number of items that have F-value is dif-
ferent from the number of items that have G-value.
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 (4) It applies even when the F-value ranking or G-value ranking is 
unbounded.
 If x falls under mp(F-value) and y falls under mp'(G) and mp is 
of a higher rank than mp', then x is F-better than y is G-valuable, 
even if there is no maximum or minimum in one or both of the 
rankings.
 (5) It satisfies Polarity.
This is obvious.
 (6) It satisfies Degree modification.
This is also obvious.
 (7) It deals with inter-polar cross-cats.
This is also obvious.
8  Normative Applications
Now that we have a better grasp of evaluative cross-cats, it is time to 
see whether they have any normative relevance. Even though these new 
value relations would of course be usable in purely axiological matters 
when we are just interested in making value judgments, it would be 
disappointing if these value relations could not be put to any normative 
use at all.
One possible application is normative decisions based on comparisons 
of what is good for different people.11 Suppose you are convinced, as many 
economists still seem to be, that there is no common value dimension on 
which we can compare what is good for people, as well-being is interper-
sonally incomparable. Then saying that x is better for me than y is for you 
amounts to a cross-cat. You can then use my analysis to decide what you 
ought to do in a choice between realizing A, which is very good for me, and 
realizing B, which is good but not very good for you (and no other person 
is affected). Since, according to my analysis, A is better for me than B is for 
you, this can be seen as providing a reason to choose A over B.
A second application is this. We have two positions and one applicant. 
One position requires prudence and the other being moral. We need to 
offer the candidate one of the positions. If the candidate is more prudent 
than moral – perhaps because she is very prudent but not very moral – 
then we should offer her the job that requires prudence. Now some might 
object that we are invoking another value consideration here: finding the 
best match between the candidate and the job. But this does not take 
away the significance of the cross-categorical value comparison since we 
are not using the “best match” value to define cross-categorical value 
comparisons; rather, the “best match” value is based on the cross-cate-
gorical comparison.
Another application relies on the link between values and attitudes. 
Even though it is controversial to define values in terms of attitudes, it is 
reasonable to assume that, at least for some kinds of values, if something 
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has a certain value, it is fitting to have a certain attitude toward it. What 
attitude it is fitting to have toward it depends on what kind of value it 
has. Sometimes it is obvious what attitude it would be fitting to have: for 
example, it is fitting to admire what is admirable, envy what is enviable, 
praise what is praiseworthy, blame what is blameworthy, and desire what 
is desirable.
Cross-cats can be put to use here. If x is more admirable than y is enviable 
– perhaps because x is very admirable and y is enviable but not very enviable, 
then to admire x but not envy y seems a more fitting combined stance than 
not to admire x but envy y. Furthermore, the stance “admire x very much, 
envy y but not very much” is more fitting than the stance “admire x but not 
very much, envy y very much.” More generally, if x is more admirable than y 
is enviable, it is more fitting to admire x more than one envies y than to envy 
y more than one admires x. Note that this claim invokes yet another kind of 
cross-categorical comparison – namely, one of attitudinal strength since the 
strength of admiration and the strength of envy do not seem to be reducible 
to one common kind of attitudinal strength.12
The final application is evaluative uncertainty. The obvious obstacle to 
taking evaluative uncertainty seriously is that we can be uncertain about 
the truth of two radically different theories that employ different kinds 
of values. For example, we can be undecided between (a) a certain virtue 
theory (e.g., Philippa Foot’s) according to which there is no impartial 
value – we can only talk about virtuous or vicious acts, and (b) a utilitar-
ian theory according to which actions can be (instrumentally) impartially 
good, but no actions are virtuous or vicious. Suppose that the choice situ-
ation is like the following (without well-defined probabilities):
Actions Virtue Theory Utilitarianism
A Very vicious Very impartially good
B Very virtuous Impartially good but not very 
impartially good
Action A might be the joyful killing of an innocent that brings about 
billions of extra very happy lives. Action B is the joyful omission of kill-
ing an innocent that brings about a few extra very happy lives created 
by the agent out of the most virtuous motives. There are no direct value 
comparisons to be made across the theories since the theories employ 
different value concepts, but we still seem to be able to say the following:
A is impartially better, according to utilitarianism, than it is virtuous, 
according to virtue theory, since it is impartially very impartially good 
according to utilitarianism and very vicious according to virtue theory.
B is more virtuous, according to virtue theory, than it is impartially 
good, according to utilitarianism, since it is very virtuous according 
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to virtue theory and impartially good but not very impartially good 
according to utilitarianism.
B is impartially better, according to utilitarianism, than A is virtuous, 
according to virtue theory, since B is impartially good but not very 
impartially good according to utilitarianism and A is very vicious 
according to virtue theory.
These cross-cats seem to suggest that B would be a more reasonable 
choice since it “maximizes the minimum cross-categorical value.”
More generally, the idea is that it is reasonable to choose B in a situa-
tion of the following kind (without well-defined probabilities).
Actions Theory T1 Theory T2
A Very T1-bad Very T2-good
B Very T1-good T2-good but not very T2-good
Of course, maximin is not uncontroversial, but this is just one example 
of how cross-cats can be used to guide action in certain cases of evalu-
ative uncertainty. Other principles that take into account both (quali-
tative) probability or plausibility and ordinal value information can be 
used instead. The scope of application of this approach to decision-mak-
ing under evaluative uncertainty goes beyond that of existing approaches, 
since they tend to assume either that no value comparisons can be made 
across theories or that they can made only when the theories employ 
exactly the same value concept.13
9  Concluding Remarks
The conclusion is that, notwithstanding the old saying, we can compare 
apples with oranges! Joking aside, there seems to be room for cross-cats 
that can be put to normative use. Of course, much more needs to be said 
to bolster this claim and show how it fits into a general account of cross-
cats, both evaluative and non-evaluative. I have provided only a very 
rough sketch of how to make sense of evaluative cross-cats. One issue 
that needs to be addressed is that cross-cats seem more natural and plau-
sible when they involve similar value concepts, such as good as a table 
and good as a president, or prudentially good and morally good; indeed, 
one could claim that there is a specific second-order value concept that 
unifies the value concepts in each pair: goodness of its kind, and good-
ness of persons, respectively. Cross-cats that invoke very different con-
cepts and very different value bearers seem less natural and plausible. For 
example, it seems odd to say that my excellent wine is a better wine than 
my having a dull life is a good state of affairs. So, one option is to add 
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restrictions to my account. For x to be cross-categorically comparable to 
x and y, they have to fall under similar (but nonidentical) value concepts 
and be similar value bearers. Of course, for this to be useful, we need to 
decide what “similar” means.
Another remaining question is why cross-cats seem more compelling 
when they involve objects with extremal values. It is very compelling to 
think that x is F-better than y is G-valuable when x is extremely F-good 
and the very best F one can imagine, whereas y is extremely G-bad and 
the very worst G one can imagine.14 We know this cannot just be a ques-
tion of their relative positions, so we need some other explanation of the 
compellingness.
Even though there are remaining issues, I hope that I have at least 
shown that cross-categorical comparisons should be taken seriously – 
and not simply dismissed as ungrammatical, meaningless, or merely 
metaphorical – and that my account is an improvement on the existing 
ones.15
Notes
 1 I assume that prudent, moral, kind, and beautiful are thick evaluative terms.
 2 It might be clearer to say, “than Trump is good as a president.”
 3 Kraut (2011: 153) claims that it makes sense to say, “This watermelon is 
a better watermelon than that poet is a poet,” but he does not provide an 
account of such comparisons.
 4 For more on the notion of covering value, see Chang (1997).
 5 See Chang (2002).
 6 The (in)famous zero-one rule for interpersonal comparisons of well-being, 
according to which everyone’s top-ranked options are assigned 1 and every-
one’s bottom-ranked options are assigned 0, satisfies an analogous principle 
and faces problems analogous to those that afflict the positional account. For 
more on critical discussion of the zero-one rule, see Hausman (1995).
 7 Here “less good” does not mean “worse,” which it can do in some contexts.
 8 These degree modifier functions are the standing meanings of their linguistic 
counterparts “very,” “moderately,” “barely,” and so on. A linguistic degree 
modifier, such as “very,” retains its meanings across different constructions, 
even if it is applied to different evaluative adjectives. For example, “very” has 
the same meaning in “very prudentially good” as in “very finally good.”
 9 At least this holds for the notion of betterness that is the comparative of 
“good,” which is my focus here. For an alternative non-transitive notion of 
betterness, see Temkin (2012: ch. 1).
 10 For more on the notion of parity, see Chang (2002).
 11 I would like to thank Gustaf Arrhenius and Michael Morreau for suggesting 
this application.
 12 See Rabinowicz (2012: 153) for a brief discussion of what he calls “cross-
kind” commensuration of attitudes.
 13 MacAskill et al. (2020) offers an opinionated introduction to existing 
accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty.
 14 I would like to thank Joe Roussos and Wlodek Rabinowicz for alerting me to 
this.
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 15 A previous version of this paper was presented at a workshop on nonstan-
dard comparisons of value, at the Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, 6 
December 2019. I am grateful for comments from the audience. I am espe-
cially grateful to the editors of this volume Henrik Andersson and Anders 
Herlitz, and to Chrisoula Andreou, Gustaf Arrhenius, Erik Carlson, Ruth 
Chang, Ralf Bader, Zak Kopeikin, Michael Morreau, Wlodek Rabinowicz, 
and Joe Roussos.
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Terminology is a minefield here: one must choose between “incommen-
surate,” “incommensurable,” and “incomparable,” at least. The termi-
nologies are incommensurate, but “incommensurate” has stuck, so I 
use it. Two items or options A and B are V-incommensurate when with 
respect to some value V, A is not better than B, B is not better than A, 
and A and B are not equally good. V-incommensurability is the failure 
of all three trichotomous comparisons (better, worse, and equally good) 
with respect to V.2
Examples of incommensurability almost always involve two options 
or items that each do better along different dimensions of the relevant 
standard or value. Cooking at home is healthier and cheaper, but order-
ing delivery is tastier and more convenient. In some classic cases – Mozart 
versus Michelangelo in creative terms (Chang 1997: 15) or Stonehenge 
versus St. Peter’s in terms of impressiveness (Broome 1997) – it’s not even 
clear how to specify the relevant dimensions in an informative way.
We could be epistemicists about incommensurability: maybe in all of 
these cases one of the comparisons does apply, but we don’t know which. 
A version of this view concerning the Moorean good has been defended 
by (Regan 1997) and deserves respect, but I set it aside to ask a condi-
tional question: if none of the trichotomous comparisons determinately 
holds, then what are the implications for agency?
Very often, we don’t simply investigate which option is better with 
respect to some value – we also choose between options. When acting, 
it’s very rare that we have no choice at all (our options can include stall-
ing for time, doing nothing, or doing something completely outrageous). 
Much of the time, though, the best option is so obvious that we don’t 
even waste any time consciously deliberating or thinking it over. See 
Arpaly (2002) for a classic discussion of the prevalence – or otherwise – 
of deliberation in our actions.
I will assume that we are making a choice with respect to some value, 
but I will suppress mention of the value, which doesn’t matter for my 
purposes. The crucial point is the connection between the value and 
9 What Does Incommensurability  
Tell Us About Agency?1
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our reasons: we ought to choose the best option (if there is one), and if 
A is better than B, then we have a stronger all-things-considered reason 
to choose A than B. Hence, I will write interchangeably of values and 
reasons.3
When one of the trichotomous comparisons obtains, and given these 
stipulations, the situation is fairly clear. If A is better than every other 
option – if A is strongly dominant – then only Aing is permissible and 
doing anything else instead would be a mistake. But sometimes, one 
option A is merely weakly dominant: at least as good as every option. 
This can be because every option is equally good, or because there are 
two or more options (including A) that are as good as each other but 
better than all others. When we are choosing cans of beans of the same 
brand at the supermarket, there are likely to be many cans tied for best 
and perhaps some that are worse (the dented ones). Buying the worse 
beans is impermissible – not morally so, but it is forbidden by our rea-
sons. It ought not be done.
If the set of options is not infinite (and the betterness relation is not 
cyclic), then we know that there must be at least one option that is not 
strongly dominated: there is no option better than it. But under incom-
mensurability, there may be no weakly dominant option. There may 
instead be (at least) two options A and B, incommensurate with each 
other – and so not weakly dominant – but better than all other options.
It may be, for example, that cooking for yourself and ordering take-
away are each better than the other options – going hungry, foraging – 
but are incommensurate with each other. Or if you are engaging in a 
spot of post-pandemic travel, the ranking of your options may have a 
fast express train and a cheaper slow train incommensurate with each 
other but better than all other options (walking, a fast express train in the 
wrong direction, … most of our options are so silly that we don’t even 
bother to think about them).
In such cases, two pieces of phenomenology seem to pull in opposite 
directions. First, either option seems permissible – certainly, neither is criti-
cizable. If neither cooking nor ordering takeaway is better than the other, 
aren’t both acceptable? And when quizzed about your choice by a nosy 
neighbor, “well cooking would have been healthier, but delivery was more 
convenient so I went for that” could be a perfectly reasonable justification. 
(Your neighbor might be suggesting that you should value your health 
more than you do, but that’s a different point, and even more nosy.)
Second, except perhaps in the most trivial choices (such as what to have 
for dinner), we don’t stop worrying when we reach the conclusion that 
two options are incommensurate. We typically continue to agonize and 
deliberate about a choice between them, at least in major choices. Even if 
we have to choose right now, and therefore pick arbitrarily, we might ret-
rospectively think the choice over. If you are like most people, when house 
hunting, there are several options open to you that are incommensurate 
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with each other but dominate all others: the smaller place closer to work, 
the bigger place further away, the fixer-upper, and so on. But with such a 
major financial commitment as a mortgage or lease, coming to think that 
your remaining options are incommensurate does not simply stop your 
deliberation. Most of us do not at that point simply roll a die. Instead, we 
think it over. (We might roll a die in the food case, but not all of us would 
in the train case. How much you agonize about your travel options has a 
lot of individual variation; I would probably enjoy travel more were I to 
simply relax about such choices as which train to take.)
These two pieces of phenomenology are not contradictory. The for-
mer is about the permissibility of actions, whereas the latter is about the 
decision procedure – and not even about which decision procedures are 
permissible or appropriate but about which ones we in fact employ. But 
the two are certainly in tension: if both options are permissible, then why 
worry and deliberate about the choice?
Joseph Raz and Ruth Chang have each drawn quite far-reaching con-
clusions about the nature of human agency from incommensurability, 
and in particular from something like these two pieces of phenomenol-
ogy. After criticizing their arguments, I’ll argue that if we see incom-
mensurability as vagueness – a view defended by (Andersson 2017), 
(Elson 2017), and most famously (Broome 1997) and Broome in this 
volume – then its implications for agency are minimal. I don’t pretend 
to offer a rigorous defense of my alternative but simply to explore how 
I think about choice under incommensurability, and to sketch a reason-
ably plausible picture.
1  Raz’s Classical Conception
Joseph Raz distinguishes two views of human agency. The first is what he 
calls rationalism: “Paradigmatic human action is taken because, of all the 
options open to the agent, it was, in the agent’s view, supported by the 
strongest reason” (Raz 2002: 47).
Rationalism doesn’t say that in paradigmatic human action, we do the 
action that is actually supported by the strongest collection of reasons. 
Instead, the action that the agent believes to be most supported by rea-
son. And as we are often mistaken or uncertain, these need not be the 
same. But as I am setting aside epistemicism, I will focus on cases where 
her beliefs are accurate. What does “paradigmatic” mean, here? I take it 
to refer to the central, “normal” case, when things are working as they 
should. There may be exceptions, but they are either relatively isolated 
oddities or involve some kind of error:
Rationalism. Normally, rational actions are those where the agent 
chooses what she believes to be the strongly dominant option because 
she believes it to be strongly dominant.
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The rationalist picture is that there are many reasons for and against 
various actions, and the action one ought to do is that one supported by 
the strongest collection of reasons, after all the weights are in. (I’m setting 
aside here “enticing reasons,” which would complicate this picture, and 
of which I am skeptical. See (Dancy 2006) for a defense of such reasons.) 
A huge part of the metaethics of the past 25 years or so consists of argu-
ments about what these reasons are: are they just desires (or grounded 
in desires), or facts about impartial welfare, or particularist facts, or …? 
Rationalism says that there is little distinctive role for the will other than 
acting in compliance with the reasons we have.
There can be some exceptions to rationalism’s “normally.” Cases where 
there are multiple weakly dominant options – such as Buridan’s Ass – 
are not a major challenge because those options remain, in Raz’s words, 
“supported by the strongest reason.” Weak dominance is not a serious 
threat to the rationalist view.
The main threat is incommensurability of an uncompromising form:
Hard Incomparability. A and B are hard-incomparable when each of 
the three trichotomous comparisons determinately fails to apply – A 
is determinately not better than B, B is determinately not better than 
A, and A and B are determinately not equally good – and in virtue of 
this, no comparison holds between A and B.
In hard incomparability, all three trichotomous comparisons determi-
nately fail to apply, and no other comparison applies either. The posi-
tion of “determinately” is crucial here because the broader definition of 
incommensurability says only that the three trichotomous comparisons 
each fail to determinately apply. This is the difference between “she is not 
determinately tall” (which leaves room for it to be indeterminate whether 
she is tall) and “she is determinately not tall” (which doesn’t).
(Raz 1986) argues that incommensurability is hard incomparability. If 
this is so, and if incommensurability is commonplace, then rationalism 
starts to look untenable because there will often be no option that’s even 
weakly dominant. As hard incomparability becomes more widespread, 
the picture of normal action as reason narrowing down the options to 
a few dominant ones looks increasingly strained. Some instances can be 
accepted – if they are, as (Raz 2002: 48) puts it, “relatively rare anoma-
lies” – but rationalism is a distortion if there not being any weakly domi-
nant option is the more common situation.
The more we move in this direction, the more support is lent to Raz’s 
second picture of agency, which he calls the Classical Conception: “para-
digmatic human action is one taken because, of all the options the agent 
considers rationally eligible, he chooses to perform it” (Raz 2002: 47). 
Here is my gloss:
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Classical Conception. Normally, rational actions are those where 
the agent chooses from among actions she believes to be rationally 
eligible.
To say that an action X is “rationally eligible” is to say that X is not 
strongly dominated, and so to choose X would not go against our rea-
sons: it’s not the case that we ought not X.
On the Classical Conception, even after the strongly dominated options 
have been eliminated, there typically remains a wide range of rationally 
eligible options. If there are five incommensurate takeaway food options 
in Reading, but each of these five is better than all other restaurants, then 
reason will eliminate all but those five options. They are rationally eligible.
The pictures have quite different underlying moral psychologies. 
Rationalism implies that in normal cases the will has no role beyond exe-
cuting one (strongly dominant) or perhaps one of several (weakly domi-
nant) choices. Raz argues that pervasive incommensurability construed 
as hard incomparability makes this picture a distortion because the will 
must often choose from several rationally eligible but incommensurate 
(and thus not even weakly dominant) options.
He argues that incommensurability is indeed widespread because desires 
are the only feasible candidate reasons (or source of reasons) that could 
remove all – or nearly all – incommensurabilities, but desires don’t provide 
reasons. Here is how I understand the master argument of (Raz 2002):
 (1) Desires don’t provide reasons.
 (2) But desires are the only plausible candidate for commensurating 
values.
 (3) So reasons normally leave a number of hard-incomparable options.
 (4) Which supports the Classical Conception.
I’ve defended the inference from (3) to (4) as plausible, but I’ve 
not engaged with the rest of the argument. Next, I’ll argue that if we 
assume that incommensurability is vagueness – in particular, that it’s 
often indeterminate which option is better – then widespread incom-
mensurability can be reconciled with something close to rationalism, 
because (3) is false.
2  Chang’s Hierarchical Voluntarism
Raz draws from incommensurability the thought that the will can choose 
without (and after) reason. Ruth Chang draws a different lesson: agency 
may involve creating reasons where there were none.
Chang argues that the trichotomy doesn’t exhaust the available 
comparisons:
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Parity. Sometimes, options are trichotomously incomparable but nev-
ertheless comparable because a fourth comparative relation called 
“Parity” holds between them.
According to Parity, at least sometimes, incommensurate options are on 
a par. Though central to Chang’s overall view, the Parity claim is not 
crucial to the deliberation argument that is my topic.
I will here discuss her view as defended across a series of papers, includ-
ing (Chang 2013) and (Chang 2017), but my main focus is the fascinating 
argument of (Chang 2009). That argument for voluntarist creation rests 
on the angstiness and continued deliberation discussed earlier: coming to 
think that our best options are incommensurate with each other doesn’t 
usually stop deliberation in its tracks, as coming to think that they are 
precisely equally good does. Importantly for Chang, we don’t always 
think this continued deliberation under incommensurability irrational, 
as, for example, a waste of mental resources would be.
To explain the rationality of continued deliberation under incommen-
surability, Chang argues that deliberation has more functions than we 
thought. I join her in a broad conception of deliberation as including 
“discovering, recognizing, investigating, appreciating, and engaging with 
the reasons there are,” but she adds to this list the voluntarist creation 
of new reasons (Chang 2009: 259). There are other voluntarists, but her 
voluntarism is distinctively hierarchical: there are “given” (non-volun-
tary) reasons, but they sometimes leave incommensurabilities. Voluntarist 
reasons can only rationalize or justify actions that are not strongly domi-
nated, considering only the given reasons.
Here is how I picture it: the given reasons mark out the fences of the 
playground within which we must act, but they don’t tell us what to 
do within that playground. Whereas for Raz the will must now simply 
choose what to do, for Chang, the faculty of reason can – through its 
capacity to deliberate – create or endorse reasons to do one thing rather 
than another, remaining in the playground. So the view is rationalist in 
a certain sense: paradigmatic action involves acting for what we take to 
be the strongest reasons, but it’s (within limits) up to us which reasons 
are strongest. Voluntarist creation is not required, and instead, one may 
simply “drift” – (Chang 2017: 19) writes that “law schools are populated 
with drifters.”
Why be suspicious about voluntarism? Because it says that we can cre-
ate reasons. Of course, we can sometimes create reasons: I can make it so 
that I have reason to give you £10 where before I did not by promising to 
give you £10. But this is changing the facts of the matter – I have created 
a promise where before there was none. Voluntarism typically involves 
the more radical claim that I can change or create the reason-giving force 
of the facts. But it’s far less clear – and more objectionable to anti-vol-
untarists – is that I could create a reason to give you £10 without doing 
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some action like promising. Promising is quite different to an act of “will-
ing [that] creates normativity by creating new reasons whose normativity 
derives from the very act of will” (Chang 2009: 255).4
Chang’s view has the advantage that because one can only create vol-
untarist reasons within the area marked out by the given reasons, there 
is no way to create voluntaristic reasons to commit murder or do other 
heinous things (presuming that they are forbidden by the given reasons). 
If the anti-voluntarist objection to normative powers is really a worry 
that such powers threaten to allow us to make all sorts of unfortunate 
reasons – such as to commit murder – then Hierarchical Voluntarism 
looks immune to it – see (Chang 2009: 270). Murder is outside the play-
ground. But if the worry is instead an expression of discomfort with us 
having the ability to create any reasons, outside of promising and the like, 
then the hierarchical view doesn’t mitigate the worry, or not very much.
But my main focus is not Hierarchical Voluntarism on its own terms 
but whether deliberation under incommensurability supports it.
2.1  The Deliberation Argument
Chang argues for Hierarchical Voluntarism by appeal to our second piece 
of phenomenology – the angstiness that attends choice under incommen-
surability and continued deliberation. Here is my understanding of the 
argument of (Chang 2009: 249ff):
 (1) Sometimes our reasons run out.
 (2) When they do, we often keep deliberating.
 (3) Unlike with continued deliberation under betterness or equal good-
ness, we (often) consider this continued deliberation under incom-
mensurability to be rational.
 (4) The best explanation for (3) is that unlike under betterness or equal 
goodness, deliberation under incommensurability is not a waste of 
time.
 (5) The best explanation for (4) is that deliberation under incommensu-
rability involves the voluntaristic creation of reasons.
Though it captures the logical structure of the argument, this presenta-
tion overstates the argument’s intended strength, which is intended to 
be more suggestive than abductive.5 And Chang defends the hierarchical 
or hybrid voluntarist view elsewhere too, but I focus on this argument 
because though I am not convinced by it, it deserves investigation and 
is (along with Raz’s Classical Conception) one of the few attempts I am 
aware of to seriously explore the connections between agency, delibera-
tion, and incommensurability.
My objection will be to premise (3): I’ll argue that we sometimes ratio-
nally continue deliberating under trichotomy, and the explanation for this 
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fact is similar to why we rationally continue deliberating under incom-
mensurability and doesn’t involve normative creation. Deliberation is an 
activity with its own costs – typically, the opportunity cost of spending 
time on it, but also other psychological downsides – but also its own 
benefits, which include but go beyond a greater chance of choosing the 
best option.
Since part of deliberation’s point is information-gathering, I won’t 
assume when discussing the deliberation argument that the agent in 
question has full information about her choice. If the stakes are high 
enough, then deliberation can continue to be rational even when one 
option appears best. When I presented this chapter at a conference in 
Stockholm, I was also planning a trip to Texas to visit family and could 
only find extraordinarily expensive travel insurance. After a reasonable 
amount of time, I found what seemed to be the best insurance policy 
(“Policy X”) – the cheapest one that met some quality thresholds. But I 
continued to deliberate: rather than simply buying that apparently best 
policy, I continued to search price-comparison websites and so on, think-
ing about which policy would really be best.
Finally, I bought Policy X. I knew this was likely to be the outcome; 
in the past, I have not usually been able to beat price-comparison web-
sites. Does this mean that my continued deliberation was irrational? I’m 
not sure. Certainly, there was an opportunity cost to it. But deliberation 
served several functions. I looked for a cheaper policy, spent time won-
dering how comprehensive my insurance really needed to be (what my 
quality thresholds should be), and so on. Assuming that my continued 
hemming and hawing didn’t simply distort my preferences or lead me 
into irrationality (a non-trivial assumption), the continued deliberation 
meant that I engaged more with the reasons for and against various poli-
cies and searched for policies I had not already seen, increasing the likeli-
hood that I would find the best policy. I believed that Policy X was the 
best policy, but I was not certain, and the deliberation raised my credence 
in that proposition.
I also became surer that I was not wasting money, that the policy I 
settled on was in fact best, and that I wasn’t making a costly mistake. 
This reassurance is worth something and may rationalize some continued 
deliberation. So perhaps I would add “confirming” to Chang’s list of the 
functions of deliberation (discovering, recognizing, investigating, appre-
ciating, and engaging with the reasons there are, and – perhaps – creating 
new reasons).
Sometimes the costs of making the wrong choice are so high as to 
swamp the cost of continued deliberation. Neither costs nor benefits need 
be financial: some of us find comparing insurance policies oddly fascinat-
ing, while also deploring its necessity as a feature of gotcha capitalism. 
All told, sometimes it can make sense to stay and re-check one’s calcula-
tion: there is a definite cost to this, not least opportunity cost but also the 
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prospect of a gain. Continued deliberation can bring net benefits, either 
by making it more likely that we choose the correct option or because of 
deliberation itself having non-causal benefits.
On the other hand, sometimes even when it’s clear that continued 
deliberation would produce a better choice, deliberation is not worth it 
and thus not rational. I buy my fruit and vegetables from the local Aldi. 
Aldi is a discounter, so – inevitably – there are some bruised or otherwise 
damaged bananas in the large tub that one must reach down into. I could 
achieve a better banana-outcome by deliberating for longer about which 
banana to take. But Aldi has decent quality controls, so I know that the 
truly undesirable bananas are rare, and such deliberation takes time. So it 
would be (even given my relative frugality) irrational for me to deliberate 
about each banana, not to mention about every item in my weekly shop. 
The food outcome would be better, but the opportunity cost and mental 
strain of the deliberation would be large. A quick survey to eliminate any 
obviously inferior bananas is the best strategy. Applied to nearly every 
item, this strategy will get me out of the store in a decent amount of time, 
with several bags of acceptable produce.
But only nearly every item. There are some goods in the shop that 
repay careful examination. The most obvious one is the avocado: a 
bruised or damaged avocado is near-unrecoverable, and so avocados 
need careful inspection. I’m laboring this point because it illustrates 
one thing: the difference between avocados and bananas is not that the 
stakes are higher when choosing the former (they are, but only a little). 
The difference is that things are more likely to go wrong with avocados, 
so even given roughly equal stakes, the expected payoff of deliberating 
about them is higher. Even under undoubted cases of trichotomy, some-
times deliberation is rational and sometimes not, and the stakes are not 
the only things that vary.
What about continued deliberation under equal goodness? It must be 
conceded that if we are certain that two options are precisely equally 
good, then it would be perverse to continue to deliberate between them. 
Buridan’s Ass should simply plump for one of the meals.6 But when it 
comes to complex choices, we almost never encounter cases of equal 
goodness. The cans of beans at the supermarket might be precisely 
equally good, but basically any complex choice with multiple dimen-
sions can engender incommensurability. I challenge you to think of a 
multidimensional comparison where two different options – no tricks, 
no implausible stipulations – are precisely equally good, despite being 
better along different dimensions. (And even in the can of beans case, if 
we look closely at the shelf, we might notice they vary slightly in appear-
ance…) All this is by way of arguing that if two options are precisely 
equally good then continued deliberation would nearly always be irra-
tional but that this is likely only to happen in cases where the options 
are qualitatively identical.
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My argument has been basically epistemic: the main benefits of delib-
eration are more knowledge (or certainty) about our situation and our 
reasons, and the consequent ability to act better; sometimes when the 
stakes are high, these can justify continued deliberation even when the 
facts are apparently all in.
Chang, of course, is not blind to the epistemic possibility. She argues 
that we can be practically certain that we are facing a hard choice, and 
that the deliberation argument can be run from this point: if it is rational 
to continue to deliberate beyond practical certainty, then there must be 
something else going on:
Although we may never be in a position to know, in some strong 
sense of “know,” that our reasons have run out in any particular 
case, we can, however, be practically certain that they have. If you 
are practically certain that p, it is irrational for you to act on the 
assumption that not p.
(Chang 2009: 250–251)
But need this state of practical certainty rule out further deliberation as 
irrational? Deliberation about a choice involving p is not straightfor-
wardly acting on the assumption that not p. And even if I’m absolutely 
certain that p, deliberating about what to do (where this depends on 
whether p) need not be irrational. As I’ve tried to argue, whether it is 
depends on the costs and benefits of continued deliberation, and they are 
not just epistemic. Consider:
Prison Escape. I’m locked in a cell and must wait an hour to make my 
escape attempt. I’m certain that it’ll be better to bash one guard over 
the head with a flowerpot rather than lock him in the bathroom, and 
these are my only two options, but the opportunity to do either will 
not arise for an hour.
Is it really irrational for me to continue to deliberate? I don’t think so. 
Of course there is the opportunity cost of not composing a prison son-
net or proof, but there are benefits too, such as confirmation that I am 
taking the right course and planning for various contingencies. (Some of 
this might stretch the boundaries of “deliberation,” but I think they fall 
within the broad scope of deciding and planning how to act.)
Prison Escape is extreme, but the point is general: granting Chang’s 
definition of practical certainty, practical certainty need not rule out 
deliberation as irrational. So even if we are practically certain that we 
are dealing with incommensurability, the apparent rationality of contin-
ued deliberation doesn’t show that deliberation includes more than fact-
finding or other non-voluntarist activities. And they seem rational even 
under trichotomy.
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That is half of my response to the deliberation argument for 
Hierarchical Voluntarism. The other half is much shorter: if the stakes 
are small enough – or the expected payoff of deliberation small enough, 
more generally – then even under incommensurability, continued delib-
eration is not rational. Think again about bananas. Suppose that you are 
going to buy one bunch of bananas, and each bunch costs £1. One bunch 
looks in just slightly better condition: a little riper, a little less bruised; the 
other bunch is bigger. Both are perfectly usable, but they are each better 
along different dimensions. Assuming that this is just one item on a regu-
lar weekly shop, should you continue to deliberate among these incom-
mensurate bunches of bananas? Of course not: getting a notebook and 
food scale and estimating some kind of quality-adjusted weight (akin to 
quality-adjusted life years in health care) for each banana would clearly 
be an irrational waste of your time.
That example was silly, but the overall argument is that there is no 
general connection between the presence of incommensurability and the 
rationality of continued deliberation beyond the point of well-founded 
belief about how your options compare.
There are several ways Chang could go here, such as restating the argu-
ment with a tweaked definition of practical certainty that p, as implying 
explicitly that continued deliberation about whether p is irrational. But 
I think this is not a plausible route. As the Prison Escape case shows, 
this kind of “deliberation-forbidding” practical certainty is far rarer. 
Moreover, one of the assumptions of the current dialectic is that delibera-
tion-forbidding practical certainty does not hold during many hard cases: 
the apparent rationality of continued deliberation under incommensura-
bility is what we are trying to explain.
3  Indeterminist Rationalism
I’ll now assume that incommensurability is vagueness, and that vague-
ness is indeterminacy: in the standard case, it’s neither true nor false 
that (i.e., indeterminate whether) A is better than B or that B is better 
than A. (It may be either false or neither true nor false that A and B are 
equally good.)
But what upshots does this view have for agency? What I’ll call 
Indeterminist Rationalism says that rationalism is true, but it’s often 
indeterminate what we have most reason to do:
Indeterminist Rationalism (IR). Rationalism is true, but it is often 
indeterminate which options (strongly and weakly) dominate others.
IR is somewhere between the rationalist and classical views. For Raz (and 
for hard incomparability in general), there is often determinately no best 
option because the ranking is incomplete. Under the indeterminacy view, 
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on the other hand, it is indeterminate which complete ranking is the cor-
rect one: there are multiple candidate rankings. Under the broadly super-
valuationist view I favor, this has the upshot that “there is a complete 
ranking of the options” is true because it’s a supertruth: it is true on every 
candidate ranking, though the rankings disagree about what that com-
plete ranking is. (Compare: “there is a precise minimum number of hairs 
to be non-bald” is supertrue according to supervaluationism, because 
true on every sharpening of “bald”; the sharpenings disagree about that 
number, however.)
I’ll argue that IR can neatly explain the two pieces of previously identi-
fied phenomenology – permissibility and rational continued deliberation. 
First, the permissibility intuition. Any sensible account of rational action 
under indeterminacy will say that when it’s indeterminate whether A or B 
is best (and determinate that no other option is best), Aing is acceptable 
and Bing is acceptable. Why the new terminology? Because there is some 
dispute about whether in such cases Aing and Bing are each permissible 
or merely borderline permissible. The most liberal kinds of rules say that 
both are permissible because E-admissible (that is to say, best on one 
sharpening); (Rinard 2015) has defended a view where in such cases Aing 
and Bing are each indeterminately permissible. But even on her view, all 
non-E-admissible options are impermissible.
Moving beyond an appeal to authority, I will say a few words about 
why I find a liberal account of action under indeterminacy plausible. 
First, looking at the structure of the case, if it’s indeterminate whether 
A or B is best, but determinate that every other option is strongly dom-
inated, then if you A or B, then it’s indeterminate whether you’ve done 
the best thing. If you do anything else, it’s determinate that you did not 
do the best thing. Since there is no option that is determinately best, if 
you A or B, there is no option to which a critic can point and say “you 
ought to have done that instead,” and say something determinately 
true. Whether you A or B, you have done the best you can in your situ-
ation because the best you can do is what is indeterminately best (to 
flirt with paradox).
Second, permissive judgments about actions seem clearly right in 
everyday cases of indeterminacy. Consider a sorites forced march: you 
are walked along a row of men, starting with the very shortest, and each 
taller than the next by 1 mm. Eventually, you are walking past some very 
tall men indeed. You are asked to comment accurately on whether each 
man is tall or not. Let’s assume that you do comment correctly on the 
clearly not-tall and the clearly tall men. If that is not the case, then you 
have determinately failed to complete your task correctly. Beyond that 
assumption, our issue concerns the penumbra, of borderline-tall men: 
your answer to “is this man tall?” should turn from No to Yes at some 
point in that penumbra. I think it is intuitively obvious that you are not 
criticizable if your verdict changes somewhere in the penumbra.
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We see how aspects of the Classical Conception are retained. Under a 
liberal decision rule, there will very often be choices not determined by 
reasons between options that are indeterminately, weakly dominant and 
thus plausibly described as rationally eligible.
Our second piece of phenomenology is the connection between incom-
mensurability and continued deliberation. As I argued earlier, there is no 
necessary connection: sometimes deliberation is rational under trichot-
omy, and sometimes it’s irrational under incommensurability. IR simply 
appeals to the thought that deliberation is an activity with its own costs 
and benefits.
But it would be churlish to deny that there does seem to be some 
connection between incommensurability and something like continued 
deliberation. IR explains this by appeal to some peculiar features of 
indeterminacy.
First, deliberation is rational when its expected benefit exceeds its 
expected cost. But under indeterminacy, it’s often non-obvious or even 
indeterminate whether this is so: the net expected payoff of each choice 
will itself be indeterminate, and thanks to the phenomenon of second-
order vagueness it may not even be clear whether we are facing an 
instance of incommensurability. It may also often be indeterminate how 
much deliberation costs (how much do you value your time, as against 
one of the goods at stake in the choice you face?) and so often indeter-
minate whether continued deliberation will bring some expected benefit.
Second, what looks like continued deliberation may simply be puzzle-
ment. Indeterminacy is a puzzling, paradoxical phenomenon (at least, 
paradoxical in those cases where it engenders a sorites) and it shouldn’t be 
surprising that we might linger when confronted with a practical manifes-
tation of it. We can see this by confronting avowed cases of choice under 
vagueness: suppose, for example, that I ask you to choose the shortest 
tall man in this crowded room. Assuming that there is some indetermi-
nacy about who is that man, it may seem obvious that you should simply 
pick a borderline-tall man. And yet I think in normal circumstances, you 
will “deliberate” for some time, perhaps leading yourself on some sorites 
forced marches (to make this vivid, suppose that each extra mm of height 
costs you £1). Eventually, you will likely settle on an arbitrary man in 
the penumbra of “tall man”: it is indeterminate whether he is the tallest 
short man, and it is indeterminate whether the slightly taller man next to 
him is the tallest short man.7 Your arbitrary choice is no better than the 
choice you could have made when initially confronted with the problem, 
and yet we would not judge you irrational for spending some time on it. 
The slogan view of IR is that it makes us stop and think, for much the 
same reason as indeterminacy everywhere can make us stop and think 
and puzzle. And as I’ll argue in the next section, if Humean accounts of 
reasons are true, then a broadly voluntaristic explanation of continued 
deliberation is indeed sometimes plausible.
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It might be objected that I’m simply assuming that questions of action 
under indeterminacy don’t themselves create any puzzling questions 
about agency. There is some truth to this but perhaps not when it comes 
to rationalism: if the indeterminacy in our reasons requires some theo-
rizing about agency, it will nevertheless not take us away from the core 
rationalist claim that rational action is acting for what we take to be the 
strongest set of reasons.
4  Indeterminist Humeanism and Naturalistic Voluntarism
To finish, I will explore the upshot of IR when paired with the view that 
desires provide reasons:
Indeterminist Humeanism (IH). IR is true, and all reasons are pro-
vided by desires.
There are many versions of “Humean” or “internalist” accounts of rea-
sons, but they center on the idea that somehow, an agent has a reason 
to do A iff Aing would promote the satisfaction of one of that agent’s 
desires. The classic of the genre is (Williams 1981), but there are many 
internalists of different kinds.
I won’t engage in detail with arguments against desires as reasons, 
except to concede that they need an answer, but I will mention one of 
them. A common objection to Humeanism is that it would mean that 
deliberation about what to do is at base consideration of what we desire 
most, insofar as we deliberate about our reasons. This is often felt to 
be implausible, and in response, some versions of Humeanism say that 
though reasons depend on desires, it is not true that the desires are 
the reasons. See (Schroeder 2007) for an influential and sophisticated 
Humean response to this worry.
I do not find it implausible that all deliberation is at least partly 
about what we desire. For example, I was unsure whether to travel by 
train or by plane to Stockholm for the conference. I dislike flying, both 
for its hassle and its environmental damage, but this rail journey would 
take approximately two full days, and with a child at home, I decided 
in the end to fly. I deliberated about this for some time, and I have no 
difficulty construing this deliberation in terms of desires: “do I really 
want to be stuck on a train for two days, burning money on food out 
of boredom?” seems to me a wholly accurate description of my delib-
erative activity. It’s not obviously false that we always deliberate about 
what we desire most.
But enough about the Humeanism. What about the indeterminacy? 
IH will then locate the source of – at least some – incommensurability in 
indeterminacy in our beliefs and desires. If my desires are imprecise, then 
they may be sharpened in various ways, and on some sharpenings of my 
Incommensurability and Agency 195
desires I prefer one house and have most reason to buy that one, and on 
other sharpenings I prefer the other and have most reason to buy that 
one. I want both a comfortable place to read and a short commute to 
work, but precisely how do these desires weigh against each other? How 
many commuting minutes am I willing to give up for an extra square 
meter of writing space? And so on. IH says that the answers to these 
questions are indeterminate, and so choices that depend on those answers 
will also manifest indeterminacy, in a version of IR.
IH engenders a naturalistic quasi-voluntarism because what I desire 
is at least partly within my control – and if my desires change, then my 
reasons change.
It is voluntarism, in the sense that if I can change my desires, I can 
change the normative valence of some fact, without changing the facts 
of the matter, unlike in the promising case. If I can give myself a desire 
that some car is red, then I can give myself a reason to get out the spray 
paint. But it is naturalistic and only quasi-voluntaristic because chang-
ing my reasons relies on causal, contingent mechanisms for changing my 
desires – there is no direct rational “endorsement” of some feature or fact 
that makes it a reason. To give myself a reason to eat vegan food, I may 
undergo hypnosis or choose to reflect deeply and vividly on the meth-
ods of industrial farming, believing that this will strengthen my desire to 
avoid many kinds of animal products. But the naturalistic nature of the 
view means that the process may not be predictable: perhaps I will simply 
be inured to the brutal realities. Animal farmers are not typically vegan, 
though there could be many explanations of that fact.
I have limited voluntary control over how my reasons evolve. As we 
have just seen, our desires may evolve in unpredictable ways – though 
ones that can seem to be retrospectively inevitable – we may move to the 
countryside in search of more space and then either develop a taste for 
rural life or come by grim experience to hate commuting. These develop-
ments are not only unpredictable but also chaotic and random: it may be 
that you hate commuting this year because of the pandemic and because 
your next-door neighbor – who takes the same train as you – is obnox-
ious. But had you moved to the countryside next year, after the vaccine 
and after said neighbor moved away, you’d grow to appreciate the peace 
of a commute.
The point is that you can at least partly affect what you desire, and 
thus what you have reason to do. But doing so will not always be per-
missible. In particular, “strategic” deliberation, with the aim of changing 
your desires and thus your reasons, will often be irrational. If at time 
t0 you have most reason to A, which strongly dominates all your other 
options, then it is impermissible to engage in a path of deliberation that 
will make you less likely to A. If you have most reason to quit smoking, 
then it’s impermissible to engage in visualizations about how horrible 
withdrawal will be, visualizations that make it less likely that you will 
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quit. This is because the deliberation dis-promotes the outcome that you 
quit smoking: it makes it less likely that you comply with your reasons.
But, of course, if your deliberation is successful, then your desires may 
have sufficiently changed that you now at t1 have most reason to not-A: 
most reason to keep smoking. Yesterday, strategic deliberation in favor of 
smoking was impermissible; today, strategic deliberation in favor of quit-
ting is impermissible. The deliberation has been a sort of transformative 
experience, similar to that described by (Paul 2014). But this shouldn’t 
be too much of a surprise because according to the Humean view I’m 
appealing to, our reasons may often change.
Indeterminacy permits a little more strategic deliberation. If at t0 it is 
indeterminate whether I have most reason to A or to B, then assuming 
a permissive decision rule, not only is it permissible for me to A or to B, 
it’s also permissible for me to go to a therapist who will strengthen my 
desire to A or to her colleague who strengthens B-desires. But doing so 
is optional: indeterminist “drifting” is often respectable. And taking the 
wider view, fixing my reasons is not always permissible – the cost of 
therapy may exceed any benefit of having determinate reasons.
Here we see a kind of hierarchy in the voluntarism: if it’s indetermi-
nate whether I have most reason to A or to B, I may only permissibly 
do things that make it more likely that I A or that I B. Typically, there 
will be a general causal connection between “getting more reason to X” 
and “becoming more likely to X,” especially given a Humean view. So 
typically, if I ought not C, then I ought not engage in therapy that will 
foreseeably strengthen my reasons to C. And there will be exceptions 
to even this.
It’s possible to break out of the hierarchy. At t1, if the set of permis-
sible options has been changed, then – even if the process that begun the 
change at t0 was impermissible at t0 – the change stands. Deliberating to 
create these reasons was impermissible, but we are where we are, and so 
acting upon them at t1 is not. If all reasons are grounded in desires, then 
there is no hard boundary to the playground.
Of course, not only deliberation can change our desires. The actions I 
take now may well determine my reasons. But since the process is natu-
ralistic and often unpredictable, we may reject the following argument 
due to Raz:
[T]here is no reason for incommensurabilities among the options 
open to the agents, for when push comes to shove, the need to choose 
will concentrate the minds of the choosers, who will realize (or think 
that they do) that they want one of the options more than the others.
(Raz 2002: 49)
As a claim about the phenomenology of deliberation, it seems false to 
me. Perhaps there are biases that reconstruct desires, but I often seem to 
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plump without forming desires. Retrospectively, I can see that it would 
have been quite consistent with my wants to have gone the other way – 
but I had to choose. In principle, this is little different choice under the 
weak dominance of Buridan’s Ass.
The more general point of this section has been that once we admit that 
desires can provide reasons – and especially if only desires can provide 
reasons – and that there can be indeterminacy therein, a kind of unpre-
dictable naturalistic non-hierarchical voluntarism becomes an option.
5  Conclusion 
Both of the authors I’ve considered draw conclusions about agency from 
incommensurability. Raz argues that agents can’t create normativity, but 
the will can choose between incommensurate options, meaning a some-
what beefed-up role for the will, which does more than simply execute 
the verdicts of reason. Chang, by contrast, argues that agents can create 
normativity but only within the space of rational freedom marked out by 
the given reasons. Here the faculty of reason and deliberation is beefed 
up to cope with cases where that space is non-trivial.
I have argued, pace Raz and Chang, that incommensurability and related 
phenomena need not inspire radical views about agency. According to 
the two indeterminist views I’ve considered, incommensurability brings 
many quirks and oddities but does not fundamentally affect the nature 
of deliberation.
Notes
 1 For incisive written comments, I am indebted to Henrik Andersson, 
John Broome, Ruth Chang, Anders Herlitz, Brad Hooker, David Hull, 
and Philip Stratton-Lake. I’m also grateful to participants at the 2019 
“Incommensurability: Vagueness, Parity and other Non-Conventional 
Comparative Relations” conference in Stockholm, an audience at Oakland 
University, and participants in the Reading philosophy Graduate Class.
 2 If the vagueness view I discuss next is correct, then “incommensurate” may be 
a sensible usage since at least some of the time, incommensurability involves 
its being vague about how options are to be compared on the same scale – 
how they are to be measured against each other.
 3 I’m grateful to John Broome and Brad Hooker for forcing me to be clearer 
here. Hooker points out that supererogation may complicate claims such as 
“we ought to choose the best option.” But the arguments to follow can focus 
only on cases where that claim is uncomplicatedly true.
 4 I’m grateful to Brad Hooker and Philip Stratton-Lake for discussion of this 
point.
 5 I’m grateful to Ruth Chang for discussion on this point.
 6 I’m grateful to Anders Herlitz for suggesting this connection.
 7 Unless we are at the edge of the penumbra, but that possibility is complicated 
by second-order vagueness, where “borderline” itself has borderline cases.
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The problem I discuss in this chapter concerns interaction between incom-
mensurability in value and risk.1 More specifically, the chapter focuses on 
value comparisons between risky actions whose outcomes are bound to 
be mutually incommensurable whatever state the world might be in. It 
is seemingly obvious that, in such circumstances, the actions themselves 
must be incommensurable in their value. Relatedly, it is seemingly obvi-
ous that one action cannot be better than another if its outcome would 
not be better than that of the other action, whatever state the world might 
be in. But these intuitions, as we shall see, can well be challenged. Indeed, 
they should be challenged, as there are cases in which they lead us astray.
The problem, in its main outline, was identified by Caspar Hare (cf. 
Hare 2010; see also Hare 2009, 2013: 45–57). It was subsequently dis-
cussed by Temkin (2012), Schoenfield (2014), and Bales et al. (2014).2 
While Hare views it as a problem concerning rational preferences and 
rational choice between risky actions, I discuss it as a challenge for for-
mal axiology, more specifically for a formal account of value relations. 
The general question is how axiology should deal with situations in 
which value incommensurability interacts with risk. This is also Temkin’s 
perspective on the problem. Schoenfield and Bales et al. combine these 
two perspectives, i.e., the perspective of axiology and that of rational 
choice. They present it as a problem for rational choice guided by value 
comparisons. All these authors’ contributions will be briefly commented 
on in what follows, though primarily in footnotes.
In the main text, I am going to focus on the problem itself, as I view 
it, and on how I think it should be solved. I will describe the problem in 
Section 1. In Section 2, I will present the solution I oppose, and then, in 
Section 3, I will present my own solution. In Section 4, I will defend my 
solution against a prima facie objection, and then, in Sections 5–7, I will 
provide an extended argument against the solution I oppose and in sup-
port of the one I favor. This argument will be based on a formal account 
of value relations inspired by the Fitting-Attitudes Analysis of value. In 
Section 8, I will identify a limitation in the scope of my argument, a 




limitation that leads to a residual issue I address in Section 9. This issue 
is one I do not know how to resolve.3
1  The Problem
To set up the problem in its general form, consider four possible out-
comes, a, b, a+, and b+, such that a+ is better than a but not better than b, 
while b+ is better than b but not better than a.
By the transitivity properties of betterness and equal goodness, it fol-
lows from the aforementioned that no other betterness relationships 
obtain between these four outcomes, nor are any of them equally good. 
Thus, a and a+ are incommensurable both with b and with b+, where by 
incommensurability I mean the following value relation:
Two items are incommensurable iff neither item is better than the 
other nor are they equally good.
To illustrate, suppose that a and b are two attractive holiday options: 
two holiday trips to exciting, but very different, destinations. Say, a is a 
trip to the Galápagos Islands, while b is a trip to Peru; a+ and b+ are the 
same trips at a small discount (or simply two slightly improved trips to 
the same locations as a and b, respectively). The destinations are different 
enough to make a and b incommensurable in value. The discounts (slight 
improvements) make a+ better than a and b+ better than b, but they are 
not significant enough to make a+ better than b or b+ better than a.4
Let S1 and S2 be two equiprobable states of the world (two “states of 
nature”), exactly one of which is actually going to obtain. These states 
determine the outcomes of the available actions. We assume that the 
states per se are axiologically neutral (i.e., they are devoid of any value, 
either positive or negative) and, furthermore, that they do not contribute 
any value, positive or negative, to the outcomes they determine. Suppose, 
for example, that a fair coin is to be tossed and that the states are the two 
possible results of the toss: S1 is heads and S2 is tails. We assume that 
heads and tails both have the same objective probability of one-half.
The two states form a partition: they are mutually incompatible and 
jointly exhaustive. I will interpret actions in Savage’s manner, as functions 
from states to outcomes. These are the outcomes they would cause, in 
different states. This way of understanding actions seems unproblematic 
as long as the states are causally and probabilistically independent of the 
actions, which I am going to assume in what follows. Indeed, I am going 
to assume throughout that we only consider state partitions in which 
the states are action-independent and are devoid of any value, whether 
intrinsic or contributive.
Now, consider two actions, X and Y, and their outcomes in states S1 
and S2, respectively:




Thus, action X yields a+ in S1 and b+ in S2, while Y yields b in S1 and 
a in S2.5
The problem to be discussed in this chapter is simple to pose: is X better 
than Y? It might well seem so since both outcomes of X are improvements 
on the outcomes of Y.6 But it might also be argued that X is not better than 
Y, since no outcome of X is better than the outcome Y would have in the 
same state. Indeed, in each state, the outcomes of X and Y are incommen-
surable.7 I will now consider the arguments on both sides in more detail: in 
the next section, I will focus on the view that X is not better than Y, and in 
the section after that, the opposing view will be considered.
In what follows, I shall refer to the issue at hand as Hare’s Problem, 
in honor of its originator.8 In Hare’s Problem, in the form in which I 
pose it, incommensurability meets risk, but solving this problem does not, 
of course, give us anything like a complete account of the interactions 
between risk and incommensurability. Attempting to offer such a com-
plete account goes far beyond the goals I have set myself in this chapter. 
Still, solving Hare’s Problem should give us at least some opening to a 
more comprehensive theory.
2  X Is not Better than Y
Assuming that states that form a given partition are causally and proba-
bilistically independent of actions, the following principle is obviously 
correct:
(Statewise) Dominance: (i) An action is better than another action 
if, in every state, its outcome is better than that of the other action. 
(ii) An action is at least as good as another action if, in every state, its 
outcome is at least as good as that of the other action.9
Now, consider another principle that seems close in spirit to Dominance:
Complementary (Statewise) Dominance: An action is not better than 
another action if, in every state, its outcome is not better than that of 
the other action.
Or, to put it more succinctly, an action is not better than another if there 
is no state in which it has a better outcome.10,11
While the first clause of Dominance links better outcomes to better 
actions, Complementary Dominance postulates the corresponding link 
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between outcomes and actions as regards the complement of betterness: 
the relation of not being better. If the outcomes are not better, in any 
state, then the action is not better.
There is also an important connection between Complementary 
Dominance and the second clause of Dominance: in the absence of incom-
mensurabilities, “not better” is equivalent to “at most as good” – the 
converse of “at least as good.” Consequently, in the absence of incom-
mensurabilities, Complementary Dominance would collapse to the sec-
ond clause of Dominance, which can also be expressed as follows: an 
action is at most as good as another action if, in every state, its outcome 
is at most as good as that of the other action. But if incommensurabilities 
are allowed, as in the case presented here, Complementary Dominance 
represents an independent constraint.
In Hare’s Problem, Complementary Dominance entails that X is not 
better than Y, since there is no state in which the outcome of X is better 
than that of Y.12
That X is not better than Y would also follow if we were to accept a 
principle that links incommensurability of outcomes to incommensura-
bility of actions:
Incommensurability: Two actions are incommensurable if their out-
comes are incommensurable in every state.
While Incommensurability does not entail Complementary Dominance, 
nor is it entailed by it, the two principles are closely related in spirit. 
Whoever accepts one of these principles should be willing, I think, to 
accept the other.
It might seem that principles such as Complementary Dominance and 
Incommensurability are irresistible, as irresistible as Dominance. Here is 
how an argument for these principles might proceed.
Consider the value of an action conditional on (the obtaining of) a 
particular state. Arguably, this conditional value can be reduced to the 
value of that action’s outcome in the state in question. This suggests that 
the same should hold for conditional value relations:
 (i) The value relation between two actions that is conditional on a par-
ticular state reduces to the value relation between the outcomes of 
these actions in that state.
But it would seem that
 (ii) If two actions stand in the same value relation conditional on 
each state, then this value relation must also hold between them 
unconditionally.
Premises (i) and (ii) imply that
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 (iii) If the outcomes of two actions stand in the same value relation in 
each state, then this value relation must also hold between the two 
actions unconditionally.13
If this argument is correct, then principles such as Complementary 
Dominance and Incommensurability must be valid, as they are special 
cases of (iii), along with Dominance.
But the argument is not correct, at least not as it stands. Its conclu-
sion (iii) is not generally true for all value relations. To see this, consider 
a value relation such as “not equally as good.” It might well be that two 
actions do not stand in this relation even though their outcomes in each 
state do. For example, suppose you can bet on heads or on tails and gain 
$1 if you win. The two bets are equally good assuming that heads are 
equally as probable as tails. But in every state, whether it is heads or tails, 
the outcomes of the bets are not equally good: one bet is won and the 
other is lost.
One might object that the two actions in this betting example are 
not equally good: one of them is better than the other, but which it is 
depends on the state that actually obtains. If the coin is going to fall 
heads up, then betting on heads is better than betting on tails, and if 
it is going to fall tails up, then betting on tails is better than betting on 
heads. This objection assumes that the value of an action depends on 
the actual state of the world.14 It is certainly one way of looking at an 
action’s value, but it is not the only way. When we consider an action ex 
ante, before learning the state the world is in, and think of it as a poten-
tial object of choice, its outcomes in all positively probable states should 
play a role in determining its value – or so I would argue. However, 
arguing for this ex ante approach to the evaluation of actions and, more 
generally, for an ex ante approach to the evaluation of risky prospects 
would take us too far afield in this chapter. Instead, here I take the ex 
ante perspective for granted. The question I discuss is therefore the fol-
lowing: what is the right solution to Hare’s Problem given the ex ante 
approach to evaluation?15
If (iii) is not generally true, then premise (i) or premise (ii) in the previ-
ous argument must be rejected. I am inclined to accept (i) but reject (ii). 
Given (i), it follows that conditionally on each state the two actions in 
the betting example are not equally good, because their outcomes are 
not equally good. But still, unconditionally, the actions are equally good, 
which provides a counterexample to premise (ii).
Since the previous argument, which issues in (iii), is incorrect and 
its conclusion is not generally true, Complementary Dominance and 
Incommensurability would need to be defended in some other way. As 
long as these principles are in doubt, we cannot conclude that, in Hare’s 
Problem, action X is not better than Y.
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3  X Is Better than Y
That X is better than Y is the position I accept myself. I will argue for it in 
this section and defend this argument further in the section that follows. 
I also need to explain what is wrong with Complementary Dominance 
and will do so in Sections 6 and 7 after some necessary preparations in 
Section 5.
Here, then, is how an argument for X being better than Y can be set up. 
I will first do so using very strong assumptions and then show how these 
assumptions can be successively weakened.
If states of nature are assigned objective probabilities, we can compare 
actions in terms of the lotteries on outcomes that the actions give rise to. 
The lottery lx generated by an action x is a probability distribution over 
outcomes o such that for at least one state, S, in the state partition, x(S) = o. 
For each such outcome o, lx(o) is the sum of the probabilities of the states 
in which x yields this outcome:
lx(o) = ΣS P(S)(x(S) = o),
where S ranges over the states in a given partition.
As is easy to see,
lX = (a
+, .5; b+, .5), while lY = (b, .5; a, .5).
In this notation, we describe a lottery by listing its possible outcomes, 
with each outcome being followed by its probability. The ordering in 
which the outcomes are listed does not matter, so, for example, (b, .5; a, 
.5) and (a, .5; b, .5) describe the same lottery.
The von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory assumes that 
preferences for lotteries satisfy the axiom of Independence: replacing 
an outcome in a lottery with another outcome that is a more preferred 
results in a more preferred lottery. What follows is the corresponding 
principle for value comparisons:
Independence: For all outcomes o, o′, o″ and all probabilities p > 0, 
(o, p; o″, 1−p) is better than (o′, p; o″, 1 −p) iff o is better than o′.
According to this principle, different lottery prizes (outcomes) make inde-
pendent value contributions to the value of a lottery: improving a prize 
always improves the lottery.
Since a+ is better than a and b+ is better than b, Independence implies 
that (a+, .5; b+, .5) is a better lottery than (a+, .5; b, .5) and that the latter 
lottery is better than (a, .5; b, .5). Since betterness is transitive, it follows 
that lX = (a
+, .5; b+, .5) is better than lY = (a, .5; b, .5).
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Suppose we now assume:
Reduction of Actions to Lotteries: For all actions x and y, x is better 
than (equally as good as) y iff lx is better than (equally as good as) ly.
According to this principle, the value of an action is determined by the 
value of the associated lottery.
It follows from Independence and Reduction of Actions to Lotteries 
that action X is better than action Y, contrary to what is implied by 
Complementary Dominance.
An argument for X being better than Y can be constructed in another way 
as well, without relying on such strong principles as Reduction of Actions 
to Lotteries and Independence. (Independence, in particular, is highly prob-
lematic. As is well-known, its preferential version has counterintuitive 
implications, as exemplified by the famous Allais’ Problem.) Instead, we 
could appeal to Dominance, which we should accept in any case, together 
with the following weakening of Reduction of Actions to Lotteries:
Weak Reduction of Actions to Lotteries: If two actions give rise to 
the same lottery, they are equally good.16





Y and Z give rise to the same lottery, (a, .5; b, .5). (Remember that the 
ordering of the outcomes in the description of a lottery does not matter.) 
Thus, Y and Z are equally good by the Weak Reduction of Actions to 
Lotteries. But by (the first clause of) Dominance, X is better than Z since, 
in every state, X’s outcome is better than Z’s. Since betterness is transitive 
across equal goodness, this means that X must also be better than Y.
Indeed, the detour through lotteries is not needed to establish the result 
we are after. Instead, we can base our argument on a very simple principle 
that is even less demanding than Weak Reduction of Actions to Lotteries.
Switch: If for some equiprobable states S and S′, an action x can be 
obtained from an action y just by switching outcomes between S and 
S′, then actions x and y are equally good.17
In other words, a mere switch of outcomes between equiprobable states 
does not affect the value of an action.18
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Now, it is easy to see that action Z results from Y by such a switch of 
outcomes between equiprobable states S1 and S2. Thus, Switch implies 
that Y and Z are equally good and, therefore, again by (the first clause 
of) Dominance and the transitivity of betterness across equal goodness, 
X is better than Y, just as X is better than Z.19 I find this argument from 
Switch both simple and compelling.20
Bales et al. (2014) pose an objection to Hare’s (2010) dominance-
based argument for the impermissibility of Y, an argument in which 
Hare also introduces a third action Z that is obtained from Y by switch-
ing outcomes.21 Their objection can be adapted to my argument as 
well, as follows: action Z would still be dominated by X even if states 
had unequal probabilities. However, if the states’ probabilities were 
unequal, we would no longer be able to use Switch (or Weak Reduction 
of Actions to Lotteries) to prove that Y and Z are equally good. We 
would thus be unable to establish that X is better than Y.22 This seems 
unsatisfactory.
I do not find this objection very worrying. That the argument does 
not extend to cases in which the state probabilities are unequal is as 
it should be. If the difference in state probabilities were non-negligible, 
then it would be reasonable to judge that X and Y are incommensurable. 
Indeed, the modeling of value relations that I am going to present next 
(beginning in Section 5) bears this out. On the other hand, it might be 
reasonable to expect that X would still be better than Y if the difference 
in state probabilities were very small. The argument I have presented 
cannot be used to prove it, but this limitation in scope does not make the 
argument less compelling.
I do recognize, however, that friends of Complementary Dominance 
will not be swayed by the argument but will reject one of its premises. 
Since they are committed to Dominance and also, I take it, to the transi-
tivity of betterness across equal goodness, they will have to reject Switch. 
Indeed, this move is perfectly natural for a friend of Complementary 
Dominance. As noted earlier, accepting that principle goes hand in 
hand with accepting Incommensurability, but Incommensurability is 
incompatible with Switch. Since outcomes a and b are incommensura-
ble, actions Y and Z lead to incommensurable outcomes in every state. 
Therefore, Incommensurability implies that that Y and Z themselves 
are incommensurable and not equally good, as Switch would have it. 
In other words, from this perspective, Switch must be rejected. (The 
same, of course, goes for the stronger principles, such as the Reduction, 
or Weak Reduction, of Actions to Lotteries.) Thus, there is still work 
to do as long as we haven’t yet provided a direct argument against 
Complementary Dominance and Incommensurability. I will attempt to 
do it in Sections 6 and 7; then I will also provide reasons for accepting 
Switch.
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4  The Same Outcomes?
First, however, we need to consider and put to rest another potential 
objection to the argument from Switch. The application of Switch to the 
case at hand assumes that the outcome of Y in S1 is the same as that of Z 
in S2, and – analogously – that the outcome of Y in S2 is the same as that 
of Z in S1. This might be questioned.
One way to question it is by arguing that an outcome includes the 
state in which it occurs. Thus, a more complete description of, say, the 
outcome of Y in S1 is ‘b in state S1′, while a more complete description of 
the outcome of Z in S2 is ‘b in state S2′. Conceived in this way, these two 
outcomes are not identical. Thus, it is not true that Z is obtained from 
Y by a mere outcome switch between equiprobable states. (For the same 
reason, the lotteries that Y and Z give rise to are not identical either.)
But this non-identity objection is ungrounded. It is perfectly reasonable 
to exclude from the outcomes those parts that are axiologically irrel-
evant. And we have assumed that the states in Hare’s Problem are irrel-
evant in this way. While they determine the outcomes of the actions, they 
do not contribute any value, positive or negative, to the outcomes under 
consideration. Consequently, there is no reason to incorporate such states 
into outcomes.
A more challenging version of the non-identity objection distinguishes 
between seemingly identical outcomes by taking into account their modal 
features. In particular, if we evaluate the outcome of an action, one rel-
evant consideration might be what the action could have brought about 
instead if the state of the world had been different. Think of a bet in 
which you lose a sum of money. For the evaluation of this outcome, it 
might well play a role whether the bet could have resulted in a large win. 
This modal fact may be relevant (positively or negatively) to the disvalue 
of your loss, so it may be reasonable to require that it should be included 
in the outcome specification.
This kind of appeal to what might have been does not, however, dis-
tinguish between the outcomes in the problem at hand. Thus, consider 
b, which is the outcome of action Y in S1. In the other, equally probable 
state, Y would have resulted in a. The situation is exactly similar concern-
ing b as the outcome of action Z in state S2: in the other, equally prob-
able state, Z would have resulted in a. Therefore, in this respect, there is 
no difference between b as the outcome of Y and b as the outcome of Z. 
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to outcome a, as brought about by 
Y or by Z.
An appeal to the modal features of outcomes might, however, also 
take another form: in evaluating an outcome of an action, it is one thing 
to consider what this action might have brought about if the state had 
been different. But we could also consider what would or could have 
210 Wlodek Rabinowicz
happened in the same state if another available action had been per-
formed instead. It might be argued that a loss resulting from a risky 
action is less bad for the agent if, in a given state, it could not have been 
prevented by acting differently: under such circumstances, there is no 
reason to regret what one has done, and this might make the outcome 
easier to bear.23
In the problem we are considering, there is a modal difference of this 
kind between the otherwise identical outcomes of Y and Z, a difference 
that might be relevant to their value. Thus, the outcome b of Y in S1 is 
not worse than the outcome in that state of any other action at the agent’s 
disposal. In S1, actions X and Z would have brought about a+ and a, 
respectively, and neither of these outcomes is better than b. By contrast, 
the outcome b of Z in S2 is worse than the outcome b+ of X in the same 
state. Because of this modal difference, it is arguable that the outcome b 
of Z in S2 is worse than the outcome b of Y in S1. The same applies to a. 
The outcome a of Z in S1 is arguably worse than the outcome a of Y in 
S2: in S1, if the agent had chosen X instead of Z, she would have brought 
about a better outcome, a+. But in S2, if the agent had chosen X instead 
of Y, she would not have brought about a better outcome, as b+ is not 
better than a. This forms a basis for the objection that action Z is worse 
than action Y: each outcome of Z is worse than the seemingly identical 
outcome of Y. Consequently, even though, by Dominance, X is better 
than Z, it does not follow that X is better than Y.
The objection just presented is controversial since it is debatable 
whether the modal features of outcomes should be seen as relevant to 
their value. However, there is a way to finesse the objection instead of 
meeting it head on: we can simply change the example by introducing a 






By introducing U, we make Y and Z perfectly symmetrical in their 
modal properties: we make their corresponding outcomes modally iden-
tical. Just as for Z there is another action, X, that in every state has a 
better outcome, so it is for Y in our modified example: there is another 
action, U, that in every state has a better outcome. Thus, a as the outcome 
of Y and a as the outcome of Z now have the same modal features, as do 
b as the outcome of Y and b as the outcome of Z.
Thus, in the presence of this fourth action, modal considerations no 
longer pose any obstacle to applying Switch to Y and Z and concluding 
Incommensurability Meets Risk 211
that these two actions are equally good. In combination with Dominance 
and the transitivity of betterness across equal goodness, we can then draw 
the conclusion that X is better than Y.
Someone might object at this point: your argument from Switch shows 
that X is better than Y when Z is available, and you have now improved 
the argument by bringing in the fourth option, U. But how is this sup-
posed to show that X is better than Y when no other alternatives are on 
offer, as is the case in Hare’s original problem?24 I agree that the argu-
ment does not show this if one believes that the value of an action might 
depend on what the agent could have done instead. Note, however, that 
Complementary Dominance implies that X is not better than Y, even if Z 
and U are available – that is, even in the case in which the argument from 
Switch cannot be faulted on modal grounds. Consequently, this argu-
ment at least shows that Complementary Dominance must be rejected if 
Switch is accepted.
In what follows I will simplify my discussion by assuming that the 
modal features of actions are not relevant to their value. On this assump-
tion, it does not matter for the comparison of X with Y whether or not 
they are the only alternatives on offer. The argument from Switch can 
then be used to draw the conclusion that X is better than Y quite gener-
ally, independently of what other actions might be available. However, 
Complementary Dominance, which might seem at least as compelling as 
Switch, implies that this conclusion is false. Therefore, if we want to hold 
on to the view that X is better than Y, we need to confront the opposition 
head on and take a closer look at Complementary Dominance. Is this 
principle as compelling as it seems to be at first sight?
5  Value Relations Analyzed
To approach this issue, it is helpful to ask first how value relations should 
be analyzed. In Rabinowicz (2008), I proposed such an analysis in the 
spirit of the Fitting-Attitudes account of value. According to this account, 
to be valuable is to be a fitting target of a pro-attitude. An item i is valu-
able iff it is fitting (appropriate, suitable) to have a pro-attitude toward i. 
Or, to put it in more standard normative terms, i is valuable iff one ought 
to have a pro-attitude toward i.25 Different kinds of value correspond to 
different kinds of fitting pro-attitudes. Items that exhibit “thick” values, 
that are, say, admirable or delightful, call for “thick” pro-attitudes: admi-
ration, delight. “Thin” values, such as goodness, correspond to “thin” 
pro-attitudes: approval or appreciation. For thin value relations, such 
as betterness, the relevant pro-attitude is preference: an item i is bet-
ter than an item j iff one ought to prefer i to j. Analogously, i and j 
are equally good iff one ought to equi-prefer i and j, i.e., be indifferent 
between them. Consequently, i and j are incommensurable iff one neither 
ought to prefer one to the other nor ought to be indifferent. The kind 
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of preference and indifference that is relevant in this context is meant to 
be a relatively stable and considered stance. Betterness and equal good-
ness are thus analyzed in terms of normative requirements regarding 
considered preferential attitudes. These normative requirements might 
in some cases leave leeway for different preferences: if divergent prefer-
ences regarding i and j are permissible (not unfitting), then these items 
are incommensurable.
Let I be the domain of items that are being compared and suppose 
that K is the non-empty class of all permissible preference orderings of 
that domain. We assume that in every ordering in K, weak preference 
(i.e., preference-or-indifference) is a reflexive and transitive relation. 
Preference and indifference are definable in terms of weak preference in 
the standard way, as, respectively, the asymmetric and symmetric parts 
of that relation. This implies, for the orderings in K, that preference is 
transitive and asymmetric, while indifference is transitive, symmetric, and 
reflexive. We can now define different value relations on I in terms of K. 
For any two items i and j in I,
i is better than j iff in every ordering in K, i is preferred to j,
which is another way of saying that one ought to prefer i to j, and
i is equally as good as j iff in every ordering in K, i and j are 
equi-preferred,
which is another way of saying that one ought to equi-prefer i and j.
These definitions imply that the relation of betterness-or-equal good-
ness is transitive and reflexive because weak preference has been assumed 
to be transitive and reflexive. In its turn, this entails that betterness is 
transitive and asymmetric, while equal goodness is transitive, symmet-
ric, and reflexive. It also implies that betterness is transitive across equal 
goodness, i.e., that i is better than j if i is better than k and k and j are 
equally good. We were assuming this property of betterness in our argu-
ment from Switch in Section 3: X is better than Y if X is better than Z and 
Z and Y are equally good.
Given this modeling of value relations,
i and j are incommensurable iff
 (i) there are orderings in K in which i is not preferred to j,
 (ii) there are orderings in K in which j is not preferred to i, and
 (iii) there are orderings in K in which i and j are not equi-preferred.
Clauses (i)–(iii) amount, respectively, to three conditions: i is not bet-
ter than j, j is not better than i, and i and j are not equally good.
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Note that these necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of incom-
mensurability are satisfied if (though not only if) the following holds:
K contains two preference orderings such that, in one, i is preferred 
to j, and in the other, j is preferred to i.
In Rabinowicz (2008), I suggested that this condition can be used to 
define a very common form of incommensurability that Ruth Chang calls 
“parity” (cf. Chang 2002). Accordingly,
i and j are on a par iff
it is permissible to prefer i to j and likewise permissible to prefer j 
to i26
Cases like this may arise when the comparison between two items is 
based on weighing several relevant dimensions, or aspects, of comparison 
against each other. One item might rate higher than the other on some of 
the dimensions and lower on others. Different assignments of weights to 
dimensions are often admissible in such cases, giving rise to different per-
missible all-things-considered preference orderings of items. K is meant to 
be the class of all such permissible all-things-considered orderings. If item 
i comes higher than j given some admissible assignments of weights to the 
dimensions of comparison, while j comes higher than i given some other 
admissible weight assignments, then K will contain preference orderings in 
which i is ranked above j and other preference orderings in which j is ranked 
above i. We will thus have a case of parity.
6  Deconstructing Complementary Dominance: The Argument 
from Ordinal Distances
Consider what this analysis of value relations in terms of permissible 
preference orderings implies for the problem at hand. We let the item 
domain I consist of outcomes and actions27 and we take K, as before, to 
be the class of permissible preference orderings of I. If Dominance and 
Switch are to be valid, then their preferential variants must hold for every 
ordering in K:
Dominance (P): (i) An action is preferred to another action if, in 
every state, its outcome is preferred to that of the other action. 
(ii) An action is weakly preferred to another action if, in every state, 
its outcome is weakly preferred to that of the other action.28
Switch (P): If an action x can be obtained from an action y just by 
switching outcomes between two equiprobable states, then x and y 
are equi-preferred.29
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Here and in what follows, “(P)” after the name of a condition stands 
for preference, to distinguish such conditions on permissible preferences 
from the analogous principles for value relations.
Now, what about Complementary Dominance? For this principle to be 
valid, K would need to satisfy the following rather clumsy condition on 
permissible preferences:
(*) If for every state S there is some ordering in K in which the out-
come of action x in S is not preferred to the outcome of action y in S, 
then in some ordering in K, x is not preferred to y.30
Note that (*), unlike Dominance (P) or Switch (P), is not a constraint on 
each preference ordering in K considered separately, but instead a condi-
tion on class K taken as a whole: it requires that K contain an ordering 
with a certain property if K contains orderings exemplifying certain other 
properties.
While (*) is both necessary and sufficient for Complementary 
Dominance, it lacks immediate appeal and, indeed, it seems to lack intui-
tive support. To see this, consider, as an illustration, a simple model that 
represents the setup of Hare’s Problem. There are just four outcomes in 
I in this model: a+, which is better than a, and b+, which is better than 
b, but a+ is not better than b, nor is b+ better than a. Suppose that class 
K consists of three preference orderings, P1, P2, and P3, that order the 
four outcomes as follows (in each ordering the higher-ranked outcomes 
appear higher up):
P1 P2 P3
a+ b+ a+, b+
a b a, b
b+ a+
b a
While P1 and P2 order the four outcomes linearly, P3 contains two 
ties: a+ and b+ are equi-preferred in P3 and so are a and b.
Given our specification of K, it follows that a+ is better than a (as it is 
preferred to a in every ordering in K), b+ is better than b (for the corre-
sponding reason), but a+ is not better than b (b is preferred to a+ in P2), 
nor is b+ better than a (a is preferred to b+ in P1), just as we wanted.
P3 is not really needed for our purposes: if we removed it from K, the 
model would equally well represent the assumed betterness relationships 
between outcomes. But adding P3 does not hurt. Indeed, instead of mak-
ing K smaller, we could make it larger: we could add further orderings 
to K, as long as in all of them a+ is preferred to a and b+ is preferred to 
b. We assume for the time being, however, that all the orderings in K are 
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complete, i.e., contain no preferential gaps. I am going to consider incom-
plete orderings in the next section.
The orderings in K extend to all the items in the domain I. Since we 
have assumed that I also contains actions, we need to say something 
about how P1–P3 order actions X, Y, and Z. We need to do this in order 
to assess Complementary Dominance. How compelling is this principle, 
or – which amounts to the same thing in our analysis – how compelling 
is its preferential version (*)?
The answer is that it is not compelling at all. The model described 
earlier can serve as an illustration. The antecedent of Complementary 
Dominance holds for X and Y in this model: there is no state in which 
X has a better outcome than Y. Or, what amounts to the same thing, 
the antecedent of (*) is satisfied by X and Y: for every state, there is a 
preference ordering in K in which the outcome of X in that state is not 
preferred to the outcome of Y (for state S1, P2 has this feature since it 
ranks a+ below b, while P1 has this feature for S2 since it ranks b+ below 
a). What about the consequent of (*) then? Is it satisfied by X and Y? Is 
there an ordering in K in which X is not ranked above Y?
Note that in every preference ordering in K, at least one of the possible 
outcomes of X, if not both, is preferred to the outcome of Y in the same 
state. In P1 this applies to a+, the outcome of X in S1, in P2 it applies to 
b+, the outcome of X in S2, while in P3 it applies to the outcomes of X in 
both states. Thus, in each of these permissible orderings, the preference 
for X over Y is supported by the preference for at least one of X’s possible 
outcomes over the corresponding outcome for Y.
Admittedly, in orderings P1 and P2 (though not in P3), the opposite 
preference, for Y over X, is also supported by the preference for one of 
the outcomes of Y over the corresponding outcome of X. But, as I will 
now argue, this support for Y is weaker than the support for X. To see 






In this ordering, the preference for X over Y is supported by the prefer-
ence for X’s outcome over Y’s outcome in S1, i.e., in P1, a+ is preferred to 
b. The preference for Y over X is supported in P1 by the preference for 
Y’s outcome over the outcome of X in S2, i.e., a is preferred to b+. But it 
is easy to see that this support for the preference for Y is weaker – less 
pronounced – than the support for the preference for X. In a very intui-
tive sense, the ordinal distance between a+ and b in P1 is greater than 
the ordinal distance between a and b+. The former items occupy in this 
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ordering the first and the fourth place, respectively, while the latter two 
items occupy, respectively, the second and the third place: they are thus 
closer to each other.
While intuitive, this idea of being closer in an ordering can be made 
more precise. An assignment of numbers to items represents an ordering 
of the items iff higher numbers are given to items that are placed higher 
up in this ordering.31 Now, clearly, in every assignment that represents P1, 
the absolute difference between the numbers assigned to a+ and b must 
be greater than the absolute difference between the numbers assigned to 
a and b+, simply because of their placement in the ordering. In this sense, 
then, the ordinal distance between a+ and b in P1 is greater than that 
between a and b+.
To put it more generally, for any complete ordering P, the ordinal dis-
tance between items i and j is greater than (equal to) the ordinal distance 
between items k and l iff for every assignment v of numerical values to 
the items in P’s domain, if v represents P, then the absolute difference 
between v(i) and v(j) is greater than (equal to) the absolute difference 
between v(k) and v(l). To put it differently, when we talk about ordinal 
distances, we focus only on those distance comparisons that are invariant 
under all monotonic (order-preserving) transformations of the measure-
ment scale.
Obviously, comparisons of ordinal distance are extremely gappy. For 
this reason, the notion of ordinal distance has very limited use. Thus, for 
example, the ordinal distance between items that occupy, say, the first 
and second places in an ordering is neither greater nor smaller than that 
between items that come in the second and fourth places. Nor are these 
distances equal; instead, they are incommensurable. As we have seen, 
however, some ordinal distances are greater or smaller than others. These 
differences in ordinal distances give rise to the differences in support. The 
support P1 offers to X in S1 is stronger than the support it offers to Y in 
S2, because, in P1, the ordinal distance between a+ and b is greater than 
that between a and b+.






In P2, just as in P1, the support that the preference for Y receives in 
one state (S1) is weaker, in terms of the ordinal distance, than the sup-
port that the preference for X receives in the other state (S2). But then, 
since the states are equiprobable, it should not come as a surprise that X 
is preferred to Y in both P1 and P2, and indeed in every ordering in K. 
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(In P3, the preference for Y receives no support at all; the preference for 
X over Y is supported in both states.) This means that the consequent of 
(*) is false, or – which amounts to the same thing – that Complementary 
Dominance fails to hold in this model.
Indeed, we can establish a stronger conclusion. The argument from 
ordinal distances generalizes: in any complete preference ordering in 
which (i) a+ is ranked above a and (ii) b+ is ranked above b, the support 
for the preference for X over Y is stronger, in terms of ordinal distance, 
than the support for the preference for Y over X.32 Unless (i) and (ii) 
hold, the ordering is not permissible given our assumptions about the 
betterness relationships between these four outcomes. Therefore, in every 
permissible complete ordering, X is preferred to Y. If all preference order-
ings in K are complete, it follows that in all of them, X is ranked above Y. 
Which means, on our analysis of value relations, that X is better than Y. 
Thus, Complementary Dominance fails in all models of Hare’s Problem 
in which K is a set of complete preference orderings. In all of them, X 
is better than Y. Note, by the way, that this argument also implies that 
Incommensurability fails in the same way. While the outcomes of actions 
X and Y are incommensurable in every state, these actions themselves are 
commensurable: X is better than Y.
A similar argument from ordinal distances can be used to defend Switch. 
As we know, this condition is equivalent to Switch (P). If an action is 
obtained from another action just by switching outcomes between equi-
probable states, then, according to Switch (P), the two actions must be 
equi-preferred in every ordering in K. To see how we can argue for Switch 
(P), let us use, as an illustration, the comparison between Y and Z. Once 
again, we only consider, for the time being, complete preference order-
ings. In any such ordering, either (1) outcomes a and b are tied, and then 
the ordering will rank Y and Z equally, or (2) one of these outcomes is 
ranked above the other: for example, a is ranked above b. (The opposite 
ranking can be dealt with in the same way.) Then (i) Y’s outcome is pre-
ferred to that of Z in S2 and (ii) Z’s outcome is preferred to that of Y in 
S1. The support that the preference for Y over Z gets from (i) is exactly 
equal to the support the preference for Z over Y gets from (ii); the ordinal 
distance from a to b is the same as that from b to a. Since S1 and S2 are 
equiprobable, it follows that Y and Z will be equi-preferred in any such 
permissible ordering, just as in the permissible orderings considered in 
case (1). It follows, then, that Switch (P) must be satisfied by any permis-
sible complete preference ordering. Therefore, in all models in which K 
only contains complete orderings, Switch will be valid.
Let us return to Hare’s Problem. I have argued that in every permissible 
complete ordering, X will be ranked above Y. This argument depends 
on the equi-probability of states. To see this, consider P1 as an example. 
If S2 were more probable than S1, the support for the preference for Y 
over X in P1, while less pronounced in terms of ordinal distance than the 
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support for the opposite preference, would gain weight: it would come 
from the preference for the outcome of Y in the more probable state (S2). 
Correspondingly, the support for X over Y in P1, while more pronounced, 
would lose weight: it would come from the preference for the outcome of 
X in the less probable state (S1). This could lead to Y being ranked above 
X in P1. In P2, on the other hand, the support for X would gain weight 
and thus would even more easily outbalance the less pronounced support 
for Y. As a result, if the states had unequal probabilities, X and Y might 
well be on a par, with each of them being preferred to the other in some 
permissible preference ordering.
Does this mean, then, that the case in which state probabilities are 
equal is exceptional, a kind of singularity? That as soon as they are not 
equal, X and Y become incommensurable? This suggestion would go too 
far. After all, there might be cases in which all permissible preference 
orderings are based on cardinal representations of outcome utilities and 
on the associated expectational representations of the utilities of actions. 
In all such orderings, X will still be preferred to Y even after a slight 
perturbation of state probabilities: expected utility is continuous in both 
utilities and probabilities. The argument from ordinal distances presented 
earlier does not, of course, presuppose the expected utility interpretation 
of permissible preferences. The comparison of ordinal distances on which 
this argument relies is much less exacting than the interval measurement 
of preference strength needed for determining expected utilities. Still, the 
ordinal modeling I rely on does not exclude such interval measurement: 
it is in principle compatible with the expected utility interpretation of 
permissible preferences. Thus, even if one state becomes slightly more 
probable than the other, X might well remain a better action than Y.
7  Incomplete Preference Orderings
There is a natural line of defense available to the friends of Complementary 
Dominance and Incommensurability. In the argument from ordinal dis-
tances, I have been assuming that all the preference orderings in K are 
complete. But this need not of course be the case. Indeed, in Rabinowicz 
(2008), I stressed that some orderings in K might well contain prefer-
ence gaps. In Hare’s Problem, a permissible preference ordering might be 
partly incomplete in its ranking of the four outcomes a+, a, b+, and b, as 
long as it ranks a+ above a and b+ above b. It might contain gaps when 
it comes to all the other comparisons between these four outcomes. In 
such an incomplete ordering, none of the possible outcomes of X is pre-
ferred to the outcome that Y would have in the same state. Consequently, 
the preference for X over Y is not supported in this ordering by pref-
erences for outcomes.33 A critic of my argument could therefore insist 
that this permissible incomplete ordering is not going to rank X above 
Y: instead, it will contain a preference gap with respect to these two 
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actions. The presence of such an ordering in K will therefore imply that 
X is incommensurable with Y. Thus, Complementary Dominance and 
Incommensurability will be rehabilitated.
This is certainly a weak point in my argument. But can I respond to the 
critic? I think so. To begin with, gaps in preference orderings might be 
permissible, but they do not have to be permissible. In a model in which 
preferential gaps among the outcomes of X and Y are not permissible, 
the argument from the preceding section shows that Complementary 
Dominance and Incommensurability are violated. Second, even in mod-
els with permissible preferential gaps, it might well be possible to fill in 
the gaps in permissible ways. To illustrate, I might, permissibly, have 
no preference regarding the two holiday trips, to the Galápagos Islands 
and to Peru, but it certainly is permissible for me to form a definite 
preference for one trip or the other. Likewise, it is permissible for me to 
form an equi-preference for these two trips. In other words, a permis-
sible incomplete preference ordering can be permissibly completed, in 
various ways.
Consider where this idea can take us. Let G be a set of items in the 
domain I and P a permissible preference ordering that contains gaps 
between some of the items in G. Suppose that these gaps can be permis-
sibly filled, i.e., that there is a permissible completion of P with respect to 
G, a permissible ordering P’ that agrees with P but is complete over G.34 
If such a permissible completion of P with respect to G exists, then it is 
reasonable to expect that P is the common part of some set of its permis-
sible completions with respect to G. In other words:
If there is a permissible completion of P with respect to G, then P is 
the intersection of some non-empty set of permissible completions of 
P with respect to G.35
If this condition is satisfied by P with respect to every subset G of I, we 
shall say that P is well-rounded. Well-roundedness is a very plausible 
constraint on permissible orderings. It expresses the intuition that, if the 
gaps in a permissible preference ordering can be permissibly filled in, then 
this ordering represents the preferences of someone who remains neutral 
when it comes to different permissible ways of filling the gaps. It contains 
only what is common to the different completions.36
If we accept the constraint of well-roundedness on the orderings in K 
and accept that gaps in permissible orderings can be permissibly filled in, 
then the argument from ordinal distances can be extended to incomplete 
orderings in K. If a permissible ordering P is gappy within the set {a, a+, b, b+}, 
but these gaps can be permissibly filled in, then P is the intersection of 
a set of its permissible completions with respect to this outcome set. But 
we already know that in all permissible orderings that are complete with 
respect to {a, a+, b, b+}, action X is preferred to action Y. Since P is the 
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common part of a set of such orderings, the same must apply to P itself, 
and even in this incomplete ordering, X must be preferred to Y.
This means that the critic’s objection fails. Complementary Dominance 
and Incommensurability are not satisfied even if incomplete orderings are 
allowed in K.
The argument I have just presented can also be used to show that 
Switch (P) (and thus also Switch) holds even if K contains incomplete 
preference orderings. If an action x can be obtained from an action y 
by a mere switch of outcomes between equiprobable states, then it does 
not matter that in some permissible orderings P there is a preference gap 
between these outcomes. As long as it is permissible to fill this gap, well-
roundedness implies that P will be the intersection of complete permis-
sible orderings. We already know that x and y are ranked equally in all 
these orderings, so they will also be ranked equally in P.
At this point, let me digress. Complementary Dominance has an exact 
analogue for permissible preferences stating that for all orderings in K, 
the following holds:
Complementary Dominance (P): An action is not preferred to another 
action if there is no state in which its outcome is preferred to that of 
the other action.
Unlike (*), this principle is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
Complementary Dominance.37 But it might appear to be as compelling as 
the latter. Are the appearances misleading even in this case? The answer 
is yes. As seen earlier, in a permissible incomplete ordering according to 
which there is no state in which the outcome of X is ranked above the 
outcome of Y, X still must be ranked above Y, provided that the gaps in 
the ordering can be permissibly filled in and the constraint of well-round-
edness is satisfied.38 However, it should be noted that Complementary 
Dominance (P) is perfectly innocuous if the preference ordering under 
consideration is complete. Then this condition immediately follows from 
the second clause of Dominance (P). This is exactly analogous to the 
observation made in Section 2: if the value ordering is complete (i.e., if 
there are no incommensurabilities), then Complementary Dominance fol-
lows from the second clause of Dominance.
8  Incomparability
Do we now have a satisfactory general solution to Hare’s Problem? 
Is an action such as X necessarily better than its competitor Y? Well, 
perhaps not. The kind of case I have so far been considering is one in 
which potential gaps in a permissible preference ordering of outcomes 
can be permissibly filled in. I have considered a case in which outcomes 
a+ and a are on a par with outcomes b+ and b. Even if preferential 
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gaps regarding these outcomes might be permissible, it is permissible to 
prefer any of the former outcomes to any of the latter and vice versa. 
Parity is a form of incommensurability, in fact, the most common one. 
It is exemplified by such comparisons as the one between holiday trips, 
or by Hare’s own comparison between different restaurant options. 
Arguably, it also is exemplified by another case he considers, one in 
which I have to choose which of my possessions should be saved from 
a fire: a Fabergé egg or an album with my wedding photos (cf. Hare 
2010: 237f).39
At least in principle, though, there might also exist cases of incommen-
surability in which it is not permissible to prefer one item to the other 
or to be indifferent.40 In such cases what is required is a preferential gap. 
In Rabinowicz (2008), I refer to such a form of incommensurability as 
incomparability in value. Clearly, incomparability should be expected to 
obtain between items belonging to different ontological categories, say, 
between persons and events or between abstract entities such as proper-
ties or states of affairs and concrete things. But if the compared items 
belong to the same category, postulating incomparability is consider-
ably more problematic. In particular, if what we compare are different 
action outcomes, then it is fair to say that incomparability between such 
items is much rarer than parity; indeed, whether it can ever occur may 
be disputed.
An example of Hare’s Problem that might involve incomparable out-
comes is provided by Bales et al. (2014). Their original example is some-
what problematic, but here is what I think is a more convincing variant of 
this example:41 outcomes a and b are, respectively, the very painful death 
of my mother and the very painful death of my father. In the “+”-versions 
of these outcomes, my mother/my father suffers slightly less when dying. 
a+ is slightly better (less bad) than a and b+ is slightly better than b, but 
from my perspective, both a+ and a are incommensurable with b+ and b. 
It might be argued that this incommensurability is of the extreme kind, 
that it is a case of incomparability in (personal) value. On this reading, it 
is impermissible for me to prefer the death of my mother (whether very 
painful or slightly less so) to the death of my father, and vice versa, nor 
is it permissible for me to be indifferent. What is required on my part is 
a preferential gap. Arguably, what characterizes genuine choice dilemmas 
is such incomparability between the alternatives.42
Are such examples as the preceding one convincing cases of incom-
parability of outcomes? This might be questioned. Perhaps, instead of 
a preferential gap being required, it might be permissible for me to be 
indifferent between the painful death of my mother (a) and the pain-
ful death of my father (b). I balk at this thought because I think that I 
can be indifferent only if I do not care which of them is going to die. 
But is this what indifference necessarily involves? It is not obvious.43 
If being indifferent between two alternatives is compatible with caring 
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very much which alternative is going to obtain, then the example under 
consideration might not be a case of incomparability: it might then be 
permissible for me to be indifferent rather than remain in a state of a 
preferential gap.
Note, however, that I should prefer my mother to die slightly less pain-
fully if possible: the preference for a+ over b is one I surely ought to have. 
Since preferences in permissible orderings are transitive across indiffer-
ence,44 it would follow that I ought to prefer my mother’s slightly less 
painful death (a+) to the painful death of my father (b) if I am indifferent 
between her very painful death (a) and his very painful death (b). This, it 
appears to me, is a counterintuitive implication. I ought not to have this 
preference in any permissible preference ordering: I ought not to prefer 
her death to his death (or vice versa), even if it would be slightly less pain-
ful. So, it does seem that being in a state of a preferential gap is the only 
permissible stance toward a and b in this case. If that is true, then it is a 
case of incomparability.
If some gaps in a preference ordering are due to incomparabilities, 
then such gaps cannot be permissibly filled in. But this means that in a 
case like this the argument from ordinal distances cannot be extended 
to incomplete preference orderings. This extension assumes that it is 
permissible to fill in preferential gaps. It is only if there is a permissible 
completion of a preference ordering with respect to an outcome set 
G = {a, a+, b, b+} that this ordering, by the constraint of well-round-
edness, can be taken to be the intersection of a set of its permissible 
completions with respect to G.
9  Residual Paradox: Incomparability Meets Risk
So, where does this leave us? I have provided an argument that explains 
why Complementary Dominance must be rejected: one action might well 
be better than another even if there is no state in which it has a better 
outcome. I have shown how this can be possible when the outcomes of 
two actions are on a par in every state. But my argument does not apply 
to a weakening of Complementary Dominance, according to which one 
action cannot be better than another if there is no state in which its out-
come is better than, or even comparable with, the outcome of the other 
action. Indeed, the following principle seems compelling:
Incomparability: Two actions are incomparable if their outcomes are 
incomparable in every state.
This means, however, that we still confront a paradox: Incomparability 
is intuitively compelling, but so is Switch, and these two principles are 
mutually incompatible if incomparabilities between outcomes are pos-
sible. If they are possible and Incomparability holds, then Switch fails to 
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hold. Actions Y and Z exemplify this point: if a and b are incomparable, 
then the outcomes of Y and Z are incomparable in every state. But then 
Incomparability implies that Y and Z themselves are incomparable. They 
are not equally good, as Switch would have it.
However, Switch is no less compelling when the outcomes are incom-
parable. Even then it seems intuitive that switching outcomes between 
equiprobable states should not affect the value of an action. Why should 
it matter whether I obtain outcome a if the coin falls heads up and out-
come b if it falls tails up, or vice versa? Or does it matter if a and b are 
incomparable? Even though, as I hope to have shown, it would not mat-
ter otherwise.
These questions remain with us. But then, despite the progress we have 
made when it comes to interactions between parity and risk, we still 
are left with the question concerning the interaction between risk and 
incomparability. We seem to have on our hands something that looks 
like a genuine paradox: both Incomparability and Switch are intrinsically 
compelling, none of them seems vulnerable to a direct criticism, but if 
incomparable outcomes are possible, these two principles cannot both 
be correct.
It is a paradox I do not know how to resolve.
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 2 Three more recent articles should also be mentioned, by Bader (2018) and 
Doody (2019a, 2019b). They are all well worth studying but will not be 
commented on here, as they appeared after this chapter had been essentially 
completed.
 3 I have been waiting to get this chapter off my chest, mainly because I con-
tinued to hope, in vain as it happens, that I would find a way to solve this 
residual problem. Now, however, it is time to present what I have and leave 
the outstanding issues to the reader.
 4 It is not essential for the problem at hand that it is the same kind of improve-
ment in both cases or that the size of the improvement is exactly the same (if 
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it is meaningful to compare these sizes). If a+ is a trip to the Galápagos Islands 
at a discount, then b+ could be a trip to Peru with an extra day in Cuzco.
 5 In his comments on this chapter, Anders Herlitz has suggested how this choice 
problem could arise in real life. Suppose X and Y are two vacation packages 
one can buy: X, departing on a Tuesday, is slightly cheaper than Y, depart-
ing on a Wednesday. Whether you fly on a Tuesday or on a Wednesday does 
not matter to you, but the price difference does matter, though only margin-
ally since it is quite small. Both packages promise to take you to either the 
Galápagos Islands or Peru, but the destinations you get to by choosing X 
and Y, respectively, are entirely dependent on whether the airline decides to 
fly to Quito on Tuesdays and to Lima on Wednesdays (S1) or the other way 
round (S2). The airline has not yet made its decision, and it may go either way, 
with equal probability. Vacation package X involves departure on a Tuesday, 
which means it will take you to the Galápagos Islands via Quito (a+) if the 
airline decides to fly to Quito on Tuesdays and to Lima on Wednesdays, but it 
will take you to Peru (b+) if the airline makes the opposite decision. Vacation 
package Y involves departure on a Wednesday, which means it will take you 
to Peru (b) if the airline decides to fly to Quito on Tuesdays and to Lima on 
Wednesdays, but it will take you to the Galápagos Islands via Quito (a) if the 
airline makes the opposite decision.
 6 In terms of the illustration used (see the preceding endnote), why not opt 
for the cheaper trip if it does not matter whether you fly on a Tuesday or a 
Wednesday?
 7 Thus, Bales et al. (2014) and Schoenfield (2014) all argue that X and Y 
are equally permissible in a case like this. Hare (2010), on the other hand, 
argues that it would be irrational to opt for Y; rationality requires that you 
choose X.
 8 However, as mentioned previously, for Hare it was a problem of rational 
choice and not an issue in axiology. I will also sometimes use the label “Hare’s 
Problem” for the choice situation itself in which the agent confronts actions X 
and Y specified as above – I hope that this will not create any confusions. Bader 
(2018) rather aptly calls such choice situations cases of “opaque sweetening.”
 9 I have three comments: (i) this principle, like several others that follow, refers 
to two distinct value relations: one between outcomes and the other between 
actions. The former relations can be reduced to the latter if we associate each 
outcome with the “constant” act that assigns this outcome to every state in 
the partition. Then the betterness relation between outcomes is reduced to 
the betterness relation between associated constant acts. (ii) As a general 
principle, Dominance is plausible only if the states in the partition consid-
ered are independent of actions (causally or probabilistically independent, 
depending on the kind of decision theory we accept). In what follows, this 
act-independence of states will be assumed throughout. (iii) Even with act-
independence, Dominance can fail if the number of states is infinite and the 
outcomes themselves involve elements of risk or uncertainty. A case in point 
is the well-known Two-Envelopes Problem (cf. Broome 1995; Dietrich and 
List 2005). Here we only consider cases in which the space of possibilities is 
partitioned into a finite number of alternative states.
 10 Bales et al. (2014: 460) defend a principle of rational choice that is closely 
related to Complementary Dominance but applies not merely to binary 
choices. It is framed in terms of “not worse” instead of “not better,” but this 
difference does not matter:
Competitiveness: An action is rationally permissible if there is no state in 
which its outcome is worse than that of some alternative action.
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Assuming that an action is rationally permissible iff it is not worse 
than any alternative action, Competitiveness follows from Complementary 
Dominance, though not vice versa. But in binary choices, such as Hare’s 
Problem, the two principles are equivalent.
 11 It is easy to see that Complementary Dominance entails the following 
principle:
Neither Nor: An action is neither better nor worse than another action if 
there is no state in which its outcome is better or worse than that of the 
other action.
In what follows, I am going to argue against Complementary Dominance, 
but my argument will also apply to Neither Nor.
Schoenfield (2014: 267) adopts a principle of rational choice that corre-
sponds to the conjunction of the first clause of Dominance and Neither Nor:
Link: In cases in which considerations of value are the only ones that are 
relevant, if you are rationally certain that one option, A, will bring about 
greater value than the alternative option, B, you’re required to choose A. If 
you are rationally certain that neither of the two options will bring about 
greater value than the other, it’s not required that you choose A, and it’s 
not required that you choose B.
 12 Hare (2010), who does not discuss value relations but instead focuses on 
rational preferences and rational choice, considers, but in the end rejects, a 
principle of deference to one’s “better-informed self” (p. 242). In a compari-
son between two actions, such as X and Y, my better-informed self, who 
knows which state obtains, would have no preference in favor of either of 
these actions. His preferences for actions would be determined by their actual 
outcomes, and I know that he would not prefer the outcome of one action 
to that of the other, whichever state actually obtains. My better-informed 
self would have the same preferences regarding final outcomes as I have, and 
Hare assumes that I do not prefer a+ to b or b to a+ and, similarly, that I do not 
prefer b+ to a or a to b+. But then, if I know that my better-informed self would 
have no preferences in favor of X or Y, the principle of deference implies that 
it is (at least) rationally permissible for me to have no such preferences either. 
Clearly, this conclusion should be welcomed by friends of Complementary 
Dominance. (It might be noted that the preferential version of Dominance 
could be defended along the same deferentialist lines.)
 13 Temkin (2012: section 8.3, p.139) considers and defends (with some important 
qualifications, see endnote 19) The State-by-State Comparison Principle: 
For any two prospects [or actions] A and B, if the value of A’s outcome 
stands in a particular comparative relation, R, to the value of B’s outcome 
for each possible state of nature, then prospect A stands in relation R to B.
This principle corresponds to (iii), and Temkin’s defense of the principle 
relies on an argument similar to the one I outlined earlier.
 14 If this state is not yet determined (before the toss of the coin), then, according 
to this view, it is not yet determined which of the bets is better, although it is 
determined that they are not equally good.
 15 One should bear in mind, though, that some of the defenders of the view 
that, in Hare’s Problem, X is not better than Y might take this view precisely 
because they adhere to the ex post approach to the evaluation of actions.
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 16 This principle is identical to what Temkin (2012: section 8.3: 238) calls The 
First Principle of Equivalence:
For any two prospects [or actions] A and B, if for every possible outcome 
[…] that might arise with a given probability […] if A is chosen, the same 
outcome […] might arise with the same probability […] if B is chosen, and 
vice versa, then prospects A and B are equally good […].
 17 Remember that the states under consideration are assumed to be axiologically 
irrelevant, i.e., they do not contribute any value, positive or negative, to out-
comes. Without this assumption, Switch would not be a plausible principle.
 18 To put it more formally, actions x and y are equally good if for some equi-
probable states S and S′, x(S) = y(S′), x(S′) = y(S), and for all other states S″ 
in the state partition, x(S″) = y(S″). While Switch is a very simple condition 
with a highly limited scope of application, it is equivalent to a principle whose 
application is wider:
Permutation: Let π be a probability-preserving permutation on states in 
a partition. If for every state S, the outcome that action x assigns to S is 
assigned by action y to π(S), then x and y are equally good.
Switch is a special case of this more general principle; it is a case in which π 
is a simple transposition of one state into another that is equally probable. At 
the same time, this special case implies the general principle since any prob-
ability-preserving permutation on a finite set of states is the relative product 
of a finite sequence of probability-preserving transpositions. Consequently, by 
the transitivity of equal goodness, Switch entails Permutation.
 19 An essentially similar argument has been presented by Temkin (2012: section 
8.3). The example Temkin considers differs somewhat from the one offered 
by Hare. In Temkin’s example, Z results from Y by an outcome switch, but 
action X leads to an improved outcome as compared with Z only in one 
state and to the same outcome in the other state. Consequently, in his argu-
ment that X is better than Z, Temkin needs to rely on a stronger principle of 
dominance than the one I have been assuming. Temkin concludes from this 
argument that the First Principle of Equivalence (which implies that Y and 
Z are equally good) and the State-by-State Comparison Principle (which, as 
we have seen, implies that X is not better than Y) are incompatible with each 
other. He finds the former principle particularly compelling. He therefore 
suggests that the State-by-State Comparison Principle should be restricted to 
accommodate the First Principle of Equivalence: “Perhaps the most natural 
way to do that would be to limit the scope of the State-by-State Comparison 
Principle to all and only those cases where it would not directly conflict with 
the First Principle of Equivalence” (Temkin 2012: 242). Temkin admits, how-
ever, that in the absence of justification, it is an ad hoc solution.
 20 An even shorter, more direct argument for the same conclusion appeals to 
Stochastic Dominance as its only premise (see Bader 2018).
Stochastic Dominance: An action x stochastically dominates an action y iff 
(i) for every possible outcome o, the probability that x will result in an out-
come at least as good as o is at least as great as the corresponding probabil-
ity for y, and (ii) for some o, this probability is greater. If clause (i) is satisfied, 
x is at least as good as y. If (i) and (ii) are satisfied, x is better than y.
It is easy to see that X stochastically dominates Y and thus is better than 
Y according to this condition. But it may be questioned whether Stochastic 
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Dominance is as intuitively compelling as the principles I have used in my 
argument from Switch. Stochastic Dominance is in any case much stronger 
than Statewise Dominance and Switch taken together. Admittedly, appealing 
to it in the argument for X being better than Y obviates the need to assume 
that betterness is transitive across equal goodness. Although this may be seen 
as an advantage by some, the advantage is minimal if one finds, as I do, this 
transitivity condition extremely intuitive.
In private communication, Orri Stefánsson has suggested another prin-
ciple that would immediately establish that X is better than Y:
An action x is better than an action y if the outcome of x would in every 
state be better than that of y if y’s outcomes were switched between some 
equiprobable states.
This condition is much weaker than Stochastic Dominance and yet it also 
makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transitivity of betterness across equal 
goodness. But there is a price to pay: the condition is ad hoc, being especially 
designed to immediately get us the conclusion we are after. Jumping to the 
conclusion in this way is unattractive; it is preferable to proceed to it by sepa-
rate steps that can be subjected to independent scrutiny.
 21 Hare (2010) defines the notion of prospects associated with an action: each 
such prospect is a possible outcome of that action paired with the agent’s 
credence that the action would yield the outcome in question. The set of all 
prospects associated with an action is thus just like a lottery but with objec-
tive probabilities replaced by credences. Hare then assumes the following 
principle:
Prospects Determine Permissibility: Facts about what it is rationally per-
missible for me to do are determined by facts about the prospects associ-
ated with the options available to me.
(Hare 2010: 240)
This principle is similar in spirit to the Reduction of Actions to Lotteries.
Hare then considers two choice situations, one in which we choose between 
X and Y (with equal objective probabilities of states replaced by equal credences) 
and the other in which the choice is between X and Z. He implicitly assumes 
the preferential version of Statewise Dominance as a criterion of permissibility, 
and thus concludes that Z is impermissible in the latter choice problem. This 
follows even if the agent has incomplete preferences, as long as she prefers a+ to 
a and b+ to b. But since the prospects associated with Y and Z are the same and 
since in both choice problems the alternative action is the same (X), if Prospects 
Determine Permissibility, Y must be impermissible in the choice between X and 
Y, just as Z is impermissible in the choice between X and Z.
Hare also puts forward a general theory of rational choice, Prospectism, 
which as a special case implies that Y is impermissible if X is available. That 
theory, however, rests on strong assumptions, much stronger than those I am 
willing to rely on in this chapter. According to Prospectism, an action, inter-
preted as a set of prospects, is permissible iff it maximizes expected utility (as 
compared with other available actions) with respect to some utility function 
on outcomes that is compatible with the agent’s possibly incomplete prefer-
ences over outcomes. Needless to say, the view that an action is permissible 
only if it is in this way rationalizable in terms of expected utility maximi-
zation is contentious. At the same time, the theory might be criticized for 
being too permissive in that it imposes no restrictions on admissible utility 
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functions apart from the requirement that they must be compatible with the 
agent’s outcome preferences. In the case we consider, if the agent’s preferences 
have gaps when it comes to comparing a and a+ with b and b+, Prospectism 
implies that action Y becomes permissible as soon as the agent ever so slightly 
increases her credence for one of the states. For this objection to Prospectism, 
see Nissan-Rozen (2015).
 22 Nor would it be possible to use Stochastic Dominance to establish this con-
clusion. It would no longer be the case that X stochastically dominates Y. To 
see this, suppose that S1 is more probable than S2. Then the probability that 
X results in an outcome at least as good as b is lower than the corresponding 
probability for Y. Analogously, if S2 is more probable than S1, the probability 
that X results in an outcome at least as good as a is lower than the corre-
sponding probability for Y.
 23 For a discussion of different kinds of regret and ways of allaying them, and 
in particular for the distinction between outcome regret, which arises when 
we reflect on what our action could instead have brought about, and action 
regret, which comes from reflecting on what would have been brought about 
if another action had been chosen, see Bovens and Rabinowicz (2015).
 24 I am indebted to Anders Herlitz for pressing this point.
 25 This formulation ignores various qualifications and provisos we might want 
to impose, for example, that an agent ought to hold a pro-attitude toward i 
only if she knows what i is like, that the “ought” in question is an ought of 
recommendation rather than a strict demand, or that the reasons for holding 
a pro-attitude (i.e., the considerations that explain why one ought to hold 
it) should be of the “right kind” – they should invoke value-making features 
of the item under consideration rather than extraneous factors (for this last 
point, see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). In what follows, 
I make a tacit assumption that these qualifications are satisfied.
 26 This definition does not exclude, of course, that in cases of parity it might also 
be permissible to be indifferent between the items in question or even to have no 
preferential attitude as far as they are concerned. Indeed, in typical cases of par-
ity, all these possibilities can be expected to be permissible (cf. Rabinowicz 2008).
 27 As previously, we think of an action as a function from states in a state parti-
tion to outcomes. In some cases, particularly in the cases we focus on, the 
elements of the state partition are assigned objective probabilities. In what 
follows, whenever two actions are being compared, they are assumed to be 
based on the same state partition.
 28 That the first clause of Dominance (P) holds for all orderings in K is both 
necessary and sufficient for the corresponding first clause of Dominance. 
However, that the second clause of Dominance (P) holds for all orderings 
in K is not sufficient for the second clause of Dominance. Using the former 
principle, we can prove that if the outcomes of x are at least as good as the 
outcomes of y in every state, then x is weakly preferred to y in every ordering 
in K. But this falls short of x being at least as good as y. To be at least as good 
as y, x must be better than y or equally as good as y, i.e., it must be preferred 
to y in every K-ordering or equi-preferred with y in every K-ordering. It is 
not enough if it is preferred in some orderings and equi-preferred in others. 
This problem would be avoided if one redefined the notion of being at least 
as good: i could be said to be at least as good as j iff i is weakly preferred to j 
in every ordering in K (cf. Rabinowicz 2008). While “at least as good” on this 
redefinition would still be entailed by “better or equally good,” the converse 
entailment would no longer hold.
 29 That this condition holds for all orderings in K is both necessary and suf-
ficient for Switch.
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 30 Or, by contraposition: if action x is preferred to action y in every ordering in 
K, then there is some state S such that the outcome of x in S is preferred to the 
outcome of y in S in every ordering in K.
 31 More generally, for any complete ordering P of the items in a certain domain, 
an assignment v of numerical values to the items in this domain represents P 
iff v assigns higher numbers to items placed higher in P and the same numbers 
to items that are equal ranked in P.
 32 In fact, P1 and P2 are the only permissible complete orderings in which the 
preference for Y over X receives any support at all. Proof: the preference for 
Y over X receives some support only if (1) a is preferred to b+ or (2) b is pre-
ferred to a+. Since a+ is preferred to a and b+ is preferred to b, (1) implies, by 
the transitivity of preference, that the four items are ordered as in P1, while 
(2) implies, again by transitivity, that they are ordered as in P2.
At the same time, in any complete ordering, the preference for X over Y 
must receive some support. Proof: if a+ is ranked above a and b+ is ranked 
above b, then, by completeness, (i) a+ is preferred to b or (ii) b+ is preferred to 
a. If (i) holds, the preference for X over Y receives support in S1. If (ii) holds, 
this preference receives support in S2.
 33 But could the preference for Y over X be supported in a permissible incom-
plete ordering without the preference for X over Y being supported? No, it 
could not. If the preference for Y over X is supported, this must mean that the 
ordering ranks (i) a above b+ or (ii) b above a+. Being permissible, it ranks (iii) 
a+ above a and (iv) b+ above b. By the transitivity of permissible preferences, 
(i), (iii), and (iv) imply that the ordering in question is identical to P1, while 
(ii), (iii), and (iv) imply that it is identical to P2. And we already know that in 
both these complete orderings, the preference for X over Y is supported and, 
indeed, that it is more pronounced than the preference for Y over X.
 34 P′ agrees with P iff for all items i and j in I, if i is preferred to (equi-preferred 
with) j in P, then i is also preferred to (equi-preferred with) j in P′. Note that 
agreement is not a symmetric relation: if P′ agrees with P, P might not agree 
with P′. Indeed, this will always be the case if P′ fills some gaps in P.
 35 This condition can also be equivalently stated as follows:
If the set Δ(P, G) of all permissible completions of P with respect to G is 
not empty, then P = ∩Δ(P, G).
To establish this equivalence, it is sufficient to note that if P is the intersec-
tion of a non-empty set of orderings, then adding to that set further orderings 
that agree with P will not make any difference to the intersection.
 36 A complete ordering is of course trivially well-rounded since it does not con-
tain any gaps.
 37 It is not sufficient since the antecedent of (*) does not require that the ante-
cedent of Complementary Dominance (P) should be satisfied by any order-
ing in K. Thus, Complementary Dominance (P) cannot be used to prove the 
consequent of (*) from its antecedent. Nor is Complementary Dominance 
(P) necessary for (*) since the consequent of (*) is relatively weak: it only 
stipulates that there exists some ordering in K in which action x is not pre-
ferred to action y. We could have a model in which some such ordering exists, 
even though K also contains another ordering that violates Complementary 
Dominance (P) with regard to actions x and y.
 38 This counterexample also applies to what might be seen as a kind of pref-
erential analogue of Incommensurability, i.e., the principle that requires a 
preference gap between two actions if there are preference gaps between 
their outcomes in every state. It should be kept in mind, though, that 
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incommensurabilities in value and preference gaps are not the same thing. If a 
preference gap between two items is permissible, this entails that the items in 
question are incommensurable, but the opposite implication need not hold.
 39 Note, however, that Hare, who is interested in the preferential version of his 
problem, assumes in his examples that the agent lacks preferences regarding 
these options. My interest is in the value relations, so I allow both the absence 
of preference and its presence, although in the latter case, I assume that it is 
permissible to have a preference either way.
 40 Or this impermissibility might at least apply to considered preferential atti-
tudes Both considered preference and considered equi-preference might be 
disallowed.
 41 I am indebted to Luc Bovens for suggesting this variant.
 42 In Rabinowicz (2008), I suggested that Sophie’s Choice might be an exam-
ple of a situation in which the alternative outcomes are incomparable from 
Sophie’s perspective: she must choose which of her children to save, but it is 
impermissible for her to prefer one child rather than the other to survive, nor 
is it permissible for her to be indifferent between these outcomes.
 43 I am indebted to Graham Oddie for pressing this point.
 44 That preferences in permissible orderings are transitive across indifference is 
a crucial assumption in my model. Without it, the model would not validate 
the condition that betterness is transitive across equal goodness.
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1  Decide Based on That Which One Has an Opinion
It seems natural and wise to make decisions on the basis of that which one 
has opinions, ignoring that which one has no clear opinion. For instance, 
consider the following very mundane decision problem:
Bike Route. I must decide which way to ride to work – whether 
the most direct route through the city center or a more convoluted 
route that is better connected by bike lanes and green spaces. There 
are a number of salient differences between these routes that matter 
for their evaluation, concerning such properties as their duration, 
safety, and aesthetics. There may well be other ways in which the two 
options differ, but I struggle to bring them to mind, let alone compare 
the bike routes with respect to them. For instance, how might my 
taking each route affect the well-being of all those I happen to inter-
act with on the way and all those who interact with those people?
In framing the Bike Route decision problem and deliberating about what 
to do, it may seem reasonable that I focus just on those aspects or criteria 
for evaluating (pairs of) bike routes about which I have a clear opinion 
or preference relation with respect to the options. What is meant here by 
a “clear” opinion or preference relation is that I either (strictly) prefer 
one option to the other in the pair or else I am indifferent between the 
options in the pair. To lack a clear opinion or preference in this sense 
is then, let us say, to find the options incommensurable. (Here the term 
“incommensurable” is treated as synonymous with other terms of art in 
the literature, like incomparable or on a par. Any purported differences 
or ways in which these are distinct forms of lacking a regular preference 
relation between options are not important to the discussion here.) The 
thought is that the criteria under which the bike route options are incom-
mensurable are precisely those that are less obvious or salient to me. 
While criteria under which options are incommensurable may sometimes 




be salient, they are typically not, and that is perfectly reasonable, one 
might think, if such criteria are not important in decision-making.
My Bike Route deliberations seem entirely commonplace. If the afore-
mentioned is an apt characterization of these deliberations, then it fol-
lows that we do commonly ignore in our decision-making that which we 
have no opinion about or criteria for which options are incommensura-
ble since this is as mundane a decision problem as any. That is, it suggests 
that we invoke, in framing our decisions, some kind of “incommensu-
rability independence” principle, whereby the relative value of options 
is independent of those aspects of the options that admit of no clear 
opinion or preference relation between them (namely, strict preference or 
indifference) such that they are incommensurable. Note that options may 
be incommensurable with respect to a criterion due to lack of opinion 
about the desirability of states of affairs by that criterion and/or lack of 
opinion about how likely it is that the options will result in these various 
states of affairs or realizations of the criterion. For instance, perhaps I 
cannot rank the bike routes with respect to the comfort of other riders 
because I cannot determine whether it is more or less or equally comfort-
able for a bike route to be more crowded.1 Otherwise (or in addition), 
perhaps I cannot rank the bike routes with respect to the comfort of other 
riders because I cannot assign precise probabilities to the relative size of 
the crowds on the bike routes on this particularly fresh spring day.
A principle akin to “incommensurability independence” is apparently 
defended by L. A. Paul in her (2014) book Transformative Experience. 
Paul claims that decisions involving transformative experiences, by def-
inition, are decisions for which the options cannot be compared with 
respect to many aspects or criteria that one cares about (and thus also 
happen to be salient, in this case). Consider for instance the decision 
about whether to take on a new social role, such as whether or not to 
become a mother or whether or not to train to be a professional astro-
naut. The status quo and the role-change option may be difficult to com-
pare with respect to criteria like “sense of personal achievement” and 
“level of anxiety.” Nonetheless, Paul suggests that one can reasonably 
come to a choice based on the remaining aspects or criteria about which 
one does have an opinion, often simply the “surprise or adventure” that 
the options afford.2
In other discussions too, something like an “incommensurability inde-
pendence” principle is floated as the only way to proceed in making 
rational decisions. For instance, Lenman (2000) raises a puzzle for those 
committed to (the relevance of) consequentialist ethical reasoning. The 
idea is that even the most foresighted agent has a sense of “cluelessness” 
about how the consequences of their options compare under the full 
myriad of ethically relevant aspects or criteria. One will easily become 
perplexed, for instance, in trying to predict which future persons may 
possibly exist and what these persons will go on to do and how good this 
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would be, were some given option pursued. Greaves (2016: 312) says, in 
light of this problem, “In attempting to take consequences into account in 
practice in decision-making, we usually focus on those effects – let us call 
them ‘foreseeable’ effects – that we take ourselves to be able to foresee 
with a reasonable degree of confidence.” One reading of this common 
wisdom (although not the one that Greaves favors) is that agents do and 
indeed rightly focus just on those aspects of the consequences of options 
that permit a clear comparison, in the sense used earlier, between them.
Finally, it seems that in the very framing of a decision problem, we rou-
tinely overlook aspects of options for which they are difficult to compare. 
Our reasoning concerns only the salient aspects of options or criteria for 
comparing them, and, as suggested earlier, the many aspects of options 
that are difficult to pin down and admit of no comparison between them 
are often not salient. So something like an “incommensurability indepen-
dence” principle seems to play a role in shaping our very perception of a 
decision problem – the apparent starting point for our deliberations. Of 
course, if this really were the starting point for our deliberations it must 
by definition lie beyond rational principles. But one might suspect that 
what we typically regard as the starting point for our deliberations is 
actually the result of some prior (un)principled reasoning.
All told there is arguably a lot of implicit support for and allegiance 
to an “incommensurability independence” principle, whereby in compar-
ing options, one simply ignores those aspects or criteria under which nei-
ther option is preferred to the other and nor is one indifferent between 
them. This chapter assesses whether this principle for comparing options 
is plausible. In fact, the chapter will assess just whether a weaker principle, 
entailed by the aforementioned, is plausible: a choice principle based on a 
kind of non-dominance relation that accommodates incommensurability 
between options on any given criterion. The non-dominance principle (or 
rather two versions of it, weak and strong) is introduced in Section 2. The 
principle is compared with a somewhat analogous principle in the litera-
ture on incommensurability and uncertainty owing to Caspar Hare (2010).
In Section 3, it is argued that neither of the two versions of the non-
dominance principle is plausible. The case against the strong version is 
relatively straightforward – it is easy to construct counterexamples. But 
the weak version too is subject to counterexamples, albeit of a special 
and more unusual form. Whether or not any of these counterexamples 
are genuine, however, might be open to challenge, especially in light of 
the debate inspired by Hare’s analysis. I show in Section 4 that, despite 
the analogies, there are significant dis-analogies between the multi-cri-
teria and uncertainty settings, and so the counterexamples retain their 
force. Finally, Section 5 returns to the question of whether we do rou-
tinely ignore aspects of our decisions for which we cannot compare 
options or whether our ordinary deliberations can be cast in a more 
reasonable light.
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2  Making the Principle(s) Precise
To explore the form of reasoning suggested in the previous section, I will 
introduce a different decision problem, for which, by assumption, there is 
salient incommensurability between the options. That is, the options are 
incommensurable with respect to certain aspects of their consequences or 
criteria that are nonetheless salient (perhaps owing to the fact that one 
of the options is recognizably novel or unfamiliar). When incommensu-
rabilities are explicitly tabled in this way, we can examine whether it is 
generally coherent to “ignore incommensurabilities” in one’s reasoning.
The problem is a very simplistic climate change policy problem. The 
choice is between the status quo option of business-as-usual or inaction 
on climate change, and a geoengineering option. We will assume that 
for the (rather short-sighted) decision-maker at hand, there are only two 
aspects of the outcome, or two criteria, that matter for the comparison of 
the options: the welfare of the present generation (labeled “current”) and 
the welfare of the subsequent generation (labeled “future”). These crite-
ria are separable (in the sense that they amount to independent, additive 
contributions to the overall value of the options) and together exhaust all 
that matters for the decision-maker in comparing the options.
To add some color: the geoengineering option involves the current gen-
eration paying for this capability and the subsequent or future generation 
implementing it. The status quo is thus perceived to be better for the cur-
rent generation than the geoengineering option since it does not involve 
costs associated with building geoengineering capability. Hence the util-
ity associated with the former, a, is greater than the utility associated with 
the latter, b. The two options are, by assumption, incommensurable for 
the future generation – each has indeterminate utility for this criterion 
(compatible with incommensurability), represented by “ind.” (In subse-
quent models of the problem, further assumptions will be introduced by 
way of making the indeterminate utilities more precise).
The informal choice principle of “ignoring incommensurabilities” rec-
ommends the status quo option in this decision problem. In comparing 
the options, we ignore the “future” criterion, as the options are incom-
mensurable under this criterion – both business-as-usual and the deploy-
ment of geoengineering are, after all, very hard to evaluate, and ultimately 
compare, for the generation directly experiencing them. We then focus 
just on the “current” criterion, or what the options are like for the current 
generation. Under this criterion, the status quo option is preferred.
The reasoning just described in fact amounts to a special case of “ignor-
ing incommensurabilities” – it involves no more than an appeal to (some 
kind of) dominance of one option over the other. That is, it appears we 
need only appeal to a choice principle that invokes the following rather 
compelling non-dominance relationship (the choice of terminology will 
be explained next):
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(Criterion-Wise) Competitive. An option is not worse than another 
option, and thus (criterion-wise) competitive, if, under every crite-
rion, its outcome is not worse than that of the other option.
Only the status quo option is (criterion-wise) competitive. The status 
quo option is not worse than the geoengineering option for those criteria 
under which the options are incommensurable (here only “future”) and it 
is moreover not worse than the geoengineering option (in fact it is better) 
under the remaining “current” criterion. As such, the status quo option is 
surely a permissible option, and plausibly uniquely so.
The choice principles just alluded to can in fact be formalized as weak 
and strong versions of what we might call “(criterion-wise) competitive-
ness,” as follows:
Weak (Criterion-Wise) Competitiveness. If an option alpha is (crite-
rion-wise) competitive with respect to all other alternative options, 
it is rationally permissible to perform alpha.
Strong (Criterion-Wise) Competitiveness. If an option alpha is 
(criterion-wise) competitive with respect to all other alternative 
options, it is rationally permissible to perform alpha, and it is not 
rationally permissible to perform an option beta that is not simi-
larly (criterion-wise) competitive with respect to all other alterna-
tive options.
Both of these non-dominance or so-called competitiveness principles 
seem compelling, even the strong version. Moreover, they are analogues of 
non-dominance principles (across states) that have been recently entertained 
by Hare (2010) and defended by Bales et al. (2014). Indeed the terminology 
here follows that of Bales et al. (2014).3 One can restore the state-wise prin-
ciples by replacing the aforementioned “criterion” with “state.” Start with 
the very notion of a non-dominated or competitive option:
(State-Wise) Competitive. An option is not worse than another option, 
and thus (state-wise) competitive, if, under every state, its outcome 
is not worse than that of the other option.
This notion then features in the two choice principles (with labels 
roughly in keeping with those of Bales et al. (2014)):
Weak (State-Wise) Competitiveness. If an option alpha is (state-wise) 
competitive with respect to all other alternative options, it is ratio-
nally permissible to perform alpha.
Strong (State-Wise) Competitiveness. If an option alpha is (state-
wise) competitive with respect to all other alternative options, it is 
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rationally permissible to perform alpha, and it is not rationally per-
missible to perform an option beta that is not similarly (state-wise) 
competitive with respect to all other alternative options.
Despite the analogy with plausible state-wise, non-dominance choice 
principles, neither the strong nor the weak criterion-wise versions are 
themselves compelling. This will be demonstrated in the following sec-
tion. We will return to why the two sets of choice principles – state-wise 
and criterion-wise, respectively – have differing status, due to important 
dis-analogies, later.
3  Against the Criterion-Wise “Competitiveness” Principles
We can interrogate the strong (criterion-wise) competitiveness principle 
by initially considering different versions or instantiations of the decision 
problem described in Table 11.1. This involves examining the different ways 
in which the options may be incommensurable under the second criterion 
(“future”) and how this is weighed against the preference for the status 
quo under the first criterion (“present”). Assume that the (expected) utili-
ties in Tables 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4 are comparable and scaled in such a way 
that the two criteria are weighted equally. Indeterminate (expected) utility 
is modeled in terms of sets of (expected) utility functions; two options are 
incommensurable when the (expected) utility functions in the set do not 
agree on the ranking of the options. Finally, the overall (expected) utilities 
for the options are determined in the usual way, as a weighted average of 
the (expected) utilities for the options under the criteria.
Table 11.2 gives one instantiation of the more general geoengineering 
problem described in Table 11.1. The (expected) utilities a and b (where 
a > b) associated with the present outcomes are specified to be 0 and −100, 
respectively. And the sets of (expected) utilities for the future generation 
Table 11.2 So far, so good for (criterion-wise) competitiveness
current future
status quo 0 { −50, −50}
geoengineering −100 {−500, 40}
Table 11.1  A multi-criteria problem with 
explicit incommensurability
current future
status quo a ind
geoengineering b ind
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outcomes represent incommensurability between these outcomes as 
required. While the status quo is expected to yield −50 utils for the future 
generation, the geoengineering option is expected to yield either −500 or 
40. (For simplicity, let us assume this is a discrete set containing only two 
expected utility functions.4) However, once we take into account the cur-
rent generation as well, the two options are not incommensurable. The 
status quo has expected utility of −25 (the result of 0.5 × 0 + 0.5 × −50). 
Geoengineering has expected utility of {−300, −30}; that is, it either has 
expected utility of −300 (the result of 0.5 × −100 + 0.5 × −500) or else −30 
(the result of 0.5 × −100 + 0.5 × 40). Both of these expected utilities for 
geoengineering are less than −25 and so the status quo option comes out 
as clearly preferable overall. This looks good even for the strong (cri-
terion-wise) competitiveness principle. By this principle, the status quo 
option is uniquely permissible, in line with the numbers.
But we can easily see how the numbers might not have been so favor-
able for strong (criterion-wise) competitiveness. Consider the version of 
the geoengineering problem in Table 11.3, which is a slight adjustment of 
the previous version.
Again, the expected utility of the status quo is −25. But this time, the 
expected utility of the geoengineering option is {−300, −20}. So by the 
standard method for determining the overall evaluation of options, the 
status quo and geoengineering options are incommensurable. According 
to one expected utility function, the status quo is better since −25 > −300. 
But according to the other, the geoengineering option is better since −25 
< −20. So it is not the case that the status quo is uniquely permissible, as 
per strong (criterion-wise) competitiveness.
Before moving on, it is important to address a worry about where the 
(expected) utility values in the above tables and those that follow come 
from. One might wonder what licenses any given representation of a 
decision problem. Surely the representation is derived from the agent’s 
overall preference ordering, and what is at issue here are constraints on 
that very preference ordering. If strong (criterion-wise) competitiveness 
is a constraint on rational preferences, then Table 11.3 together with the 
stated calculus for determining the overall evaluation and thus ranking of 
the options simply does not represent a rational agent. It might be added 
that an objection to strong (criterion-wise) competitiveness must involve 
a demonstration that the principle conflicts with an alternative and even 
Table 11.3  A prima facie violation of strong 
(criterion-wise) competitiveness
current future
status quo 0 {−50, −50}
geoengineering −100 {−500, 60}
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more compelling principle of preference/choice. And that has not been 
provided here.
A preliminary response to this objection is simply to push the can a 
little down the road. For now, we are assuming that a rational agent 
entertaining a decision problem for which the criteria are separable 
and exhaustive of what matters to her and moreover admit of com-
parable (expected) utility measures, has overall preferences that can 
be represented as the weighted average of her expected utilities across 
the criteria.5 (We are further allowing that preferences may be incom-
plete under any given criterion, represented as sets of expected utilities, 
yielding sets of weighted average expected utilities overall.) The initial 
question is not whether strong or weak (criterion-wise) competitiveness 
should be regarded as a primitive or basic constraint on rational pref-
erences. Rather, it is the more modest question of whether there is in 
fact a conflict between strong or weak (criterion-wise) competitiveness 
and the model of rational preference just described. And we see from 
Table 11.3 that there is indeed a conflict. This provides some reason 
to doubt strong (criterion-wise) competitiveness; whether we should 
rather rethink our supposed model of rational preference will be taken 
up in the next section.
One way to pose the lesson here is that when a pair of options are 
incommensurable for one or more criteria in a decision problem, on the 
model we are supposing, the incommensurability can “swamp” the over-
all evaluation of the options, even if one option is strictly preferred on the 
remaining criteria. It is only in special cases that the incommensurability 
of options on some criteria can be regarded as “minor,” in the sense that 
the associated range of expected utilities does not undermine the strict 
preference for one option on the remaining criteria. Hence strong (cri-
terion-wise) competitiveness is not generally consistent with the model 
of rational preferences in the multi-criteria setting that is supposed here.
Let us turn now to the weak (criterion-wise) competitiveness principle. 
Are there cases where, despite being (criterion-wise) competitive or non-
dominated, an option is nonetheless not permissible? The answer is “yes.” 
Again, a small variation on the previous decision problem can show that 
even weak (criterion-wise) competitiveness is not generally consistent 
with the model of rational preference presupposed here.
In the new case, described in Table 11.4, the options are incommensu-
rable under both criteria. Hence by weak (criterion-wise) competitiveness, 
both options are permissible. And yet, by the lights of our supposed model 
of rational preference, the geoengineering option here is not permissible. 
The geoengineering option will be either worse than the status quo for the 
current generation by 100 and yet better for the future generation by 40, or 
it will be better than the status quo for the current generation by 20, and yet 
worse for the future generation by 300. As such, geoengineering is overall 
determinately worse. Indeed, the status quo has an overall expected utility 
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of −25 while geoengineering has (determinately less) overall expected utility 
of {−55, −165}; that is, it either has an overall expected utility of −55 (the 
result of 0.5 × −100 + 0.5 × −10), or else it has overall expected utility of 
−165 (the result of 0.5 × 20 + 0.5 × −350).
Admittedly, this is a rather peculiar case, insofar as the agent's attitudes 
go. The peculiarity is the strange complementarity between the agent’s 
preference attitudes across the two criteria on all candidate expected util-
ity functions: Either geoengineering is worse for the current generation 
but better for the future generation, or else geoengineering is better for 
the current generation and yet worse for the future generation. This pat-
tern is crucial for geoengineering coming out determinately worse over-
all. (All that is further required for that result is that geoengineering is 
not sufficiently better for the current/future generation to compensate 
for just how much worse it is for the other generation.) In particular, the 
other two logical possibilities – whereby geoengineering is worse on both 
criteria or else better on both criteria – must not be live candidates for 
the agent.
What kind of story might we tell to make the aforementioned model 
seem plausible? Let the geoengineering option involve the current gen-
eration doing a trial implementation and addressing any problems that 
arise before the future generation does a full implementation. Perhaps the 
agent is divided between two evaluations because they cannot assign pre-
cise probabilities to the possibility that crucial problems will be identified 
in the trial. If the problems are identified, then the geoengineering option 
will be worse for the current generation but slightly better, let’s say, for 
the future generation; if the problems are not identified, then the geoen-
gineering option will be better for the current generation but much worse 
for the future generation when hitherto unforeseen problems arise that 
are nonetheless expected to be highly detrimental. Assume the agent has a 
rather strange belief state: for whatever reason, she thinks either the cru-
cial problems being identified is a certainty, or else the crucial problems 
not being identified is a certainty (and nothing in between). Hence there 
are two possible expected utility representations across the two criteria, 
as per Table 11.4. One can appreciate from this sketchy narrative that 
decision problems like those described in Table 11.4 are rather unusual. 
Nonetheless, they are a conceptual possibility. Indeed, a simpler problem 
in the same vein will be introduced in the next section.
Table 11.4  A prima facie violation of weak 
(criterion-wise) competitiveness
current future
status quo {0, 0} {−50, −50}
geoengineering {−100, 20} {−10, −350}
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4  Comparison with the State-Wise Analogues
It was briefly noted earlier that there is room for dispute about the sta-
tus of the state-wise competitiveness principles. Hence one might presume 
that there should equally be room for dispute about the status of their 
criterion-wise counterparts. As such, one might think that the supposed 
model of rational (multi-criteria) preference in Section 3 is more conten-
tious than first meets the eye such that the conflict with the (criterion-wise) 
competitiveness principles is far from devastating for the latter. A closer 
look at the extent of the analogy between the state-wise and the criterion-
wise principles does not support this optimism about the latter, however. 
That is what we turn to now: a demonstration that the two versions of 
competitiveness are not on a par as constraints on rational preference.
We will focus on the weak form of the competitiveness principles since 
these are lesser constraints on rational preference. The last section pre-
sented a prima facie case that not even weak (criterion-wise) competi-
tiveness is a plausible constraint on rational preference. The following 
decision problem – “Two Transparent Boxes” – presents this case in sim-
pler terms, (even) more contrived as it may be. Indeed, the problem will 
play a useful role in our subsequent discussion because it has the same 
tabular form – with the exception of the labeling and meaning of the 
columns – as the decision problem introduced by Casper Hare (2010) 
entitled “Two Opaque Boxes.” Hare’s problem inspired much further dis-
cussion of constraints on rational preference where incommensurability 
and risk are concerned, including Bales et al.’s (2014) defense of what we 
here refer to as weak (state-wise) competitiveness.
Here is the analogue to Hare’s decision problem (with crucial similari-
ties to the final geoengineering case, as will be elaborated next):
Two Transparent Boxes. You show me items A and B, two dollar 
coins, two twins Pablo and Penelope, and two transparent boxes, the 
contents of which must be distributed between the twins in speci-
fied ways. I consider A and B to be incommensurable with respect 
to both Pablo and Penelope's welfare. Perhaps A is a ticket to the 
opera while B is a ticket to an A-league sports game. (Moreover, I 
consider the twins to derive the same welfare from the same items.) 
The twins’ welfare is all that matters to me and the welfare of each 
matters equally to me. I see that Box 1 contains A for Pablo and B 
for Penelope, while Box 2 contains B for Pablo and A for Penelope, 
plus an extra dollar for each. Then you invite me to choose one of the 
boxes so as to benefit the twins in the specified way.
Table 11.5 depicts our decision problem in tabular form, where A+ can 
be interpreted as the outcome A plus one dollar, and B+ can be inter-
preted similarly. Here the columns represent the independent criteria 
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or sources of value – Pablo’s and Penelope’s respective welfare – that 
matter (equally, by assumption) to the decision-maker. As noted earlier, 
“Two Transparent Boxes” is constructed to have the same tabular form 
as Hare’s “Two Opaque Boxes” problem, the difference being the mean-
ing of the columns. In Hare’s problem, the columns represent rather the 
possible states of the world (each equi-probable by assumption since they 
are the results of a fair coin toss). (A further difference then is that the 
problem in Table 11.5 involves two dollar coins, while Hare’s problem 
requires just one for which the accompanying prize is uncertain.) In both 
problems it is assumed that A+ is strictly preferred to A, B+ is strictly 
preferred to B, and A and A+ are each incommensurable with B and B+, 
independent of the column, whether the criterion or the supposed state 
of the world.
The decision problem depicted in Table 11.5 – whether the trans-
parent or opaque version – can be regarded as having the same crucial 
“complementarity” in expected utility values across the columns as the 
final geoengineering problem above. Assume that the incommensurabil-
ity between A and B is represented by a set of expected utilities, some of 
which put A higher in value and some of which put B higher in value. 
Recall that when a dollar is added to either prize, the two remain incom-
mensurable. On some expected utility functions then, A is better than 
B plus a dollar, favoring Box 1 in the first column. But on those very 
same expected utility functions, A plus a dollar is better than B, by an 
even greater amount. So Box 1 loses by a greater amount in the second 
column than it wins in the first column. Likewise, for the expected utility 
functions in which Box 1 wins on the second column, it loses by a greater 
amount on the first column.
By the weak (criterion-wise) competitiveness principle, both Box 1 and 
Box 2 are permissible choices in the Two Transparent Boxes problem. 
Similarly, by weak (state-wise) competitiveness, both boxes are permissible 
choices in the Two Opaque Boxes problem. That is because, under each of 
the columns (i.e., each of the criteria/states), the two options are incom-
mensurable. Hence each option is not worse than the other across all the 
columns and thus each option is competitive. But surely, whichever prob-
lem one faces, the choice of Box 2 is better! Moreover, our utility model 
described above – revealing the “complementarity” between the column 
utilities (to the detriment of Box 1) for all possible utility functions – 
apparently reveals why it is that Box 2 comes out determinately better.
Table 11.5 Two transparent boxes
column 1 – Pablo (0.5) column 2 – Penelope (0.5)
Box 1 A B
Box 2 B+ A+
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Some argue that Box 1 in “Two Opaque Boxes” is nonetheless a per-
missible choice (for instance, Bales et al. 2014). The major positive argu-
ment for this claim (noted already by Hare, 2010) involves appealing to 
the agent’s attitudes were she fully informed. In “Two Opaque Boxes” the 
agent may reason that there are two ways in which the world might go, 
corresponding to the two states of the world. Or, put differently, if she 
were fully informed, there are two possible states of knowledge she might 
have. Either way, her fully informed self will not find Box 1 worse than 
Box 2 (in fact, she will find them to be incommensurable). So why not 
defer to her fully informed self and regard the two boxes as permissible 
choices, neither one worse than the other, even under uncertainty? The 
general principle might be stated as follows:
Defer to Fully Informed Self. If you know that your fully informed 
self will find an option no worse than alternatives, then you should 
now, even under uncertainty, find this option no worse than alterna-
tives and thus permissible.
Something along the lines of the aforementioned is typically granted in 
the literature as a reason to endorse the weak (state-wise) competitive-
ness principle. The dispute is about whether this is a good enough reason 
to overcome the reasons against endorsing the weak (state-wise) com-
petitiveness principle. But we need not here take a side in this debate (see, 
however, Rabinowicz, 2021, for further analysis).6 What is important for 
our discussion is that this reason in favor of weak (state-wise) competi-
tiveness does not translate well to the multi-criteria setting. The analogue 
general principle is as follows:
Defer to Fully One-Track-Minded Self. If you know that your fully 
one-track-minded self will find an option no worse than alterna-
tives, then you should now, even taking into account all criteria, 
find this option no worse than alternatives and thus permissible.
In the case of “Two Transparent Boxes,” the idea is that when the deci-
sion-maker focuses on the respective plights of Pablo and Penelope (the 
“criteria” in this decision problem), she finds neither box worse than the 
other. Hence, she should find neither box worse than the other overall 
when all criteria are taken into account.
The crucial problem with this proposed maxim to defer to one’s fully 
one-track-minded self is that this self (or rather these selves), unlike one’s 
fully informed self (or possible selves), has no claim to authority. It sim-
ply does not matter what would be my attitudes were I to only care 
about any single aspect or criterion of choice. That has nothing to do 
with either my actual or idealized preference attitudes.
Incommensurability 243
These considerations bear on the question of whether “complemen-
tarities” in candidate expected utilities across different columns (criteria/
states) of a decision problem matter or are even recognized as mean-
ingful. The representation of the agent’s attitudes in “Two Transparent 
Boxes” described earlier, whereby on any candidate expected utility func-
tion, Box 2 is better for one person (criterion) by a greater amount than 
it is worse for the other person (criterion) denies any special primacy to 
criteria taken in isolation. The idea is that it is simply a further fact about 
the agent’s attitudes that Box 2 is better than Box 1 overall, despite the 
two boxes being incommensurable with respect to each of the criteria 
taken in isolation.
Compare the situation with “Two Opaque Boxes.” Some argue that 
here too, there may be facts about the agent’s attitudes, to do with 
“complementarities” in their expected utilities across states, that cannot 
necessarily be discerned by looking at the states in isolation. Jim Joyce 
(2010) emphasizes this point in discussing agents who are intuitively best 
modeled as having “imprecise probabilities.” Certain decision problems 
strongly suggest that the agent considers a number of possible probability 
functions as live candidates and that complementarities across states, or 
patterns that are true of all these candidate probability functions, are real 
and important.7 But at least in the case of states, it is plausible to argue 
for the contrary position: that one’s attitudes with respect to states taken 
in isolation are basic, these being the possibilities for one’s fully informed 
self, and that one’s overall attitudes across states are derived from one’s 
attitudes toward the states in isolation. In other words, it is plausible to 
deny any significance to the complementarities or global features shared 
by all the candidate probability and utility function pairs that may play 
a role in modeling one’s preference attitudes across states. It follows that 
there is reason to think weak (state-wise) competitiveness is a constraint 
on rational preference. There are no such reasons favoring weak (crite-
rion-wise) competitiveness.
5  Return to Ordinary Decision-Making Practices 
A case has thus been made against choice principles based on a non-
dominance relation for the multi-criteria decision setting that extends to 
incommensurability. The principles in question were dubbed weak/strong 
(criterion-wise) competitiveness. Any stronger principle – such as a ver-
sion of independence that extends to incommensurability – is thus also 
undermined by the analysis here. Recall that the rough idea of the stron-
ger principle is “ignore those aspects of options whereby they are incom-
mensurable, and base one’s overall preferences on the remaining criteria.” 
This is a poor guide to choice deliberations. We have seen that an option 
cannot be ruled out of contention just because it is dis-preferred on all 
those criteria for which it is not incommensurable with another option. 
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Moreover, an option that is preferred or at least not dis-preferred on all 
those criteria for which it is not incommensurable with another option 
may nonetheless be dis-preferred overall.
Are our ordinary choice deliberations then routinely unreasonable? For 
all that was said in Section 1, the answer is apparently “yes.” The Bike 
Route decision problem was introduced to motivate the idea that we do 
indeed routinely ignore those aspects of options or criteria for which we 
cannot compare options. And this decision problem is as mundane as any.
There is, however, a more charitable reading of our ordinary choice 
deliberations in light of the findings here. It is to insist that appearances 
can be deceiving. To the extent that we do “ignore incommensurabilities” 
in assessing options, it is because the incommensurabilities in question 
are relatively “minor”; they do not “swamp” those aspects of the options 
for which the agent has clear preferences (as per the decision problem in 
Table 11.2). In other cases, we may not be ignoring incommensurabilities 
at all but rather doing something which, again, is typically regarded as 
faultless (and in accordance with the model of multi-criteria decision-
making presupposed in this discussion): we may simply be ignoring crite-
ria for which we are indifferent between the options.
The more charitable reading raises further questions, however, about 
the reasonableness of ordinary choice deliberations. The deliberations 
as described may well be consistent, in the sense of according with 
the appropriate preference axioms. But one might doubt whether it is 
reasonable in a more substantive sense to be (more or less) indifferent 
between options with respect to criteria that are less salient, say, criteria 
concerning the options’ more complicated causally downstream effects.8 
For instance, one might doubt whether it is reasonable to be indifferent 
between the city bike route and the green bike route when it comes to 
complicated downstream effects like one’s impact on the people one will 
encounter along the route and how these people will in turn impact on 
those they encounter and so on.
Here the discussion prompted by James Lenman’s worry that we are 
“clueless” about the consequences of our actions is helpful. Hilary Greaves 
(2016) offers a limited defense of our being indifferent between pairs of 
options with respect to their more complicated causally downstream 
effects. The defense rests on a specific application of “the principle of 
indifference”: roughly that in many cases, there is no reason to think that 
some coincidental downstream effect of one option will not be equally 
likely to be a coincidental downstream effect of the other option instead.
The question is whether an appeal of this sort to the principle of indif-
ference is typically apt. Greaves (2016) herself outlines circumstances in 
which it is not: cases where conflicting considerations bear on how options 
are ranked with respect to the more difficult choice criteria concerning 
the options’ causally downstream effects. Perhaps Laurie Paul has some-
thing like this in mind with respect to decisions involving transformative 
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experience: for many choice criteria associated with life satisfaction, say, 
there will be unresolved conflicting considerations regarding how the 
options should be ranked. In such cases, the reasonable attitude is argu-
ably one of incommensurability between the options under the criteria in 
question. But note that there seems no reason for this incommensurabil-
ity, in general, to be relatively minor, such that it can be safely ignored. 
Quite the opposite. The incommensurability here seems significant, and 
if the choice criteria in question are also significant, then the incommen-
surability will have a “swamping” effect. That is, to the extent that our 
decision problems are best described in the way just outlined, then we 
must live with widespread indeterminacy or incommensurability in our 
overall ranking of options.
Notes
 1 The reason for this incompleteness of preference or lack of opinion would 
presumably be that the criterion in question is itself multi-dimensional. For 
example, the comfort of other riders may depend on both companionship and 
ease of riding; these may pull in opposite directions, and it may be unclear 
how they trade-off against each other.
 2 Compare with Bykvist and Stefánsson’s (2017) similar interpretation of Paul’s 
proposal for making decisions involving transformative experience. (They go 
on to critique the proposal.)
 3 Note that Rabinowicz (2021) rejects the state-wise competitiveness principles 
stated here (in line with Hare), but both regard the principles to be at least 
plausible, if ultimately incorrect.
 4 Typically, sets of expected utility representations are thought to be convex, 
but the appeal to discrete, non-convex sets does not compromise the analysis 
here.
 5 See, for instance, Keeney and Raiffa (1976) for a representation theorem sup-
porting this choice rule, at least when the preference orderings concerned 
are complete. In our examples, some preference orderings for criteria are 
assumed incomplete. But Keeney and Raiffa’s theorem may nonetheless be 
taken to provide support for the weighted average choice rule, even a modi-
fied version that yields sets of weighted averages. And we can suppose that 
there is independent support for the representation of the preferences under 
each criterion as given in the tables.
 6 Several reasons are given against endorsing weak (state-wise) competitive-
ness. Hare (2010) notes that there is a consideration in favor of Box 2, the 
dollar, but none in favor of Box 1. Moreover, Hare appeals to an argument 
from transitivity that is made explicit by Rabinowicz (2021): if one switches 
the prizes for Box 2 between the columns in Table 11.5, this option dominates 
and is thus better than Box 1. Surely one should be indifferent between ordi-
nary Box 2 (as it appears in Table 11.5) and the switched Box 2. But then, 
by transitivity, ordinary Box 2 is better than Box 1. To deny this, and thus 
maintain that Box 1 is not worse than ordinary Box 2 and thus a permissible 
choice, one would have to resist the indifference of the ordinary and switched 
Box 2 or else admit a violation of transitivity.
 7 The term “complementarity” used here is indeed taken from Joyce, although 
he uses it in a narrower sense and with respect to candidate probability 
functions.
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 8 The phrase “(more or less) indifferent” is intended to account for cases of 
“minor incommensurabilty” (as discussed earlier and illustrated in Table 
11.2), as well as cases of genuine indifference.
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Suppose you are deciding between law school and pursuing a PhD in phi-
losophy. This is a hard choice. The life of a philosophy professor – which 
is what you hope would result from pursuing the degree in philosophy – 
and the life of a successful lawyer – which is what you hope would result 
from going to law school – manifest significantly different qualities 
of what you value in a career. Becoming a successful lawyer promises 
greater financial security, holidays in Majorca, and a revered social status. 
Becoming a philosopher, however, promises greater intellectual satisfac-
tion, lazy mornings, and a great deal of professional autonomy. When it 
comes to these two careers, you’re ambivalent: you don’t prefer one to 
the other, nor are you indifferent between the two.1 It’s hard to choose 
when you’re ambivalent.
But this choice is even harder still. For this is also a choice under 
uncertainty. Merely choosing to pursue a particular career doesn’t 
guarantee success. Going to law school might result in you becoming a 
successful lawyer. But it might not. Instead, it might result in you flunking 
out and being buried beneath a mountain of student loans. Similarly, 
pursuing a PhD in philosophy might result in becoming a professor of 
philosophy, but this is far from guaranteed. Instead, it might result in 
a very interesting dissertation on the metaphysics of absences and very 
troubling absences of tenure-track positions in metaphysics. Both options 
are a gamble: how things shake out turn on features of the world you’re 
uncertain about.
When you are uncertain about what will result from your choices, the 
standard advice is to maximize expected utility (i.e., for each of your 
options, you should weigh the value of its possible outcomes by your cre-
dence in that outcome being the one that would actually result were you 
to perform it; the weighted average of these values is an option’s expected 
value; the option with the highest expected value is the one you ought to 
perform). But if you’re ambivalent between the potential outcomes of your 
options – as you are in this example – this advice is not helpful. Because 
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you are ambivalent between being a lawyer and being a philosopher, your 
preferences cannot be represented with a utility-function, and, thus, there 
is no well-defined quantity whose expectation you can maximize.
What can be said instead? Are there any general principles – or, better 
still, a full-fledged decision theory – to guide us when facing decisions of 
this kind? If ambivalence and uncertainty are ubiquitous, which I con-
tend it’s plausible to think they are, this is a pressing question.2
To the end of addressing this question, I develop an impossibility result: 
there are a handful of independently plausible constraints that no such 
decision theory can jointly satisfy.
2  The Puzzle of Opaque Sweetening
Let’s begin by looking at Caspar Hare’s puzzle of opaque sweetening 
(Hare 2010, 2013), which itself underlies an impossibility result.
Opaque Sweetening. There are two opaque boxes: a Larger box (L) and 
a Regular box (R). A fair coin has been tossed. If the coin landed heads, 
then a voucher for an all-expenses-paid Alpine ski vacation (A) was 
placed in the Larger box and a voucher for an all-expenses-paid beach 
vacation (B) was placed in the Regular box; if the coin landed tails, then 
B was placed in the Larger box and A was placed in the Regular box. In 













Figure 12.1 Two vacations in opaque boxes, distributed by coin-flip.
Now imagine that $20 is added to the Larger box. If you choose the 
Larger box, you will win whichever prize it contains plus $20. Nothing is 
added to the Regular box. You are asked to choose one of the two boxes, 





Figure 12.2  An example of Opaque Sweetening. The Larger box has been sweet-
ened with $20.
The puzzle exploits a characteristic feature of being ambivalent – 
namely, that it, unlike indifference, is insensitive to mild sweetening: if 
you are ambivalent between X and Y, you should likewise be ambivalent 
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between X and Y+, a slightly improved version of Y. Let’s suppose that 
you are ambivalent between the adventurous skiing trip in the Alps and 
the relaxing trip to the beach. There are various good things to be said 
in favor of each. You don’t prefer either one to the other. Moreover, you 
don’t prefer the beach vacation plus 20 bucks (B+$20) to the ski vacation, 
and you don’t prefer the ski vacation plus 20 bucks (A+$20) to the beach 
vacation. Small improvements aren’t enough to resolve your ambivalence.
Is there a box you’re rationally required to take? Or is it rationally 
permissible to take either? The puzzle brings out a tension between 
two attractive ideas. One of these ideas supports the verdict that one is 
rationally required to take, or prefer, L+ over R. And the other supports 
the verdict that it is rationally permissible for one to take either.
The first idea is that you ought to evaluate an option in terms of its cor-
responding prospects: the probability distribution over its potential out-
comes. In this case, L+’s corresponding prospects (a 50% chance of A+$20 
and a 50% chance of B+$20) are better than R’s (a 50% chance of A and a 
50% chance of B); and so you ought to prefer, and thus take, L+ over R.3
The other idea is that rationality shouldn’t require you to prefer one 
option to another if there is no way for the one to be better than the other. In 
this case, even though you don’t know which box contains which prize, you 
know that you don’t prefer what’s in L+ to what’s in R. If the coin landed 
heads, then L+ contains A+$20 and R contains B, and you don’t prefer A+$20 to 
B; if the coin landed tails, then L+ contains B+$20 and R contains A, and you 
don’t prefer B+$20 to A. No matter how the coin landed, you’re ambivalent 
between the prizes in each box. There is no way for L+ to result in an out-
come you prefer to what you would get by choosing R instead. And – so the 
thought goes – you aren’t rationally required to prefer, or take, L+ over R.
This conflict can be presented as an impossibility result: no decision 
theory, which allows for ambivalence, can satisfy the following four 
constraints.
Neutrality
If φ and ψ are probability-preserving permutations of each other, you 
are rationally required to be indifferent between the two.
Two options are probability-preserving permutations of each other just 
in case every outcome that might result from the one is just as likely to 





Figure 12.3  An example illustrating Neutrality. L and R are probability-preserv-
ing permutations of each other.
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Given that a fair coin is equally likely to land heads as it is to land tails, 
L and R are probability-preserving permutations of each other. Every 
outcome that might result from L – namely, A or B – is equally likely to 
result from R. According to Neutrality, then, you are rationally required 
to be indifferent between L and R.4
The motivation for Neutrality is that, when evaluating an option, all 
that should matter is how good its outcomes are and how likely those 
outcomes are to result. The identity of the state in which the outcome 
occurs is only relevant insofar as it affects the outcome’s value or prob-
ability of obtaining. Outcomes are to be individuated in such a way that 
the states in which they occur don’t affect their value. So, options that are 
probability-preserving permutations of each other are the same in every 
respect that’s relevant to rational choice.
The next constraint is a familiar one. It relies on the notion of strict 
dominance. Let’s say that an option φ strictly dominates an option ψ just 
in case, for every state S that might obtain, you prefer φ’s to ψ’s outcome in 
S.5 Informally, we can say that one option strictly dominates another just 
in case it always does better. (Although we don’t need it now, the notion of 
weak dominance will play a role later on. One option weakly dominates 
another just in case, for each state, the former’s outcome is at least as good 
as the latter’s, and there is some state in which the former’s outcome is bet-
ter.6 Informally, we can say that one option weakly dominates another just 
in case it’s always at least as good and sometimes better.)
Strict Dominance Principle
If φ strictly dominates ψ, you’re rationally required to prefer φ to ψ.
The motivation for the Strict Dominance Principle is that, if φ strictly 
dominates ψ, φ is guaranteed to be better than ψ. Although you might not 
know which outcome would result from performing φ, you do know that 
whichever it is, you prefer it to the outcome that would result from per-
forming ψ instead. You know, then, that φ will net you more value than 








Figure 12.4 An example of Dominance.
L+ strictly dominates L. You don’t know how the coin has landed, but 
you do know that, either way, L+ will net you a better prize than L would. 
Because L+ strictly dominates L, you are in a position to know something 
significant about how the options compare in the actual word: L+ is better. 
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Ideally, you’d always prefer the option that promises to be actually better. 
Of course, we don’t always know which of our options promises to actu-
ally be best – but, when we do know (as we do when one of the options 
strictly dominates the others), it would be irrational not to prefer it.7
The third constraint is also a familiar one: transitivity. Because we’re 
concerned with a number of different ordering-relations – e.g., strict pref-
erence, indifference, ambivalence – there are a number of different cor-
responding transitivity claims.
The first concerns only strict preference:
Transitivity of Preference
If you prefer X to Y and you prefer Y to Z, then you should prefer 
X to Z.
The next concerns only indifference:
Transitivity of Indifference
If you’re indifferent between X and Y and you’re indifferent between 
Y and Z, then you should be indifferent between X and Z.
And then there are versions of transitivity that mix preference and indif-
ference, the following of which most concerns us here:
Sensitivity to Sweetening
If you prefer X to Y and are indifferent between Y and Z, then you 
should prefer X to Z.
These different claims admit different possible motivations. The 
most famous motivation for Transitivity of Preference, for example, is 
the money pump argument: if you violate it, it’s possible to construct 
a series of trades, each of which (if you act on your preferences) it is 
rational for you to take but which collectively guarantee a sure-thing 
loss. Alternatively, you might take transitivity to be partially constitutive 
of the meaning of these notions (Davidson 1976). For example, part of 
what it means to be indifferent between Y and Z is that, if you prefer X 
to Y, you should then prefer X to Z. This is how I propose we interpret 
Sensitivity to Sweetening.8
The final constraint has the flavor of a dominance principle. It relies on 
the notion of one option being never worse than another. Let’s say that 
an option φ is never worse than an option ψ just in case, for every state S 
that might obtain, you don’t prefer ψ’s outcome to φ’s in S.9
Never Worse Principle
If φ is never worse than ψ, then you are not rationally required to 
prefer ψ to φ.
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The motivation for this principle is somewhat similar to one given for 
the Strict Dominance Principle: if φ is never worse than ψ, then you are in 
a position to know that you don’t prefer ψ’s actual outcome to φ’s – and 
if you know, as a matter of actual fact, that ψ isn’t any better than φ, you 
aren’t rationally required to prefer it.10 The case of opaque sweetening, 
which opened this section (see Figure 12.2), serves to illustrate this con-
straint. In that example, because you don’t prefer A+$20 to B and you don’t 
prefer B+$20 to A, R is never worse than L. And so, according to the Never 
Worse Principle, you aren’t rationally required to prefer L+ to R.
These four constraints – Neutrality, the Strict Dominance Principle, 
Sensitivity to Sweetening, and the Never Worse Principle – are jointly 






Figure 12.5  An example illustrating that Neutrality, the Strict Dominance 
Principle, Sensitivity to Sweetening, and the Never Worse Principle 
are jointly inconsistent.
Given Neutrality, you’re rationally required to be indifferent between 
L and R. From the Strict Dominance Principle, you’re rationally required 
to prefer L+ to L. If you adopt the attitudes that these principles ratio-
nally require you to adopt, then, from Sensitivity to Sweetening, you’re 
also rationally required to prefer L+ to R, which violates the Never Worse 
Principle. Therefore, there can be no decision theory that both allows for 
ambivalence and satisfies all four of these constraints.
3  Neutrality and the Never Worse Principle
The puzzle of Opaque Sweetening has sparked a debate, which divides 
roughly into two camps: those who support (something like) Neutrality 
and those who support (something like) the Never Worse Principle.11 
This makes the impossibility result presented above of only limited inter-
est. Both Neutrality and the Never Worse Principle are – as I will soon 
argue, needlessly – contentious. The most compelling motivation for the 
one tells against the truth of the other (and vice versa), so the two aren’t 
really independently plausible.
Consider Neutrality, for example. You should only find this principle 
appealing if you think that the role states play in determining what it’s 
rational to do is a derivative one. The states matter only insofar as they 
serve to determine evaluatively relevant features of the potential outcomes 
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and those outcomes’ probabilities; once the outcomes and their prob-
abilities have been determined, the facts about which outcome would be 
realized in which state is irrelevant. If two options have the same poten-
tial outcomes with the same probabilities, the reasons you have to favor 
the one perfectly balance the reasons you have to favor the other, and so 
you ought to be indifferent between them.
But it’s precisely this view about states that proponents of the Never 
Worse Principle should deny. On these views, the states matter (over and 
above their effect on the outcomes and their probabilities) because, ide-
ally, your attitudes should match the value-relations that actually hold 
between your options – and the facts about which outcomes will be real-
ized in which states are relevant to whether you’re in a position to know 
which value-relation obtains in the actual world. If you know, for exam-
ple, that φ’s outcome is better than ψ’s in the actual world, you should 
prefer φ to ψ; if you know that you’re indifferent between φ’s and ψ’s 
outcome in the actual world, you should be indifferent between φ and 
ψ; and if you know – as you do with L and R – that you are ambiva-
lent between your options’ outcomes in the actual world, you should 
be ambivalent, not indifferent, between those options. Permuting states 
(even if they are equiprobable) might affect what you’re in a position to 
know about how your options compare in the actual world. But, on these 
views, such knowledge plays an important (perhaps even decisive) role in 
determining what it’s rational to do.
Just as the proponents of the Never Worse Principle have reason to 
reject Neutrality, the proponents of Neutrality have reason to reject the 
Never Worse Principle. They can claim that, while it might often be true 
that you’re not required to prefer one option to another if you know that 
the latter is guaranteed to not be worse than the latter, this isn’t always 
the case. In many cases, φ is never worse than ψ because φ’s outcomes 
are at least as good as ψ’s in each state – in which case, you can’t have 
more reason to ψ than to φ. But, in the example depicted in Figure 12.2, 
R is never worse than L+ (and L+ is never worse than R), not because 
R’s outcomes are at least as good as L+’s but because you’re ambivalent 
between their outcomes – and that’s compatible with having more reason 
to take L+ than R.12 In a similar vein, they could claim that what matters 
in evaluating an option is not merely how good that option is relative to 
how things would’ve been had you chosen otherwise but also how good 
things could’ve been. Were the former all that mattered, then perhaps 
the Never Worse Principle would be correct. But, because L+ guarantees 
something better than what you just as well could get from R, you are – 
contra the Never Worse Principle – required to prefer L+ to R.13
Both Neutrality and the Never Worse Principle are contentious. In the 
next section, I will show that there exists an impossibility result that fol-
lows from less controversial constraints.
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4  Less Controversial Constraints
In this section, I’ll develop a different impossibility result, which replaces 
Neutrality and the Never Worse Principle with less controversial con-
straints. Recall that Neutrality was controversial because it abstracts 
away from the facts about which outcomes occupy which states. Its crit-
ics contend that these facts are important because they’re relevant to 
what you might be in a position to know about how your options com-
pare in the actual world. In short, Neutrality effectively allows for cross-
state comparisons – which, its critics contend, are illegitimate (at least 
when there’s ambivalence). Also, recall that the Never Worse Principle 
was controversial because the fact that one option is never worse than 
another is (at least relative to one conception of reasons) nevertheless 
compatible with having no reason to take the former and some reason to 
take the latter – as illustrated by the fact that φ can be both never worse 
than ψ and yet stochastically dominated by it. This is, in part, because the 
never worse than relation isn’t asymmetric: it is possible for two options, 
like L+ and R, to both be never worse than the other. Thus, that, e.g., R 
is never worse than L+ doesn’t provide you with a reason to prefer R – 
or, at least, not one that isn’t perfectly counterbalanced by an analogous 
reason in the other direction. I’ll introduce some constraints that avoid 
these criticisms.
The first is a weakening of the Never Worse Principle. Roughly, it says 
that if one option is never worse than another and it is likely to be better, 
then you are not rationally required to disprefer it. An option, φ, is likely 
to be better than another, ψ, just in case the probability you assign to the 
disjunction of the states in which you prefer φ’s outcome to ψ’s is greater 
than 50%.14
Never Worse, Likely Better Principle
If φ is never worse than ψ and is likely to be better, then you are not 
rationally required to prefer ψ to φ.
Notice that this principle, unlike the Never Worse Principle, makes use 
of a notion that is asymmetric: if φ is never worse and likely to be better 
than ψ, then ψ isn’t never worse and likely to be better than φ. So, if φ is 
never worse and likely to be better than ψ, you do have a reason – a fairly 
powerful one, in fact – for taking φ over ψ (and one which isn’t perfectly 
counterbalanced by an analogous reason in the other direction). Given 
this powerful consideration in φ’s favor, it’s hard to see how you could 
nevertheless be rationally required to prefer ψ instead. The Never Worse, 
Likely Better Principle says that you’re not. This principle is harder to 
deny than its cousin, the Never Worse Principle.
Figure 12.6 provides an example of the principle in action. Suppose you 
are deciding between L+ and R. Before you make your selection, though, 
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the situation changes. Rather than facing a choice between the Larger box 
plus 20 bucks (L+) and the Regular box (R), you are told that, either, you 
can pay a small fee ($2.50, say) to acquire L+ outright (L±) or you can opt 
for a mixed option (M). A fair six-sided die has been rolled. If it landed on 
1, you’ll receive R; if it landed on anything but 1, you’ll receive L+. Out of 
these two new options – L± and M – which should you choose?
Coin: Heads Tails
Die:  –  –
L± A+$. A+$. B+$. B+$.
M B A+$ A B+$
Figure 12.6 An example illustrating the Never Worse, Likely Better Principle.
According to the Never Worse, Likely Better Principle, you are not 
rationally required to prefer paying the $2.50 for L+ over letting the die 
decide. M, the mixed option, is five-sixths likely to result in L+ at no cost, 
which, no matter which prize it contains, is preferable to paying for it. 
Furthermore, in the unlikely event that M doesn’t result in L+, it neverthe-
less promises a prize that isn’t worse than the one you’d get by paying 
to have L+ outright. There’s certainly something to be said in M’s favor. 
And so any view which holds – contra the Never Worse, Likely Better 
Principle – that one is rationally required to prefer L± to M, at the very 
least owes us an explanation for how that could be.15
The next constraint is best introduced with an example (see Figure 12.7). 
Suppose that you’re in possession of R – the box that contains B if the coin 
landed heads and A if it landed tails – and have yet to open it. Before you do, 
you are offered a deal: you can either accept a dollar or you can be entered 
into a drawing for a large sum of money. Which should you choose: the dol-
lar or the drawing? Suppose you do some back-of-the-envelope math and 
discover that you are completely indifferent between the sure-thing dollar 
and the drawing; even though the drawing might result in a larger sum, the 
chance of winning it is too small for it to come out on top. Because this 
choice has no effect on which prize is in the box, the fact that you’ve yet to 
open the box is irrelevant to whether you should choose the dollar or the 
drawing; if you’d be indifferent between the two without R, you should be 




R+$ B+$ A+$ B+$ A+$
R+d B A B+$/p A+$/p
Tails Tails
Figure 12.7 The dollar or the drawing? An example illustrating Orthogonal Equipoise.
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Notice that, in comparing R+$1 to R+d, you are in a position to know 
that one of the two is actually better than the other (although you know 
not which). Unlike the comparison between L+ and R, where you know 
you are ambivalent between their respective outcomes, here, you know 
you’re not; it could be (in the very likely event that your ticket isn’t a 
winner) that R+$1 is (slightly) better than R+d, and it could be (in the very 
unlikely event that your ticket is a winner) that R+d is (significantly) bet-
ter than R+$1, but it cannot be that you’re ambivalent. This is a mani-
festation of the fact that, although you’re ambivalent between A and B, 
that ambivalence is orthogonal – and, thus, irrelevant – to your choice 
between the dollar and the drawing. As it happens, the extent to which 
R+$1 might be better than R+d (+$1), weighted by the chance that it is bet-
ter (1−p) perfectly balances the extent to which R+d might be better than 
R+$1(+$1/p − 1), weighted by the chance that it is better (p). So, because 
the considerations in favor of the one perfectly balance the considerations 
in favor of the other, you should be indifferent between the two.
In general, the thought is this. Even if you’re ambivalent between some 
of φ’s and ψ’s outcomes, so long as you’re not ambivalent between any of 
the outcomes in the same state, you should be indifferent between φ and 
ψ if your estimate of the extent to which φ might be better than ψ equals 
your estimate of the extent to which ψ might be better than φ.
Orthogonal Equipoise
If, in every state, there’s no ambivalence between φ’s and ψ’s out-
comes, then if the probabilistically weighted average of the extent to 
which φ’s outcome might be better than ψ’s equals the probabilisti-
cally weighted average of the extent to which ψ’s outcome might be 
better than φs, then you should be indifferent between φ and ψ.
This requires some further spelling out, given that, if you’re ambiva-
lent between any outcomes whatsoever, it’s not straightforward how to 
measure the extent to which one outcome might be better than another 
in a way that admits probabilistic-weighting (even if you aren’t ambiva-
lent about those two outcomes specifically). There are several ways of 
making the notion precise. Here’s one way. If your preferences could be 
represented with a utility-function, u, the notion is clear: the probabilisti-
cally weighted average of the extent to which φ’s outcome might be bet-
ter than ψ’s is ∑S′ Cr(S′) · (u(φ∧S′) − u(ψ∧S′)), for all states S′ in which 
u(φ∧S′) > u(ψ∧S′). We can generalize the idea in the following way. Even 
if your preference-ordering cannot, due to ambivalence, be represented 
with a single utility-function, it can be represented with a set of utility-
functions. Consider all of the coherent extensions of your preferences: 
that is, all of the ways of rendering your preferences complete while 
holding fixed the preferences you do have.17 We then represent each of 
these coherent extensions with a utility-function. Let 𝒰 be the set of all 
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these utility-functions. This set represents your preference-ordering. If the 
probabilistically weighted averages are the same according to all of these 
utility-functions, then, so long as there’s no ambivalence between φ’s and 
ψ’s outcomes, you should be indifferent.18
Orthogonal Equipoise is not logically weaker than Neutrality; the 
two are logically independent. But it is, I contend, a less controversial 
principle in virtue of the fact that it eschews making the kind of cross-
state comparisons that the opponents of Neutrality found objectionable. 
Instead, it compares the differences in value between the outcomes in 
the same states (assuming that such comparisons can be made). The 
constraint doesn’t presume that it always will be possible to make these 
comparisons. But, when you can, your ambivalence is, in some sense, 
orthogonal to the choice at hand. It can, then, for the purposes of making 
the decision, disappear into the background.
The impossibility result, which is presented in the next section, also 
requires the Weak Dominance Principle, as well as Transitivity.
5  The Impossibility Result
In this section, I’ll show that the Never Worse, Likely Better Principle, 
Orthogonal Equipoise, the Weak Dominance Principle, Transitivity of 
Preference, Transitivity of Indifference, and Sensitivity to Sweetening are 
jointly inconsistent. I’ll demonstrate this in a series of steps.
5.1  Opaque Sweetening, Redux
The first step in the argument is to show that Orthogonal Equipoise, 
along with Dominance and Transitivity, entail that, in the original 
Opaque Sweetening example (See Figure 12.2), you are rationally required 
to prefer L+ to R. The argument goes like this.19
Suppose that in front of you is a button that reads “A.” You know the 
following. A fair coin has been tossed. If you push the button, you win 
prize A if the coin landed heads and nothing if the coin landed tails. If 
you don’t push the button, you win prize A if the coin landed tails and 
nothing if it landed heads (See Figure 12.8).
Heads Tails
Push “A” A 
Don’t Push  A
Figure 12.8 The “A” Button Example.
Because you know that the coin is fair and because you prefer prize A 
to nothing, Orthogonal Equipoise entails that you should be indifferent 
between pushing the button and not.
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Now suppose that in front of you there is a button that reads “B.” 
Again, you know that a fair coin has been tossed. In this case, if you push 
the button, you win prize B if the coin landed tails and nothing otherwise, 
and if you don’t push the button, you win prize B if the coin landed heads 






Figure 12.9 The “B” Button Example.
For analogous reasons, Orthogonal Equipoise entails that you should 
be indifferent between pushing the button and not.
Now suppose that both buttons are in front of you (See Figure 12.10). 
You can push neither, push one but not the other, or push both. Because, 
for each button, you are indifferent between pushing it and not, by 
Transitivity of Indifference, you should be indifferent between pushing 
neither and pushing both.
Heads
Push Both A B
Push Only “A” A&B 
Push Neither B A
Tails
Figure 12.10 The Both Buttons Example.
Because you know the coin is fair and because (assuming you value 
the prizes independently) the extent to which you prefer (A & B) to 
B is exactly the same as the extent to which you prefer A to nothing, 
Orthogonal Equipoise entails that you should be indifferent between 
pushing neither and pushing only “A.” For analogous reasons – this time 
concerning the extent to which you prefer (A & B) to A and the extent to 
which you prefer B to nothing – Orthogonal Equipoise entails that you 
should be indifferent between pushing only “A” and pushing both. From 
Transitivity of Indifference, then, it follows that you should be indifferent 
between pushing neither and pushing both. 
Now, suppose we sweeten the option Push Both with $20 (See Figure 12.11).
Heads Tails
Push Both+ A+$ B+$
Push Both A B
Figure 12.11 Sweetening the Push Both option with $20.
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From the Strict Dominance Principle, it follows that you should pre-
fer Push Both+ to Push Both. And then from Sensitivity to Sweetening, 
it follows that you are rationally required to prefer Push Both+ to Push 
Neither. Because, structurally, this decision-problem is identical to the 
one between L+ and R, this completes the first step of the argument.
For reasons that will become clear soon, notice that there’s an analo-
gous argument for the conclusion that you are rationally required to pre-




Figure 12.12 Another case of Opaque Sweetening.
All one needs to do is to rerun the argument from above with a $17 
bonus added to each vacation package.
5.2  The Dollar and the Drawing, Redux
The second step of the argument is to show that Orthogonal Equipoise 
and the Strict Dominance Principle entail that you should prefer R+$17 to 
R* (See Figure 12.13).
Coin: Heads Tails
Die:  –  –
R+$ B+$ B+$ A+$ A+$
R∗ B B+$. A A+$.
Figure 12.13  Dollars vs the Drawing: R sweetened with $17 versus sweetened 
with a five-sixth chance of winning $20.25.
The argument is fairly straightforward. First, let’s assume (as we 
implicitly have been) that you value money linearly, that you value the 
vacations and the money independently, and that you are risk-neutral. 
Given these assumptions, you should be indifferent between a lottery 
that affords you a five-sixth chance of winning $20.25 and a sure-thing 
$16.875. Imagine, as we did earlier, that you have a choice between the 
two – but that, also, you are in possession of R. As we saw, Orthogonal 
Equipoise entails that, because you are indifferent between the lottery and 
the cash, you should be indifferent between R* and R+$16.875. But because 
R+$17 strictly dominates R+$16.875, the Strict Dominance Principle says that 
you are required to prefer it. And, thus, from Sensitivity to Sweetening, 
you are also required to prefer it to R*. The extent to which the R+$17 
might be better than R* is large enough to counteract the more likely, but 
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less significant, extent to which the latter might be better than the for-
mer. This completes the second step of the argument: you are rationally 
required to prefer R+$17 to R*.
5.3  The Drawing and the Roll
The third step is to argue that you are required to prefer the drawing (R*) 
to the roll (M). Recall that R* is just R sweetened with a lottery that has a 
five-sixth chance of paying out $20.25 and that M is a mixture of L+ and 
R, where, if you take it, you have a five-sixth chance of getting L+ and a 
one-sixth chance of getting R. Let’s suppose that both R* and M turn on 










Figure 12.14  The Drawing vs the Roll: R sweetened with a five-sixth chance of 
winning $20.25 versus the mixed option.
The argument here is very similar to the one in the first step (see Figures 
12.8–12.11). First, we consider a slightly soured version of R* that prom-
ises a potential windfall of only $20 rather than $20.25. Then, as in step 
one, we “disassemble” that choice into two different decision-problems, 
like so (see Figure 12.15):
Coin: Heads Tails
Die:  –  –




Figure 12.15 The Drawing vs the Roll, but with only prize B.
By Orthogonal Equipoise, you are required to be indifferent between 












Figure 12.16 The Drawing vs the Roll, but with only prize A.
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For the same reasons, you are required to be indifferent between R*A 
and MA.
There are four possible combinations of actions you could take: both 
MA & MB, both R*A & R*B, MA & R*B, or R*A & MB. From Orthogonal 
Equipoise and Transitivity of Indifference, it follows that you are 
required to be indifferent between (MA & MB) and (R*A & R*B). Then, 
from the Weak Dominance Principle, it follows that you are required 
to prefer R* to (R*A & R*B). From Sensitivity to Sweetening (and the fact 
that (MA & MB) is extensionally equivalent to M), you are required to 
prefer R* to M.
5.4  The Final Step: Pay or Roll
In the first step, we reached the conclusion that you are required to prefer 
L± to R+$17. In the second step, we reached the conclusion that you are 
required to prefer R+$17 to R*. In the third step, we concluded that you 
are required to prefer R* to M.
Coin: Heads Tails
Die:  –  –
L± A A+$. B+$. B+$.
R+$ B+$ B+$ A+$ A+$
R∗ B B+$. A A+$.
M B A+$ A B+$
Figure 12.17 The Final Step: Pay or Roll.
From the fact that you’re required to prefer L± to R+$17 and that you’re 
required to prefer R+$17 to R*, it follows from Transitivity of Preference 
that you are required to prefer L± to R*. From that fact and that you 
are required to prefer R* to M, it follows from another application of 
Transitivity of Preference that you are required to prefer L± to M (See 
Figure 12.17).
But as we saw in the previous section, this violates the Never Worse, 
Likely Better Principle. You can be certain that however the world turns 
out to be, M’s outcome won’t be worse than L±’s. Moreover, if the die 
rolls anything other than a 1, which is fairly likely to happen, L±’s out-
come will be worse than M’s. These are some powerful considerations 
that speak in favor of M over L±, which is why the Never Worse, Likely 
Better Principle holds that you are, therefore, not required to prefer L± to 
M. And yet, the argument in this section led us to the conclusion that you 
are. And that’s a contradiction.
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6  Conclusion
It’s hard to choose when you’re ambivalent about your choices. It’s harder 
still – or so I hope I’ve shown – to choose when you are both ambivalent 
and uncertain. I’ve argued that a number of independently plausible prin-
ciples governing rational choice in such situations are jointly inconsistent. 
I’ve argued that this result is, in some ways, more serious than the Opaque 
Sweetening puzzle because it relies on principles that are less contentious.
What should we make of this result? One possible reaction is to give 
up on developing a decision theory for such situations. If you’re ambiva-
lent, you should work to resolve it rather than expect decision theory to 
provide you with any helpful advice.
That might ultimately be correct, but I think that’s to give up too early. 
I think that, as a matter of fact, we are all ambivalent about something 
at least some of the time. I’m skeptical that one even realistically could 
resolve all of one’s ambivalence. I’m also skeptical that one should – that 
it is some kind of character flaw or mark of irrationality to be ambivalent 
about at least some things at least some of the time. In fact, in some cases, 
ambivalence might be the correct – or most fitting – attitude to have, 
especially in the face of what might be actual value indeterminacy out 
in the world. And so it would be a shame – an embarrassment, even – if 
formal decision theory had absolutely nothing to offer us.
What are our other options? Give up one (or more) of the offending prin-
ciples. I’ve attempted to argue that each of the principles used to derive the 
contradiction is fairly plausible. But plausibility is not infallibility. I think, in 
terms of rejecting a principle, the most promising routes are, either, to deny 
the Never Worse, Likely Better Principle or to deny Transitivity. Proponents 
of views, like Prospectism, which evaluate options solely in terms of the 
probability distribution over its outcomes, will need to reject the Never 
Worse, Likely Better Principle. But, in doing so, they owe us an explanation 
for why it seems right – and it’s not clear that the extant responses to the 
Never Worse Principle successfully carry over. On the other hand, propo-
nents of dominance-style principles, like the Never Worse Principle and the 
Never Worse, Likely Better Principle, should (I think) reject Transitivity. But 
that, too, of course, comes at a cost – even a potentially non- metaphorical 
one (in the event that one is transformed into a money pump).
I think more work needs to be done in exploring the terrain surround-
ing hard choices. I hope this chapter has helped impose some structure 
on that terrain. In the meantime, hard choices will remain as hard as ever.
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Notes
 1 In decision theory, this is known as having incomplete preferences. And while 
the Completeness Axiom is a mainstay of traditional axiomatic decision the-
ory, it is often, since the very beginning, assumed for the sake of mathematical 
convenience rather than justified as a genuine rational requirement. See, for 
example, (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944: 630), (Savage 1954: 21), 
(Chernoff 1954), and (Aumann 1962).
 2 Chang (1997, 2002, 2009, 2017) is a notable example of someone who, like 
me, thinks the phenomenon is ubiquitous. However, I intend “ambivalence” 
to refer to a subjective, psychological state. The psychological state is cona-
tive, not cognitive: ambivalence might correspond to, but is not identical 
with, a belief about the objective value-relations that hold between the items. 
Chang’s “parity,” on the other hand, is a (non-transitive) fourth value- relation; 
in addition to “better than,” “worse than,” and “as good as,” two comparable 
alternatives might be “on a par.” Discussions of related phenomena can be 
found in (Griffin 1986: 80-98), (Parfit 1984: 431), and (Broome 2007).
 3 Although not always argued for explicitly, there are a number of views com-
mitted to this underlying idea: e.g., I. J. Good’s Quantizationism (Good 1952), 
Isaac Levi’s V-admissibility (Levi 1986, 2008), Amartya Sen’s Intersection 
Maximization (Sen 2004), and (Weirich 2004). The view is also popular 
among economists: e.g., (Dubra et al. 2004; Evren and Ok 2011; Galaabaatar 
and Karni 2013; Ok et al. 2012). I’ll treat Hare’s Prospectism as a representa-
tive of this family of views (Hare 2010, 2013). These views, roughly, represent 
one’s preferences with the set of utility-functions that correspond to all of 
the coherent extensions of one’s preference-ordering such that you count as 
preferring X to Y just in case every function in the set ranks X ahead of Y, 
you count as being indifferent between X and Y just in case every function in 
the set ranks them that way, and you lack a preference between the two when 
there’s disagreement among the functions in the set.
 4 It might be objected that really the two options have different outcomes 
because, e.g., in the case of L, there is A-when-the-coin-has-landed-heads, 
whereas, for R, there is the outcome A-when-the-coin-has-landed-tails. 
However, the typical convention in decision theory, which I will be adhering 
to here, is that outcomes are individuated finely enough to encompass all of 
the features that matter to the chooser. If the flip of the coin mattered in this 
way, it would be a mistake to represent, e.g., the outcomes (L ∧ Heads) and 
(R ∧ Tails) with the same symbol. The fact that we are representing these out-
comes with the same symbols should be taken to imply that Heads and Tails 
are (to borrow a phrase from (Ramsey, 1931, p.177)) ethically neutral: you 
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are indifferent between (L ∧ Heads), A, and (R ∧ Tails), and you are indiffer-
ent between (L ∧ Tails), B, and (R ∧ Heads).
 5 In symbols: φ strictly dominates ψ just in case, for all states S, (φ ∧ S) ≻ (ψ ∧ S).
 6 In symbols: φ weakly dominates ψ just in case, for all states S, (φ ∧ S) ⪰ 
(ψ ∧ S), and there is some state S∗ such that (φ ∧ S∗)≻(ψ ∧ S∗).
 7 A quick note of caution. The Strict Dominance Principle, like all statewise 
dominance principles, risks delivering incorrect verdicts when the probability 
of a state depends on which option is performed (Nozick 1969). It’s contro-
versial what notion of dependence matters here – a causal or evidential one. 
Let’s hereby avoid the issue by understanding the dominance principles to 
be restricted to cases in which the states are both causally and evidentially 
independent of one’s options.
 8 I’ll mention that the analogous claim that replaces “indifference” with 
“ambivalence” – that is, the one that says “if you prefer X to Y and are 
ambivalent between Y and Z, then you should prefer X to Z” – is exactly 
what was being denied earlier when we said that ambivalence is insensitive to 
mild sweetening. There might be cases in which, because your preference for 
X over Y is so strong, you should prefer X to Z. But this principle does not 
hold in general – and certainly doesn’t hold when your preference for X over 
Y is slight.
 9 In symbols: φ is never worse than ψ just in case, for all state S, (φ ∧ S) ⊀ (ψ ∧ S).
 10 In the service of defending a similar principle, which they call Competitiveness, 
Bales et al. (2014) explicitly appeal to an analogy with weak dominance. 
Schoenfield (2014), also defending a similar principle (which she calls LINK 
because it links facts about expected value to what one knows about value), 
worries that views that violate it are “imposing requirements that transcend 
what we actually care about: the achievement of value.” See (Doody 2019b) 
for discussion, and critical assessment, of these arguments.
 11 In the former camp, we have: Hare (2010, 2013), who first introduced the 
puzzle and who (cautiously) endorses a principle (called “Prospects Determine 
Permissibility”) that entails Neutrality; Rabinowicz (2021), who argues for a 
very similar principle (which he calls “Permutation (P)”); and Bader (2018). 
In the latter camp, there is Bales et al. (2014), who defend a principle (which 
they call “Competitiveness”) that is similar in spirit to the Never Worse 
Principle and Schoenfield (2014), whose previously mentioned “LINK” prin-
ciple provides a metaethical motivation for our own.
 12 Hare (2013: 51) argues along these lines. On his view, you should choose L+ 
over R because you have no reason to choose R over L+ (anything that can be 
said in favor of doing the former can equally well be said in favor of doing 
the latter) but you do have a reason to choose L+ over R (you’re sure to get 
20 bucks). The fact that R is never worse than L+ doesn’t give you a reason 
to choose it (given that L+ is also never worse than R), nor does it remove the 
reason you have to choose L+ over R. On this view, rationality is about doing 
what you have the most reason to do. And, in this case, you have more reason 
to choose L+ than you do to choose R.
 13 Bader (2018: 505) argues along these lines. In his view, you should prefer L+ 
to R because the former stochastically dominates the latter. One option sto-
chastically dominates another just in case, for every outcome, the probability 
of getting something at least as good is at least a great for the former as it is 
for the latter, and there is some outcome such that the probability of getting 
something at least as good as it is greater for the former than the latter. The 
probability of getting something at least as good as A is the same for both L+ 
and R: 50%. Likewise for B. However, the probability of getting something at 
least as great as A+$20 is 50% for L+ but 0% for R. Likewise for B+$20.
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 14 In symbols: φ is likely to be better than ψ just in case ∑S Cr(S)·𝟙[(φ∧S)≻(ψ
∧S)]>.5, where 𝟙[p] is an indicator function that returns 1 when p is true and 
returns 0 when p is false. In a similar fashion, we could define notions like 
“very likely to be better” by replacing “.5” with a higher threshold.
 15 For further discussion of this example, see Doody (2019b), who presents it as 
a counterexample to views like Prospectism (Hare 2010, 2013), that recom-
mend evaluating options solely in terms of their prospects.
 16 The reasoning here presupposes that you value the prizes in the outcomes 
independently of each other: that having the one does not add or subtract 
from the value of having the other. If that assumption doesn’t hold, substitute 
in prizes for which it does.
 17 In symbols: ⪰+ is a coherent extension of your preference-ordering if, and only 
if, (i) for all X and Y, X ⪰+ Y if you prefer X to Y or are indifferent between 
them, and (ii) ⪰+ is complete.
 18 This strategy makes the principle somewhat similar to Hare’s Prospectism 
(Hare 2010, 2013). But because the principle is restricted to cases in which 
there is no statewise ambivalence, Orthogonal Equipoise is significantly 
weaker. Another way of generalizing the notion takes its inspiration from 
Hare’s Deferentialism (Hare 2010). The details are more complicated, but 
the rough idea is this: for each state S, we choose a representative utility-
function from 𝒰 (subject to certain constraints) and perform the calculations 
using these “state-dependent” utilities. Deferentialism is meant to generalize 
the intuition underlying the Never Worse Principle into a full-fledged decision 
theory, so if the view also entails Orthogonal Equipoise, that’s further confir-
mation of that principle’s plausibility.
 19 This argument is discussed and presented with greater detail in Doody (2019a).
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